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No one can kill the drought:  Understanding complexity 
in the relationship between drought and conflict amongst 
pastoralists in northern Kenya 
 
Carla Suzanne Handley 
Abstract 
Climate-induced resource scarcity is currently cited as one of the most important drivers 
of human conflict, particularly in the developing world.  It is predicted that in the 
coming years, rising global temperatures may increase aridity in a number of resource-
poor regions, precipitating violence, as subsistence populations struggle to maintain 
livelihoods.  East African pastoral communities have long adapted to unpredictable, 
adverse climatic conditions by modifying behaviours according to their environmental 
circumstance.  A growing concern, however, is whether pastoralists can adapt to 
prolonged periods of drought, reduced rangeland productivity, and increased livelihood 
insecurity.  A number of studies have argued that pastoralists may rely on violent 
livestock raids in order to recoup herd losses incurred during drought periods.  This 
thesis investigates the apparent relationship between drought-induced resource scarcity 
and inter-ethnic conflict amongst three pastoral populations in northern Kenya.  
Through the analysis of ethnographic data and quantitative applications, this study 
examines the nature of the relationship between periods of increased drought and 
escalations in conflict episodes, testing if there is, indeed, a direct relationship between 
these two phenomena.  Furthermore, it builds on the complexity of this relationship by 
identifying a number of intermediary causal and social effects that may interact and 
influence the nature of the resource scarcity – conflict relationship.  Game theory and 
socio-ecological resilience models are used as explanatory frameworks, as a way of 
making sense of these ‘chaotic’ interactions.  Ultimately, this thesis presents new 
theoretical perspectives in understanding resource-based conflicts, tests the adaptive 
‘limits’ of subsistence populations, and examines the impact that conflict has on the 
resilience of pastoral communities.    
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Box 1.1:  Entering the field in a drought context, taken from field notes, Lenchokut, August 2009 
We hear the bellowing and bleating of animals well before reaching the top of the 
barren hillside. The morning chorus of goats and sheep signals their growing 
impatience to leave the safety of their night time enclosure - possibly the memories of 
their stomachs deceiving that of their minds into believing that satisfaction awaits them. 
Not yet even 7 am, and the heat radiating across my back lets me know that again there 
will be no cool winds to calm the afternoon sun, and the treble in the animals’ bleating 
begins to mirror the growing trepidation in my mind that this first foray into herding is 
going to be a lot harder than I had anticipated. Raphael grabs my hand to help pull me 
up and over the final ledge as the soil and rubble start to give way and tumble back 
down over our path of ascent. We have been working together only a couple of weeks, 
yet Raphael’s steady hand reaffirms my assurance in him as a reliable field assistant, 
committed translator, and constant companion. He straightens up, greeting the 
Lesamare household with the familiar “supa,” ready to be followed up with the 
hypnotic back and forth questioning of how family members have slept and inquiries 
into the well-being of animals.  Unfortunately, today there will be none of this, as it is 
clear from the scene unfolding before us that the greeting has fallen on deaf ears.  
The head of the Lesamare family is positioned in the middle of the manyatta, a man 
distinctively sinewy and bare to the waist save for the characteristic red tartan cloth, 
worn by so many of his Samburu brothers, adorning his shoulders. His age is 
indeterminate to me, possibly belied by the physical and mental state in which we come 
to meet him. He dashes and darts back and forth between the two thorn-ringed 
enclosures, the contents of which are spilling out rapidly, their baying reaching 
something of a crescendo. Lesamare’s two wives look on - witnesses like ourselves as he 
repeatedly takes three steps towards one enclosure, only to change his mind, moving 
two steps back towards the other. And then somewhere in the course of all this, he 
comes to find that he has gone nowhere, unlike his sheep and goats which have 
scattered everywhere amongst us. In realising this, he also comes to notice our presence 
as silent witnesses to his plight. Lowering his voice with concern, Raphael brings forth 
his greeting once more, but this time Lesamare responds, his eyes glazed and shoulders 
discernibly slumped. As the men talk, armed with my fledgling grasp of Kisamburu, my 
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ears pick up glimmers of conversation: water...animals...drought; however, the picture 
still remains very much unclear to me. I only come to grips with the reality of the 
situation after the conversation winds down, with Lesamare still standing in between the 
two thorn rings as Raphael turns to me with an explanation. In his deliberate and 
reflective manner, he tells me simply that Lesamare feels that he can no longer make 
decisions for his animals. There is nowhere for them to graze. There is no milk for the 
young to drink. Every night claims more and more of the malnourished herd. He cannot 
even come to sort them or dictate the direction of the day’s herding. With that Raphael 
looks at me squarely and says, “You see? The drought has defeated him.” 
 
Not being one to remain idle in the face of adversity, Raphael begins to pull apart and 
untangle the opening of the outer thorn fencing, calling to Lesamare with a questioning 
lilt. Drawn back out of his distant gaze and seeing what must be done, Lesamare begins 
anew - the sting of his switch coming to life, separating the marauding animals into 
classifications of which only the Lesamare family are intimately aware. Needing no 
encouragement, the women join in on the livestock orchestration, and in minutes the 
animals are lined up, looking now more like soldiers ready for deployment. Carrying a 
hooked stick more than twice my height, the “little wife” passes it to me, indicating that 
this is to be my contribution for the day. Although untested and unsure I will be able to 
use it with any great effect, I can feel that it is pliable and at the same time incredibly 
strong. Satisfied that I am properly armed, she turns for me to follow her out of the 
enclosure, signalling that the time has come for us to begin. 
 
The vignette above provides an insight into the physical condition of the study area and 
represents the psychological state of a number of participants at the time in which I 
began my field research.  By August 2009, three preceding rainy seasons had failed 
within the study site, a considerable number of people had been left destitute due to the 
effects of prolonged drought and / or livestock theft, and the feelings of the people 
during these initial stages of data collection ranged from bewilderment (as seen above), 
to confusion, to resignation, and indignation.  It is under these conditions that the 
research begins.  
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1.1 Introduction 
In 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reported that climate 
change will enhance the propensity for violent conflict within the developing world, 
leaving communities poorer, less resilient, and less able to cope with the consequences 
of environmental degradation (Smith and Vivekananda 2007).  Currently, the potential 
impact of climate change on subsistence populations is unclear and unpredictable, as a 
causal relationship between climatic changes and human conflict in light of coping 
mechanisms traditionally used to mitigate the negative effects of climatic events has not 
been clearly established.  Some scholars see resource scarcity (produced by climatic 
changes) as a major underlying determinant of violent human conflict (McGuire 2008; 
Homer-Dixon 1999; Kaplan 1994).  Others disagree, arguing that poverty, inequities 
between groups, availability of weapons, and political influences are more significant 
drivers of conflict outcomes than environmental change (Baechler 1999; Richards 1996).  
My goal for this thesis is to contribute empirical research to this unresolved theoretical 
debate and to present new theoretical perspectives that provide a more nuanced 
understanding of the data.   
 
In order to achieve this, I have focused on a geographical environment that is highly 
sensitive to climatic shifts and on populations with long histories of successfully 
adapting to climate variability (Barnett 2001).  It is predicted that in the coming years, 
Africa’s temperatures will rise twice as fast as the world average, with sub-Saharan 
Africa enduring the worst water shortages (Qing 2006).  East African pastoral 
communities have long adapted to unpredictable, adverse conditions by modifying 
behaviours according to environmental circumstance (Spencer 1998).  A growing 
concern, however, is whether pastoralists can adapt to prolonged periods of ever-
increasing drought, subsequent land degradation, and loss of livelihoods.  Violent 
livestock raids are said to be a traditional method of restocking herds, so it is plausible 
that they may escalate during extreme climatic shifts and loss of adequate grazing lands 
(Johnson and Anderson 1988).   
 
The impetus behind this doctoral study stems from Masters research that I conducted at 
the University of Cambridge where I examined whether human aggressive competition 
and interpersonal conflict are inherent, biological traits that are comparable to the 
intraspecific violence and conflict found within chimpanzee populations.  In order to 
24 
 
achieve this, I relied on a several methods:  comparative analysis of published 
ethnographies on extant human populations, archaeological case studies of extinct 
human groups, and primary osteological analysis of early Egyptian populations to 
assess conflict incidence levels.  I was able to identify a number of causal factors that 
influenced levels of either aggressive competition or peaceable co-operation in varying 
human populations across time.  Ultimately, my conclusions reinforced the idea that 
humans have the biological potential for both aggressive competition and peaceable co-
operation, and therefore mediating socio-ecological factors can significantly influence 
the context under which competition or co-operation is expressed (Johnson and Earle 
1987).  This paradigm challenges the idea that human violence is the product of an 
irrational biological instinct (Riches 1986).  It also opens up the discussion further in 
challenging environmentally deterministic arguments, which can sometimes arise from 
studies examining the relationship between resource scarcity and conflict.  From my 
Masters research, I concluded that further studies in human conflict must utilise a 
similar systematic approach to understand the interaction of specific socio-ecological 
factors (population density, environmental constraints, population histories, political 
influences, etc.) in an attempt to gain an understanding of the conditions under which 
aggressive competition or peaceable co-operation may result.  The research presented 
here follows this approach by examining the strategies employed by pastoralists in 
response to extreme climatic events and determining whether patterns or correlations 
can be established between the stressor event and the resulting behaviour.   
 
It is within this context that I examine three main questions: 
1) Do episodes of drought-induced resource scarcity correlate with higher levels of 
human inter-ethnic conflict found within Kenya’s pastoral communities?  
 
2) What is the current (and theoretical future) capacity of these populations to 
manage increased levels of drought-induced resource scarcity?  
 
3) Is conflict used as a strategy for pastoral groups coping with resource scarcity?  
Is conflict a beneficial strategy as part of a resilient system? 
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The complex interrelationships between drought, land degradation, pastoral adaptation 
strategies, and conflict are not yet understood, as it is unclear which processes may 
drive others.  Furthermore, it is important to investigate how pastoralists continue to 
employ appropriate coping mechanisms in order to successfully manage these 
relationships.  Ultimately this doctoral study will help to clarify these networks through 
context-specific research and seek to establish correlations between drought episodes 
and conflict outcomes. 
1.2 Objectives 
In order to make a substantive contribution to the debate on the effects that climate-
induced resource scarcity has on levels of pastoral conflict, there are four primary 
objectives that I have set out to accomplish in this thesis:  1) to explore and explain 
complexity, 2) to highlight human cooperation, 3) to demonstrate ethnographic breadth 
and depth, and 4) to achieve intersubjectivity.      
 
I. Exploring and Explaining Complexity:  This empirical study seeks to go beyond 
simple explanations of the relationship between drought-induced resource scarcity 
and conflict.  Instead, it aims to provide an understanding of:  1) the extent to 
which these two variables are related, 2) how they relate to one another, or the 
nature of their relationship, 3) the pathways and mechanisms that may lead from 
one to the other, and 4) other influences or components that may affect the 
outcome of this relationship.  In order to maximise breadth, this study utilises a 
mixed-methods approach to capture a range of perspectives.  Likewise, in order to 
explain potential complexities found in the results, their interpretation and 
explanation make use of a variety of approaches and analytical frameworks. 
   
II. Highlighting Human Cooperation:  In support of the first objective, which looks 
to build on complexity, the second objective of this thesis is to incorporate an 
understanding of the role human cooperative behaviour plays in constructing 
social relationships.  By declaring this aim, I look to redress an apparent 
imbalance in much of the existing literature, which tends to place great emphasis 
on the contentious relationships that develop as a result of resource competition, 
therefore de-emphasising the role cooperative behaviours play.     
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III. Demonstrating Ethnographic Breadth and Depth:  this study relies on results 
produced from extensive fieldwork designed to engage with a diverse group of 
people and provide a thorough account of individual perspectives.  Recording data 
in this way has helped to assess the many possible ways that drought and conflict 
may be experienced by pastoralists in northern Kenya.      
 
IV. Achieving Intersubjectivity:  Foregrounding the emic perspective in 
understanding drought and conflict aids in employing socially and culturally-
appropriate analyses of phenomena experienced by local communities.  An 
intersubjective understanding not only provides a more rigorous assessment, but it 
also helps to ensure that any recommendations resulting from the research will be 
applicable and desirable to local people.   
 
In focusing on these four research objectives, the results of this thesis aim to be 
empirically-driven, understood from an intersubjective perspective, strengthened by the 
use of multiple methods, theoretical frameworks, and engagement with a diverse sample 
of respondents, and ultimately able to be placed within a global context and provide real 
insight into the debated nature of the relationship between resource scarcity and human 
conflict. 
1.3 Plan and Thesis Outline 
In relation to the three overarching research questions, I address five distinct 
frameworks and thematic areas, each of which is discussed in the literature review in 
chapter two.  Question one asks from the macro perspective whether there is, in fact, a 
relationship between climate-driven resource scarcity and conflict amongst pastoralists 
in northern Kenya.  If there is a relationship, then how specifically do these two 
variables relate to one another?  Therefore, the first theme addresses the nature of 
conflict in a resource scarcity context.   
 
Much of the current literature discussing the relationship between climatic events and 
resulting human conflict is considered grey literature, coming from development 
institutions and various INGOs.  Unfortunately when turning to the academic literature 
to fill these knowledge gaps, empirical research investigating the effects of climate-
driven resource scarcity on human behaviours are still very much lacking in number and 
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scope.  A number of scholars have tried to establish this relationship (e.g., Witsenburg 
and Roba 2007; Fukui and Markakis 1994; Homer-Dixon 1991; Fukui and Turton 1979), 
however, with mixed and generally limited results.  A major critique of these studies is 
that the analyses rarely incorporate an understanding of rangeland dynamics within arid 
ecosystems, nor do they acknowledge the vast array of intervening variables that must 
be considered within this relationship.  Furthermore, little attempt is made to gain a 
first-hand socio-ecological understanding of what exactly ‘resource scarcity’ entails 
from the people that it affects, and often times this body of literature focuses solely on 
discrete rainfall data as an indication of the condition.  Therefore, in order to shed light 
on this relationship and to address some of the knowledge gaps that exist within the 
academic and development literature, I examine the relationship between drought-
induced resource scarcity and conflict from an ethnographic perspective in chapter five, 
followed by a statistical assessment of this relationship in chapter six. 
 
The remaining chapters in the thesis seek to build on the complexity of the initial 
‘simple’ relationship discussed in the preceding paragraphs.  First, chapters seven and 
eight focus on the motivations, or factors, that influence conflict outcomes during inter-
ethnic interactions.  In order to achieve this, chapter seven assesses motivations for 
conflict that take into consideration more inclusive influential factors, such as political 
agendas, economic pressures, environmental stresses, and ‘cultural’ objectives that 
conflict helps to address or fulfil.  On the other hand, chapter eight takes a game theory 
approach, arguing that when faced with periods of resource scarcity, pastoralists are not 
condemned to a ‘downward spiral’ of warfare.  Instead, outcomes during interactions 
between pastoral groups are mediated by relative costs and benefits of strategic 
decisions taken by both sides.  Finally, chapter nine identifies and assesses the efficacy 
of traditional pastoral coping mechanisms utilised during periods of resource scarcity in 
order to alleviate the likelihood of negative outcomes and provides an assessment of the 
efficacy of such mechanisms in a modern context.  The chapter concludes with an 
analysis of the degree to which these coping mechanisms build resilience within the 
pastoral system, thus directly addressing the second major question of this thesis.  The 
third question regarding the use of conflict as a beneficial coping mechanism or as part 
of a resilient system builds on information presented in chapters eight and nine, with a 
final discussion of this question provided in chapter ten. 
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To summarise, the table below shows the five themes, the corresponding chapters that 
focus on each theme, and the associated question addressed by each chapter: 
 
Table 1.1:  Table showing themes discussed in the thesis, the data chapters that incorporate each theme, 
and the central research question addressed by each chapter 
THEME CHAPTER QUESTION 
ADDRESSED 
Relationship between resource scarcity and 
conflict 
five and six 1 
Motivations for conflict and cooperation in 
pastoral populations 
seven and eight 1 and 3 
Game theory analysis eight 2 and 3 
Pastoral coping mechanisms managing 
resource scarcity 
nine 3 
Resilience in pastoral systems nine 2 
  
The thesis is completed by a literature review in chapter two addressing the five relevant 
themes listed in the above table.  Chapter three provides the ethnographic and historical 
context for each of the three pastoral populations under study and descriptions for each 
of the research sites consulted in the field.  The diversity of methods employed during 
data collection are described and justifications provided in chapter four, and finally, 
chapter ten provides a comprehensive analysis of the conclusions that can be drawn 
from each of the preceding data chapters.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Conflict and Cooperation in Humans 
Violence and interpersonal conflict are phenomena commonly thought to be universal 
among modern human populations.  Judging by the levels of conflict being reported in 
contemporary society, one could be inclined to take a Hobbesian view that the human 
condition is one of perpetual warfare (Hobbes 1970).  Although conflict is recognised as 
a pervasive trait witnessed throughout all human societies, it is also true that levels of 
aggressive behaviour and motivations towards aggression can differ significantly from 
one population to another (McCall and Shields 2008) and even within the same 
population depending on the nature of its interaction with others.  The complex 
motivations governing the varying expression of human interpersonal conflict are not 
easily understood; however, any such analysis would be glaringly incomplete if it were 
not to discuss the other side of the very same coin:  human cooperative behaviour.  As 
Layton (2006) states, “violence and peacemaking are both parts of a broader social 
complex.  One cannot be discussed without the other” (143).  The following paragraphs 
will briefly outline the approaches taken by a number of authors who have examined the 
origins and expression of violence and / or peaceability amongst human populations.  
As the reader will see, there is a distinct imbalance in the volume of literature dedicated 
to each topic, which I will seek to redress in the following chapters.         
 
2.1.1 Biology and Social Learning Theory 
When examining the origins of violence in human societies, there are two predominant 
theories.  The first explains violent behaviour as biologically-determined, thus 
positioning violence as a human universal placed outside the realm or influence of 
socio-cultural factors (Wrangham and Peterson 1996; Lorenz 1966; Ardrey 1967; Freud 
1933).  The second theory suggests violence via cultural transmission where acts of 
aggression are driven by culturally-prescribed circumstances.  Accordingly, violence in 
this case need not be considered inevitable across human populations (Carman 1997).  
At its most basic level, biological theory suggests that humans are capable of 
committing aggressive acts due to behavioural similarities that we share with our closest, 
and arguably the most violent of all primates relatives:  the chimpanzee.   
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Aggressive behaviour, as Lorenz describes in his 1966 book On Aggression, results 
from an “excitation” built up within the human nervous system that compels the 
individual to act aggressively (Lorenz 1966).  Conversely, social learning theory stems 
from the general Standard Social Science Model (SSSM) which suggests that human 
behaviour is free from biological control and not determined by evolutionary 
mechanisms (Cosmides, Tooby and Barkow 1992), thus human behaviours are a 
product of their social and cultural environments and subject to the rules that influence 
these realms (Riches 1986).  A basic assumption of this theory is that similar reactions 
to external stimuli amongst genetically unrelated groups of people are a product of 
social learning.  In the 1960s Albert Bandura was one of the first people to discuss 
social learning theory relative to aggression where he emphasised aggression as a 
learned behaviour that can be used as an appropriate response when presented with 
complementary social cues (Bandura 1977).  Therefore for the individual, when similar 
social cues present themselves in the future, the aggressive behaviour has a greater 
likelihood of being repeated.   
 
Cosmides, Tooby and Barkow heavily criticised the SSSM as they argued that social 
scientists portrayed the mind as a ‘blank slate’ that could be filled in with rules dictated 
by social transmission (1992).  They presented a more progressive approach by 
introducing the Integrated Causal Model (ICM or IM), which incorporates greater 
nature-nurture interaction and does not reject an evolutionarily-informed basis for the 
expression of aggressive behaviours.  Foley contributes to this middle ground by stating 
that there is no gene for aggressiveness (Foley 1997).  He suggests that there are genes 
that control for very general characteristics such as the ability to learn, or observe, or 
alter responses.  Therefore, it is not the specific behaviours that have been selected for, 
but the ability to respond appropriately to specific conditions.  In this way, violence is 
not a direct expression of single genes but instead, it results from a complex web of 
traits acting upon and interacting with one another to produce the appropriate response.  
As Howell and Willis explain, “Human beings come pre-packaged with a set of 
potential capacities and constraints, but these in themselves are not fixed or determined.  
The chosen specific response makes reference to local histories, local circumstances, 
and local causes” (Howell and Willis 1989: 19).  Violence is in this case a human 
potential, but it is one among many that can be expressed if given the proper stimulation. 
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Transference of aggressive traits clearly need not be simply through one pathway or the 
other, as biological and social learning transmission tend to be operating simultaneously.  
Bourdieu’s ‘habitus’ describes the social cues that we observe and internalise as 
children that may be expressed as adults (Bourdieu 1977), where there exists a great 
likelihood that we will copy our parents’ behaviour, therefore passing traits from one 
generation to the next (Layton 2006).   
  
Within the framework of social learning theory, Geen and Donnerstein (1998) describe 
a number of conditions that may compel an individual to employ aggressive tactics 
upon receiving appropriate provocation: 
a. There is a history of reinforcement for aggression for the actor. 
b. There is a high utility and value placed on aggression. 
c. Positive outcomes are expected by using aggressive means. 
d. The actor has generated very few solutions for conflict resolution. 
e. There is a high hostile attribution bias where actor misreads social cues  
f. The actor holds strong beliefs supporting aggression.   
g. The actor has a poor anticipation of the consequences to using aggressive 
means. 
  
This model can be criticised for the emphasis it places on pathways solely to aggressive 
actions.  In examining the above framework, it is likely that given the correct exposure 
to peaceable strategies, cooperative outcomes would be just as likely to result from 
provocation as would aggressive ones.   
 
2.1.2 Types of Aggression:  Affective and Instrumental 
There are essentially two distinct forms of aggression that humans display: one is 
affective aggression, in which harming the victim is the main motive for the act, and the 
second is instrumental aggression which may or may not involve strong emotions, but it 
is motivated by concerns more important to the aggressor than the harm-doing itself 
(Geen 2001).  According to Geen, affective aggression is accompanied by a strong 
negative emotional state and is usually aroused by some form of provocation.  Jealousy, 
malice, or greed are examples of negative emotional states, but as the theory suggests, 
the state must at some point lead to an anger response.  The response may directly 
follow the provocation stimulus, or it can be anger that is built up over time and 
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released later on, otherwise known as delayed-response affective aggression (Frijda 
1994).  Instrumental aggression, on the other hand, may include the aggressor intending 
to harm, but he may lack feelings of malice or anger towards the recipient (Geen 2001).  
The aggression in this case is simply a means to some other end.  Violence for the 
purpose of self-defence or military action in an attempt to gain control of territory are 
both examples of this type of aggression.  In assessing types of aggression, it is 
important to understand that affective and instrumental aggression are not mutually 
exclusive, and they can often be operating at the same time.   
 
2.1.3 Socio-Ecological Factors Associated with Cooperative and 
Aggressive Relationships 
The following discussion highlights a number of socio-ecological factors closely 
associated with varying levels of cooperative or aggressive behaviours within human 
populations.  The identified factors are not necessarily causes of cooperation or violence; 
in fact, some may be born from competitive or cooperative pressures.     
 
2.1.3.1 Competition for Limited Resources 
A number of authors have argued that when resource availability cannot sustain the 
number of individuals utilising them, aggressive behaviours may result.  Although, as 
will be discussed later, heightened cooperation and reciprocity are also viable options 
when faced with limited resources, this school of thought maintains that a number of 
studies have shown that scarcity is more likely to produce hostility rather than 
friendship (Berkowitz 1993).  The argument follows that, as resources diminish, 
competition inevitably arises, which can cause groups to monopolise resources and try 
to maintain control of them by any means necessary.  Johnson and Earle (1987) argue 
that if the resource benefit outweighs the risk of violence, then violence will result.  
Although this statement may be valid, further discussions on game theory as presented 
in this chapter challenge this type of deterministic, and rather pessimistic, view of the 
relationship between resource scarcity and resulting human behaviours.    
 
Furthermore, it is argued that resource competition can lead to the aggregation of 
bonded groups for the protection of themselves and of their valued resources.  For 
farmers, competition is high over desirable land, necessitating reinforcement in 
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increased population, which can further intensify conflict levels (Johnson and Earle 
1987).  Pastoralists, who typically prefer smaller group sizes and little within-group 
territoriality due to the spatial distribution of patchy resources found in their areas 
(Yellen and Harpending 1972), are seen to band together for protection against livestock 
raiding by ethnic neighbours (Nisbett and Cohen 1996).  Interestingly in this scenario, 
there are two processes operating simultaneously:  pastoralists demonstrate high levels 
of intra-group cooperation (lack of internal territoriality over resources and defensive 
bonding) in order to provide a competitive advantage when managing inter-group 
relationships.  van Hooff and van Schaik (1992) also acknowledge this complementary 
function amongst non-human primates when they write, “in contest competition for 
limiting resources, primates cooperate to improve their competitive ability” (378).  
Cooperation in intergroup conflict has been recorded in a wide range of both human and 
non-human populations (e.g., Adams 1990; Rissing and Pollock 1988); the essential 
elements being the nature of the resource and the intensity of intergroup competition 
(Davies and Houston 1984). 
 
2.1.3.2 In-group – Out-group Bias 
Related to the above discussion, strong internal group cohesion helps to strengthen the 
inside / outside dichotomy found between groups, referred to as ethnocentrism (Summer 
1906), the ‘we – they’ partition (Sherif 1966), in-group bias (Rabbie and Horwitz 1969), 
or in-group – out-group differentiation (Rabbie 1982, 1992).  Evidence for such 
xenophobic behaviour has been recorded across a number of human and higher primate 
groups (Holloway 1974, LeVine and Campbell 1972).  Internal peace fosters group 
solidarity, which can be highly effective in maintaining defences or waging hostilities 
towards non-related, external groups.  The reverse may also well be true:  due to 
external pressure and hostilities provoking a need for defence, internal cooperation can 
be forged and maintained.  It is difficult to assess which exactly is the ‘initial condition’ 
driving the other, although the directionality of this distinction may not be entirely 
necessary to ascertain.  Boehm (1992) notes that adhering to a strict code of conduct 
designed to manage internal strife, thus strengthening internal group solidarity, is 
paramount if a group is to successfully mitigate or handle any external threats.  He 
concludes, like Bohannan (1967) before him, that “such conflict management behaviour 
has surely coevolved with the competitive behaviours it manages; indeed, it is useful to 
see them as functioning in a complementary manner” (Boehm 1992: 167). 
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2.1.3.3 Gender Relations 
Pronounced gender inequality does not necessarily lead to an increase in societal 
aggression, however inequality may be a proxy for populations who are prone to 
aggressive interactions.  A strong belief in female subordination and aggressive tactics 
used to maintain such subordination are manifest in the power differences of a male-
dominated, patriarchially-oriented society (Dobash and Dobash 1979).  These societies 
tend to place greater emphasis on male bravery, aggression, and displays of status. 
     
Furthermore, it is argued that male-dominated societies perpetuate imbalances in power 
through strong male bonds and female dispersal.  A great number of studies in humans 
and non-human primates have shown a correlation between male bonded societies and 
increased levels of violence (Otterbein and Otterbein 1965; Paige and Paige 1981; van 
Velzen and van Wetering 1960).  This form of male bonding can facilitate the rapid 
mobilisation of related men into fighting groups for the benefit of community protection 
(Wrangham and Peterson 1996), yet it can also manifest itself in the exclusion and 
subordination of women.  Nomadic pastoralists, being both patrilineal and patrilocal, 
provide a clear example of strong fraternal bonding and internal cooperation against 
neighbouring communities for the benefit and protection of their own communities.  
             
In their 1976 paper “Population, Warfare, and the Male Supremacist Complex,” 
William Divale and Marvin Harris state that male-dominated societies display a number 
of characteristics closely associated with male aggression (e.g., male monopoly over 
weapons, male centred clubs, patrilineal bias for inheritance, polygyny, bride price, etc.) 
which they believe to result from the presence of endemic warfare and thus the 
heightened need for community protection (Divale and Harris 1976).  For the authors, 
these characteristics are cultural manifestations resulting from the need for aggressive 
males in specific social conditions. 
 
Conversely Howell and Willis, among others, successfully identified a correlation 
between peacefulness as a moral value and gender equality (Howell and Willis 1989; 
Knauft 1987; Chagnon 1988), and Ross (1986) further identified a significant 
relationship between low levels of violence and an increase in female political activity 
and female controlled organisations.  It is again difficult to identify the direction of 
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causality between inter-community aggression and male-bonded, male-dominated 
groups, to which the following discussion of game theory approaches will offer some 
insight.    
 
2.1.3.4 Kinship and Marriage 
Group solidarity is considerably strengthened through formal kinship relations, 
established through blood or marriage ties.  Marriages may be used strategically through 
endogamous relations, thus creating greater solidarity within the group, or through 
exogamous relations, which helps to create a network of interrelationships that extend 
beyond the boundaries of the unified group.  The inter-group bonds formed though 
kinship may help to dampen the aggressive relationships between competing 
populations.   
 
However, as discussed above, kinship bonds also help to form an even greater 
dichotomy between in-group – out-group bias.  As David Riches and Joanna Overing 
note in their separate discussions on the Amazonian Piaroa peoples, this group 
maintains strong internal cooperation established through kin ties; however, their group 
solidarity acts to enhance aggressive behaviour towards external non-kin (Riches 1986, 
Overing 1986).  In this sense, kinship excludes outsiders from cooperative associations, 
thus stacking the deck in favour of aggressive relationships towards out-groups.   
 
2.1.3.5 Reciprocity, Creating Alliances and Spreading Risk 
Related to the above discussion, ethnographic studies have shown that peaceability is 
enhanced by the sharing and exchange of goods and people between groups (Price 
1975; Woodburn 1982; Gibson 1989a; Gibson 1989b; Dentan 1988; Howell 1988; 
Robarchek and Robarchek 1988; Roseman 1988).  In order for inter-group cooperation 
to be likely, the benefits of the larger community must outweigh the costs of 
cooperation (i.e., drain on resources, increased population pressure, etc.) before people 
are likely to form alliances.  However, as previously discussed, a primary method for 
creating alliances is through the exchange of marriage partners between groups (Tylor 
1903; Lévi-Strauss 1969), where increased kinship ties facilitate cooperation through 
kin selection.  As such, a strict cost-benefit analysis is not the sole consideration to be 
taken into account when assessing one group’s proclivity towards cooperation with 
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another.  To take this one step further, Trivers’ concept of reciprocal altruism (1971) 
places greater emphasis on cooperative interactions between non-related group 
members in a form of reciprocity built out of repeated interactions that are ultimately 
beneficial to both partners.  Groups that characteristically have seasonal food shortages 
or where resources are patchy and unpredictable in both time and space tend to rely on 
cooperative food sharing during particularly lean months or during the temporary 
abundance of seasonal foods (Flood 1980).  On the one hand, resource scarcity may 
provoke conflict; however, violence is kept in check due to the importance of broad 
interpersonal and intergroup ties that are maintained in order to spread risks (Johnson 
and Earle 2000).   
 
2.1.3.6 Ideology and Social Values 
Deep-seated social beliefs may strongly influence levels of peace or conflict within a 
population.  It is argued that a society whose members engage in intensely violent 
activity and are rewarded for such behaviour (either socially or materially) may be 
reinforcing the instrumental value of aggression to its group members.  Through this 
reinforcement, aggressive acts may then become embedded in the social norms that 
prescribe the conditions under which aggression is an acceptable, if not a desirable 
behaviour (Geen 2001).  Males performing ‘territorial duties’ (e.g., feuding, raiding, 
warfare) are entrenched in patriotic ideologies that value and, more importantly, reward 
male bravery and courage (LeVine and Campbell 1972; Campbell 1975).    
 
Conversely, if social ideologies can serve to foster aggression within communities, 
promoting and valuing peace may follow similar pathways.  Interestingly, some authors 
have argued that peaceability is not necessarily the result of peace-loving or instigated 
through peace promotion, but instead is the result of a fear of and subsequent shunning 
of violence (Howell and Willis 1989, Briggs 1978).  Their contention is that people who 
fear or hate violence will likely demonstrate emotional restraint in their own behaviour, 
live moderately, and will be highly conscious of appeasing those around them.  
Furthermore, this societal ideology is reinforced by the community onto its individuals 
in that if one transgresses against the values of peace, shunning or ostracism from the 
greater community may result.  Ultimately in both cases, aggressive and cooperative 
behaviours are reinforced, promoted, and policed by the community at large.   
 
37 
 
2.1.3.7 Leaders, Traditional Conflict Resolution, and Punishment 
Clearly defined leadership within strict hierarchical societies can serve as unifying 
forces in battle and warfare.  More egalitarian societies, where leadership may be 
established solely through an age-respect hierarchy as seen amongst pastoral 
populations, typically correlate with reduced levels of violence (Flanagan 1989).  
Leaders may be charged with making decisions for the group that involve organising 
trade, organising ceremonies, forging alliances with leaders from other groups, 
managing risks, or emphasising behavioural restraint so that violent behaviour is kept in 
check within and between communities (Kiefer 1972).   
 
A number of psychological studies have shown that relatively few people restrain 
themselves out of a strong internal sense of right and wrong, and that it is primarily the 
threat of punishment that preserves social order (Zimbardo 1969).  In this case, 
preserving peace is fundamentally a matter of controlling individual behaviour by 
showing wrongdoers that their misdeeds will have negative outcomes.  Where western 
societies have established court systems and policing to control and rule on disputes, in 
contrast many subsistence economies rely on traditional methods of conflict resolution 
where rules and punishments are established and agreed upon relative to local beliefs, 
customs, histories, and values.  For pastoralists, punishment customs, enforcing rules, 
and maintaining / establishing positive inter-group relationships are matters for the 
elders that require group adherence. 
 
In closing this section, it may be noted that pronounced competition for scarce resources, 
strong in-group – out-group bias, or inequity in gender relations do not always lead to 
aggressive relationships between groups, i.e. they are not deterministic.  As will be 
demonstrated, pastoral communities have built up flexible responses and strategies to 
pressures that allow them to cope with societal stresses and potential depravity.  Russell 
Geen notes that if people can generate responses that are necessary to produce 
instrumentally useful results, then they may not react to stressful conditions with 
aggression regardless of their level of predisposition to aggression (Geen 2001).  The 
preceding paragraphs have highlighted a number of corollaries associated with either 
peaceable or competitive strategies found amongst human populations; however, the 
likelihood that either of these two strategies is employed depends on a broader 
understanding of contexts and mitigating factors.  The following discussion on game 
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theory will provide some of this context and also provide the understanding as to how 
strategies may shift in light of changing contexts.  
 
2.1.4 Problems in Defining Violent Conflict 
In moving forward with an assessment of how conflict and cooperation strategies 
function within north Kenyan pastoral societies, a brief discussion is necessary on the 
various definitions of human violence, thus enabling its appropriate identification.  
However, establishing a functional definition is problematic in four distinct ways.  The 
first deals with the issue of physicality.  David Riches argues that the term ‘violence’ 
has such a distinctive Anglo-Saxon meaning that it can be problematic to compare 
violence cross-culturally in societies where ‘violence’ does not necessarily reflect the 
same range of behaviours that English-speakers commonly ascribe to the term (Riches 
1986).  In many non-Western societies much physical hurt is invisibly performed 
through acts like witchcraft or cursing as, for instance, described by Overing in Piaroa 
sorcery (Overing 1986).  To the practitioners, these behaviours are a reality that brings 
about visible, physical hurt, and therefore any study addressing violence prevalence in 
an ethnographic context should include these interactions.  We cannot simply identify 
violence in terms that John Carman describes as a solely “material event with material 
consequences” (Carman 1997: 6).   
 
In an attempt to circumvent the dilemma of the physicality of violence, Gerda Siann 
defines aggression as the “intention to hurt or emerge superior to others that does not 
necessarily involve physical injury” (Siann 1985:  12).  Although this definition helps to 
solve one problem, it raises a second in that it requires an assessment of the 
intentionality of the actor.  Defining violence in this way has been criticised for a lack 
of objectivity (Buss 1961); furthermore, intentionality can be elusive to determine, 
especially when evaluating non-human populations (Silverberg and Gray 1992).  
Gerber’s analysis of Samoan family life describes Samoan children being beaten by 
their fathers – a seemingly violent act, however beating in this context is the method by 
which paternal love is manifest towards the child.  Furthermore, both father and child 
agree on the legitimacy of the act (Gerber 1985).   
 
This example draws attention not just to the mental state of the ‘aggressor’ but also to 
that of the recipient of violence.  Baron and Richardson’s definition of aggression is 
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useful here in that it defines aggression as “any form of behaviour directed toward the 
goal of harming or injuring another living being who is motivated to avoid such 
treatment” (Baron and Richardson 1994: 11).  Although valuable, this definition does 
not adequately satisfy the problem of intentionality, which remains as a concept that 
must be managed and addressed when conducting analyses of interpersonal interactions.  
Furthermore, it implies a moral judgement that aggression is inherently negative and 
juxtaposes the interaction between a perpetrator and a victim (Ferguson and Beaver 
2009).  Although potentially unavoidable, as one party must commit an act of violence 
and one must receive it, attention should be given to diminishing any accusatory 
language that may take a moral position.   
 
E.O. Wilson addresses the analytical predicament of intentionality by defining 
aggression as “a physical act or threat of action by one individual that reduces the 
freedom or genetic fitness of another” (Wilson 1975:  577).  On the one hand, Wilson’s 
definition avoids the intent of the actor which means that it can make for greater cross-
species and cultural comparisons; however, it has been criticised for ignoring aggressive 
behaviour that may fail to decrease fitness.  Also, it excludes violence that may increase 
genetic fitness, for example as demonstrated in mothers’ aggressive weaning of infants 
(Silverberg and Gray 1992).   
 
2.1.4.1 A Functional Definition of Violence and Associated Terminology 
Clearly, defining violence in a way that is useful in identifying aggressive behaviours is 
problematic.  In moving forward, one of the above definitions may be used with an 
acknowledgement of its inherent short-comings, or like Justice Stewart’s definition of 
pornography, may we simply “know it when we see it?”  One of the main objectives of 
this dissertation is to establish quantifiable relationships between climatic conditions 
(i.e., drought) and levels of inter-ethnic conflict.  Although I appreciated during my 
fieldwork that threats, coercion, rumour, and fear mongering, etc. have tangible effects 
on the behaviours and well-being of communities, it would be extraordinarily difficult 
to measure these interactions and outcomes in any systematic or reliable way.  As such, 
I will focus solely on assessing physical acts of inter-ethnic conflict, where I have an 
understanding of the actor(s)’ motives, and the recipient is motivated to avoid such 
harm.   
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Furthermore, I will only assess acts of inter-ethnic conflict and not intra-ethnic or state / 
government level conflict.  As my primary concern is to establish the nature of the 
relationship between climatic conditions and levels of pastoral conflict, state violence 
(i.e., police beatings, state confiscation of animals, corruption, etc.) is recorded as an 
external factor but not as a direct act of inter-ethnic pastoralist violence.  Intra-ethnic 
violence is not recorded for the purpose of any quantitative analysis due to the 
extraordinarily high levels of internal cooperation, and any internal quarrels tend to 
centre on domestic affairs (i.e., jealousy, ridicule, discipline, etc.) which are not the 
focus of this study.      
 
Regarding terminology, literature concerning violent behaviour tends to use the terms 
‘aggression’ and ‘violence’ interchangeably as a matter of the author’s personal 
preference.  For the remaining chapters, I will use the terms ‘conflict’ or ‘conflicts’ as: 1) 
I am interested in recording the incidents of aggressive acts, which can easily be 
referenced as ‘conflicts,’ and 2) ‘violence’ and ‘aggression’ are more loaded terms, 
recalling elements of biological theory with the actor having an innate drive to aggress, 
and these terms can place moral judgements on the actor as one who ‘is violent’ or ‘is 
aggressive.’  In contrast, ‘conflict’ carries less prejudice and lessens the impression that 
‘fault’ needs to be assigned to any actor(s).   
2.2 Game Theory Approaches to Conflict and 
Cooperation 
Game theory is used in this analysis for three primary reasons.  First, using a game 
theory approach acts as a counter-balance to a rather ‘conflict-centric’ analysis.  Game 
theory provides a framework where the presence of cooperation bears equal importance 
to the discussion and truly, one type of interaction cannot be discussed without the other.  
Second, a game theory approach, with its emphasis on the emergence of stable 
strategies, releases the discussion from any moral judgement that may appear from other 
types of analyses.  As Layton suggests in his 2006 book Order and Anarchy, “if 
Darwinian hypotheses are applied to the analysis of human social behaviour they do not 
ask whether some forms of behaviour are intrinsically better than others, merely 
investigate how social strategies aid individuals’ survival through social interaction in 
specific circumstances” (Layton 2006: 5).  Finally, game theory provides a robust 
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framework in which to test real world situations that operate in a social milieu, 
integrating both biological and social theory.  John Maynard Smith (1982) highlights 
game theory in relation to standard evolutionary theory when he says,  
“In the case of wing form, then, we want to understand why selection has 
favoured particular phenotypes.  The appropriate mathematical tool is 
optimisation theory.  We are faced with the problem of deciding what particular 
features (e.g. a high lift : drag ratio, a small turning circle) contribute to fitness, 
but not with the special difficulties which arise when success depends on what 
others are doing.  It is in the latter context that game theory becomes relevant” 
(Maynard Smith 1982: 1). 
When making an assessment as to whether or not conflict is “adaptive,” this question 
needs to be answered not solely in reference to one population operating in a vacuum, 
but instead with reference to all of the relevant players and to the social context in 
which the interactions are taking place.  To this aim, game theory can be a very 
powerful tool. 
 
2.2.1 Principles of Game Theory         
Game theory as a concept originated in the 1930s; however, it was applied extensively 
to the fields of biology and the social sciences from the 1950s into the 1970s.  Game 
theory applications were heavily influenced by John Nash’s concept of the Nash 
equilibrium.  This concept states that in a game, the strategies of the players and their 
corresponding pay-offs are said to constitute a Nash equilibrium if after each player 
chooses a strategy, it does not benefit any of the players to change his / her strategy 
while the other players’ strategies remain unchanged; or more simply, equilibrium is 
reached when each player has made the best decision possible in light of the decisions 
made by the other players.  Based on the concept of Nash equilibrium, mathematicians 
Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresner, while working for the RAND Corporation, 
developed a model of cooperation and conflict, which was formalised by Albert Tucker 
in 1950 into the game known as the Prisoner’s Dilemma.     
 
The design of the Prisoner’s Dilemma will be discussed in greater detail in chapter eight.  
However, it is based on the principle that when two individuals are faced with the 
decision to either cooperate or defect during an interaction, although joint cooperation 
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will provide the best result for both players, they may find it too difficult or costly to do 
so when faced with the chance that the other player may defect.  Defection therefore 
becomes the optimum choice despite it receiving a lesser pay-off than joint cooperation.  
The most favourable strategy in this type of interaction is one which can be considered 
an evolutionarily stable one.  As defined by Maynard Smith and Price, an ESS, or an 
evolutionarily stable strategy, is a “strategy such that, if most of the members of the 
population adopt it, there is “no ‘mutant’ strategy that would give higher reproductive 
fitness” (Maynard Smith and Price 1973: 15), meaning that no other strategy “could 
invade the population under the influence of natural selection” (Maynard Smith 1982: 
10).  The Prisoner’s Dilemma game shows that the most beneficial ESS in a one-time 
interaction, independent of what the other player does, is always to defect (Axelrod and 
Hamilton 1981).   
 
2.2.2 Lessons from the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Establishing an ESS of all defection (ALL D) in a one-time interaction is quite straight-
forward; however, this assumption does not accurately reflect real-world situations 
where the same two individuals may have a high probability of meeting one another 
more than once.  In order to address this question of repeated interactions between the 
same individuals, in 1980 Robert Axelrod established two tournaments where he invited 
a number of theorists to design and submit a strategy that would compete with all of the 
other strategies submitted through 200 iterations of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.  In both 
tournaments, the strategy that won was the most simple, known as the Tit-for-Tat (TFT), 
submitted by Professor Anatol Rapoport.  The rules of the TFT strategy are that the 
player always cooperates on the first move, and subsequent moves reciprocate what the 
opponent has done on the previous move – defection for defection, cooperation for 
cooperation (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Axelrod 1984).  Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) 
determined that this strategy has four basic principles that ensure its success:  1) it is 
‘nice,’ meaning that it is willing to initiate cooperation; 2) it is ‘forgiving,’ meaning it 
can immediately resume cooperation after defection; 3) it is ‘provocable,’ meaning it 
can answer defection with a defection without being vindictive; and 4) it is 
‘recognisable,’ meaning the strategy is straight-forward and easily understood by the 
opponent.  Axelrod (1984) strongly supported the idea that TFT is the most likely 
outcome when individuals interact over a long time and are likely to continue their 
interactions in the future, leading to a balanced reciprocity between the pairing.  It is 
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also the strategy that can survive in a ‘variegated environment’ (i.e., where there are 
multiple strategies present within the population) and avoid invasion by other strategies, 
thus making it an ESS.  Robert Boyd concisely summarised the relationship between the 
TFT strategy and the ALL D strategy as ESSs when he writes, “ALL D can always 
resist invasion by TFT, but TFT can resist invasion by ALL D only if w is sufficiently 
large” (Boyd 1992: 481), where w is the likelihood that the pairing will continue to have 
interactions with each other in the future.  When the number of interactions is known 
and finite between the pair, then the ALL D is the only ESS (Axelrod and Hamilton 
1981).  Because there can be more than one ESS and because ALL D is the only stable 
strategy regardless of the probability of continued interactions, this raised the problem 
for Axelrod and Hamilton of how cooperative behaviour could have initially infiltrated 
a population in the midst of predominantly unconditional defectors.   
 
2.2.3 The Emergence of Cooperation 
The problem of the emergence of cooperative behaviour into a world of egoists has been 
discussed at length by a number of people, including those beyond the realm of 
evolutionary theorists with the contributions of philosophers like John Locke and 
Thomas Hobbes.  They asked how it is that individuals can sacrifice self-interested 
goals having an immediate benefit to themselves so that instead they may benefit in the 
future (Hobbes 1970; Locke 1960).  From an evolutionary perspective, Nowak makes 
the position clear when he states that “in any mixed population, defectors have a higher 
average fitness than co-operators...a population of only co-operators has the highest 
average fitness while a population of only defectors has the lowest.  We see that natural 
selection in well-mixed populations needs help for establishing cooperation” (Nowak 
2006: 1560).   
 
Axelrod and Hamilton proposed two pathways by which cooperation could expand and 
establish itself amidst a population composed vastly of defectors.  The first is through 
the spread of ‘mutant’ strategies via kin-selected altruism, where a high degree of 
biological relatedness helps to promote altruistic acts between family members.  
Cooperation can continue to spread through non-biologically related members of a 
population through a number of mechanisms, but most notably through social kinship 
and by Trivers’ theory of reciprocal altruism.  Social kinship can encompass a greater 
scope of relatedness beyond that of biology to include members of one’s clan, intimate 
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members of one’s peer group, respected elders, etc. who are capable of influencing our 
social spheres and behaviours.  It has been noted that the behaviours that we display 
towards our social kin vary independently from the degree in which we are genetically 
related (Sahlins 1976), and therefore biology is not necessarily a prerequisite for the 
perpetuation of altruistic acts between group members.  Reciprocal altruism aids the 
permeation of cooperative acts within a population of biologically unrelated individuals 
where there is an expectation that increasing another’s fitness by reducing your own 
will be repaid by the other at a later time (Trivers 1971).  Trivers feels that this type of 
altruistic behaviour develops in uncertain environments where there is a substantial, 
unpredictable risk from disturbances like climatic events, disease outbreaks, or social 
upheavals, etc., and there is no way of knowing ahead of time who will be in a better 
position.   
 
According to Axelrod and Hamilton, the second method by which cooperative acts enter 
into a population is through clustering (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981).  As they explain, 
clustering does not have to be entirely independent of kinship, and in fact, they can 
often times reinforce one another.  The simple idea behind clustering is that a small 
group of members engaging in cooperative interactions, such as TFT strategies, are 
going to favour interactions with one another and will tend to avoid / reduce the number 
of interactions that they have with unconditional defectors (ALL D).  As a cluster 
composed of cooperative individuals will have a higher average fitness than all other 
individuals and the probability of one TFT strategist meeting and interacting with 
another TFT strategist increases, then the population of those using cooperative 
strategies like TFT will increase.  A clear summation is provided by Axelrod and 
Hamilton that illustrates the chronology of the emergence and growth of cooperative 
strategies into a population and the stability of such strategies:   
“ALL D is the primeval state and is evolutionarily stable.  This means that it can 
resist the invasion of any strategy that has virtually all of its interactions with 
ALL D.  But cooperation based on reciprocity can gain a foothold through two 
different mechanisms. First, there can be kinship between mutant strategies...A 
second mechanism to overcome total defection is for the mutant strategies to 
arrive in a cluster so that they provide a nontrivial proportion of the interactions 
each has, even if they are so few as to provide a negligible proportion of the 
interactions which the ALL D individuals have.  Then the tournament approach 
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demonstrates that once a variety of strategies is present, TIT FOR TAT is an 
extremely robust one.  It does well in a wide range of circumstances and 
gradually displaces all other strategies in a simulation of a great variety of more 
or less sophisticated decision rules.  And if the probability that interaction 
between two individuals will continue is great enough, then TIT FOR TAT is 
itself evolutionarily stable” (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981: 1394).  
An important aspect to understanding whether a strategy is an ESS is that this 
distinction is very much context-dependent.  As has been demonstrated, the ability for a 
strategy to maintain itself and be uninvadable by others is dependent on the number of 
interactions performed by the same pairing and the likelihood that they will interact 
again in the future for an unforeseeable amount of time, but an ESS is also partly 
determined by the types of strategies that are currently present in the same population.  
As we have seen, TFT is regarded as an ESS if and only if the number of interactions is 
sufficiently large, however a TFT population can be weakened by the appearance of 
unconditional co-operators (ALL C), which will lead to the proliferation of 
unconditional exploiters (ALL D) who can opportunistically gain advantage over the 
ALL C group (Nowak and Sigmund 1993) and spread.  This discovery led to the 
emergence of the PAVLOV strategy, (cooperates on first move, cooperates when player 
and co-player do the same thing on previous move, defects when player and co-player 
do different things on the previous move), which is also known as the win-stay lose-
switch strategy, as a more robust and stable strategy over the TFT in the iterated 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game.  Nowak (2006) concluded that the TFT strategy is efficient 
in establishing itself within a society that is composed predominantly of defectors, 
however once cooperation is established, the PAVLOV strategy is better than the TFT 
in maintaining cooperative behaviour.  Chapter eight will continue to explore this idea 
of population and context dependent ESSs with a more in-depth discussion of relevant 
theories presented by Maynard Smith and Price.    
      
2.2.4 The Maintenance of Cooperation 
Once cooperation has been established in a population, how exactly can it be maintained?  
There have been a great many authors who have contributed to this discussion; however, 
the majority have focused on three essential traits for the continuance of cooperative 
behaviours within a mixed population where other strategies are present:  1) trust 
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between group members, 2) the ability to recognise and identify co-operators and 
defectors within the population, and 3) the punishment of defectors. 
 
Establishing trust between group members in a population is the result of pairings 
engaging in repeated interactions where the participants can begin to anticipate the 
other’s move based on prior knowledge.   Although homogeneity within the population 
is not essential for maintaining trust, Elinor Ostrom (1990) makes the point that social 
heterogeneity can reduce levels of trust between group members.  However, of greater 
importance to Ostrom is not that all participants are the same, but instead that they share 
similar cultural / world views that help to govern their interactions and group decisions 
(Ruttan 2006).  Anticipating each other’s intentions can only improve through repeated 
interactions; however, faith in the anticipated outcome can be strengthened by cross-
cutting similarities between groups, such as inter-marriage, similar cultural practices, or 
shared religious beliefs.  Finally, trust is also strengthened through network reciprocity 
(Nowak 2006) and indirect reciprocity (Nowak and Sigmund 1998).  Network 
reciprocity is similar to Axelrod’s idea of clustering where co-operators form networks 
with other co-operators, increasingly the likelihood of continued cooperation and 
therefore reaffirming trust bonds.  Indirect reciprocity, on the other hand, deals with 
establishing a good reputation based on previous incidents of helping others, which is 
spread by gossip and language amongst the group members, to be rewarded by others at 
a later date.  Knowledge of a good reputation promotes trust between individuals whose 
actions may be anticipated, and they themselves will choose cooperative exchanges. 
 
The second trait that helps to maintain cooperation within a population is the ability for 
group members to be able to clearly identify co-operators and defectors.  Humans with 
their large brains and higher cognitive functions are able to distinguish between 
individuals and track social relationships.  This ability is beneficial for fostering 
behavioural flexibility where an individual’s actions can differ from pairing to pairing, 
depending on whom we interact with, thus also allowing us greater specificity in 
managing these different relationships.  As Maynard Smith (1982) points out, 
effectively managing these relationships requires the ability to recognise individuals, or 
the number of partners one interacts with in the population must be relatively small.  
Ultimately, larger social groups hamper the conditions under which cooperative 
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behaviours are favoured (Boyd 1992; Bendor and Mookerjee 1987; Boyd and Richerson 
1988, 1989; Joshi 1987).   
 
Defectors cannot be tolerated within the group dynamic if cooperation is to be 
maintained due to their proclivity for opportunistically exploiting cooperative members.  
As such, punishment directed specifically towards defectors is an effective mechanism 
by which cooperation can be maintained (Nowak 2006; Fehr and Fischbacher 2003; 
Fehr and Gaechter 2002; Clutton-Brock and Parker 1995; Ostrom 1990; McCay and 
Acheson 1987; Axelrod and Keohane 1985).  The costs of sanctioning defectors and 
obstacles that must be dealt with for the proper punishment of non-cooperative group 
members will be discussed in further detail in chapter eight.   
2.3 Resource Scarcity and Conflict:  Understanding 
Causation 
A number of scholars have argued that resource scarcity as a result of environmental 
pressures has an effect on the levels of national and international conflict within human 
societies (e.g., Gleick 1991; Homer-Dixon 1991; Brauch 2002).  Much of the literature 
is more theoretically inclined than empirically driven (Barnett 2000), and some, 
particularly within the development and popular domain, can make sensational claims 
of ‘water wars’ and ‘environmental refugees’ based on no more than the intuition that 
increased resource scarcity will effectively lead to a breakdown in social stability 
(Homer-Dixon 1999).  However, clear evidence to support such claims is often lacking, 
resulting in a rather overly-simplistic and, some would argue, deeply flawed analysis– 
extending from an environmentally-deterministic view of expanding population growth, 
depletion of natural resources and inevitable ensuing conflict.  This mono-causal, 
ecologically-focused explanation of conflict stems from a Malthusian understanding of 
exponential population growth relative to linearly-increasing food production (Malthus 
1798) and emphasising that climate is the over-whelming motivation behind human 
social structure, settlement patterns, and behaviours (Huntington 1915).  Even though 
this perspective has gradually fallen out of favour in academic circles, particularly 
amongst social scientists (Riebsame 1985), some scholars continue to emphasise the 
role of resource scarcity as inevitably leading to human conflicts (Markakis 1994).  
Others have taken a more nuanced approach to understanding the causal links between 
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environmental scarcity and conflict and, when correlations are demonstrated, these 
authors acknowledge that diminishing resources in light of population growth may help 
to explain, or even be a key factor in explaining, some of the conflict present in a given 
society; however, environmental scarcity alone rarely, if ever, is an entirely adequate 
explanation for this outcome (Barnett and Adger 2007; Homer-Dixon 1999; Sillitoe 
1977).               
 
The following body of literature and research acknowledges that relationships between 
environmental scarcity and conflict is mediated, influenced, interacted upon, 
compounded, and alleviated by more complex social, cultural, political, environmental, 
and economic influences that operate on multiple levels over multiple time scales (e.g., 
Uvin 1996; Kasperson and Kasperson 2001; Leary et al. 2006).  An illustration of the 
differences between these two points of view has been provided in discussions 
surrounding the link between increased environmental degradation and famine.  The 
strictly ecological framework (Malthusian) would state that starvation is a direct result 
of human population growth over-whelming food supplies that have been reduced 
through the effects of drought.  Authors such as Sen (1981), de Waal (1989) and Davis 
(2001) argue that famine is not a straight-forward result of a lack of food, but instead 
result from disease outbreaks, lack of / insufficient health services, market failures, and 
policy failures that result in food insecurity.  Furthermore, famine is not an inevitable 
consequence of drought; avoiding disaster depends on mechanisms found within 
affected communities that help to mediate or alleviate the potential deleterious effects of 
resource scarcity.  Applying this understanding to the resource scarcity – conflict 
context, a commitment to considering the complexity of this relationship requires an 
incorporation of the relationships that exist between the myriad of social, ecological, 
economic, etc. factors into any assessment and understanding the nature of the 
relationships that exist between each of these factors at a number of scales (Barnett and 
Adger 2007).  In order to make sense of this complexity, a framework for identifying 
and evaluating the component parts of these relationships and understanding their 
interconnections is vital in the analysis of empirical data.  Arguably the most 
comprehensive and functional framework examining the relationship between 
environmental scarcity and conflict has been provided by Homer-Dixon (1999) in his 
publication Environment, Scarcity, and Violence.  I shall be relying most heavily on the 
approach taken in this work for the remainder of the thesis, however, also 
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acknowledging contributions from other studies, where applicable (e.g., Barnett and 
Adger 2007).     
 
2.3.1 Components of the Complexity Approach 
In achieving an adequate understanding of the component parts of the complexity 
framework demonstrating how environmental scarcity may lead to violent outcomes, 
Homer-Dixon (1999) advocates the use of arrow diagrams.  Drawing on this approach, 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the component parts that contribute in key interactions or the 
intervening variables that need to be taken into consideration when looking to identify 
causal links leading to conflict within an empirical analysis.  Homer-Dixon argues that 
these diagrams ultimately help to answer the question of whether environmental scarcity 
makes an important contribution to conflict in light of other processes at work (1999) – 
a critique made by a number of individuals who doubt the importance of resource 
scarcity (B) in producing social hardships (C).  Homer-Dixon argues, in fact, that “a 
more accurate view of environmental scarcity’s role is that it often acts as a deep, 
underlying stressor of social systems, and it produces its effects by interacting with 
contextual factors unique to the society” (ibid: 81).   
 
Figure 2.1:  Diagram illustrating the resource scarcity – conflict relationship model, as explained in 
Homer-Dixon (1999) 
Population 
Growth
(A)
Resource 
Scarcity
(B)
Contextual 
Factors (1)
Social 
Effects
(C)
Contextual 
Factors (2)
Conflict
(D)
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This diagram reads from the left, starting with condition (A) where Homer-Dixon 
contends, and supports throughout his analysis, that population growth worsens 
resource scarcity (B) as the two have been proven to be highly correlated (Rudel and 
Roper 1996).  Although this thesis, as will be demonstrated in chapter seven, opposes 
Homer-Dixon’s insistence on population growth as a key driver of resource scarcity, it 
has been left in Figure 2.1 in order to fully present his argument.  Continuing right 
along the diagram, Homer-Dixon explains the connections between (B) towards (C) and 
(D), where in his view, there are five components that provide a deeper understanding 
of the causal links between the explanatory variables (B) (in this case, resource scarcity) 
and the outcomes (C) and (D).  Briefly, these are: 1) Necessity – can (C) and (D) be 
explained without (B); 2) Strength – along a continuum, how weak or strong is the 
relationship between (B) to (C) and (D); 3) Proximity – (B) is a distant or proximate 
cause of (C) and (D); 4) Multicausality – the number of processes (B)s that produce (C) 
and (D); and 5) Interaction – the relationship between the (B)s as either interactive or 
additive in producing (C) and (D).   
 
In determining the likelihood that resource scarcity, and possibly other causal factors (B) 
like political upheaval or economic crisis, will lead directly to various social effects (C), 
Homer-Dixon believes that he makes his greatest contribution to the bigger debate in 
shedding light on the contextual factors (1) (referred to as CF1 in the text) that mitigate, 
alleviate, lessen or augment the direct effects of the causal factors contributing to 
conflict.  CF1s specifically in relation to pastoralists will be discussed further in section 
2.4 of this chapter; however, in the CF1s discussed here have been referred to in other 
sources as coping behaviours, adaptive strategies, buffering mechanisms, etc. and are 
essentially factors made up of environmental, institutional, social, and cultural 
components of a society (Choucri 1984).  Reuveny (2007) contributes to this discussion 
when he says that it’s not the strength of the disaster (B) that has the most impact, but 
rather, how strong (B) is relative to the capacity of people to withstand it (CF1).  For 
Homer-Dixon’s part (1999), the capacity of a population to employ robust CF1s that 
help to lessen the strength of the relationship between resource scarcity and negative 
outcomes (C) and (D) is based on a combination of social ingenuity (scope of practices, 
policies, and institutions buffering societies from scarcity effects) and technological 
ingenuity (food, water, risk-avoidance technologies and knowledge acting as safeguards 
against scarcity).  He asserts that problems arise when societies face a widening 
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ingenuity gap, with the requirement / pressure for ingenuity rising but unfortunately the 
supply of ingenuity is not able to keep up with the increase by stagnating or dropping.  
Most at risk of facing ingenuity gaps, Homer-Dixon argues, are poor populations as 
they face insurmountable levels of brain drain, limited access to finances, ill-functioning 
judicial systems, and weak or incompetent governance.          
 
Moving further through the diagram, as resource scarcity (B) is negotiated by the effects 
of contextual factors (1), the outcome of this interaction are resulting social effects.  
Homer-Dixon identifies five main categories of effects as a product of resource scarcity:  
1) constrained agricultural productivity in ecologically marginal regions; 2) constrained 
economic productivity, predominantly on resource-dependent people; 3) migration of 
people in search of better livelihoods; 4) greater segmentation of society, usually along 
existing ethnic cleavages (Percival and Homer-Dixon 1995), and 5) disruption of 
institutions, especially the state (Homer-Dixon 1999: 80).  Arguably the most important 
social effect resulting from escalating resource scarcity in relation to this dissertation is 
social segmentation, particularly along ethnic lines.  Segmentation in this respect can 
encourage competition between groups where critical resources overlap and produces a 
tendency to look inwards, increasing the ‘we-they’ division between groups (Chazan 
1994).   
 
While a number of studies have been able to make the connection between resource 
scarcity (B) being mediated by contextual factors (1) that produce subsequent social 
effects (C) (e.g., Mochizuki 2004; Haile 2004), very few have closely examined the 
relationship between social effects (C) and resulting violent conflict (D).  This omission 
is illustrated by analyses such as that of Markakis (1994), who says in relation to 
resource-based conflict in the Horn of Africa that “scarcity and mobility make conflict 
inevitable” (1994: 219).  However, the point that Markakis and others (e.g., Oba 1992) 
often neglect is that there is a second level of contextual factors (2) that either moves 
actors to aggress or to employ cooperative means in response to prevailing social effects 
(Barnett and Adger 2007).  Homer-Dixon (1999) presents three basic theories that help 
to explain the transition from social effects into conflict (i.e., contextual factors (2)):  1) 
frustration-aggression theory, 2) group identity theory, and 3) structural theory.  
Frustration-aggression theory acts on individual behaviours where aggression is thought 
to be the result of a belief that someone / something is blocking the individual from 
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achieving a desirable goal.  Much of the literature dealing with frustration-aggression 
theories focus on youth where, for instance, expectations for a better life are left 
unfulfilled (Ohlsson 2000), there is the need to regain a lost sense of power or status 
(Goodhand 2003), members act out of a need for protection from violence (Keen 2000), 
or frustration can stem from a ‘generation gap’ between the wants and desires of youth 
versus the regulatory powers of elder members of society (Archibald and Richards 
2002).  Second, group identity theory explains the way groups reaffirm their identities 
and reinforce the ‘we-they’ divide through aspects such as building camaraderie when 
discriminating against others or improving the group’s status in relation to others.  
Finally, structural theory deals with economic and game theory explanations of conflicts 
based on ‘rational’ calculations that also take into consideration the opponent’s actions 
(see section 2.2).  By way of an example of how social effects (C) can translate into 
violent conflict (D) via contextual factors (2), Reuveny (2007) notes that an influx of 
migrants into an area (social effect) may result in conflict if there is ethnic tension or 
lack of trust between the groups, civil strife, or disparities between groups that reinforce 
the ‘we-they’ divide (group identity theory); however, if the receiving population and 
migrant group share a common ethnicity, religion, or culture, conflict as an outcome is 
much less likely.                 
 
Finally, Homer-Dixon’s (1999) provides an explanation of the ‘types’ of conflict (D) 
that can result from the environmental scarcity – conflict pathway.  He argues that 
group identity theory can best be used to explain group identity conflicts (i.e., scarcities 
that increase ethnic or group division where violence has a strong identity dynamic).  A 
combination of frustration-aggression theories and group identity theories can be used 
to explain insurgencies against the state or other dominant bodies as these models 
emphasise frustration that arises from grievances or perceptions of relative disparity.  
Finally, structural theory can help to explain simple scarcity conflicts, which are the 
intergroup resource struggles that stem from a group self-interest in maximising one’s 
shares of a diminishing resource.   
 
A major distinction between Homer-Dixon’s analysis and the one that will be 
demonstrated in this thesis relates to this last point.  Homer-Dixon focuses on resources 
that are both ‘rivalrous and excludable’ and not on the common-pool resources that help 
to define pastoral systems.  In this way, his analysis is one that should be viewed in light 
of a zero-sum game where there is the likelihood that groups are aware of the timespan 
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of interactions and the resources in question are in finite supply.  It is due to this focus 
in Homer-Dixon’s work that, I believe, leads to an over-emphasis on the propensity for 
violent outcomes as a result of social stresses, even when mediated by contextual 
factors.  In this way, if resources are finite and excludable, then cooperative strategies in 
iterative interactions would have little benefit to the groups involved.  The other point 
worth mentioning here is that the model presented by Homer-Dixon illustrates 
connections between its component parts as linear and uni-directional.  However, the 
reality is a highly chaotic system of non-linear feedback mechanisms, stochastic 
processes, and thresholds that can be affected by perturbations, intervening elements 
and dynamic interactions that are hidden through the schematic of using simple arrows 
within the diagram.  Although the components themselves have been identified through 
the help of Homer-Dixon’s work, understanding the ‘chaotic’ nature of the relationships 
that exist between concurrent causal factors, contextual factors, and social effects is 
where a detailed empirical study, such as this thesis, can make the greatest contribution 
to the understanding of multivariate and highly interactive socio-ecological systems.  
   
In order to test these complex relationships, Homer-Dixon’s analysis and others provide 
some advice to researchers in moving from a theoretical to an empirical application.  
Primarily, Barnett and Adger (2007) suggest that a systematic research project designed 
to shed light on the relationship between resource scarcity and conflict will focus on 
populations where: environmental risk factors are high, state involvement or efficacy is 
considered to be low, public services such as educational and healthcare are poor / 
lacking, and the majority of the population’s livelihood is highly resource-dependent.  
Second, after selecting a research area that reflects these criteria, George and McKeown 
(1985) suggest using process tracing as the first step in understanding the causal 
relationships that may exist in empirical data linking environmental scarcity to conflict.  
The aim here is to see if, in fact, 1) any such connection exists within the data between 
the independent (environmental scarcity) and dependent (conflict) variables, 2) if there 
are common patterns of causality within this connection, and 3) to identify the 
intermediate variables that may affect the relationship between the independent and 
dependent variables.  Third, Homer-Dixon explains that a truly robust study having 
sufficient data, will make use of quantitative, correlational analyses that test the 
hypothesised relationships appearing out of the process tracing (Homer-Dixon 1999).   
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As discussed in chapter one, this thesis has incorporated these approaches in order to 
investigate fully the complex nature of the relationships that may (or may not) exist 
between increasing resource scarcity and levels of conflict found amongst pastoralists in 
northern Kenya.  While Homer-Dixon’s approach has been extraordinarily helpful in 
identifying the component parts in the relationship between resource scarcity and 
conflict, and hence, very useful in its application to process tracing, I have consulted 
more quantitative analyses to statistically test these relationships.  In chapter six, I focus 
on research conducted by Witsenburg and Roba (2003, 2007) that provides the most 
comparable study to my own, as both focus on north Kenyan pastoral populations to see 
if decreasing rainfall in the area can help to explain historic and contemporary trends in 
resource conflict.  Although the aims of both investigations overlap, where these two 
projects differ and for what reasons will be discussed further within chapter six. 
2.4 Coping Strategies for Resource Scarcity 
Depending on a group’s mode of production, the strategies used to cope with periods of 
resource scarcity are diverse and reflect the environments that shape each mode of 
production.  To cope with environmental stress, hunter-gatherers may increase the 
number of food sources to include secondary and tertiary foods (Couper-Johnston 2000, 
Winterhalder 1986); engage in food sharing amongst an optimal number of individuals 
(Winterhalder 1990); migrate to distant, ecologically dissimilar areas where 
relationships have been maintained through kinship, trade, or historical alliances; share 
local knowledge regarding the availability of temporal resources (Couper-Johnston 
2000; Winterhalder 1990); or increase their engagement in commercial trade (Couper-
Johnston 2000).   
 
Subsistence farming populations may cope with resource scarcity by adopting various 
strategies including:  maintaining low population densities of small scattered 
communities, which opens up land necessary to increase fallow periods and crop 
diversity (Baksh and Johnson 1990); employing an open field system which is managed 
communally to spread risk across individual plots; increasing food storage reserves 
(Winterhalder 1990); investing in farming technology such as irrigation systems, 
improved crop selection, or soil diversification and management; intensifying and 
diversifying labour or engaging in commercial networks; utilising marginal lands for 
growing secondary crops; or placing greater importance on wild food sources (Puri 
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2007).  Large-scale farming communities and industrialised societies cope with 
environmental hardship by employing similar strategies to those of subsistence farmers, 
but there is greater investment in technologies such as using automated irrigation 
systems, crop engineering, or developing drought-resistant seeds and plants (Warrick et 
al. 1975).  Furthermore, these communities subscribe to a centralised leadership, which 
establishes policies for the protection and education of farmers; there is greater reliance 
on government aid (planting, food, and financial aid) during extreme environmental 
crisis (ibid); and increased engagement with the larger market economy, providing more 
extensive networks (Puri 2007).    
 
In Cashdan’s (1990) book, B.S. Low discusses the degree to which tribal and peasant 
populations need to employ particular adaptation strategies based on:  1) the 
extremeness of the environment in which they live, 2) how variable environmental 
conditions are in a given year, and 3) the predictability of these conditions (Low 1990).  
Low demonstrates that environments exhibiting extreme conditions favour highly 
specialised species adapted to cope with such extremes, whereas regions that experience 
a high degree of climatic variation generally call for a suite of adaptations instead of 
niche specialisation.  However, it is the level of predictability that is crucial in allowing 
either specialisations or a range of adaptations to be employed optimally, to plan ahead, 
mitigate negative climatic effects, or avoid maladaptive behaviours.  Here, predictability 
appears to have the greatest influence over the successful implementation of adaptive 
strategies for managing climatic conditions.   
 
2.4.1 East African Pastoralism and Coping in Rangeland Systems 
Pastoralism as a mode of production is estimated to have existed for 4000 years in East 
Africa.  During this time, increased aridity in the area helped to move the tsetse fly 
southward on the continent, thus opening up expanses of land on which to keep large 
numbers of animals (Raimbault and Dutour 1990; Smith 1979).  Three quarters of 
Africa’s pastoralists inhabit this area (Sandford 1983) which typically receives between 
250 – 750 mm of rain annually, but is prone to large fluctuations, unpredictability and 
spatial heterogeneity (Norton-Griffiths et al. 1975).  It is within this dynamic 
environment that pastoralists must rely upon a wide range of coping strategies that act 
as ‘buffering mechanisms’ (Halstead and O’Shea 1989) or as risk avoidance strategies 
(McCabe 1997) in order to successfully manage periods of resource scarcity.  The 
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following paragraphs highlight the six coping mechanisms most often discussed in the 
literature for East African pastoralists:  mobility, herd accumulation, herd diversification, 
social networks, livelihood diversification, and increased commercialisation.           
 
2.4.1.1 Mobility 
In unpredictable, risk-prone environments, a high degree of mobility and open 
utilisation of communal grazing land is of vital importance.  Herds can be moved away 
from unproductive / risk-prone lands to benefit opportunistically from accessing more 
productive, spatially-distributed patches (e.g., Bollig and Göbel 1997; Lane 1998; de 
Bruijn and van Dijk 2003; Scoones 1995, 1994; Ellis et al. 1987; Ellis and Swift 1988; 
Ellis and Galvin 1994; Dyson-Hudson and Dyson-Hudson 1980).  Movement for this 
purpose can be generally characterised as residing in wet season areas that lack 
permanent water supplies when rainfall allows the exploitation of these areas, followed 
by an increased rate and range of movement during the dry season / at times of resource 
scarcity in search of perennial water sources and available grazing (Angassa and Beyene 
2003).  Mobility not only allows for the use of productive tracts of land and water, but it 
also enables previously-inhabited land to rest and recover after utilisation, which is an 
essential component of successful rangelands management (Oba and Lusigi 1987; 
Cossins and Upton 1988a).  Managed correctly, mobile pastoralism has been proven to 
be more economically profitable and productive than classical ranching models within 
paddocked, sedentarised areas (Niamir-Fuller 2005; Behnke and Scoones 1993; 
Coughernour et al. 1985).  Dyson-Hudson and Dyson-Hudson (1980) note that, as a 
strategy, mobile herding is a favourable coping response to resource scarcity as it does 
not require a large capital investment, or high inputs of fuel energy, or the transference 
of foods suitable for human consumption into supporting livestock.        
 
Unfortunately, this understanding and acceptance of pastoral nomadism and its 
ecological and economic benefits has not always existed.  Starting in the colonial period 
in East Africa, there have been a number of attempts at settling nomadic pastoral groups, 
as the colonial governments saw mobility as a problem that needed to be eliminated and 
not a mode of adaptation in response to an unpredictable environment that needed to be 
strengthened (Baxter 1991, 1993; Gilles 1990).  Primarily, the colonial governments 
promoted the idea that sedentarisation would benefit local populations by increasing 
access to education and establishing much-needed health systems.  A more covert 
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rationale was that sedentarisation would assist the government in managing the 
whereabouts of its newly-colonised citizens for greater control, efficient tax collection, 
and improved security (e.g., PC/NFD/1/2/3; PC/NFD/1/9/9).  At the close of the 
colonial period, a growing body of literature was also critical of the pastoralist lifestyle, 
arguing that nomadic populations negatively impact their natural environment.  Most 
famously, Hardin’s 1968 “Tragedy of the Commons” describes how common property 
resources and open access to communal land ultimately leads to over-grazing, 
environmental degradation, and a reduction in land productivity (Hardin 1968).  
Hardin’s work influenced many others, including H. F. Lamprey, who in 1976 stated 
that communal, open access to land and the practice of maximising herd size promoted 
desertification due to human mismanagement of the land (Lamprey 1976).  Other 
authors reinforced these beliefs, supporting the claim that pastoralists were self-
destructive due to the levels of degradation that they caused in their environments 
(Picardi and Siefert 1976; Lamprey 1983; Brown 1971).  The science behind this body 
of literature was based on the perception that rangelands in East Africa operated as a 
bounded equilibrial system where ecological stability determines stocking rates and 
carrying capacity based on the natural vegetation succession (Lamprey 1983; Westoby 
et al. 1989; Ellis and Swift 1988) and therefore should be managed as such.   
 
It was not until the late 1980s and early 1990s, with the release of works like Behnke, 
Scoones and Kerven’s Range Ecology at Disequilibrium (1993), that a new paradigm 
was emphasised in understanding how people live and thrive in highly variable, non-
equilibrial environments based on flexible, responsive subsistence strategies.  This work 
and others (e.g., Ellis and Swift 1988; Homewood and Rodgers 1991; Ostrom 1990; 
McCabe 1987, 1990; Fratkin 1989, 1991) supported the understanding that rangelands 
are grazing dependent, prone to stochastic events such as drought and subsequent 
livestock off-take, and that pastoralists who have been utilising these lands for many 
generations are well situated to manage them in an environmentally-sensitive manner.  
Ultimately, an adaptable mobile system over communal land shares risk, allows access 
to alternative grazing areas whilst waiting for exploited pasture to regenerate, and 
results in higher populations of herbivores maintained (Niamir-Fuller 1998).  Thus, the 
‘new thinking’ of rangeland ecologists within dryland areas promotes an awareness of 
pastoral mobility as a sound response to highly variable and unpredictable climates.   
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From an ecological perspective, it can now be seen that the effects of controlled grazing 
policies, formalised land tenure, and land alienation in East Africa were highly 
damaging to the overall productivity of pastoral subsistence at the time.  It has even 
been postulated that some of the environmental changes observed in contemporary 
society, such as growing bush cover, are in part owed to these historical policies (Oba 
1996; Bassi 1997).  Continuous sedentary grazing, particularly during the wet season, 
results in increased levels of overgrazing, lower pasture palatability, a reduction in 
vegetation productivity, higher soil compaction, lower water infiltration, and ultimately 
pastureland degradation as livestock are forced to stay within a circumscribed area 
(Niamir-Fuller 2000).  Furthermore, by restricting the movement of people to a reduced 
area of pastureland, there exists, by default, a large area of grazing land that is not 
utilised.  These under-grazed areas not only represent unexploited resources for 
pastoralists and productivity lost, but lack of grazing can result in these areas having 
lower palatability of primary productivity, lower phosphorous content of topsoils, lower 
overall herbaceous densities, lower biomass production of fodder species, and increased 
invasions of unpalatable plants that can sometimes be a more serious problem than 
over-grazing (Niamir-Fuller 1998).  The use of grazing schemes reflects the issues 
raised here.  For example, in 1981 in Senegal, the German GTZ Ferlo project was set up 
to paddock 14,000 hectares of rangeland where water was supplied in each paddock and 
stocking rates were monitored for a period of 12 years in order to assess the 
environmental and socio-economic impacts of such grazing management schemes.  
Ultimately findings showed that fixed stocking rates meant that the stocking densities 
were too high in bad years and herds had to move out of the project area to survive, and 
in good years, the unconsumed biomass hampered plant growth in the following years.  
Out of the 12 years that were monitored, stocking rates and available biomass matched 
in only 2 of those years (Thebaud et al. 1995).  The conclusion that may be drawn from 
this long-term monitoring project is that estimating stocking densities and formalising 
rangeland usage is extremely difficult in dynamic ecosystems.  The failures of the GTZ 
project support the principle that free mobility provides a superior way of utilising 
variable and unpredictable natural resources, and therefore herd mobility and land use 
should be flexible, which is a vital part of pastoralist coping strategies.     
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2.4.1.2 Herd Accumulation and Diversification 
A second coping strategy employed by East African pastoralists to manage resource 
scarcity is accumulating herd stocks, effectively creating an insurance policy against 
drought extremes when large percentages of the herd may die.  This strategy was 
criticised by Herskovits in 1926 as the ‘East African cattle complex’ as he believed that 
amassing livestock herds was an irrational pastoral practice ultimately counter-
productive to effective environmental management (Herskovits 1926).  However, as the 
‘new thinking’ in rangeland ecology emerged in the 1980s, this body of work 
sufficiently demonstrated that in disequilibrium systems prone to repeated herd die-off, 
herd accumulation does not correlate with land degradation due to overgrazing.  
Furthermore, stocking rates prior to drought episodes have little effect on the numbers 
of animals remaining after the drought period has ended (Behnke and Scoones 1993; 
Sperling 1989; Ellis et al. 1987), where herd die-off is more a product of rainfall 
variability and the length of the dry period in question.   
 
Beneficially, Coughenour et al. (1985) explain that accumulation allows for the keeping 
of large numbers of breeding females necessary for food requirements, and 
accumulation also allows for breeding herds to remain intact during scarcity periods so 
that when conditions once again become favourable, herders are more able to rebuild 
herds close to pre-crisis numbers (e.g., Coughenour et al. 1985; Hjort 1981; Roth 1996; 
McPeak 2005).  Accumulation for pastoralists in East Africa is vital; a place where 
livestock off-take due to the effects of drought can diminish herds by estimates of more 
than half (McCabe 1985) and such devastation has the possibility of affecting herd 
numbers, particularly of breeding females, for up to ten years (Dahl and Hjort 1976, 
1979).       
 
Not only is accumulation important but due to the spatial heterogeneity and 
environmental variability found in East Africa, pastoralists of these regions buffer 
themselves against resource scarcity by diversifying the types of livestock species in 
their herds.  One of the primary reasons for diversification is to take advantage of 
different ecological niches and grazing / browse requirements (Coppock 1994; Oba and 
Lusigi 1987; Franke and Chasin 1980) of cattle, sheep and donkeys (mostly favouring 
perennial grasses) and goats and camels (mostly favouring mixed bushy environments).  
Pastoralists are able to monitor their stocks and dynamics in the landscape to respond to 
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changing conditions that may favour varying proportions of livestock species within 
herds.  As such, small stock (goats and sheep) have become increasingly favourable due 
to their apparent hardiness in recurring drought (Dahl and Hjort 1976; Legesse 1980; 
Barton, Morton and Hendy 2001) and opening up additional market opportunities (Little 
1992).  Furthermore, diversified stock acts as an additional insurance policy should 
environmental change or disease outbreak affect a sub-section of the herd, then the other 
species in the herd provide necessary redundancy to avoid catastrophic disaster 
(Lamprey and Waller 1990).         
 
2.4.1.3 Social Networks, Stock Alliances, and Indigenous Knowledge Transfer 
As discussed previously in this chapter, building strong social networks through inter-
ethnic marriage and spatially-dispersed stock alliances are paramount to spreading risk.  
Far-reaching social networks allow alliances to be called upon in times of individual 
hardship over areas showing differential fitness and risks being spatially heterogeneous 
(e.g., Almagor 1978; Sobania 1991; Goldschmidt 1979; Bollig 2006).  The result of 
these reciprocal relationships allows for affected parties to ‘borrow’ livestock from 
affines in order to replenish breeding stocks after disturbances or to readily move 
animals into more productive pastures during times of environmental stress.  Dyson-
Hudson (1966) has estimated that maintaining social networks effectively opens up four 
or five times the amount of space within a pastoral territory than one herder would have 
access to if he were managing his herd in isolation.  Furthermore, pastoralists living in 
the unpredictable, heterogeneous environments of East Africa need to rely on strong 
social networks that allow for the transmission of knowledge of temporary resource 
availability across generations, between family members, amongst age sets or kinsmen, 
and throughout clans in order to make optimal use of environmental assets if and when 
they become available during times of relative scarcity.  Animal disease management 
and improved livestock rearing practices are also often transmitted through local 
knowledge systems (Morton 2006), which can help in mitigating the effects of 
environmental hardship.   
 
2.4.1.4 Livelihood Diversification and Accessing Markets 
Just as diversification of herd species is beneficial in order to utilise a range of 
ecological zones, pastoralists also try to diversify livelihoods in a way to expand on 
their income-generating schemes and modes of subsistence.  Diversifying subsistence 
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can be accomplished by changing food sources from a pastoral diet of animal products 
to one based on wild fruit and tuber gathering (Oba 1985), hunting wild game (Turton 
1977), receiving relief food (Hogg 1983), and increasing cereals and grains into daily 
diets (Galvin 1992).  Second, pastoralists can increasingly engage in different forms of 
labour, which can either be small contract work (fetching firewood, cutting fence posts, 
transporting goods, etc.) to more skilled positions in urban / peri-urban areas, such as 
night guards, police officers, game scouts, etc.  Evidence shows that these forms of 
wage labour are on the increase where the number of Ariaal pastoralists reporting to be 
contract workers doubled from 1976 – 1985 (Fratkin 1991), while Richard Hogg reports 
that the number of Borana workers in Nairobi increased by 450% between 1962 and 
1969 (Hogg 1980).  Farming activities have also been encouraged by development 
agencies and governments in East Africa in areas with more reliable rainfall.  As a 
production strategy, growing crops takes far less time to recover productivity after a 
disturbance than re-accumulating lost livestock herds due to animals’ comparatively 
slow reproductive rate (Smith 1997).  Strictly speaking, this may be the case; however, 
access to livestock markets for re-stocking (Little 1985) and the ability to move animals 
into productive areas can aid in the rapid recovery of herd numbers post-drought 
(Homewood and Lewis 1987).              
 
Finally, to help in dampening the potential negative effects of resource insecurity, 
pastoralists are engaging more frequently in market systems and commercialisation of 
livestock and other natural products.  From their herds, individuals will sell live animals, 
meat, hides, and milk (Little 1992) with other sources of income derived from the sale 
of such things as fence posts, charcoal, firewood, gum arabic, tea, soap, plastic items, 
and alcohol (Little et al. 1999; Zaal and Dietz 1999; Morton and Meadows 2000).  
Capital raised through the sale of these products can be used to purchase supplementary 
feed for livestock, pay for water from boreholes (Morton 2006) or purchase alternative 
foods (maize, beans, rice, cooking oil) necessary for supporting families when herds 
have either moved away from a home area in search of pasture or potentially when 
animals have stopped producing milk due to the effects of prolonged drought.   
 
2.4.2 Coping Mechanisms:  Points for Consideration 
In moving forward from a discussion focused on coping mechanisms to one centred on 
whether or not these practices are adaptive in the long-term, there are three points to 
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consider.  First, the mechanisms described above are not fixed nor do they represent any 
sort of sequential “stages” through which pastoralism passes over time.  Instead, herd 
owners combine these at different points in their lives and under relevant circumstances 
as they see fit (Holtzman 1996).  Furthermore, it is well-known that the utilisation of 
certain coping mechanisms can be transient and reversible for the individual, for 
instance, moving from exclusively herding livestock into wage labour for an indefinite 
period of time and then back again into livestock investment and herding (Little et al. 
2001).  The coping mechanisms change in response to contemporary social, ecological, 
political, personal, and economic pressures as necessary. 
 
Second, the coping mechanisms described should not be thought of as independent and 
mutually-exclusive.  Not only are they most often employed concurrently, but the 
effects of one strategy may also have repercussions on another strategy, both positively 
and negatively.  For instance, diversifying diets to include relief foods enables greater 
herd accumulation as animals do not need to be sold during times of stress in order to 
raise capital (Hogg 1983), thus representing a positive association between these two 
mechanisms.  Likewise, herd accumulation increases and is increased by extensive 
social networks:  the more animals an owner has, the more he can distribute through 
affines, and the more affines he has, the more likely he is to successfully increase his 
herd numbers (Almagor 1978).  Unfortunately, there are negative relationships that exist 
between a number of strategies, in particular between farming with mobility and 
markets with herd accumulation and social networks.  In the former case, encouraging 
livelihood diversification into farming has often resulted in restricting the movement of 
herds over areas historically accessed by pastoralists.  Therefore, this reduces the 
effective area which livestock may use in times of resource stress (Dahl and Hjort 1979; 
Hogg 1987, 1988).  For the latter scenario, likely a relic of colonial de-stocking policies, 
engaging in livestock markets has a profound effect on pastoralists’ ability to 
accumulate herds and maintain breeding stocks.  Swift (1979) warns that markets pose a 
risk by off-loading males that normally help to keep stock numbers high, getting rid of 
surplus animals that could otherwise become objects of exchange in social networks, 
and selling breeding stocks that reduce milk supplies and a vital subset of the herd 
required for re-growth after periods of resource stress. 
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Finally, there are marked differences in who exactly has the opportunity to utilise 
certain coping mechanisms and to what effect.  The above coping mechanisms have 
been discussed rather generally and appear to be uniformly applied to all pastoralists 
throughout East Africa who are facing resource scarcity.  However, factors such as age, 
gender, wealth, primary mode of production, and distance to urban areas all play a 
significant role in influencing which coping mechanisms can be optimally employed 
(Adger et al. 2007).  Of these factors, the one that arguably demonstrates the clearest 
disparity is that of differential wealth – a relationship first recognised by Fredrik Barth 
in 1964.  Empirical studies since this time have shown that comparatively wealthy 
individuals are:  1) more likely to control breeding numbers of livestock where poor 
individuals seek to accumulate herd numbers (Mace 1993); 2) less likely to lose animals 
during climatic stress than poorer individuals due to greater herd diversification and 
accumulation (Fratkin and Roth 1990); 3) more likely to engage in profitable livelihood 
diversification in comparison with poorer individuals who engage in cheaper and more 
unsustainable forms of wage labour (Little et al. 2001); and 4) more likely to benefit 
from decreased mobility by settling in towns where they can engage in business, while 
less wealthy individuals suffer from the loss of mobility when sedentarised in town 
areas (Coppock 1994).  The relationships discussed here are not exhaustive in any sense, 
but they are important to keep in mind in regards to further points that will be raised in 
chapter nine when discussing the scope of adaptive strategies in contemporary pastoral 
societies in northern Kenya.                
 
2.5 Theories of Vulnerability and Resilience 
Having reviewed the range of coping mechanisms employed by pastoralists to manage 
increased resource scarcity, the final section of this review considers associated 
questions of sustainability.  Faced with apparently novel challenges, can populations 
continue as they have in the past; or instead, are there more fundamental changes that 
must be made in order for subsistence populations, such as pastoralists, to successfully 
adapt and persist?  Where ‘sustainability’ and its many permutations (e.g., sustainable 
action, sustainable management, etc.) has received much attention in earlier decades, the 
focus has now squarely adjusted to discussions of ‘vulnerability’ and ‘resilience.’  
Common use of these terms often times assumes them to be simply two sides of the 
same coin, (i.e., a population having high resilience naturally has low vulnerability).  
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However, there is much subtlety missed here; a problem that Davoudi (2012) raises 
when he describes them as contemporary buzzwords that are in danger of losing all 
significance.  The following discussion will look closely at the concepts of vulnerability 
and resilience as potentially useful and robust analytical tools.   
 
2.5.1 Vulnerability 
Vulnerability has been defined as the “state of susceptibility to harm from exposure to 
stresses associated with environmental and social change and from the absence of 
capacity to adapt” (Adger 2006: 268).  Some authors have argued that a more complete 
definition of vulnerability should make reference to human well-being (Wisner et al. 
2003) as it incorporates all social, economic, environmental and political spheres of 
influence (Bohle, Downing and Watts 1994), and the nature of resulting vulnerability is 
closely related to the type of interference causing the condition (Handmer, Dovers and 
Downing 1999).  As such, in the literature, vulnerability has been divided into two 
distinct categories:  entitlements-based explanations of vulnerability dealing with the 
social influence of institutions, class, social status, gender, etc. and secondly, natural 
hazards-based vulnerability dealing with environmental risks and the associated human 
responses (Adger 2006).  Although this thesis has initially focussed on the latter of the 
two, entitlements-based influences will be discussed at considerable length in the 
following chapters.  In either case, vulnerability refers to the exposure of groups or 
individuals to stress (Chambers 1989), where stress is the result of social factors or 
environmental risks causing disruption to group or individual livelihoods (Adger 1999), 
which results in ‘forced’ adaptation to a changing environment (Adger 1999).    
 
In the context of this dissertation, the contribution of vulnerability is problematic for a 
number of reasons.  Primarily, vulnerability as a concept lacks the analytical weight in 
establishing the limits of coping strategies in the context of dynamic environmental and 
social conditions, such as those found in northern Kenya.  Some studies have sought to 
quantify vulnerability, for example Liverman’s 1990 study in Mexico that assessed the 
major components of vulnerability on collectively owned land in light of increased 
exposure to drought, and Luers et al. (2003) quantifying vulnerability as:  
 
                     
                                                                  
 . 
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Although these studies represent considerable and worthwhile attempts, it is inherently 
difficult to assess with any precision rather vague terms such as ‘sensitivity to stress.’  
Furthermore, quantifying such diffuse terms may not result in any clearer 
conceptualisation of how vulnerability is understood and how it operates within socio-
ecological systems and may, in fact, diminish its impact by hiding its complexity 
(Alwang et al. 2001).  The IPCC has attempted to identify criteria on which a 
vulnerability assessment can be made by evaluating the following categories:  1) Range 
of technology available for adaptation, 2) Availability and distribution of resources 
across a region, 3) Structure of vital institutions, their decision-making authority, and 
the decision criteria used, 4) Range and stock of human capital (education, security, 
etc.), 5) Range and stock of social capital, 6) Risk spreading measures available, 7) 
Decision-makers’ ability to manage information, determine the credibility of 
information, and the credibility of the individuals themselves, 8) Population’s 
determination of the source and perception of stress and the significance of exposure to 
it (in Yohe and Tol 2002).  However, Fraser, Mabee and Slaymaker (2003) argue that, 
although the IPCC has included a great range of social, economic, and political 
considerations in an attempt to move away from overly-simplistic descriptions, the 
result is stiflingly complex, and the breadth of information cannot be adequately 
assessed.  The alternative is to rely on a framework that is dynamic, has the flexibility to 
be qualitatively applied to varied regions and populations, and can highlight relative 
states amongst this variety.  However, this approach still lacks a long-term 
understanding and evolution of vulnerability within systems, which will need to be 
addressed elsewhere. 
                  
Second, vulnerability literature is often considerably pessimistic, with emphasis on 
assessing risks, exposure to risks, and sensitivity to risks and little attention on the 
adaptive capacities of populations in overcoming such risks.  Within climate change 
discussions, the IPCC defines vulnerability simply as the “degree to which a system is 
susceptible to and is unable to cope with adverse effects [of climate change]” 
(McCarthy et al. 2001: 2.3), and a substantial number of publications make the 
assumption that climate change will ultimately result in widespread problems, as though 
this statement is a foregone conclusion without reference to well-established coping 
mechanisms or populations borne from unstable, unpredictable environments.  Where 
studies such as Kasperson et al. (1995) ‘regions at risk’ analysis determine vulnerability 
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based solely on regional biophysical data, Handmer, Dovers and Downing (1999) 
reinforce the argument that there is a vast difference between the impact of climate 
change and the impact of climate change with adaptation measures in place, which will 
have knock-on effects in determining the relative vulnerability of a population facing 
climatic threats.               
 
As the vulnerability literature has arguably been guilty of downplaying the role of 
coping mechanisms in mitigating vulnerability, the result is perhaps an assumption that 
increased vulnerability is an inherent part of subsistence communities and developing 
regions.  Poor households are said to be most at risk from natural hazards (Hewitt 1983, 
1997; Watts 1983) as it is assumed that vulnerability is contingent on poverty and local 
resource dependency (Adger 1999).  The argument follows that wealthier nations have 
greater disaster preparedness (Handmer, Dovers and Downing 1999) due to their 
enhanced technology and increased income (Burton, Kates and White 1993).  Poverty in 
this context is defined generally as a measure of absolute poverty (i.e., quantifiable 
poverty lines, $1.25/day, etc.) rather than referencing a more inclusive and dynamic 
incorporation of multidimensional poverty indices, such as wealth of social 
relationships, membership in broad networks, subjective attitudes towards well-being, 
etc. (e.g., Suich 2012).  This tradition, in the context of climate change vulnerability, is 
focused on the environmental risks, the probability of exposure to them, and their likely 
impacts without a firm understanding of the extent to which poor and rural populations 
are capable of managing risks in unpredictable or harsh environments.  In order to 
address this issue, a number of authors (e.g., Cannon 1994; Burton et al. 1993; Berkes 
and Jolly 2001; Mortimore and Adams 2001; Wisner et al. 2003) have argued that 
vulnerability resulting from hazards is not directly determined by levels of wealth, and 
therefore it is essential to bring into the discussion how coping mechanisms, 
institutional structures, and behavioural adaptability help to mediate the potential 
deleterious effects of such risks and reduce overall levels of vulnerability.     
 
The inadequacies of a vulnerability framework in which to discuss climatic risks with 
adaptation may actually be inherent in the design.  The vulnerability literature is borne 
from a tradition emphasising the desire to return the system to some state, deemed to be 
‘sustainable,’ that existed prior to the effects of any perturbations.  Focusing on hazards 
with relatively little attention paid to coping mechanisms and adaptability places 
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emphasis on how these hazards are felt, mitigated, and overcome rather than accepting a 
complete system reconfiguration.  In this case, resilience is a necessary framework in 
which to address these issues and adequately reflect on the goals of resilience for 
subsistence based populations living in dynamic environments.  
 
2.5.2 Resilience 
In the 1960’s the term ‘resilience’ made its appearance within ecological literature 
where it had previously been used by physical scientists to describe the properties of a 
spring, emphasising the stability of the object and its resistance to external forces 
(Davoudi 2012).  C.S. Holling brought this kind of thinking to the fore in his 1973 paper 
“Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems” where he identified two distinct 
properties of ecological systems:  stability and resilience.  In his words, stability is “the 
ability of a system to return to an equilibrium state after a temporary disturbance; the 
more rapidly it returns and the less it fluctuates, the more stable it would be,” and he 
went on to describe resilience as “a measure of the persistence of systems and of their 
ability to absorb change and disturbance and still maintain the same relationships 
between populations or state variables” (Holling 1973: 17).  These distinctions led 
Holling to think of stability as a property of, what he called, engineering resilience.  The 
focus here is on the ability of a system to return quickly to a single equilibrium, or to 
bounce back to the condition that was present before the introduction of a disturbance.  
For engineering resilience, the faster the system returns to the original state, with the 
least fluctuation, then the more resilient the system (Holling 1973, 1986, 1996).  
Engineering resilience is a framework often favoured in the examination of urban 
systems, where there is high value placed on the system’s capacity to rebound, rebuild, 
and recover quickly after a devastating event, such as a flood or terrorist attack (Vale 
and Campanella 2005).         
 
On the other hand, Holling also proposed the idea of ecological (later called 
evolutionary) resilience, that closer resembled his original definition of resilience.  
Instead of emphasising the amount of time it would take for a system to bounce back 
after shock, ecological resilience focused on the “magnitude of the disturbance that can 
be absorbed before the system changes its structure” (Holling 1996: 33) and places 
greater value on the ability of a system to persist and to adapt (Adger 2003).  This 
understanding represented a shift from focusing on constancy of behaviours and placed 
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it squarely onto the persistence of the relationships in a system.  Holling discouraged the 
idea of fixed and rigid states having a single, stable equilibrium to which it was 
necessary to return after external shocks for a system to be deemed resilient.  Instead, he 
offered the alternative of the existence of multiple equilibria, where systems could 
persist by moving into various alternative stable states, which Holling referred to as 
‘domains of attraction’ (Holling 1973).  Figure 2.2 below illustrates the integration of 
multiple domains of attraction into a stability landscape, where the dot represents the 
system and the basins represent the domains of attraction.       
 
Figure 2.2:  “Stability landscape,” top image adapted from Walker et al. 2004 with bottom image adapted 
from Gallopín 2006. 
L
R
Pr
 
 
 
The component parts of the domains of attraction as described by Walker et al. (2004) 
and represented in the figure above are: 1) Latitude (L):  the maximum distance between 
thresholds where a system crossing into a new threshold means recovery into the 
original threshold is difficult or potentially impossible; 2) Resistance (R): the depth of 
the basin, representing the system’s reluctance at being changed; 3) Precariousness (Pr):  
the proximity of a system to the threshold; and 4) Panarchy (not pictured):  positioning 
in a domain on one focal scale is dependent on the interactions and influences of scales 
above and below (e.g., climate change, market fluctuations, local uprising, etc.) 
(Gunderson and Holling 2002).  Both internal and external forces (e.g., rainfall, 
temperature, management practices, etc.) can augment the stability landscape by 
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changing the number or shape (L, R) of the domains of attraction.  The location of a 
system within the stability landscape can change in primarily two ways.  First, the 
behaviours and relationships within the system may remain constant, yet with the 
change in shape of the domain, the relative position of the system changes.  
Alternatively, the behaviours or nature of relationships can change, which means that 
the positioning of the system will move around the domain (or potentially cross into a 
new domain) as the shape of the stability landscape remain constant.  Furthermore, the 
system may also change position due to a combination of the above two methods:  a 
change in landscape coupled with a change in behaviour.  In order to understand how 
these concepts operate more practically, Holling (1973) provides the example of cattle 
grazing lands in the western United States where he notes that due to grazing pressure 
and reduced effects of fires from fire prevention campaigns, these grasslands are 
becoming dominated by trees and woody shrubs at the expense of the grasses.  Once the 
trees and shrubs have become established to the point of out-competing the grass, even 
the prohibition of grazing in these areas will not re-establish the grass.  By establishing 
the dominance of the trees and shrubs, this moves the system from one domain of 
attraction (grasslands) into this new domain of attraction (trees) where a return to the 
original domain could only be achieved by a directed reduction in the number of trees 
and shrubs.  Holling summates that this example points “to one or more distinct 
domains of attraction in which the important point is not so much how stable they are 
within the domain, but how likely it is for the system to move from one domain into 
another and so persist in a changed configuration” (Holling 1973: 9).   
 
The ecological resilience framework as described above represents an important 
paradigm shift away from the conservative perspectives favoured by government action 
plans of single-equilibrium systems, emphasising optimality, valuing stability and 
‘bounce-backability.’  On the contrary, ecological resilience allows for a ‘bouncing 
forth,’ recognising that environments are dynamic and hardly ever return to ‘original’ 
states (Kinzig et al. 2006).  With the stability view and timeliness in mind, emergency 
response plans may erroneously focus their attentions on short-term damage reductions, 
where in fact, the long-term approach taken by ecological resilience rightly incorporates 
adaptive capacity building in order to foster persistence of the system within a variable, 
dynamic landscape.  Closely examining stability and resilience, these two concepts are, 
by nature, directly opposed to one another.  As Davoudi explains, “resilience is 
performed when systems are confronted with disturbance and stress. This means that 
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[systems] become resilient not in spite of adversities but because of it” (Davoudi 2012: 
7).  A number of authors, including Holling, have noted that systems evolving within a 
highly fluctuating and unstable landscape may take advantage of opportunistic periods 
of favourable conditions, thus producing a “highly resilient system capable of repeating 
itself and persisting over time until a disturbance restarts the sequence” (Holling 1973: 
15).  These authors conclude that instability can produce an enormous amount of 
resilience into the system, therefore systems having low stability will have high 
resilience.  The relationship between instability and resilience is clearly a product of 
their evolutionary history in systems persevering through multiple permutations and 
fluctuations in the stability landscape.  As instability helps to build resilience in this way, 
it is worth noting that precariousness (Pr), although seemingly undesirable at the outset, 
is also borne out of a strong evolutionary feedback that helps to foster resilience.  
Kaufmann (2000) explains that a system’s existence on the edge of a threshold has led 
to the evolution of strong resistance (R), therefore helping to keep the system within the 
domain of attraction and reinforcing its resilience.             
 
2.5.2.1 Applying Resilience to Socio-Ecological Systems (SESs) 
The ecological understanding of resilience as defined by Holling can be translated to 
socio-ecological systems (Simmie and Martin 2010), however with the inclusion of two 
additional considerations:  adaptability and transformability (Gunderson and Holling 
2002; Walker et al. 2004; Folke et al. 2010).  Resilience in this context remains as ‘the 
magnitude of disturbance that can be absorbed before the system dramatically changes 
to an alternative state,’ but goes on to include adaptation, which refers to the collective 
capacity of humans within a system to self-organise and to actively manage or influence 
resilience (Holling 1973; Carpenter et al. 2001; Berkes and Folke 1998; Berkes, 
Colding, Folke 2003; Folke 2006; Adger 2006).  Levin (1998) emphasises that self-
organisation for a complex adaptive systems occurs ‘without intent,’ even though the 
human actors within the system may manage resilience with intent.  These intentions 
may change the trajectory of the system by increasing the size of desirable domains of 
attraction, shrinking undesirable domains, or changing the system to move deeper 
within a domain, or to move towards the thresholds / out of an undesirable domain 
(Walker et al. 2004).  The paramount importance of adaptive capacity within variable 
environments should not be understated.  Managing uncertainty through anticipatory 
policies often misses the mark as the type and scale of the disturbance in such 
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environments cannot be adequately ascertained in advance.  As such, many authors 
argue that, given the levels of uncertainty, the most useful approach in resilience 
building is to strengthen adaptive capacity within the system (Handmer, Dovers and 
Downing 1999).  Walker et al. (2004) argue that the key to strengthening adaptive 
capacity, and therefore improving resilience in the system, is through diversifying both 
biological and social components of the system.  Diversifying these components within 
the system contributes to its ‘functional redundancy,’ and can keep the system within a 
desirable domain of attraction, which is a property of its resistance (R).  Conversely, 
when a system becomes unsound due to political, ecological, social, or economic 
influences, the fundamental nature of the system needs to be drastically overhauled, 
which is made possible by the system’s capacity for transformability.  Transformability 
allows for a reconfiguration of the stability landscape or the capacity to create a new 
system before becoming irreversibly trapped in a failing or undesirable basin of 
attraction (Walker et al. 2004).  Through overhauling behaviours and withstanding 
adjustments to a novel domain, the system persists, which is the fundamental objective 
behind ecological resilience. 
 
In applying an ecological / evolutionary understanding of resilience to the socio-
ecological domain, Davoudi (2012) offers some words of caution.  Primarily, he 
suggests that resilience research in SESs should not take a deterministic view of systems.  
Outcomes should be treated as tendencies and not as though they are inevitable.  Second, 
attention must be paid to the effects on a system coming from multiple levels and not 
simply at the scale of the system, as the beliefs and objectives of human actors on one 
level can have a significant influence on the outcomes of a system at another scale.  
Finally, in moving resilience beyond the scope of an ecological lens, close attention 
must be paid to that which can be provided by a social science perspective.  Human 
actors can be highly adaptable and display great ingenuity in shaping their worlds, but 
most importantly the operation of resilience within a socio-ecological framework must 
make reference to the human desires that help to guide these principles (Davoudi 2012).      
 
This last point exposes the tension that exists between strict objectives of ecological / 
evolutionary resilience and resilience as it operates in socio-ecological systems.  
Slobodkin (1964) likens evolution to a game, where the only real pay-off is to remain in 
the game, which is achieved through adaptability.  Holling, with his emphasis on 
persistence through flexibility, would likely concur with this statement.  However, 
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Davoudi (2012) raises the point that for socio-ecological systems, we must ask:  
resilience for whom and to what end?  Engineering resilience, with its emphasis on 
stability and bounce-backability, is also problematic when applied to SESs as it exalts a 
rapid ‘return to normal;’ but, it does not think critically about what this entails exactly 
and for whom (Pendall et al. 2010).  Pendall et al. (2010) highlight this tension by 
showing that Hurricane Katrina, while physically destructive, helped to expose 
underlying social issues that were unacceptable to many and voiced objections in 
returning ‘to business as usual.’  Davoudi concludes by saying, “If the outcomes depart 
from the perceived desirable, reaching an alternative outcome is not seen as a sign of 
resilience” (Davoudi 2012: 9).   
 
The issue of desirability does not factor significantly into discussions of ecological 
resilience theory, and as such, it may become problematic when attempting to examine 
empirical data from human populations in these terms.  This is where I believe 
vulnerability can make its greatest contribution.  Although, as highlighted above, for the 
purposes of this thesis the concept of vulnerability lacks the analytical capacity to guide 
discussions dealing with resource scarcity and coping mechanisms in a disequilibrium 
system, it does place great emphasis on the perceptions of risk within communities 
(Kasperson et al. 2005, Adger 2006) and pays close attention to rich qualitative 
assessments in regard to place and to appropriate contexts (Luttrell 2001; Winkels 
2004).  In moving forward, a complete understanding of resilience as it operates within 
subsistence communities prone to disturbances will need to incorporate this type of 
emphasis on community-led perceptions of risk, vulnerability, and desirability of 
outcomes. 
 
The following diagram outlines a model illustrating the component parts of resilience as 
discussed within this section, which will formulate the framework for chapter nine.   
Being a model, it is neither prescriptive nor does it necessarily show a conscious 
pathway that groups take when managing threats.  Instead, it provides a visual 
conceptualisation of how resilience may operate within a population faced with a 
disturbance. 
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Figure 2.3:  Model demonstrating the components of resilience operating in a socio-ecological system 
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The model begins with a disturbance to the system (1) such as a drought event, flooding, 
or terrorist attack, for example.  Under a more traditional vulnerability framework, an 
assessment may be made at this point (2) as to whether the disturbance is likely to 
increase vulnerability within the system.  The approach this dissertation will take 
instead is for the presentation of a disturbance to elicit (3) where stakeholders are able 
to assess their perceptions of the risk at hand and whether active response is needed.  
Adaptive strategies and coping mechanisms (4) may be actively employed in response 
to the perceived risk, or they may be an in-built, unreflective part of the system, 
depending on its evolutionary history.  At this point, there may be the additional 
74 
 
disturbance of institutional or secondary risks (5).  Handmer, Dovers and Downing 
(1999) echo this point that a system’s coping mechanisms can be seriously undermined 
and their efficacy reduced by the presence of chronic violence, institutional collapse, or 
warfare, which may have catastrophic results to the system if these secondary 
disturbances are not negotiated properly.  The negotiation phase (6) is where resilience 
is managed, and the adaptive capacity of the system is tested to handle these novel 
introductions and secondary perturbations.  Following this negotiation, a resilience 
assessment may be made by the actors (7), which can be re-evaluated in light of the 
desirability of the outcome (8) to the stakeholders within the system.  Depending on this 
evaluation, there may need to be further investment in continuing to manage resilience 
(6) by re-negotiating the interplay between coping mechanisms and secondary 
influences.  The model as described here will be used in chapter nine to illustrate the 
dynamics between pastoral coping mechanisms and external influences for communities 
facing increased resource scarcity in northern Kenya.      
2.6 Conclusion 
The following chapters will reflect upon and make use of the theories and analytical 
frameworks discussed within this literature review.  Chapter five refers to issues raised 
when assessing the direct relationship between resource scarcity and conflict, as 
described here in section 2.3.  Chapter six continues with this analysis, however, 
approaching the question using quantitative applications.  In chapter seven, the 
relationship begins to incorporate more complex additive and intermediary social effects 
and motivations for conflict, highlighting theories discussed in sections 2.1 and 2.3.  
Chapter eight utilises a game theory approach (i.e., section 2.2) as a way of explaining 
competitive or cooperative strategies employed by pastoralists during inter-ethnic 
interactions.  Finally, chapter nine references issues raised in sections 2.4 and 2.5 when 
discussing the coping mechanisms that pastoralists employ in order to mitigate the 
negative effects of resource scarcity and how this contributes to pastoral resilience.  
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Chapter 3: Area and Background 
3.1 Brief History and Administration of Northern 
Kenya 
I undertook fieldwork within the pastoralist areas of the Samburu (Central and East), 
Isiolo, Garba Tula, and Laisamis districts of northern Kenya, which span both the Rift 
Valley and Eastern provinces (refer to Figure 3.1 for a map of the area).  These districts 
cover an area of 68,700.4 km
2
 and, according to the 2009 Kenyan National Census, are 
home to 479,412 nomadic pastoralists; the greater northern region has an estimated 
population of 6,050,189 pastoralists and agro-pastoralists (Kenyan Bureau of Statistics 
2010).  Some of the major ethnic groups in the area are the Samburu, Borana, Somali, 
Turkana, Pokot, Gabra, and Rendille.  These populations have remained largely distant 
from the official gaze of national politics and development.  However, like many other 
East African pastoral group, livelihoods in northern Kenya have been greatly affected 
by regional, national, and international influences (Catley, Lind and Scoones 2013), 
most recently demonstrated by increasing engagement with long-distance, integrated 
markets, a rising Somali refugee population (Gedi et al. 2008), and growth in Chinese 
development initiatives, road construction, and oil extraction.  Northern Kenya itself has 
largely been viewed as a buffering zone for Kenya’s southern, more populated cities 
(such as Nairobi, Naivasha, and Nakuru) from potentially harmful neighbouring 
countries like Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia.  As such, it has often served as an isolated 
location for international refugee camps and consequently has suffered a number of 
integration problems from trans-boundary movement (Fratkin and Roth 2005).  
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Figure 3.1:  Map of Kenya showing detail of study area 
 
Politically, Kenya became part of the East Africa Protectorate under Britain in 1895 and 
was administered as a British colony from 1920 until gaining independence as a self-
governing democracy in 1963.  Under British rule, northern Kenya was known as the 
Northern Frontier District (NFD), having established colonial posts in Maralal, Marsabit, 
and Archers Post.  At the time of independence, the ethnic Somali living in northern 
Kenya lobbied for the NFD to secede from the newly-independent Kenya in order to 
join the Greater Somali region; a desire that precipitated the Shifta War (1963 – 1968).  
The colonial British government had initially entertained this request and took 
preliminary steps to allow for the administration of the NFD to be granted to the Somali 
Republic; however, the independent Kenyan government denied their claim, which led 
the British to renege on their agreement with the Somali (de Waal 1997).  Brought to 
arms over the claim for the NFD, the Somali approached their neighbouring Borana in 
Kenya to assist them in fighting in the Shifta War, enticing the Borana with claims that 
the new Kikuyu, Christian government under President Jomo Kenyatta would threaten 
their Islamic way of life, where the colonialists had been tolerant and respectful of 
Borana religious practices.  The resistance faced by the independent government from 
the ethnic Somali and their sympathisers led to what is locally known as Daba.  As one 
Borana religious scholar told me: 
“Daba was when we were living in reserves.  Kenya became independent, and 
the Somali were against the independent government and joined hands with the 
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Borana...the Somali asked the Borana to join hands with them to fight so they all 
went to Somalia to get guns and come back as shifta, attacking police all over 
this Ewaso region. Eventually the shiftas were defeated because the government 
attacked many Borana and put their animals in concentration camps and burned 
[the animals] down or shot them.  This was actually the Daba.  People were also 
put in concentration camps and killed.  Then a lot of police and security were 
put in this region in order to control the shifta...Many people were left in poverty, 
and there was no government relief then.  Not all Borana or Somali wanted 
shifta, but they ended up paying the penalty.  Even our DC was against the shifta, 
saying they were deceiving the Borana.  When the Somali heard this, they killed 
him...the Somali didn’t suffer Daba like the Borana because they could go back 
to their area or back to Somalia.  They provided guns to the Borana and 
convinced the Borana that the war was a good idea.  The Shifta War was fought 
against the independent government because the Somali convinced the Borana 
that the Kikuyu would lead them astray with the Christian government.  The 
Somali didn’t want a Kikuyu government.  They wanted to lead their own 
district, and they wanted pure Islam in their areas and to manage themselves...It 
was more political than anything but [the Somali] used religion as the 
convincing reason to the Borana.”   
 
The Daba had a profound effect on the Borana way of life in Kenya in the post-colonial 
period.  Anthropologist Paul Baxter noted during follow-up fieldwork conducted in 
1982 that very few Borana still maintained themselves through pastoralism, and he 
estimated that approximately 40% of Borana were living in shanty towns, having few 
economic alternatives by which to support themselves (Baxter 1993).  Alex de Waal 
stressed that the result of the government concentration camps, enforced reduction in 
pastoral mobility, and systematic impoverishment of the Borana people meant that their 
“society was irretrievably altered” (de Waal 1997: 41).  The reduction in livestock 
numbers in comparison with other northern ethnic groups who were unaffected by the 
Daba has been noted in other studies (Hogg 1985) through to this present study.       
 
From the time of fieldwork in 2009 up until 2012 (with the implementation of the new 
Kenyan constitution), Kenyan administration divides the north into three provinces (Rift 
Valley, Eastern, and North Eastern), sub-divided into 96 districts, with further sub-
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divisions of each district into divisions, divisions into locations, and locations into sub-
locations (see Table 3.4 for examples).  Each province is administered by a Provincial 
Commissioner (PC), who is appointed by the President under the Ministry of State for 
Provincial Administration and Internal Security.  Administration is further divided at 
the local level to the:  District Commissioner (DC, district); District Officer (DO, 
division); Chief (location); Assistant Chief (sub-location); Chairman (settlement area).  
Establishing and maintaining security is at the core of these government posts; however, 
the organisation of Kenyan policing units is also a complex matter.  Nationally, there is 
the body of security known as the Kenyan Police; however, this entity is comprised of 
the Kenyan Regular Police, the Criminal Investigations Department (CID), the General 
Service Unit (GSU) which is a paramilitary police branch, and other specialised 
policing units such as the Anti-Stock Theft Unit (ASTU).  Administered through the 
DC’s office is the Administrative Police (AP) branch, which was established in order to 
address local community needs in light of cultural traditions, structures, and governance.  
The jurisdiction held by each of these bodies is not always clear, and it is not 
uncommon to find an AP post located within the same location as an ASTU camp and a 
Regular Police station, for instance.  Beyond these official security units, the DC’s 
office also administers the use of Kenyan Police Reserves (KPR) or “home guards” as 
they are known locally.  Home guards were established by the colonial government in 
1948 due to the wartime pressures placed on an already over-extended regular police 
service, and currently they are only in operation in rural and remote areas where a 
strong police presence is lacking.  Local individuals apply to the DC’s office to be 
provided with a gun for the purpose of protecting their community and property from 
lawlessness, banditry, and livestock theft, although the people report that very little 
training and monitoring is provided in the use of KPR weapons. 
3.2 The People 
This research focused on three historically rival ethnic groups found within these 
regions:  the Samburu, Borana, and Rendille (see Figure 3.2 below for geographical 
distribution).  From the numerous ethnic groups that compose the northern territories of 
Kenya, I selected three distinct populations for further research as the dynamics 
between the three groups lend themselves to a number of interesting comparisons and 
questions for analysis.  Each group shares a border with the other two groups; therefore 
the nature of the interactions between all three groups could be observed, recorded and 
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analysed.  Furthermore, previously published ethnographic literature on these 
populations (Baxter 1954, 1979; Baxter, Hultin and Truilzi 1996; Dahl and Hjort 1979; 
Dahl 1979; Dahl and Megerssa 1990; Spencer 1998, 1973, 1965; Straight 2006; Fratkin 
1986) pointed to three dyadic relationships where two were aggressively competitive 
(Samburu – Borana; Rendille – Borana) and one was peaceably cooperative (Samburu – 
Rendille).  Moreover, variations in subsistence economies, cultural practices, religion, 
political engagement, ranging behaviour, levels of mobility, and access to natural 
resources make these three groups ideal study populations for exploring behavioural 
adaptations in the context of a changing environment.  
Figure 3.2:  Detail of research area, demonstrating the division between ethnic groups within Kenya 
 
 
3.2.1 The Samburu 
The Samburu are a Nilotic-speaking people originating in Sudan but most closely 
resembling the Maasai in terms of subsistence and cultural traditions, to the extent that 
98% of language is shared between the two groups (Sommer and Vossen 1993).  They 
are nomadic pastoralists living in the Samburu district, who rely most heavily on milk 
production from cattle and small stock (sheep and goats).  People from the area report 
that, within the last 20 years, camel herding has been introduced (either by development 
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agencies or through inter-personal relationships) to a number of Samburu communities 
as a way to combat livestock losses resulting from prolonged drought.     
 
Paul Spencer’s The Samburu (1965) and Nomads in Alliance (1973) are regarded as 
providing the most comprehensive account of Samburu organisation, traditions and 
practices despite the majority of Spencer’s fieldwork being conducted under colonial 
administration.  Much has changed for the Samburu from the colonial period until now 
in terms of environmental conditions, political influences, development initiatives, and 
livelihood pursuits; however, Spencer’s work continues to stand as the major authority 
in describing Samburu age set systems, genealogies, and kinship relationships, for 
which the reader should refer to these works for more information.     
 
For the purposes and scope of this study, and based on my observations of 
contemporary Samburu life whilst in the field, I have identified a number of key 
concepts that will be used for comparative purposes between the three ethnic groups.   
 
Table 3.1:  Key Samburu concepts solicited from ethnographic data collection 
Primary Ethnic 
Neighbours 
North = Rendille (peaceful) 
East = Borana (contentious) 
South = Wildlife conservancies and European ranches (peaceful); Pokot 
(contentious) 
West = Turkana (contentious); Pokot (contentious) 
Religion There has been a successful spread of Christianity through the Samburu 
district; however, traditional pre-Christian worship practices still 
continue.  There is a strong belief in the divine (either Christian or pre-
Christian); however, there is very little evidence of Christian practices 
within remote community areas. 
Marriage Marriage must be exogamous to the clan, although there are a growing 
number of individuals who are marrying within their own clans and a 
substantial number of individuals who are marrying from Rendille and 
Turkana areas.  Marriage continues to be polygamous with men having 
on average 2 – 5 wives, and a negotiated bride price must be paid to the 
family of each wife. 
Seasonal Fission / 
Fusion 
Families tend to live together during rainy months in large manyattas 
when the landscape around settlement areas is able to support the 
numbers of livestock that will return home with the young herders.  
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These families will stay together and only fission during extended dry 
seasons and under drought conditions where herders need to travel far 
from the settlement areas in order to locate adequate pasture and water.   
Education Nursery schools are found in high numbers throughout the territory; 
however, primary schools tend to be under-equipped and under-staffed.  
Secondary schools are found only in densely populated areas (such as 
Wamba, Archers Post, and Maralal, etc.).  Free primary education is 
provided by the government; however, secondary schools incur 
considerable fees.  Literacy rates are still quite low for northern Kenya, 
and mother tongue is the standard for communication. 
Production Most Samburu remain pure pastoralists; however, there are agro-
pastoralist areas found around the Maralal highlands where there are 
higher levels of precipitation.  Samburu herds tend to have high numbers 
of small stock (typically 100 – 400 individuals per herd), but the cow 
remains the most precious inclusion in the herd.  However, due to an 
overall reduction in grass-cover and other grazing fodder, along with the 
cow’s high dependence on water, cow numbers have decreased 
substantially over the last generation.   
Internal Governance The elders system is still quite strong amongst the Samburu where 
organisation and internal disputes are addressed by the respected elders 
of each community.  Age-sets become elders once the younger age-set 
(separated by approximately 15 years) has been circumcised into the 
moran age-set, which signals the elder group to begin marrying and to 
become trained in the ‘ways of the elder.’  The position of the elder is 
highly structured by the age-set system, and members of the elder group 
are expected to act with authority, thoughtfulness, and moderation and to 
not actively engage in conflict with other ethnic groups.   
Settlements Villages and towns are not major features of the Samburu territory where 
people prefer to live in rural manyattas with related clansmen.  There are 
comparatively few amenities available (schools, clinics, markets, etc.) 
for the Samburu due to this rural lifestyle. 
Environment and 
Resources 
The Samburu territory benefits from the inclusion of hilly, forested areas 
(Maralal, Ndoto mountains, Matthews Ranges, etc.) as these receive 
comparatively higher levels of rainfall than other areas of the territory, 
and they are thick with vegetation.  Samburu along the southern border 
benefit from water provided by the Ewaso Nyiro River where the rest of 
the territory relies on small ephemeral streams, shallow wells, a number 
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of drilled boreholes, and natural water catchments (i.e., rock hollows).   
Youth Male Samburu youth remain children until the age of circumcision (~15 
years old).  After this rite of passage, taken with other youth members of 
the same clan, the initiated age-set is collectively responsible for the 
protection of their ethnic group’s livestock and personal safety.  For this 
reason, all morans carry weapons (knives, spears, or guns).  High labour 
demands are placed on the morans as they are required to herd animals 
far from home territory areas when the environmental conditions require 
substantial migrations in search of pasture and water.  However, during 
rainy periods, the morans are able to return to their home areas where 
they will be at leisure.  Moran spend this free time singing and dancing 
in the evenings with young ladies from their area, where the subject 
matter of these songs range from the re-telling of battles, to where 
morans have travelled during the dry season, to acts of bravery, or praise 
for animals.  The moran age-set period ends when the new moran age-
set is ready to take its place, and the current morans can begin to marry, 
at approximately 30 years old.       
Division of Labour 
(based on age and 
gender) 
The young children (pre-circumcision, both boys and girls) are trained to 
herd small stock around the home areas from a young age (~4 years old) 
until they are capable of taking the animals further for grazing or until 
the boys are circumcised as morans.  Samburu wives are required to herd 
small stock along with cattle and camels near the home areas, but they 
may be called on to herd further from the home territory in search of 
water and pasture if the morans are over-extended or in short supply.  
The Samburu wives are also charged with taking care of the home and 
all domestic activities (cooking, gathering firewood, collecting water, 
taking care of children, constructing the house, moving the home during 
migrations, etc.).  The elder men are charged with making all decisions 
that affect the household and the family’s herds and the day to day 
management of the livestock.  
 
3.2.2 The Borana 
The Borana are a Cushitic people found in Kenya in the Isiolo, Garba Tula, and 
Marsabit districts but originating from Ethiopia.  While acknowledging that these 
people are part of the larger Borana ethnic community, extending from northern Kenya 
into southern Ethiopia, this study will focus specifically on the Waso Borana, who are 
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Oromo speakers living in regions close to the Ewaso Nyiro River in Kenya (e.g., Isiolo, 
Garba Tula, Merti, Malka Daka, Mado Gashi, etc.).  However for the sake of simplicity, 
they will be referred to in this thesis simply as ‘Borana.’  The Borana rely mainly on 
cattle and small stock; however, they also herd a number of camels in particularly arid 
regions of their district, with many individuals citing a Somali influence in camel 
rearing.  The table below (Table 3.2) details some of the features found amongst the 
Waso Borana communities of northern Kenya, as recorded during ethnographic 
fieldwork.  Other published ethnographic accounts (e.g., Baxter 1954, 1979; Dahl and 
Hjort 1979, 1976; Dahl 1979; Helland 2001) supplement information provided here.     
 
Table 3.2:  Key Borana concepts solicited from ethnographic data collection 
Primary Ethnic 
Neighbours 
North = Borana of Marsabit and of Ethiopia (peaceful) 
East = Somali (currently peaceful, although contentious in recent past) 
South = Meru (peaceful) 
West = Samburu and Rendille (contentious) 
Within territory = Turkana (contentious), Somali (see above), Meru 
(peaceful), Garre (peaceful) 
Religion The vast majority of Waso Borana are Muslim, as a result of their long-
standing interaction with Somali clans, who introduced the Borana to 
Islam in the early 1930s.  Conversion was aided through ethnic isolation 
of Waso Borana from more northern Borana, resulting from the strict 
colonial ethnic boundaries drawn in 1934 (Aguilar 1996).  Mosques are 
common throughout Waso Borana territory, and Islamic practice (i.e., 
daily prayer) can be witnessed in most areas. 
Marriage Marriage must be exogamous to the clan although, like the Samburu, an 
increasing number of people are marrying within their own clans; 
however, there are fewer reported inter-ethnic marriages than among the 
Samburu and Rendille.  Families are polygamous, although men report 
having fewer wives on average than the Samburu (typically 1 – 3 wives).  
Bride price is also paid amongst Borana families, although this too is 
reduced in comparison to Samburu marriages. 
Seasonal Fission / 
Fusion 
Families tend to be more highly sedentarised around town / village 
centres (olas) therefore having access to local amenities while herds 
remain in nearby (2-15 kms away) pasture areas (arjals).  Family 
members either take turns leaving their olas to care for livestock or non-
related herders are hired to manage the animals.  Animal products 
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(mainly milk) are sent back to the settled families on a regular basis 
(approximately every other day).   
Education Because Borana families tended to live closer to settled areas, children 
can access educational institutions more readily, and many are educated 
through secondary school.  While mother tongue is the preferred 
language for communication, a large number of Borana speak Swahili, 
and many are proficient in English.  
Production Livestock remain the major source of income (and reportedly preferred 
source) for most Borana families; however, paid herding, wage labour, 
small-scale business, and scattered small-scale farming (along the Ewaso 
and Lorian Swamp areas) are also part of contemporary Borana 
livelihoods.  Herds tend to be smaller than those of the Samburu and 
Rendille; however, the rate of camel ownership is higher amongst the 
Borana than the Samburu.     
Internal Governance All internal issues are addressed through community elders; however, 
important matters of Borana governance at a more regional level are 
decided upon through the Gaada system (see Baxter 1954; Legesse 1973 
for further explanation).  For the purposes of this thesis, it is adequate to 
note that Borana activities, particularly in relation to Borana youth, are 
heavily dictated and influenced by the elders of the community at the 
local level.  Decisions to engage in inter-ethnic conflict are most often 
sanctioned by the local elders.   
Settlement Villages and towns feature heavily within the Borana territory, and as 
such, people tend to have better access to education, health services, 
development aid, and markets.  However, there is a high rate of 
unemployment reported in these settled areas. 
Environment and 
Resources 
The Ewaso Nyiro River extends through the Isiolo and Garba Tula 
districts, providing much-needed water for livestock and acts as a source 
of irrigation for farming schemes.  There are a number of natural springs, 
particularly in the west of their territory, and the Borana may utilise 
vegetation found in wildlife reserves and conservancy areas to the south 
during times of extreme hardship.     
Youth Male Borana youth remain children until the passage of three generation 
sets (each spanning 8 years, 1 – 24 years old), at which point, the youth 
will graduate into a ‘junior’ warrior-hood for the next 8 year period (25 – 
32 years old), and finally into ‘senior’ warrior-hood for the remaining 8 
year period (33 – 40 years old).  At the end of the senior warrior-hood, 
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males are expected to marry and manage their own herds.  Although this 
is the official progression through the generation sets, the Waso Borana 
no longer follow such strict timelines as indicated above (although 
respondents did indicate that the generation set process is more 
formalised amongst the Ethiopian Borana).  The Borana are circumcised, 
but this practice is not as ritualised as that found amongst the Samburu.  
In terms of raiding behaviours, older Borana men (as long as they are 
still physically capable) may still participate in raiding activities, where 
this is not the case amongst the Samburu or Rendille.    
Division of Labour 
(based on age and 
gender) 
Labour and herding activities are divided up between the men and the 
women where Borana adult men are more actively involved with herding 
activities than the Samburu elders, and the Borana wives, although also 
herders, tend to focus on more domestic issues and caring for the young 
children.  The women are required to fetch water and firewood, along 
with cooking, constructing homes, and moving the house during 
migration periods.  However, Borana women are more associated with 
ola areas (larger settlements, closer to amenities, etc.) than life in the 
arjal, which is dominated by young men, married male herders, and 
employed herders.   
       
3.2.3 The Rendille 
The Rendille of Marsabit and Laisamis districts, a Cushitic ethnic group originating 
from Somalia, are predominantly camel herders with a considerable number of small 
stock and small supply of cows where there is grazing available in their area.  The 
Rendille herds are highly mobile in order to adapt to the extreme arid conditions of their 
home ranges located within the Kaisut Desert.  Spencer’s work on the Rendille notes 
that during the colonial period, approximately one-third of all Samburu communities 
descend from Rendille families (Spencer 1965) through generations of Rendille 
migration into Samburu territory and subsequent intermarriage (see Spencer 1973 for a 
more detailed description of Rendille – Samburu marriage practices).  Today it is clear 
that the Samburu and Rendille are very much “together,” born from a relationship that 
not only saw the mixing of families but also the mixing of livestock based on the 
ecological niches each community inhabited.  Spencer wrote, “The areas which best suit 
the Samburu cattle are those which least suit the Rendille camels.  Camels do not thrive 
in the rather cooler climates of the south-west...camels have a low resistance to sleeping 
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sickness which tends to be prevalent in areas of thick bush associated with Samburu 
grazing areas” (Spencer 1973: 12).  There existed a symbiotic relationship between 
these two ethnic groups where the Samburu could rely on the Rendille to keep and herd 
their camels in exchange for the Samburu taking care of Rendille cows (Dahl and Hjort 
1976).  However, my observations between these two groups demonstrates a diminished 
exchange and co-management of animals between the Samburu and Rendille, possibly 
due to increased covariate risk of drought and prevalence of severe climatic events (see 
chapter nine for further discussions on covariate risk).  The ethnographic description 
provided here is supported by other published ethnographic accounts (e.g., Spencer 
1973; Fratkin 1987, 1991, 1993, 1998; O’Leary 1990).   
 
Table 3.3:  Key Rendille concepts solicited from ethnographic data collection 
Primary Ethnic 
Neighbours 
North = Turkana (mixed, reported conflict incidents) 
East = Borana (contentious), Somali (contentious)  
South = Samburu (peaceful) 
West = Turkana (mixed, reported conflict incidents), Samburu (peaceful) 
Religion Christian missions and Christianity has been spread throughout Rendille 
territory; however, traditional religious practices are still very prevalent 
in this area. 
Marriage In principle, marriage must be exogamous between clans; however, there 
are reports of individuals marrying within their own clans, and marriage 
with the Samburu is prevalent.  Spencer reports that Rendille families are 
monogamous (due to the nature of camel ownership); however, currently 
many Rendille families report polygamous relationships.  Families tend 
to be smaller than the Samburu (typically 1 – 2 wives).  Bride price is 
also paid amongst Rendille families, which are comparable to Samburu 
marriage costs. 
Seasonal Fission / 
Fusion 
Herds tend to be highly mobile amongst the Rendille compared with the 
other two ethnic groups; however, they follow a similar pattern to 
Samburu fission / fusion depending on seasonality.  The mobile herding 
camps have considerably high livestock densities which gather around 
premium water supplies and are herded mainly by the moran and young 
men with very few women present.   
Education Literacy rates and formal education were some of the lowest reported to 
me amongst these three populations.  Herding still appears to be a 
priority amongst Rendille communities, and the mobile lifestyle does not 
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necessarily lend itself to engaging with education establishments.  
Production Livestock (particularly camels and small stock) are the preferred source 
of income and subsistence found in Rendille areas.  Herds tend to be on a 
similar scale as those reported amongst the Samburu; however, camel 
ownership is considerably higher.  There is very little opportunity for 
farming in these areas due to the desert-like conditions found in much of 
the territory.     
Internal Governance All internal issues are dealt with through counsel amongst the elders and 
chairmen (respected elders from the community in positions of 
leadership, as established by the community).  Matters are discussed 
under a large tree within the settlement area, and all advice must be 
adhered to by community members. 
Settlement Access to education, health services, and markets can be found almost 
exclusively in populated towns (Kargi, Korr, Laisamis, Nguronit) that 
house a lot of the children and mothers.  Herders prefer to live in more 
rural collections of fora (see terminology) in areas where animals can 
have access to graze and sufficient water located away from the towns.   
Environment and 
Resources 
Access to water is problematic in Rendille territory as deserts like the 
Chalbi and Kaisut dominate much of this region.  Due to extreme aridity, 
Rendille are increasingly relying on drilled boreholes in order to utilise 
vital pasture areas.      
Youth The Rendille have similar age-set systems to the Samburu, and are 
circumcised in a similar manner, and pass through a warrior phase (also 
moran) like that of the Samburu.  The Rendille herding camps are 
predominantly composed of young male herders and moran who are 
capable of moving over vast distances with the camels and small stock.  
There are also a number of hired Rendille herders amongst the satellite 
camps, as inheritance is provided solely to the first-born male, thus 
requiring subsequent male children to grow their wealth from investment 
in small stock or through herding other’s in exchange for pay / animals. 
Division of Labour 
(based on age and 
gender) 
The division of labour is very similar to that described amongst the 
Samburu families; however, Rendille women are often times found 
closer to town areas than are Samburu women in order to access goods 
and services and have access to domestic water.  Male youth are 
responsible for the majority of labour-intensive herding activities; 
however, many unmarried girls were also observed managing large 
camel herds for grazing and watering.  Similar to the Samburu, Rendille 
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women are responsible for the domestic activities of the home, where 
Rendille men are officially charged with the responsibilities of herd 
management and decision-making.   
 
3.2.4 The Fieldwork Experience 
In the following paragraphs, I endeavour to provide some insight into the experiences of 
living with, working with, interviewing, and observing these three ethnic groups for a 
period of a year and a half in order to supply some additional context to the field 
situation.  From engaging with Samburu communities across six different regions, I 
personally came to find them welcoming to outsiders, extremely hard-working, open to 
long discussions and detail-oriented with their descriptions.  Furthermore, I found that 
most informants answered questions based on their own personal experiences and 
observations with little regard to how others from their community may answer the 
same question.  In relation to this point, when being pressed for answers to questions 
where an individual him/herself was not personally witness to a situation or had first-
hand knowledge of the account, it was common for me to hear the response, “I do not 
know so I cannot lie.”  As an outside researcher coming to this area to find out “how 
things are,” I appreciated that individuals would refuse to answer such questions rather 
than potentially lead me astray in my investigations.   
 
My time with the Borana was also an enjoyable and fruitful one as I found people to be 
talkative and very interested in the nature of the research.  I found the married women to 
be accommodating and protective of me as their guest and “daughter;” likewise, the 
elder men took on a more paternal role in our interactions, making sure that I was 
welcomed and cared for as a visitor to their area.  Although I am not Muslim (however I 
observed all religious practices while amongst the Borana), people were curious about 
my belief system and tolerant of alternative views of science and religious or physical 
cosmologies.  During interviews, I found that I had to place greater reliance on 
creativity in asking questions and cross-checking information, as my impression from 
conducting interviews amongst the Borana is that they tend to value a high degree of 
conformity in their answers to questions and can be “policed” by other individuals 
listening to the interviews.  I often joked that responses read as though they were taken 
from, as I called it, “The Borana Handbook for Standardised Responses.”  In order to 
manage this issue and avoid 100+ identical interviews, I realised early into the 
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fieldwork that a more productive approach was to interview people alone, request input 
in the form of descriptions rather than through direct questions, and preface each 
interview with a more detailed introduction of the research objectives and a more direct 
request for each respondent’s own personal views than I had whilst interviewing 
Samburu participants. 
 
Working and living amongst the Rendille was highly rewarding in witnessing 
community practices that were steeped in, what the Samburu referred to as, “deep 
culture.”  The ‘traditional’ and seemingly more ‘simple’ lifestyle with a strong reliance 
on livestock required a high labour investment from the young herders.  I found 
respondents to be inquisitive, talkative, and helpful; however, there were times of 
internal frustration on my part when responses sometimes appeared illogical based on 
information obtained earlier in discussions.  Unlike Spencer, who reported that he found 
Rendille informants, “easier to work with than the Samburu” with the Rendille coming 
across as “more direct and more consistent,” thus allowing him to cover more ground 
during interviews (Spencer 1973: 3), I found just the opposite to be true.  Because of 
this issue, I came to find participant-observation methods more fruitful amongst the 
Rendille than relying on interview data alone. 
3.3 Field Site Descriptions 
The processes of selecting field sites for data collection are discussed in the following 
chapter.  A map is provided in Figure 3.3 below, situating each of the seventeen field 
sites within the research area, and Table 3.4 provides a description for each study site. 
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Figure 3.3:  Map of field sites, by ethnic group affiliation 
 
  
91 
 
Table 3.4:  Description for each field site consulted.  The colours in each row correspond with the ethnic 
affiliations provided above in Figure 3.3.  The sequence of field sites provided corresponds to the 
chronological order in which data was collected in the field. 
SETTLEMENT 
(Sub-location / 
Location / 
Division / District 
/ Province) 
STUDY 
GROUP 
DESCRIPTION OF FIELD SITES 
Lenchokut 
 
(Lkisin / Ngilai 
West / Wamba / 
Samburu East / Rift 
Valley) 
Samburu Purely Samburu area in the interior of Samburu East District.  It is 
located close to a major livestock market (Loolkuliyiani) and Samburu 
centre (Wamba).  Livestock numbers are comparatively high in this 
location, and the area consists of approximately 29 manyattas made up 
of 142 temporary houses.  It is a hilly area, lacking tree cover. 
Kitich 
 
(Ngilai / Ngilai 
Central / Wamba / 
Samburu East / Rift 
Valley) 
 
Samburu Highly mobile, satellite camps comprised solely of Samburu morans 
with their livestock.  It is a densely forested area with perennial water 
sources in the interior of the Samburu territory as part of the Matthews 
Ranges.  There is high disease prevalence from insects and insecurity 
from the high abundance of wildlife.  The satellite camps were too 
numerous and mobile to count. 
Naalamurrwak 
 
(Remote / Waso 
West / Waso / 
Samburu East / Rift 
Valley) 
Samburu Pastoral area close to Wamba centre and Lengusaka livestock market.  
The area is part of a community conservancy where there has been a 
grazing management scheme implemented.  This is a border area; 
however, it is not a contentious one as there are livestock ranches and 
conservancies to the south.  The area consists of 8 manyattas made up 
of 58 temporary houses. 
Lolmisigiyioi 
 
(Tinga / Loosuk / 
Kirisia / Samburu 
Central / Rift 
Valley) 
Samburu An agro-pastoral area on the Leroghi Plateau, bordering the Pokot 
ethnic group to the west.  It is a high altitude area and benefits from 
significant rainfall due to its elevation; however, it is highly insecure 
due to the presence of the Pokot.  The homes here are more permanent 
structures where manyattas contain only 1 – 2 houses each.  There are 
approximately 45 manyattas in this settlement. 
Ntabasi 
 
(Sere-olipi / Sere-
olipi / Waso / 
Samburu East / Rift 
Valley) 
Samburu 
/ 
Rendille 
Predominantly Samburu area with a number of mixed Rendille 
families.  This is a highly contentious border area with the Borana 
where there is much insecurity.  It is located close to the great northern 
highway and to the village of Sere-olipi.  There are approximately 13 
manyattas in this settlement, comprised of 124 temporary houses. 
Girissa 
 
(Kulamawe / 
Kulamawe / Kinna 
/ Garba Tula / 
Eastern) 
Borana A very large, highly mobile Borana and Somali area located close to 
Kulamawe town.  It is populated mainly by male herders living in 
small mobile goses (without shelter).  There are approximately 50 olas 
in this region, with each ola being comprised of approximately 2 – 5 
goses.  There is a heavy concentration of livestock in this area, relying 
on the Girissa earth-dug water pan for their drinking water.  This area 
is considered to be an interior area; however, it is approaching the 
border with the Samburu. 
Mata Arba  
 
(Mata Arba / 
Korbesa / Cherab / 
Isiolo / Eastern) 
Borana A large settlement of approximately 47 olas, on average having 1-3 
goses per ola and populated solely by Borana in the interior of Borana 
territory.  The goses here are in the form of  semi-permanent housing, 
a few having corrugated iron roofs.  This is a more settled area, 
consisting of mainly women, children, and elderly.  Livestock were 
not allowed into the settlement area so they were kept by the male 
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herders within grazing land a short distance away from the settlement 
(about 2km).  The area surrounding Mata Arba is incredibly dry and 
collecting water for domestic use is extremely difficult.    
Darer Shai 
 
(Garba Tula North 
/ Garba Tula / 
Garba Tula / Garba 
Tula / Eastern) 
Borana A densely wooded area close to Garba Tula town.  It is a pastoral area 
where the herds of Garba Tula families are kept by the male herders.  
There are both Borana and Somali found here, with 7 olas, having 20 
goses, and it is considered an interior area. 
Kambi Garba 
 
(Bulla Pesa / Isiolo 
Central / Isiolo 
Central / Isiolo / 
Eastern) 
Borana A large settlement of approximately 82 olas, made up of 1-3 goses per 
ola.  These are mainly permanent / semi-permanent households, and 
the settlement is in close proximity to Isiolo town, which is a densely 
populated area.  It is a cosmopolitan area comprised of Borana, 
Somali, Turkana, and Garre families with few livestock being found 
within the settlement.  Many families engage in small-scale farming in 
nearby areas or have family members working in Isiolo to provide 
additional income.  This is considered a border area with the Samburu 
and migrant Turkana populations. 
Gambella 
 
(Bulla Pesa / Isiolo 
Central / Isiolo 
Central / Isiolo / 
Eastern) 
Borana Gambella is a grazing area located close to Kambi Garba, composed of 
satellite livestock camps accompanied by predominantly male herders.  
This is a border area with the Samburu and Turkana, having both 
Borana and Somali herders present.  There are approximately 10 olas, 
each composed of 1-3 goses. 
Farakaren 
 
(Illaut / Nguronit / 
Korr / Laisamis / 
Eastern) 
Rendille 
/ 
Samburu 
This is a non-contentious border area between the Samburu and 
Rendille territories located close to the Ndoto Mountains.  It is a 
particularly dry area and finding potable water for both humans and 
livestock is problematic.  The Rendille families have very large camel 
herds which are kept in grazing areas in the surrounding hillsides.  
There are 7 manyattas here, containing 186 temporary homes.  
Lolkerded 
 
(Laresoro / Waso 
East / Waso / 
Samburu East / Rift 
Valley) 
Samburu This is a highly contentious border area with the Borana, located close 
to the town of Archers Post, the great northern highway, and the 
Ewaso Nyiro river.  It is found within the Kalama conservancy area, 
and there are grazing management schemes underway here.  The 
families are predominantly Samburu, although there are a number of 
Turkana families living in the area.  It is pastoral area comprised of 28 
manyattas with 138 temporary houses.  The area is close to the British 
and Kenyan army training grounds where a large number of disused 
bullets can be obtained from the ground. 
Resim 
 
(Resim / Ngaroni / 
Wamba / Samburu 
East / Rift Valley) 
Samburu Interior Samburu area with comparatively large herds and having large 
manyattas used as “training grounds” for junior elders.  Many of the 
elder males remembered Paul Spencer living with them during the 
colonial period.  The settlement area is made up of 19 manyattas 
consisting of 76 temporary homes.   
Daka Dhima 
 
(Malka Daka / 
Malka Daka / 
Garba Tula / Garba 
Tula / Eastern) 
Borana Arjal area of livestock whose families live in Malka Daka village.  It is 
a Borana area for grazing livestock; however, due to the dense 
vegetation, it suffers from a lot of conflict with wildlife.  It is an 
interior area; however, it was the site of much conflict with the Somali 
in the 1990s as the Somali were already settled in these areas amongst 
the Borana.  The area has 18 olas, comprised of 74 goses located close 
to the Ewaso Nyiro river. 
Malka Daka 
 
Borana Malka Daka village is an established settlement area having a mosque, 
a clinic, and a school.  There are no animals that are kept in the village 
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(Malka Daka / 
Malka Daka / 
Garba Tula / Garba 
Tula / Eastern) 
as they are all grazed in the surrounding arjals.  Education, literacy, 
and spoken English are high here; however, unemployment is also 
very high.  Although the olas were not counted, a decent estimate 
would be approximately 50-60 olas, consisting of semi-permanent and 
permanent structures, each having 1 – 2 homes in each ola.  Small-
scale farming is practiced by a number of inhabitants here at times 
when irrigation is possible or as a form of supplementary food. 
Darer 
Mukguracha 
 
(Gotu / Ngare Mara 
/ Isiolo East / Isiolo 
/ Eastern) 
Borana A hotly-contested border area with the Samburu to the north and west.  
It is a pastoral grazing area for Borana and Somali families consisting 
of mainly male herders who are heavily armed and equipped.  The 
grazing areas are located north of the Ewaso Nyiro, and the town of 
Gotu (having important natural perennial springs) is across the river to 
the south.  There is an AP post and ASTU unit stationed in Gotu due to 
the high prevalence of raiding in this area.  The settlement contains 10 
olas, having 29 goses.   
Unesco Ririma 
 
(Kargi / Kargi / 
Loiyangalani / 
Laisamis / Eastern) 
Rendille This is a very dry, purely Rendille area with a large number of camel 
herds.  Accessing water here was highly problematic until a borehole 
and pump were dug in the area in 2006.  The area consists of mainly 
young male herders and Rendille morans.  There are approximately 32 
fora in the area, comprised of 153 gobs.  This is considered an interior 
area; however, many of the men graze their animals closer to border 
areas with the Borana where conflict typically ensues. 
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3.4 Photos of Study Area 
Figure 3.4:  Photos taken within Samburu fieldwork areas.  Clockwise from upper left-hand corner:  a 
typical Samburu manyatta showing thorn-ringed fence and mud and wooden housing; highly mobile 
satellite moran camp within Kitich forest; a typical primary school in Kalama conservancy area; a 
married Samburu woman, as demonstrated by metal hooped earrings; typical nursery school under a 
shady tree and encircled by thorn fencing; drilled borehole with hand-pump used to fill domestic jerry 
cans near Ndoto Mountains; Lengusaka market selling livestock and small food items (maize meal flour, 
tea, sugar, etc.) 
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Figure 3.5:  Photos taken within Borana fieldwork areas.  Clockwise from upper left-hand corner:  earth 
dam constructed for livestock and domestic use in Girissa area; Gotu village containing houses and a 
number of small shops located on the road that is one of the two passageways across the Ewaso Nyiro 
River; a typical Borana gose constructed with wood and thick reed matting; a dry-season well for 
livestock, hand dug inside a dry riverbed and protected by thorn fencing; two young male herders 
standing by their gose.    
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Figure 3.6:  Photos taken within Rendille fieldwork areas.  Clockwise from upper left-hand corner:  a 
group of Rendille morans demonstrating traditional bead adornment, carrying herding sticks and rifles; a 
typical Rendille fora with house constructed from wooden branches and thick reed matting, displaying a 
characteristic Rendille entranceway; a large boma of small stock enclosed by thorn-ringed fencing; a 
Rendille gob, showing sleeping area next to the animal boma and fireplace for cooking. 
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Figure 3.7:  Photos taken during fieldwork.  Clockwise from upper left-hand corner:  researcher and field 
assistant’s tents amongst a mixed Samburu / Rendille manyatta near the Ndoto Mountains; typical 
ephemeral stream used to dig shallow wells used as a source of water for domestic and livestock purposes; 
the major waterway of northern Kenya – the Ewaso Nyiro River during the wet season; a Samburu cow 
pictured in August 2009 near Wamba, having succumbed to the effects of malnutrition. 
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Chapter 4: Methods 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the reasoning behind decisions taken in the research and fieldwork 
design, how data were gathered in the field, and how the data were processed post-
fieldwork.  The aim of the data collection and analysis was to maximise the number and 
variety of sites sampled, individuals interviewed, activities witnessed, and perspectives 
recorded in order to achieve substantial ethnographic depth.  Furthermore, considerable 
effort was taken in order to be able to place qualitative data within a relevant 
environmental and climatic context. 
4.2 Fieldwork Plan and Preparation 
The fieldwork was designed to be divided up into two distinct field trips utilising mixed 
methodologies.  The first phase of fieldwork lasted 9 months (August 2009 – April 2010) 
and was to focus on qualitative ethnographic data collection in the form of detailed 
interviews, collecting oral histories, migration histories, participant observation, focus 
groups, and mobile ethnographies.  The data gathered during this phase were to be used 
to develop hypotheses regarding the relationship between climatic conditions and 
conflict prevalence.  These hypotheses were to be used to develop a standardised 
questionnaire that would be administered during the second phase of fieldwork (June – 
December 2010) to collect quantifiable data.  However, in practice, the distinction 
between the two fieldwork phases was not so apparent.  During data collection in the 
first phase of fieldwork and through recording people’s understanding of the role of 
drought in their lives, I progressively developed questions that would lend themselves to 
being quantified at a later stage.  However, these questions, incorporated as part of the 
‘natural’ course of the interviews and discussions, lacked the rigidity of a standardised 
questionnaire.  Ultimately, I believe that this was a superior approach to the original 
fieldwork plan, as it was important to understand the questions in context with 
individuals’ lives and experiences, especially considering the delicate nature of 
inquiring about drought and violent episodes.  Furthermore during both of the fieldwork 
phases, participatory GIS mapping of resource use, water sources, and settlement 
distributions were carried out within community areas (Abbot et al. 1998) in order to 
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map the field sites accurately, including a robust understanding of the resources 
available to local communities.  This also helped to provide the appropriate 
environmental context under which anthropological data can be analysed (Steinberg and 
Steinberg 2006).   
 
Before commencing fieldwork, I was already well acquainted with the more southerly 
regions of the research area as I had worked and travelled within these areas on two 
previous excursions to Kenya in 2004 and 2005 and had established numerous contacts 
in-country that would prove to be invaluable as I began doctoral fieldwork.  In July 
2009, Earthwatch Institute, that had been my employer in the previous field expeditions, 
invited me to supervise one of their research projects at their Arid Drylands Research 
Centre, located in Wamba, Samburu East District.  During this two week project, I 
worked with staff and researchers from the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF), Kenya 
Wildlife Service (KWS), Moi University, and resident Samburu and Borana field staff.  
These individuals assisted by providing me with an introduction into the wider local 
community.  For the first month of my PhD fieldwork, I based myself at the Wamba 
Catholic Mission, where I became acquainted with various members of the 
administrative and pastoral staff.  The mission, along with its hospital, is generally 
considered the heart of the Samburu community in Wamba.  Religious practices make 
up a very small proportion of the wide range of activities that are carried out through the 
mission – from feeding programmes, to educational services, to sports and leisure 
activities, and artistic performances.   
 
It was through my relationship with the mission that I was able to secure a highly 
qualified and well-suited individual to assist me with:  1) translation, as the Samburu 
communities within my research area predominantly spoke mother tongue (Maa), 2) 
data recording, in order to provide context and interpret behaviours from a local 
perspective, and 3) logistical support in the field, as the duration and conditions of the 
fieldwork could be challenging (remote area, little field support, etc.).  In order to 
identify appropriate candidates, the mission administrator announced a job description 
that I had prepared seeking such a person during one of the Sunday masses.  In total, 11 
men applied for the position, whom I interviewed, and made my decision based on their 
proficiency in English, accuracy in translation from Maa to English and vice versa 
(assessed with the assistance of a highly-educated Samburu researcher), geographical 
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and ecological knowledge of the greater Samburu region, their level of integration into 
the community, having a “likeable” personality, the ability to problem-solve and, not 
without good reason, some knowledge of bush mechanics.  A more nebulous criterion, 
but nonetheless an important one, was the field assistants must be able to “think” 
between two cultures, providing both emic and etic perspectives on the same events and 
occurrences.  Henige (1982) describes such people as being exposed to new modes of 
thinking but also having a deep understanding of their own cultural heritage.  Judging 
against these criteria, Raphael Lejohn Leteele, a primary school graduate up through 
class eight (~13 years old), was an excellent match for the requirements of the job and 
was employed as my field assistant throughout my time within the Samburu 
communities.      
 
After being in the field for approximately five months while working with the Samburu 
communities, I needed to begin searching for a field assistant to help me with similar 
tasks within the Borana region.  Due to the more cosmopolitan nature of Isiolo District, 
there was no central body where I could advertise for a Borana field assistant, as I had 
done through the Wamba Mission.  Instead, I distributed a job posting to all of the 
government, development, community-based organisations (CBOs), and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) that are based within Isiolo town.  From this 
posting, I interviewed 17 aptly qualified men and women from the Borana community 
and selected Hussein Guyo Gonossa, a secondary school graduate who had a rich 
background in working for other field researchers on various development and 
ecological programmes, as my field assistant.  Unfortunately, due to poor health, 
Hussein was unable to commit to the duration of the fieldwork and was subsequently 
replaced by his younger brother Abdy Kareem Guyo, who was also a secondary school 
graduate and qualified school teacher.   
 
By the time that I was coming to choose a Rendille field assistant, I had already been in 
the field for a period of one year, and this process was therefore not as formal, as I had 
made many contacts along the way and knew of a number of individuals who were well 
qualified.  Instead of canvassing for applicants, I used close personal connections and 
recommendations from friends to select Harun Basele, a secondary school graduate, 
from a short-list of three individuals.  Harun and I worked together until I officially left 
the field in December 2010. 
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All of the field assistants chosen were men, all married, and all of an elder (non-youth / 
warrior) age-set.  Although this was not a specific requirement for the three positions, 
and I was highly motivated to hire female field assistants, the use of married male field 
assistants was advantageous for a number of reasons.  The first reason is that married 
women in all three communities simply did not apply for the position.  When I queried 
this aspect, I was told by a number of local women that it would be difficult to leave 
their domestic responsibilities and children for weeks and months at a time.  For the 
Borana community, the women who applied were unmarried girls, and although highly 
educated and well qualified, there were a number of concerns that I had about working 
together.  The first, and most important, is that while the unmarried girls would be able 
to converse freely with the married and unmarried women in their communities, it 
would be more problematic to speak with the men in the communities, particularly the 
older men.  Within the Samburu and Rendille communities, unmarried girls rarely 
converse openly and speak at length to elder men, in part because they are marriageable 
and represent ‘potential’ wives.  This can also be true for the Borana; furthermore, 
married males have more ‘authority’ in speaking with other married males than an 
unmarried female would in the same situation.  It can already be difficult to talk directly 
with an individual moran, as they generally keep to themselves, unless you can engage 
them within a group (as discussed in section 4.5.2 of this chapter).  Having an 
unmarried woman converse with a group of morans would have been difficult, as she 
would represent a potential girlfriend, and therefore they may not be direct with her or 
answer pointed questions.  Finally, the women whom I interviewed were more 
‘sheltered’ than their male counterparts, primarily exposed to their local region but with 
little first-hand knowledge about areas more than 50km away from where they were 
living.  Married men, in this case, were more appropriate field assistants because they 
generally could talk openly with a more diverse group of people, they were able to leave 
their families for a number of weeks at a time, they tended to have better first-hand 
knowledge of all of the community areas, they had more ‘authority’ in dealing with 
community leaders, police and DCs, and they generally had more field experience than 
their younger female counterparts. 
  
Field conditions were generally physically harsh, with very limited access to water in 
the form of hand dug wells, no electricity, travelling over unpaved bush roads / paths, 
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and temperatures approaching 50˚C during the daytime.  My field assistants and I would 
travel to each research site by 4-wheel drive vehicle, carrying with us 70 litres of clean 
drinking water, dry food and root vegetable provisions to last the duration of the 
fieldtrip, a three-person tent, and a large main tent that would serve as a rain shelter, 
gathering point, impromptu interview area, kitchen, bathing facility, and my home for 
the 17 months of fieldwork.  For each field site, I would spend approximately 1 month 
in each area and then leave the field for a period of 3 – 4 days to stay at a rented home 
in Nanyuki, a comparatively large town in the Rift Valley some 3 – 14 hours’ drive 
away, depending on the location of the previous field site, where I would wash clothes, 
have a shower, charge batteries, safely store field notebooks, buy more food stuffs, and 
replenish water supplies.  While at the field sites, data collection took place seven days 
a week from 6am (at the time of the morning milking) until 6:30pm (at the time that the 
livestock would return to their bomas for the evening milking).   
 
The final aspect worth mentioning regarding the fieldwork logistics is that by August 
2009, the Rendille, Samburu, and Borana people of northern Kenya had experienced 
three failed rainy seasons, equating to approximately one year of extreme drought 
conditions (the actual period without rain was a year and a half; however drought 
conditions are reported to have started at the beginning of the second failed rainy 
season).  It would not rain until October 2009, and even then, the rain that fell was far 
from sufficient to replenish water reserves and promote vegetation regeneration.  
Resources for livestock and people alike were extremely depleted at the time that I 
entered the field, and feelings of bewilderment, desperation, indignation, and 
resignation characterised many of the people that I spoke to during the initial stages of 
data collection.  Despite these conditions, people were extraordinarily welcoming, 
generous with their time in providing information, and supportive of my fieldwork, 
which I was surprised to find considering the hardship conditions.      
4.3 Entering the Field 
All official permissions to conduct research amongst these three pastoral populations 
were granted before entering the field.  I abided strictly by the Association of Social 
Anthropologists of the UK (ASA) ethical guidelines, as the research plan was approved 
by the Durham Anthropology Ethics Committee in March 2009.  The project was also 
given health and safety approval from Durham’s Department of Anthropology.  Further 
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permissions were granted from Kenya’s Ministry of Education, Science and Technology 
to carry out research from July 2009 – January 2012.  In order to expedite the 
processing of the Kenyan research permit and to serve as a mentor in the field,   
additional in-country research oversight and support was provided by Professor Joshua 
Akong’a in the Department of Anthropology and Human Ecology at Moi University in 
Eldoret, Kenya, who has studied pastoral decision-making strategies in drought-prone 
areas. 
 
Entering the field was a multi-step process, which was vital for the successful 
implementation of the fieldwork.  The first step in working with each group was to find 
reliable maps for each ethnic territory.  To this end, the DC’s office in Wamba and the 
Isiolo Bureau of Statistics were extremely helpful.  With each field assistant, we would 
consult the maps, identify where communities were likely to be found, and the general 
conditions expected in each area (amount of rainfall, topography, water sources, etc.).  
My primarily criterion at this stage was to make sure that the study sites would 
represent both interior populations and border populations for each ethnic group, as I 
was aware that these two groups are disproportionately prone to conflict episodes and 
would experience conflict in different ways (e.g., Smith, Barrett and Box 2001).  After 
assessing the maps and choosing the general regions where we were looking to work, 
my field assistant and I would travel to the DC’s office that had jurisdiction over the 
region we were looking to enter (sometimes requiring up to an extra day of travelling), 
in order to be granted his permission, to notify him that we would be working in the 
area for security reasons, and for him to ‘hand us over’ to the location chief of the area 
in which we wanted to work.  This ‘handing over’ process was of the utmost importance 
in allowing us to enter the community areas without any issues and to be ‘known’ to the 
people, even before our arrival.  On occasions when the mobile network permitted, the 
DC would make direct contact with the chief to alert him to our pending arrival, or he 
would supply us with an official letter from his office stating that we had been given 
local approval to conduct research within a specified community area.  Having obtained 
the DC’s approval, we would proceed into the community area in order to find the 
location chief.  With the chief, the three of us would talk about the local area, and the 
chief could describe where the communities could be found during the time period in 
question.  From these discussions, we would decide upon a community area that had a 
considerable number (>5) of homesteads (manyatta, ola, fora) so that the pool of 
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individuals was large enough to provide a decent sample size.  Once the particular 
settlement area had been chosen, the chief then either travelled with us to the area, or we 
were handed over to the local chief.  From there, the local chief would either gather his 
community’s elders, or he would call a baraza (meeting) with the community at large to 
introduce us, notify his people of our purpose during our time with them, and to ask that 
we be treated as part of the community.  This method of entering the community areas 
worked exceedingly well across all three populations to the extent that we had close to a 
100% acceptance rate amongst identified participants.  A number of people expressed 
their pleasure that we had been sensitive to the local ways of entering others’ 
communities and that we had used the prescribed chain of command in order to do so.    
 
Working between three communities over a large area and without any prior knowledge 
of the local languages being used in interviews was not without its challenges.  
However, in order to facilitate trust between the interviewer and interviewee and to 
ensure the highest quality of data being collected, the methods devised for this research 
were designed specifically to address these issues.  First, the handing-over process and 
obtaining the appropriate permissions, as described in the preceding paragraphs, were 
paramount to the community receiving us with openness and respect.  Second, I selected 
my three field assistants with such care that they be ‘known’ and respected by the larger 
community, either through their family names or as individuals.  For instance, Raphael 
Leteele belongs to one of the largest Samburu clans, many people told me that he has a 
reputation of being a trustworthy and hardworking individual in the community (which 
I also found to be true), he had worked previously on a number of support projects in 
the greater Samburu region (digging permanent wells, driving people in hospital 
vehicles for clinics and medical support), his father (with whom Raphael shares his 
name) was well-known for circumcising a great number of men throughout the 
Samburu area, and the Leteele name can be found in both Samburu and Rendille areas, 
which was helpful when working in mixed Samburu – Rendille locations.  Third, my 
field assistants and I worked very closely together before entering the field, extensively 
discussing the purpose of each interview and how interviews should be conducted 
without interpretation or embellishment during translation.  Also, there was a good 
working and personal relationship between myself and my assistants that they could tell 
me if problems arose during any of the interviews.  We discussed every interview 
afterwards, whether anomalies had appeared, what may have caused them, and if there 
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were aspects (verbal or non-verbal) that I had missed.  As fieldwork lasted 
approximately one month in each of the field sites, trust needed to be established 
quickly between myself and the community.  To this aim, my approach was to capitalise 
on and make use of already well-established trust bonds between the chiefs and the local 
community and between my field assistants and the local community.  Furthermore, I 
(and my field assistants) did work exceedingly hard when we were in the community 
areas:  never taking a day off, entering into remote / dangerous locations, walking 
everywhere over long distances, milking animals, herding animals, collecting water, 
driving people for medical attention, observing eating restrictions during Ramadan, etc. 
that I was told by many that these behaviours went a long way among the people in 
proving my dedication to the research that they, in turn, wanted to help me with their 
time and openness.  My relationship with each of these communities was extremely 
positive, setting an atmosphere that lent itself to productive data collection.  
Furthermore, I conducted a number of interviews in English (approximately 25), and 
none of these interviews yielded information that was contrary to the translator-assisted 
interviews.  These aspects gave me confidence that the data being collected were 
reliable and accurately captured interviewees’ thoughts and feelings on the issues being 
discussed.         
4.4 Selecting a Sample 
During fieldwork, participants were chosen by first mapping the homesteads (manyattas, 
olas, foras) with the help of the sub-location chief / informed elder within each field site.  
We asked the informant to describe which families / households could be found within 
each homestead.  Although no formally agreed-upon boundaries exist between one sub-
location area to another, the informant often cited important landmarks, such as a water 
source, road, hilltop, riverbed, etc. that they felt delineated sub-location boundaries, and 
the members found inside such boundaries would share common resources, such as a 
well, borehole, or grazing land.  Once the homesteads had been mapped, including the 
names of the families for each household, my field assistant and I would then divide the 
settlements up by proximity to one another, allowing for members from 2 – 3 
homesteads to be interviewed each day.  For the 17 field sites studied, the number of 
homesteads ranged from 8 up to 82, each homestead having between 1 – 35 households.  
However, the average size sub-location was approximately 35 homesteads, and the 
average household number was approximately 5 per homestead.  The typical distance 
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between the two furthest homesteads away from each other in any given sub-location 
was approximately 8km.  Please see Figure 4.1 for a graphic representation of a typical 
sub-location and Figure 4.2 for a representation of a typical homestead. 
Figure 4.1:  Hand-drawn map of Lolkerded field site, from field notebook.  Drawn with the assistance of 
local elder and brother to the location chief.  It depicts the sub-location borders as Laresoro River to the 
east, Losesia road to the south, and the tarmac road to the west and north. 
 
  
107 
 
Figure 4.2:  Representation of a Samburu manyatta, composed of 3 households, 3 animals bomas (1 
belonging to each family), and 3 passages for each of the livestock herds to pass through out of the 
settlement 
 
 
It was not possible to specify an exact sample size before entering the field since it 
depended on the quality and nature of interviews and the point at which ‘saturation’ was 
reached.  At the outset, I aimed to interview at least 20 members of each of the three 
ethnic groups (60 respondents in total).  However, at the close of fieldwork, I had 
interviewed more than 275 individuals.  The inclusion criteria for interviews were 
purposely broad, as I wanted the sample to encompass the full range of ages, gender, 
marital status, education levels, etc.  It was important to record the different experiences 
of conflict and climatic events from many points of view.  Ultimately, I interviewed an 
equal number of married men and women, many groups of children, a number of groups 
of morans (approximately fifteen), unmarried individuals (more male herders than 
females), with ages that approximately ranged from four to one hundred.  Interviews 
with children were brief (less than thirty minutes), always in the presence of a parent / 
adult, and they did not discuss conflict incidents.  Instead, they focused on the types of 
games children play, if they attend school, their expectations for / source of their future 
livelihoods, and exposure / attitudes towards other ethnic groups.  The overall interview 
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approach was designed to be one that was a stratified random sampling (Fink 2003); 
however, the sample was more opportunistic than random.  After choosing the 
homesteads based on the methods described above, we would enter each homestead, 
greet all of the family members who were present, see who was available to be 
interviewed, and then select an individual who would contribute to the diversity of the 
sample.  Whenever possible, we would try to solicit interviews from more elder 
members of the settlement (ages 70+ years), as these individuals were relatively few in 
number, and we could capture historical knowledge from as far back in time as possible.  
Each of the interviews lasted for a period of 1 – 3 hours on average, which we found to 
be an adequate amount of time to solicit information and was also acceptable to the 
interviewees.  We made clear to all participants that they could stop the interview at any 
time if they felt uncomfortable, upset, ill, tired, or if they had responsibilities that 
needed their attention.  The majority of individuals were talkative, eagerly provided 
information, and often times liked to continue the conversation even after the official 
interview had ended.     
 
Initially, we were interviewing more than one person per homestead; however, we came 
to find that the stories (such as migration histories and conflict incidents) between two 
individuals from the same homestead were rather similar as a result of the families’ 
tendencies to migrate together.  Because of this, we switched tactics early in the 
fieldwork to only interview one member from each homestead, therefore allowing us to 
cover more ground, include an increased number of homesteads in the sample, and 
increase the diversity of experiences being recorded.              
4.5 Methods and Justification 
4.5.1 Semi-Structured Interviews 
Before recording any data, participants were informed fully about the purpose, methods, 
and limitations of the study (e.g., not making promises based on results) before seeking 
their voluntary agreement to participate.  During the interviews, a major goal was to 
help the participants place themselves within a certain environmental context and have 
participants verbalise what each environmental condition means or looks like to them.  
It was important for this analysis to make sure that the participants had a clear 
understanding of the time periods that they would be discussing and the behaviours 
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associated with each of those periods.  We would start by recording oral histories 
(Henige 1982) which focused on life events, pertinent issues regarding environmental 
change, change and continuity in pastoral modes of production, ranging behaviour, 
ethnic conflict, government administration, livestock populations, development in the 
area, etc.  One area that I focused on in the oral histories was to record very detailed 
migration histories starting from the time and place where the individual was born, 
where s/he had moved to, how long s/he lived in each location, why s/he moved to a 
particular area, what each area looked like, how productive each area was, why s/he 
moved from each area, how the next place was chosen that s/he moved to, etc.  
Recording detailed migration histories in this way got people thinking about the land, 
how they lived within it, and how it changed over time; moreover, this approach 
enabled people to link their behaviours and actions to the environments in which they 
found themselves throughout their lifespans.  In order to optimise the quality of the 
retrospective reporting, event history calendars that were developed for the 2009 
Kenyan census (Kenya Bureau of Statistics 2010) were used to tie memories back to 
specific political, ecological, or life history events (Belli 1998).  Next, we discussed the 
landscape around them, as they saw it at the time of the interview.  I asked how the land 
was, if it was benefitting the animals, what was deficient about it (if anything), and how 
it compared to areas in which they had lived in the past.  Then I would ask about the 
years leading up to the present – how they had changed or stayed the same or had an 
influence on what the land looks like in the present.  This was one of the key elements 
in furthering the inter-subjective pursuits of this study as we could discuss the land 
together, and I could gain a first-hand appreciation of its contemporary appearance, and 
then was able to put that information into an historical context. 
 
When talking about conflict incidents, it was important that this was not initially 
emphasised too early on in the interview, in order to make the participant feel more at 
ease, to foster rapport between us, and the “non-conflict” information recorded earlier in 
the interview could be used to corroborate details provided about the conflict incidents 
that were reported.  Discussing conflict in general can be a highly contentious issue.  
Even though the research participants knew that I was an independent researcher 
without any connections to the government, there is a pervasive fear that details about 
raids, who was involved, the weapons that were used, etc. can be reported back to the 
government, which they fear may cause them problems.  As I divided my fieldwork 
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time between more than one ethnic group, there was no pressure for me to solicit details 
regarding conflict events where the research participant would be culpable in any way.  
Instead, I could focus on conflict events where the interviewee was the ‘victim’ rather 
than the perpetrator, meaning that he / she would be more willing to report events and to 
provide details.  However, this method of recording events where the research 
participant is primarily the victim of a conflict event does have its problems.  The major 
issue is the tendency for interviewees to over-report episodes of victimisation or 
animals lost in raiding events in order to provoke sympathy from the researcher and 
create negative feelings towards “the enemy.”  Throughout the interviews, my field 
assistants and I remained highly vigilant in order to recognise anomalies in an 
interviewee’s reports, exaggerations, misrepresentations, etc., based on the data 
collected previously in the interview, which would render the conflict incident details 
unreliable.  If this were the case, we would ask for additional clarification on any details 
that were not corroborated with other information contained in the interview.  Taking 
the time at the beginning of the interview to collect a highly detailed migration history 
for each family was incredibly helpful in verifying conflict incidents as this allowed us 
to cross-check dates, locations, types of animals being herded, family members who 
were involved, etc.  Conflict information was also examined against meticulous incident 
reports kept by the Secretary for the District Peace Committee in Samburu East District 
that recorded the date, specific location, ethnic groups involved, and a description of 
each conflict event for 2009.  Incidents were also verified when one household 
referenced a conflict that had not affected their animals specifically (mentioned because 
it had factored into how they managed their migration at the time), but it had affected 
another household in the area, for whom we had recorded conflict information 
previously.  During the entirety of the fieldwork, there were a number of interviews 
(approximately 10 out of 275+ interviews) that were wholly abandoned due to 
misinformation.      
       
More specifically, participants were asked if they themselves had ever experienced any 
conflict or were involved in any raiding events, either as ‘perpetrator’ or ‘victim.’  If 
they answered in the affirmative, details were then gathered about the particular raiding 
event:  people involved, ethnic groups involved, animals affected, weapons used, etc.  
Dates for each conflict event were placed into a chronology in light of the event history 
calendars and the oral / migration histories previously recorded in the interview in order 
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to narrow conflict dates to a specific year.  For the vast majority of interviews, this 
technique worked exceptionally well, and I was able to ascertain the exact year of a 
conflict.  For those incidents where the exact year was not achieved, every effort was 
made to narrow the date to within ±1 year.  If the accuracy of the dates was called into 
question, for instance if there were conflicting timelines between the conflict incidents 
and migration histories, then the particular conflict incident in question was not 
included in further analysis.  As each participant recounted additional conflicts, a 
chronology of conflicts could be established, whereby I was able to flag any anomalies 
in order that dates may be corrected.  After I recorded all of the details surrounding 
conflicts that the participant had experienced personally, I would then ask whether 
either of the participant’s parents had been involved in any conflicts at the time that the 
participant was living at home, i.e. before marriage.  This line of questioning helped to 
ensure a higher level of accuracy in terms of dating conflicts as the interviewee had a 
first-hand account of all of the conflict events that were discussed rather than reporting 
details based on hearsay. 
 
Throughout the interviews, the questions asked were all open-ended in order to allow 
people to express fully their understanding of the environment, experiences that they 
have had in it, and feelings that they have associated with these experiences, thus 
promoting a rich, inclusive data set.     
 
4.5.2 Focus Groups 
Focus groups were used for two very important reasons, which I only discovered as a 
result of conducting some unproductive interviews.  Primarily, it was a way for me to 
engage with subsets of the community that were relatively difficult to access on a one-
on-one basis.  These tended to be the younger members of society – the young 
(unmarried) women because they were shy or not used to discussing personal 
sentiments or feelings in front of an elder male of their community (as my field 
assistants were all elder males).  However, once they were situated amongst their peers, 
they felt more comfortable and opened up considerably more to my line of questioning 
within the focus group.  The young (unmarried) males were also engaged in focus 
groups as the elders had warned me that I would never come to understand the minds of 
a moran or young man because they keep their thoughts to themselves.  After 
conducting a couple of unsuccessful interviews with some young males, I decided to 
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engage them as a group and in the bush away from the eyes and ears of their fathers and 
elders, which is how and where they spend their leisure time normally.  The third group 
that I engaged in a focus group setting was the married women.  Although 
approximately 50% of my interviewees were composed of married women, I found the 
focus group forum to be highly productive for the women to feel free, speak out, have a 
voice, and be consulted on a larger scale than they may feel simply being interviewed 
within their home.   
 
This leads to my second reason for conducting focus groups, that when discussing the 
motivations for someone to raid or support a raid during a one-on-one interview, the 
respondents may not feel entirely comfortable expressing their inner-most sentiments if 
they think that the response will be met with judgement, disdain, or if they are afraid 
that they may be the only person to answer in a certain way.  However, during a focus 
group, I found that it only took one member of the group to express him / herself and 
the rest of the group would also begin speaking up as, based on my response / my field 
assistant’s response, they could see that the focus group was a space where their 
opinions and sentiments would not be judged nor would there be any consequences for 
“provocative” points of view.  This finding is contrary to one of the concerns of focus 
groups, namely that they breed conformity in opinions or withholding information 
(Morgan 1997); however, I did not find this to be the case.  Instead, I was told that, 
because each member of the focus group knew one another’s personal information (in 
terms of migration, raiding behaviour, etc.) then when members were asked to 
contribute, they were ‘policed’ by the rest of the individuals in the group.  This was not 
an active policing, but instead, people reported that it would be impossible to lie in the 
group situation where all but the researcher is aware of the truth. 
     
4.5.3 Participant-Observation 
Dyson-Hudson (1972) wrote that if one wants to understand herders, then one must also 
understand herding.  In order to further the inter-subjective approach, I helped with the 
herding and watering livestock activities with a wide array of herders and with each 
type of livestock herd (cows, goats, sheep, camels).  Herding activities were divided up 
into the morning herding and the afternoon herding, where I would stay with the same 
herder throughout the day.  I would spend either the morning or the afternoon walking 
with the herd, passively watching, recording, photographing, and GPS tracking the 
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actions of the herder and the livestock animals.  In the other herding session, I would 
actively ask questions about herding, the livestock themselves, how herd decisions were 
made, what plants or water was best for the animals, etc., as I helped the herder move 
the animals as they grazed / browsed.  Milking was also an important part of the day’s 
activities, and I was involved in both the morning and evening milking sessions.  I 
contributed greatly with the goat milking; however, I proved to be entirely inadequate at 
milking the cows.  Herding and milking allowed me to speak freely with the women, 
and gave me the greatest access to the young girls and male youths (warrior-age or 
uncircumcised).  Similarly, collecting water with the women from wells and boreholes 
was a time for chatting and listening to community gossip as women would remain 
around the waterholes talking to people or washing clothes.  These experiences were 
also vital for me to see the trouble in finding a substantial supply of clean water, 
collecting the water from often-times deep wells, and carrying the water back to the 
household more than once in a day.  Helping with the water collection gave me a first-
hand view into the increasing hardships that women face in particular (as the women are 
the water collectors) as the effects of drought continue to escalate.    
 
Throughout my time in the field, I also attended a number of livestock markets, which 
represented the biggest social event of the week for most local communities.  Here, I 
witnessed and recorded how animals are bought and sold, the activities associated with 
getting animals to market, how prices are brokered between buyers and sellers, who are 
the buyers and sellers, the ‘credit’ system as it applies to local community members, the 
fluctuating value of animals in the market, obstacles people face in getting their animals 
to market, and feelings associated with the location of markets, access to markets, what 
markets provide to people, and how to regulate markets.    
 
Finally, I attended a number of peace meetings hosted either by location chiefs or 
district peace committee members that were either focused on peace discussions in 
general (how to improve inter-ethnic peace relations overall), or on addressing a 
particular recent inter-ethnic conflict event.  During the meetings, I recorded the number 
of individuals who were present and which ethnic groups they were representing, along 
with notes on what people were saying, how they were talking to one another, and what 
issues were focussed on in terms of peace-building.             
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One final note about my participation in the field is that the importance of walking with 
pastoralists cannot be under-estimated.  Although I would use a vehicle to travel to and 
from the field sites, this was the only time that the vehicle was used, and all other 
activities were conducted whilst walking with individuals.  The importance of walking 
from a research perspective will be discussed in the next section; however, from a 
personal perspective, walking together was appreciated by the local community and 
helped to build rapport between participants and researchers.  Many people commented 
on the difference between this approach and that of development officials who ‘never 
even get out of their cars’ and get to see the situation ‘on the ground.’         
 
4.5.4 Mobile Ethnographies 
In light of the discussion above, I also collected ethnographic data within pastoral 
communities by conducting mobile narratives – a method successfully used by my 
supervisor whilst recording children’s mobility experiences in Africa (Porter, 
Hampshire et al. 2010).  By walking with pastoral communities during settlement 
migrations, herding activities, to / from water sources, and to / from markets, we were 
able to discuss changes to the land, concerns during movement of the camps, decision-
making processes, ranging behaviour, etc.  Mobile narratives were an effective way to 
elicit information and gain an improved understanding of how place and environment 
impact pastoralists’ daily lives.   
 
4.5.5 Mapping 
The initial mapping of settlement areas has been discussed in section 4.4 of this chapter; 
however, these maps were not only used to identify homesteads in the area and inform 
interview activities, they were also used in participatory mapping exercises (Abbot et al. 
1998).  Walking with an informed member of the community, we would cover the 
entire area of each field site, using a GPS to record waypoints of important features:  
water sources, productive grazing areas, riverbeds, mountains, erosion areas, thick 
bushy areas, field site boundaries, amenities available, locations of all homesteads, etc.  
For each waypoint, a digital photograph was taken of the surroundings, and with the 
help of the informant, we would record the vegetation that could be seen whilst standing 
at the waypoint, its current condition, and if there were any interesting stories, anecdotes 
or historical information associated with the area.  The participatory mapping was a way 
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to get a sense of the history of the land and to see it from the perspective of the local 
people in how it’s used, what aspects are considered to be valuable, discuss how things 
have changed over time (if at all), understand the significance of new developments, etc.  
Unlike perhaps in other parts of Kenya where there have been concerns surrounding 
land grabs, people in these areas did not find the mapping to be problematic or 
contentious, and many enjoyed assisting with this exercise.   
   
4.5.6 Tree Transects 
Tree transects were conducted in order to determine an estimation of the number of 
trees that were being cut as supplementary fodder for animals during drought conditions 
when ground-cover was particularly sparse.  The function of the tree transects will be 
discussed further in chapter nine.  We used line transect sampling as this method 
effectively lends itself to sampling sparse, tall vegetation (Sutherland 1996).  For each 
field site, four 1-kilometer transects were blindly selected without prior familiarity with 
the area, and the transect line was walked using a GPS.  Any livestock fodder species 
tree above two meters (the minimum height for mature trees) touching the transect line 
(that is, within one meter of the transect line) was entered into a data sheet that recorded 
the species of tree, if there were any human cuts made on the tree, whether the cuts were 
‘new’ (considered to be within the previous year) or ‘old’ (made sometime before the 
previous year), or if the tree was dead, or if there were no cuts made to the tree.  At the 
end of the transect, a description of the transect was taken, recording information 
regarding proximity to riverbeds, proximity to homesteads, or any other pertinent 
information, such as competition / lack of competition with other vegetation in the area.   
 
4.5.7 Archival and Meteorological Data 
Colonial administrative records housed within the National Archives of Kenya were 
consulted in order to provide historical context, gather preliminary rainfall data taken 
during the colonial period, and record conflict incidence data taken by colonial 
administrators.  Particularly useful were the provincial and district annual reports for the 
Northern Frontier District (NFD) and district handing over reports written by the out-
going District Commissioners to the incoming individuals, which provided information 
on inter-ethnic relations, climatic conditions, pastoral management, and note-worthy 
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incidents that had taken place within the district or on the international borders.  The 
records dated from 1902 to the close of the colonial period. 
   
Rainfall data were obtained from the Kenya Meteorological Department in Nairobi, 
which has recorded rainfall measurements at dozens of sites throughout northern Kenya 
from approximately 1959 to present day.  However, there are major discrepancies in the 
data in terms of the continuity of recording (i.e., many sites have numerous years with 
missing information or are lacking entire entries for certain years).  In choosing from 
the dozens of recorded sites in northern Kenya from which to obtain rainfall records, it 
was necessary to have at least one site correspond with each ethnic group under study 
and obtain areas that had a long recorded history with most of the data filled in for each 
month and year under investigation.  Under the most ideal conditions, I would have 
been able to obtain data from every weather station in order to get the most complete 
historical and spatial understanding of rainfall patterns in northern Kenya, but obtaining 
all of these data would have been cost-prohibitive as the foreign student rates were 
exceedingly high at 18,000 ksh (~£140) per site.  Ultimately, the areas of Marsabit 
Mountain (typically high rainfall, intersection of Borana, Samburu, and Rendille 
populations), North Horr police post (Rendille area), Wamba District Officer’s office 
(Samburu area), and the Garba Tula police station (Borana area) were chosen for data 
collection purposes.  Although Marsabit Mountain is an area of atypically high rainfall, 
it is included in this study because:  1) it does represent a common area that can be 
utilised by all three ethnic groups, and 2) in years where surrounding areas are dry / 
drought-like, it can serve as a dry season refuge or dispersal area to ease resource 
shortages in a home location.  
 
Some recent studies on pastoralists (e.g., Ericksen et al. 2013) have used NDVI 
(Normalised Difference Vegetation Index) as a measure of the amount of live green 
vegetation available in a given land area rather than relying on rainfall data to assess 
this measurement.  NDVI was also considered for this thesis, and will likely be used in 
future analyses based on this research; however, rainfall records were used in this 
current study for a number of reasons.  First, the amount of rainfall received in arid and 
semi-arid areas has been shown to be the factor most closely associated with vegetation 
growth (Vetter 2005; Ellis and Galvin 1994), and therefore is a reliable source of data 
for this type of analysis.  Furthermore, rainfall records are readily available for the time 
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periods covered by this study, where the earliest NDVI maps for this region date back to 
1981.  Therefore, using rainfall records rather than NDVI has yielded a larger dataset 
for statistical analysis.  Finally, as mentioned in chapter two, statistical analyses from 
this study are compared to results from Witsenburg and Roba (2003, 2007), which also 
make use of rainfall measurements; therefore, comparisons benefit from using the same 
metric.   
4.5.8 A Note on Technology 
Briefly, all data recording was conducted simply using notebooks as I was trying to 
facilitate an environment where people could speak freely.  There was a certain amount 
of mistrust people had in speaking with a voice recorder present; therefore, I found the 
notebook to be more user-friendly, particularly when discussing conflict.  Furthermore, 
the lack of electricity in the field made it difficult to use any power-aided technology 
(recorders, laptops, etc.).  Digital photography was only used to document environments, 
livestock activities, and homesteads, as it was unnecessary to photograph people for the 
purposes of the data collection, and in fact, a number of respondents expressed their 
displeasure if photographs of them had been requested.  
4.6 Data Analysis 
4.6.1 Qualitative Data 
All qualitative data collected in field notes from interviews, observations, mobile 
ethnographies, focus groups, participatory mapping, and archival data were typed into a 
Word document.  Due to the sheer quantity of data collected (as the data entry, 
processing and cleaning required ten months’ of work), it was not possible to take the 
time to code all of the qualitative information systematically.  Instead, my purpose with 
the field notes was to familiarise myself thoroughly with the data by: 1) typing up the 
field notes, 2) re-reading the complete set of field notes and highlighting key sections, 3) 
writing brief summaries for each interview, and 4) identifying ‘emerging themes’ for 
each field site, which were the starting point in formulating, thinking about, and making 
connections between the data.  The analysis took a grounded theory approach (Glaser 
1992), as these emerging themes greatly helped to form the structure and key arguments 
found in this thesis.      
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4.6.2 Quantifiable Data 
Meteorological data was entered into an SPSS database, recording the year, location of 
weather station, and amount of annual rain in millimetres.  See chapter six for the 
complete statistical analysis of rainfall data. 
 
Conflict incidents were entered into an SPSS database, which recorded aspects such as:  
‘affected’ ethnic group, ‘raider’ ethnic group, year of conflict, month of conflict (if 
known), location of incident, whether livestock and / or people were affected in the 
conflict, number and types of livestock affected, number of people injured / killed, and 
the motivations given for the conflict event.  In order to ensure that conflict incidents 
were not being double-counted, I paid close attention to specific details that were 
provided about each conflict event aside from the basic questions of where, when, and 
who was involved.  People tended to recall a striking aspect of each conflict that would 
help to discount a subsequent re-telling of the same conflict.  For instance, a number of 
Borana in the Malka Daka area recalled a conflict where children were burned alive by 
a group of Somali, or the Samburu community in Ntabasi made reference to a famous 
battle at Kauro where all of the Borana were slaughtered in their sleep, but no animals 
were taken.  Although I recorded what each person had to say about the same conflict 
event, these events were only counted once in the statistical analysis.  Furthermore, the 
method by which we chose research participants helped to limit the double-counting of 
conflict incidents.  For each incident I recorded, I would ask the research participant if 
others were involved in the incident, particularly members from the same location that 
may be interviewed on a later day.  By recording the families that were involved in a 
particular conflict, I would typically not interview members of that family to reduce the 
likelihood that conflicts could be double-recorded.  This method also helped to increase 
the total number of unique conflicts that were being recorded, as it was necessary to 
capture as many incidents as possible in order to produce a robust statistical analysis.  
From the 275+ individuals interviewed during fieldwork, there were 194 people who 
recorded unique conflict incidents, which accounted for exactly 300 individual conflict 
events that were used in this statistical analysis.  For further details regarding the 
statistical analysis, please see chapter six. 
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4.6.3 Tree Transect Data 
Data taken from the tree transects were entered into an Excel spreadsheet, listing each 
location, transect number, names of tree species, number of total trees included in the 
transect line, number of trees having new cuts, number of trees having old cuts, number 
of trees without cuts.  For trees that contained both new and old cuts, these were 
counted solely as ‘new cut’ trees in order to avoid double-counting.  From this database, 
I could then calculate the percentage of total fodder-species trees cut, the percentage of 
new fodder-species trees cut, and the percentage of old fodder-species trees cut for each 
location.   
4.6.4 Mapping Data 
GPS data has been downloaded and catalogued using ArcGIS in order to produce a map 
of the entire study area, detailing each of the 17 field sites (shown in the previous 
chapter).  However, due to the vast quantity of data collected in relation to the mapping 
activities, time has not permitted me to offer any thorough analysis of these data for the 
purposes of this thesis.  It represents an exciting source of information for future spatial 
analyses, but such a rigorous investigation of the data is beyond the scope of this current 
thesis.  Instead, these data were used to supplement and enrich the qualitative data 
analysis, as discussed in section 4.6.1. 
4.7 Conclusion 
The mixed-method approach as described in this chapter has taken a broad perspective 
in investigating pastoral livelihoods, experiences, and motivations from an inter-
subjective standpoint.  Furthermore, the research approach that I have taken has been 
conducted with the goal of placing the above understanding within a deep socio-
ecological context – how people interact with landscapes, understand them, manage 
them and whose actions are shaped and influenced by them.  The approach is purposely 
inclusive and seeks to assess the likely complexity found within multiple diverse 
perspectives.   
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Chapter 5: Ethnographic Analysis of 
Climatic Conditions and 
Conflict 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to assess the nature of the relationship between drought-
induced resource scarcity and conflict in the most straight-forward manner, focusing 
solely on this relationship’s two primary variables:  1) climate and 2) conflict.  As 
discussed in chapter two, there has been a considerable amount of literature, both 
academic and from development, that posits a significant connection between these two 
variables; however, conclusive empirical evidence in support of these trends is often 
lacking.  Many ethnographies describing pastoralists in East Africa may talk about 
climatic conditions and also offer discussions on conflict behaviour, but often times, the 
readers is left to draw conclusions between these two phenomena without truly 
understanding the nature of this relationship.  Furthermore, the significance of these 
terms alone or the emphasis an author places on one term or the other can be 
problematic in the literature.  Spencer’s seminal ethnographic works, The Samburu 
(1965) and Nomads in Alliance (1973), explain quite clearly the effects that recurrent 
drought had on both of these societies and how herd management was largely focused 
on reducing the negative consequences of extreme climatic events.  However, in both of 
these volumes there is very little discussion regarding the role of aggressive behaviour 
and conflict between ethnic groups.  Spencer refers to the, “substantial loss [of cattle] 
through enemy raids (mainly in the past)” (1965: 27); however, he does not elaborate 
beyond this point to discuss the motivations behind aggressive acts, the significance 
conflict has / had, or why these contentious relationships came to an end – perhaps 
reflecting the nature of data collected during colonial administration and security.  He 
states that conflict and the role of the moran are defining features of the past, but from 
this description, it can be difficult to conceptualise these defining features and make use 
of them in further analysis.   
 
Contrary to the ‘mainstream’ paradigm that suggests a positive correlation between 
drought-like climatic conditions and increased levels of conflict amongst pastoralists 
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(e.g., McCabe 2004; Mkutu 2001; Homer-Dixon 1999, 1991; Markakis 1998; Fukui and 
Markakis 1994), local stakeholders and ‘people on the ground’ may, in fact, report the 
opposite relationship to be true.  In a talk given at London’s Royal Geographic Society 
in November 2008, Ian Craig, Executive Director of Lewa Conservancy and the 
Northern Rangelands Trust in north central Kenya stated that rainfall and pastoral 
conflict have the inverse relationship, meaning higher levels of violence can be seen 
during rainy season abundance.  Craig’s understanding of this relationship is based on 
years of observation as a large ranch and wildlife conservancy owner bordering on the 
Samburu and Borana territories, and he is well-placed to draw these conclusions, as he 
himself has negotiated and resolved many stock conflicts between disparate ethnic 
groups.  His reasoning behind this conclusion is that during rainfall periods, cattle 
populations rapidly increase, there is no market to sell off surplus animals, the pressure 
on communal resources increases, and people start to congregate and settle around large 
water resources (earth dams, reservoirs, etc.).  These water points become contested 
areas between disparate groups utilising them, where conflicts are likely to result.  
Furthermore, animals at this time increase in body mass, body condition, and strength, 
which makes them attractive to would-be raiders and attackers, and improved animal 
health allows the livestock to travel faster and further back into the territory of the 
raiding party, therefore making raiding during this time highly lucrative.  Similar 
findings that conflict is correlated with rainy periods and relative resource abundance 
have been presented by Witsenburg and Roba (2003, 2007) in their study among the 
Borana of northern Kenya.      
 
However in response to Craig’s reasoning, the following arguments can be made:  1) in 
areas prone to recurrent drought, livestock populations never have the chance to 
increase beyond any environmental or economic carrying capacities (Behnke and 
Scoones 1993), and 2) as demonstrated by migratory wild animal populations in East 
Africa, gathering at water points normally happens during dry seasons when water 
access is not widely-spread through small ephemeral streams or water catchments, etc., 
not during wet season months, as Craig had mentioned.  Spencer reinforces the nature 
of this pattern of migration when discussing Samburu movements when he writes, “As 
the dry season advances, there is progressive migration towards those water points 
which have not yet dried up.  With the onset of rains there is a wider choice for 
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nomadism, and the population tends to disperse more evenly over the countryside” 
(1965: 7).   
 
From the discussion above, can we be sure that Craig and Spencer are referencing the 
same experiences and therefore making accurate comparisons?  Craig talks about ‘rainy 
season abundance,’ yet Spencer references the ‘onset of the rains.’  With the 
information provided here, it is difficult to estimate whether or not these are indeed 
similar climatic conditions.  Therefore, for any robust analysis to take shape, a deep 
understanding of the terminology used must be provided.   
5.2 Understanding Climate 
One of the primary methodological issues that needed to be addressed in this study was 
how to go about defining exactly what drought ‘is’ and how to identify the emic criteria 
by which a population determines whether it is experiencing drought conditions so that 
it may be understood from an etic perspective.  The National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) defines a drought as “a deficiency in precipitation over an 
extended period, usually a season or more, resulting in a water shortage causing adverse 
impacts on vegetation, animals, and / or people” and goes on to say that drought “is a 
temporary aberration from normal climatic conditions” (NOAA drought factsheet, Aug 
2006).  A distinction is made here between meteorological drought (a degree of dryness 
or duration of dryness away from the norm for a particular area), agricultural drought 
(having impacts on plants, soil and ground water levels), and hydrological drought 
(extended precipitation shortfalls impacting water supplies) – please see Figure 5.1 for a 
further explanation of the relationship between these three types of drought. 
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Figure 5.1:  Diagram depicting the relationship between three types of drought.  (Source:  NOAA 
Drought fact sheet, August 2006) 
 
 
When trying to apply these definitions of drought to the East African pastoralist context, 
even at the most basic level, it becomes highly problematic.  Primarily, to attempt to 
define what a normal degree of dryness or rainfall is for these areas is challenging, as 
rainfall and weather patterns across East Africa are predominantly characterised by their 
high degree of variability as the norm.  This will be discussed in greater detail in the 
following chapter which requires a numerical understanding of drought.  However, what 
is important to keep in mind here is that due to the nature of variability within East 
African rainfall patterns, it would be inappropriate to apply a specific rubric of drought 
characteristics indiscriminately with little regard to how the local people themselves 
define drought within their own communities.  Drought is, in fact, defined by the people 
who experience it and in a context that is well-known to the actors.  A farmer, 
meteorologist, or pastoralist may all have different thresholds for the environmental 
conditions that they consider constitute drought, and therefore, it must be examined 
from this user-defined, emic perspective.  This perspective may be sub-divided even 
further within each group, for instance, between agro-pastoralists, pure pastoralists, 
camel owners, cattle owners, etc. 
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5.2.1 Climate Perspectives   
Even within the three pastoral communities involved in this research, there were some 
differences in perspectives of drought based on one’s age or gender.  As I was speaking 
with many elders from these communities, they often spoke with nostalgia of the 
landscape during their youth, where nowadays drought may be seen by them as a more 
modern phenomenon. 
“The landscape has changed over time.  Before, there was grass 
everywhere…but now we don’t see any.  It’s been since the early 1990s that this 
has happened.  The periods between the droughts are becoming closer together, 
and the rainfall is less and less when it does come.  Comparing a long time ago 
to now, cow dung used to float due to the heavy rains.” (Samburu, elder woman, 
Lenchokut) 
Within all three populations, the elder communities’ stories corroborated that “back then” 
(generally referring to the period of their youth) there was grass and plenty of water for 
their animals.  If drought did happen, it was nothing like those of “today” because it did 
not last very long, but more importantly, it was broken by a period of sufficient rain that 
would replenish the water sources and the grazing land.  Nowadays, the rain in their 
eyes is never sufficient to overcome the deleterious effects of a preceding year’s 
drought.  However, younger individuals often times viewed recurring drought as part of 
the “typical,” albeit difficult, life experience, in contrast to the views held by many 
elders who have not always been consistently exposed to drought periods.  The life that 
the pastoralist youth know may be one filled with hardships; however, without having a 
basis for comparison with a more prosperous time, this type of hardship may become 
the norm for them, with the rains offering a small amount of respite from their 
otherwise arduous way of life.   
 
Likewise, male and female perspectives on what constitutes “drought” were also 
different amongst the three pastoral populations and tended to focus on how drought 
conditions affected each sphere of influence.  Men, who were largely in charge of day-
to-day herd management, would quite often refer to the lack of pastureland, the need to 
move frequently and to distant places, or how difficult it was to find sufficient water for 
their herds, etc.  Women, whose influence would have an emphasis on more domestic 
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affairs, would say that drought means a lack of milk, or that the children had very little 
food and had to rely on rations, or that they had to travel further to collect water 
compared to years receiving sufficient rain.  
 
5.2.2 Climate Terminology 
Due to these differences in perspectives and in order to ensure that researcher and 
participants were discussing similar concepts, and whether each participant’s view 
could be representative of the general population, a baseline terminology needed to be 
agreed upon ahead of conducting interviews that dealt with relationships between 
climatic conditions and conflict.  In order to devise a list of terms that were agreeable in 
definition to the researcher, field assistant / translator, and with the intention of the 
discussion being clear to the community, an intermediary needed to be consulted for 
two of the populations under study.  Raphael, my Samburu field assistant and translator, 
was an educated man within his community as a class 8 graduate (up until age ~13).  
However, in order to ensure the highest degree of accuracy possible with terminology, 
we consulted over a number of days with a third party.  This individual is herself a 
member of the Samburu community, living within the heartland of Samburu District.  
Furthermore, she is a university graduate who worked for an international NGO, where 
she assisted Kenyan and western researchers with environmental field projects.  Her 
understanding of the nuances within the English language, with reference to ecological 
terminology, and in relation to her mother tongue made her an ideal intermediary 
between myself and Raphael.  The three of us discussed various aspects of climatic 
conditions from both perspectives in order to arrive at a baseline vocabulary that was in-
line with the aims of the research, but more importantly, could be understood and built 
upon by the local participants, who were able to contribute context to the terminology 
being used.  This method of using a highly-educated, western-exposed intermediary 
worked so well while conducting interviews amongst the Samburu population that it 
was also employed when moving on to work with the Borana communities, with pre-
field discussions taking place between myself, my field assistant, and a Borana graduate 
in conservation biology from the University of Nairobi.  Harun Basele, my field 
assistant when working within the Rendille community, was educated up through form 
four (up through age ~18), had worked for a number of years with the British Army 
based in central Kenya, had a very strong understanding of English, and fluently spoke 
Kisamburu and Kiborana in additional to his native Kirendille.  In order to ensure 
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consistency between the former two populations and within the Rendille communities, 
Harun met with myself and Raphael ahead of entering the field so that we could discuss 
the terminology that had been used amongst the Samburu population, which was then 
translated into Kirendille, to the satisfaction of both Raphael and myself.   
 
Preparing in this way, although a somewhat lengthy process, draws inspiration from 
other studies, such as de Waal’s Famine that Kills (1989), that have taken a highly 
nuanced approach to understanding seemingly ‘universal’ concepts, like drought or 
conflict or famine, and classified them from an emic perspective.  After completing this 
process for all three ethnic groups, the following climatic terminology was agreed upon 
and used throughout the interviews, as shown in Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1:  Climatic terminology used during community interviews 
TERMINOLOGY SAMBURU BORANA RENDILLE 
Rainy Condition Lari Rob Herr / Rob 
Normal Dry Condition N’kolong Supat Bon Rob Dahn 
Extended Dry Condition N’kolong Turno Bon Atholesa Nabahai 
Severe Drought Condition Riai Oola Arabah 
 
By using this terminology and asking people to describe conditions that were associated 
with each term, the following descriptions began to take shape for each group:    
Rainy Condition – this is a time where everything is green, there are leaves on the trees, 
the grass is growing, and animals have plenty to eat.  There can be areas of dense, thick 
bush, and the land looks productive.  Water is abundant and wide-spread, being 
collected from temporary streams / rivers, and the smaller catchments.  The animals are 
producing a lot of milk, and the children have enough to eat.  People (particularly the 
young men) are at rest / leisure within their home area, and other leisure activities are 
going on, such as singing, dancing, and making crafts or domestic goods.  This 
condition is characterised by the leaves and grass being green and abundant and the 
people being at leisure.  It is apparent typically as the rains are continuing. 
 
Normal Dry Condition – this is a time where there is still grass on the ground, but it is 
starting to dry.  Also, the leaves are still on the trees, but they are drying up.  Water is 
less in abundance; however, there is still enough for livestock and domestic use.  People 
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are still at home, but they may be travelling a bit further from the boma in order to graze 
their animals, but they will return each night to their home.  The animals are still 
producing sufficient milk for the needs of their family.  This condition is characterised 
by drying, green grass and leaves.  
 
Extended Dry Condition –  although historically not an annual occurrence, the extended 
dry condition has now become part of the ‘normal’ annual cycle.  This is a time where 
the grass has dried and has become quite scarce to the point that the leaves have 
completely dried on the trees and are starting to fall.  Water may become scarce during 
this time for both livestock and domestic use, and people will need to dig deeper wells 
and invest a lot more time and energy into watering their animals and fetching domestic 
water.  Some animals will stop producing milk at this time (particularly the weaker or 
older ones or those relying on grazing), and people will have to start moving with their 
herds to more distant pastures, too far away to return home in the same day.  This 
condition is characterised by very dry, white grass and leaves that the animals will eat 
from the ground.   
 
Severe Drought Condition – this is a time where even dry grass and leaves are highly 
scarce, and people have to resort to shaking leaves and seeds from the trees in order for 
the animals to have anything to eat.  People have to labour very hard for their animals 
during severe drought and resort to practices such as finding supplementary fodder 
(weaver bird nests, dried maize husks, or chopping tree branches).  Water is extremely 
scarce for people and animals, and herds will have to travel far in order to be watered.  
The women will have to spend a long time fetching domestic water from deep wells or 
digging new wells.  The animals are no longer producing milk and will be found at a 
great distance away from their home areas.  Animals will begin to die at this point from 
famine, or disease, or a combination of the two and will continue to die until it starts to 
rain.  People will begin to fear that humans will start to die if the drought continues.  
This is the time when people will need to take their animals to sub-prime grazing areas 
or to the border areas in order to find sufficient pasture in these dry season refuges.  
This condition is characterised by hardship, lack of pasture and water, lack of food, and 
animals dying.      
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When conducting interviews across the three different ethnic groups, it was important to 
establish whether or not these terms were in any way contested between the groups, or 
even within each of the groups across ages, genders, or ecological regions.  It could be 
that what is considered a “normal dry condition” for one group would be called an 
“extended dry condition” in another group, for example.  I began each interview by 
talking with people about how they felt the landscape was at the time they were being 
interviewed.  They were not asked to choose from the four conditions that my field 
assistants and I had identified, but instead, we allowed people to speak freely and would 
listen to how they identified the present state and what environmental or social 
conditions they would expect to find during that period.  The overwhelming majority 
identified one of the four conditions listed above, and the agreement between groups 
and within groups was exceptionally high.  This level of agreement gave us confidence 
that we could safely make comparisons between different sites and corresponding 
behaviours and also between different ethnic groups and corresponding behaviours.     
 
Furthermore, it was important for me as the researcher to come to understand how to 
identify and re-calibrate my own understanding of what drought conditions look like or 
what could be expected during rainy conditions.  The research benefitted from the fact 
that, when I began fieldwork in July 2009, Kenya was, by all accounts (pastoralists, 
European ranchers, wildlife managers, taxi drivers in Nairobi, etc.), experiencing one of 
the worst droughts in living memory.  This helped me to understand the full range of 
environmental conditions that people were facing in the north, and the fieldwork was 
purposely scheduled so that I would be able to experience all conditions from the rainy 
season to extreme drought within each of the areas under investigation.  I also returned 
to a number of areas on more than one occasion during a different season so that I could 
assess for myself changes in the land and how the same landscape can progress from 
one condition to another.  This was vital in order to gain a first-hand appreciation of 
environmental change from season to season.  The box below provides some insight 
into the progression of an inter-subjective viewpoint.         
 
Box 5.1:  Reflections from field notes:  Inter-subjectivity and perspectives on environmental conditions, 
Lenchokut, December 2009 
Lenchokut, set in the foothills of the Mathews Ranges, was to my mind the place of my 
Samburu origins.  It was the first area that I arrived at in August 2009 along with my 
field assistant, Raphael, without having any expectations as to what I might find.  The 
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District Commissioner for Samburu East had decided that my care was to be entrusted 
to a local councillor and successful herd owner, Benjamin Lekamario, who would come 
to be my Samburu father and steadfast guardian throughout my time in Kenya.  We 
arrived after a dusty and arduous drive to a fenced home set on top of a hill, from which 
I could see many other similar hills in the distance, each dotted with the familiar outline 
of a thorn-ringed fence protecting the small domed houses found within.  I stepped out 
of the Land Rover and from this perch, surveyed all that I could see, as my heart began 
to sink.  The covering was bare, dry, and brown, looking like a desolate wasteland.  
There was not one sliver of green to catch the eye for miles and miles in any direction.  
The acacia trees with their sharp thorns, even at the best of times looking dangerous 
and uninviting, were particularly harsh as there were no leaves to soften their 
appearance.  Taking in the scene that spread out before me bit by bit, my only thought 
repeating over and over in my mind was, “How can people live here?  How can it be 
that anyone is still standing in these conditions?”         
 
In December 2009 I was again dismounting from my vehicle to step out onto the same 
hill and survey what was five months earlier a barren wasteland.  Yet this time, my 
heart leapt up as a flush of relief swept over me.  Where once the hillsides looked like 
brown scars on the landscape and the wind had whipped through the dry river bed, 
picking up dust in tiny cyclones, these had been replaced by patches of short, hardy tufts 
of grass and the sound of people in the riverbed shouting and collecting tin buckets of 
water from the dug well.  I had returned to the beginning and found it not as I had left 
it, but instead, with happiness and the promise of prosperity bubbling all around.  As 
my mother undid the latch at the back of the Land Rover and let herself out, stepping 
onto north Kenyan soil for the first time in order to celebrate the Christmas holidays 
together, she stood next to me peering out over the scene around us, and said, “My 
goodness, it’s totally bare isn’t it!”   
 
5.2.3 Understanding Conflict 
As discussed in chapter two, aggressive acts can take many forms from physical 
violence to the perceived threat of violence.  Violence can be unleashed directly from 
the perpetrator onto the victim, or it can be delivered instead through a spiritual act, as 
by way of a curse.  For the purposes of this thesis, the conflict that I am examining is 
purely that which has a physical manifestation – either animals being taken, people 
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fleeing from their land in fear, or individuals being injured or killed during 
confrontations.  Most importantly, all conflict referred to in this analysis is solely inter-
ethnic fighting between disparate small-scale populations and does not include intra-
ethnic conflict or violence directed by the state or against the state.     
 
Having established an agreed upon set of terminology for climatic conditions to be 
addressed during interviews, it was necessary to do the same for terminology dealing 
with aggressive conflict.  After conferring with the same mediators as mentioned above, 
we decided to use the following vocabulary throughout the interviews:  
 
Table 5.2:  Conflict terminology used during community interviews 
TERMINOLOGY SAMBURU BORANA RENDILLE 
Small Stealing  Nyamu Hann Wein 
Fight to retrieve animals Ngutung’at Bua Solabna 
Unsuccessful retrieval / taking 
enemies’ animals during retreat (verb) 
Naaru Bojes / Bojesa Hatu 
 
Raid Njore Dul Dul 
 
The following provides descriptions for each of these terms:   
 
Small Stealing – this is the type of small theft of a few animals that are taken in a back 
and forth (generally referred to as 1 – 1 stealing) fashion with one ethnic group taking a 
few animals, followed up by the other ethnic group taking a few animals.  The overall 
characteristic of small stealing is that it is opportunistic, usually covert, and most 
importantly, little to no force is used.  Examples of this are snatching a few animals 
while they are being watered, taking livestock when the herder’s attentions are 
elsewhere, or taking animals from child herders who offer no defence or who run away 
at the sight of “enemies.” 
 
Fight to retrieve animals – this conflict occurs when animals have been taken from an 
ethnic group, which then immediately organises itself to get back the animals that were 
taken.  It most often involves force or trapping / ambushing the thieves while they are in 
transit, before they can re-enter their own territory.  The objective here is to retrieve 
one’s property; however, people are injured in these exchanges, particularly if members 
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of one’s ethnic group had been injured in the original theft, and the victimised party 
wants to enact immediate revenge. 
 
Unsuccessful retrieval / taking enemies’ animals during retreat – this conflict occurs 
when the retrieval of one’s own animals has been unsuccessful, at which point the 
victimised ethnic group becomes the aggressor and takes animals from the thieves as 
they retreat from the unsuccessful retrieval episode.  This exchange most often involves 
a use of force (usually meaning the use of guns or spears).   
 
Raid – this type of conflict is the most formalised type of aggressive exchange where a 
raiding party meets, discusses the strategy of where to raid / which ethnic groups to be 
targeted, asks for volunteers to strengthen their numbers, and takes the time to gather 
provisions for a successful raid (food, water, spears, guns, bullets, etc.).  There generally 
needs to be a legitimised reason for the raid (e.g., a show of strength in order to 
maintain and defend one’s territory, or as an act of retaliation), and in some 
circumstances, the raid may receive prior approval by the group’s elders (particularly 
within the Borana community).  Above all else, a show and use of force (guns / spears / 
aggressive tactics) is the defining feature of a raid.   
 
5.2.4 Conflict Perspectives 
During fieldwork, there appeared to be very little variation amongst all three 
communities in how types of conflicts are identified between age groups and between 
the sexes.  The definitions were not at all contested, and all people felt comfortable 
using the above terminology in reference to any skirmishes or conflict events that were 
being discussed.  The only evident differences were more to do with the emotional / 
moral attachments that individuals placed on conflict events.  Although there was a 
range of feelings associated with discussing conflicts amongst the individuals within 
each of these communities, there was a slight tendency towards certain attitudes that 
could be classified by age, but very little difference could be discerned according to 
gender.   The youths in all three communities were almost entirely united in feeling that 
aggressive acts towards an enemy ethnic group were justified and necessary; however, 
their parents (or parents’ generation) tended to preach the virtues of moderation and 
tempered behaviour.  These differences and the apparent reasons for them will be 
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discussed further in chapter seven when looking at the motivations behind aggressive 
conflicts, but it is an important distinction.   
5.3 Patterns of Climate and Conflict 
Utilising interview methods discussed in chapter four helped to place people within an 
environmental context and to reconstruct their migration histories, and episodes that 
occurred relative to each area, in reference to an environmental context.  I would then 
ask the following questions: 
 
1) During which climate condition would you expect there to be an increased 
amount of inter-ethnic conflict or do you feel that there is no connection 
between these things? 
2) Why would you expect an increase in conflict during that particular time? 
3) What type of conflict would you expect during that time?  Why is that? 
4) Does this type of conflict or other type of conflicts happen under any other 
climate conditions?  Why / why not? 
5) If conditions were to get drier and drought was more frequent and more severe 
within your community, what would you expect to happen to the levels of 
conflict found here?  Would they increase or decrease or stay the same?  What is 
your reasoning behind this? 
6) If conditions were to get wetter and there was a lot more rain within your 
community, what would you expect to happen to the levels of conflict found 
here?  Would they increase or decrease or stay the same?  What is your 
reasoning behind this? 
 
This line of questioning yielded some interesting results because it aimed to ensure that 
people took the time to think through how, or if, there is a connection at all between 
climatic conditions and levels of conflict found between ethnic groups.   
   
After compiling all of the responses from these interviews (sample of more than 275 
interviews), I then began to classify a number of patterns and themes that were 
emerging when people came to discuss the relationship between climatic conditions and 
levels of conflict between communities.  These classifications are detailed in the 
following sections.  
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5.3.1 Conflict at Any Time 
A small number of participants amongst all three ethnic groups mentioned that climatic 
conditions have very little to no bearing on whether or not there is conflict between 
ethnic groups.  They stated that conflict is pervasive throughout each season and from 
year to year.  During my fieldwork, I recorded comments such as:  
“Conflict now has become a tradition in the droughts or the rain.  It happens at 
any time because people are living in tough situations.” (Borana, elder male, 
border, Kambi Garba) 
and 
“Most conflicts are happening at any time of the year…[the thieves] can’t wait.  
They can’t wait for drought to come nor rain to come before conflict happens.  
For thieves, they are just hoping to get animals whenever so they don’t wait to 
go.” (Lmaskara, elder female, interior, Farakaren)   
 
From these perspectives, it appears that the discharge of conflict and violent acts has no 
discernible patterns dependent on climatic conditions.  In this case, conflict is an 
omnipresent feature of these societies, and in many ways, people who express this view 
seem to have resigned themselves to the fact that conflict is always a part of their lives. 
 
However, upon comparative examination of the 17 different sub-locations under study, 
the view that conflict occurs regardless of climatic condition does not hold true for each 
area, nor is it fully representative of the majority of individuals interviewed.  In 
reflecting upon ‘who’ experiences conflict, why, and when they do so in relation to 
other groups, there are discernible patterns that emerge between episodes of conflict 
being reported in light of corresponding climatic conditions.  The following paragraphs 
will discuss these different climatic conditions and how conflict operates or appears in 
each state. 
 
5.3.2 Conflict during Drought 
Within each of the three ethnic groups under study, a large proportion of participants 
reported that they would expect, or they hear about, the greatest number of conflicts 
occurring during periods of intense drought (riai, oola, or arabah).  The overwhelming 
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reason that is cited for an increase in conflict during extreme drought periods is the 
tendency for migration patterns to shift towards border areas as people search for 
adequate water and pasture.  Border areas are quite often utilised as dry-season refuges, 
predominantly because they are highly-contested and therefore experience long fallow 
periods as a result of disuse.  Extreme drought forces people to move into these areas as 
pastureland and water in the interior of a territory begins to dry and productivity 
decreases to a point that it cannot sufficiently support the animal numbers that are found 
there.  As one man explains,  
“Droughts take us closer to our enemies.  There is no enemy who gets tired of 
looking for our animals in a drought.  It is we who bring our animals to them.” 
(Samburu, elder male, interior, Lenchokut)   
This quote is highly reminiscent of Terrence McCabe’s (2004) seminal work Cattle 
Bring Us To Our Enemies, discussing the mobility patterns of Turkana populations and 
the pressures groups face in taking their animals to resource-rich, contested border areas.  
In order to cope with these pressures, pastoral families in this current study explain that 
as the length of the drought increases over time, the interior populations move from 
their home areas gradually to the border, picking up comrades and kinsmen along the 
way.  By the time the border is reached, the population of both people and animals 
living there is exceptionally high.  This condition creates the ideal opportunity in which 
to take animals because drought brings those who would not normally have contact with 
one another together, which has historically been a rare occurrence.   
 
5.3.2.1 Avoiding Conflict During the Drought 
Although the discussion above makes a clear case as to why one would expect to find 
an increase in the amount of conflict seen during a drought period, interviewees also 
pointed to a number of deterrents against fighting during dry periods that also must be 
considered.  Primarily during periods of extreme drought, many people explained that 
labour demands increase when herding animals, putting a strain not only on the herd but 
also on the herder.  As one woman explained,  
“In drought, people search busily for pasture.  There is no time for raiding.  Also 
animals are weak so they can’t move quickly so they will be caught and returned 
by the bua.” (Borana, elder female, interior, Malka Daka) 
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The Dyson-Hudsons (1980) have also made this claim that the high labour demands 
found amongst livestock herders greatly reduces their ability to operate solely as 
warriors or to become completely militaristic.  In these cases, the pastoral herding 
responsibilities diminish their capacity for raiding.  On top of the labour demands, 
participants also explained that joining and planning for a raid takes time, a lot of 
resources (food, water, money for ammunition, etc.), and it requires a lot of physical 
expenditure on the part of the raider.  This type of investment takes effort and attention 
away from one’s own herd, and therefore it has the potential to jeopardise the quality 
and quantity of animals already owned.   
“No moran leaves his animals in n’kolong and riai because everyone is 
concentrating on his own animals then.” (Samburu, elder female, interior, Resim)   
People explained that under another herder’s care, the animals may be more vulnerable 
to attack from enemies, more susceptible to predation from wildlife, and have an 
increased risk of malnutrition while the livestock owner is away because the ‘substitute’ 
herder will likely give preference to caring for his own animals during such a precarious 
time.  For good reason, there is a certain amount of anxiety that herd owners feel over-
worked and stressed during drought periods, and therefore they feel it is unwise to 
increase the burden of another individual while taking your chances in joining a raid, 
which could very well result in a lack of returns.    
“[During the drought], I herded the cows and shoats…and didn’t give the herd to 
any related morans because all of the others were busy taking care of their own 
animals, and I don’t trust that they will take care of them like me.”  (Samburu, 
elder male, interior, Lolkerded) 
Second, respondents say that it is part of the collective good to try to keep amicable 
relationships with neighbouring ethnic groups at a time of drought so that both sides 
may have access to vital shared resources during periods of scarcity.   
“They won’t fight in drought because they want to make sure that each side’s 
animals have access to shared grazing where there is grass in the middle of them.  
They call a ‘cease fire’ during these hardship times so that their animals can 
graze until it rains.” (Samburu, elder  male, border, Lolmisigiyioi)   
Maintaining peace within the boundary areas allows people to have equal access to 
resources that are vital for their herds’ survival, where these areas may in fact be a last 
resort for people.   
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“It is important to keep the peace because if peace were broken in the boundary, 
they have to go home, and the animals will suffer.” (Samburu, moran, interior, 
Kitich)   
In this way, running away from the border due to a fear of conflict will almost certainly 
mean death for livestock during periods of extreme drought. 
 
Another reason people identified to avoid conflict during times of climatic stress is that 
if raids were to happen in the boundary when two ethnic groups’ animals are close to 
one another, this puts one’s own herd at risk of retaliation.   
“In drought, [people] go closer to the border for grazing, but each group fears 
one another so they don’t raid because of the fear of retaliation.  They don’t raid 
when close, only small fights happen, and one animal may go to the other side.  
The enemy will only be very aggressive when they are far from their border 
because their animals will be far and protected so there won’t be the possibility 
of retaliation.” (Samburu, elder male, border, Sereolipi)   
Many respondents explained that this scenario is quite common that when the victim 
goes to the enemy side to retrieve his animals after they have been taken (ngutung’at / 
bua / solabna), the enemy has then opened himself up for his own animals to be taken 
as well (naaru / bojesa / hatu) and could end up much worse off than before he stole 
another’s animals.  Retaliation generally involves taking back one’s stolen animals and 
taking the animals of the raider.  When questioned about the reasons for taking others’ 
animals as well, respondents explained that this acts as both a punitive measure and as a 
result of the logistical problem that the stolen herd is generally mixed within the 
captor’s own herd, therefore making it impossible for the retaliator to take back his own 
animals whilst keeping the raider’s animals separate.  Stolen animals that remain in the 
boundary area will be seen by the original owners or other members of the owners’ 
ethnic group.  Herders indicated that this constant reminder that animals have been 
taken is very painful to a herd owner, and it is likely to cause provocation amongst his 
clansmen to the point that retaliation is almost certain. 
   
A final deterrent to raiding during droughts is that, as alluded to above, the stolen 
animals are more likely to die during these periods, and therefore, the raids are not only 
likely to incite further conflict, but they are also unlikely to be lucrative.   
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“If the drought continues to increase in the area over time, then they can only 
take their animals to the border.  There will be a lot of petty theft because 
animals are few, but raids will not happen because there will be nowhere to take 
the stolen animals, and so they will have to graze together in the border and 
respect each other’s grazing.  They couldn’t go anywhere with the stolen 
animals.” (Samburu, elder female, border, Lolkerded)   
Already there is a heavy burden placed on one’s animals during droughts with the need 
to find adequate water and pasture.  As the original herd is already suffering and finding 
it problematic to meet their nutritional needs, there is little reason to add to this hardship 
with additional animals.  The likelihood of their survival is also low in the midst of 
resource scarcity.   
 
5.3.2.2 Characteristics of Conflict during Drought 
There are a number of characteristics that help to define the type of conflict that 
happens during drought-like conditions.  One is that it can be classified as more small (1 
– 1) stealing (nyamu, hann, wein) rather than full-scale raiding.   
“There’s not much raiding in the dry season because they need to sort out and 
agree how to graze and water animals so they can overcome the drought period.  
This is small stealing compared to the big raids that can happen during the rain.” 
(Samburu, elder male, border, Lolkerded)   
Due to the proximity of people to a large number of available animals and the lack of 
planning that is required, this type of stealing is more frequent, and it is generally 
opportunistic.   
“Most conflict that happens in drought is because people go to the boundary.  
The best time to steal is to go to the boundary, and not steal right away, but 
instead, just protect your animals, but if one group finds an ‘opening’ over the 
other one, they can attack…An ‘opening’ would be something like when the 
majority of the herd comes to drink water and the minority is left grazing.  The 
enemy then can take the minority.” (Samburu, elder male, interior, Resim) 
As described above, to carry out large-scale raiding and capturing a lot of animals 
during a drought period would not be wise as there is nowhere to take the raided 
animals for safe grazing.  The drought keeps people in the boundaries, otherwise the 
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animals are sure to die from malnutrition if taken back into the interior areas.  Therefore, 
many people conclude that the persistent, clandestine stealing of a few animals from 
each side while in the boundary is a more beneficial scheme during this time. 
 
5.3.3 Conflict during Rains 
Another popular understanding amongst the participants interviewed was that more 
conflict occurs during rainy conditions rather than during drought-like conditions.  The 
primary reason most often cited was because the male youth can be home during the 
rains with their families’ animals, as there is enough pasture to graze around their home 
territories.  Because of this, the youths are at leisure and have the time to talk, plan, and 
organise large-scale raiding activities.   
“Most of the time, the raids happen in the rain because [morans] go back to the 
interior, relax, meet with others, and organise for raids.” (Samburu, elder male, 
border, Lenchokut)   
People describe raids as generally not a spur-of-the-moment activity – they require a 
certain amount of planning, organising, and fortifying the party in numbers and supplies.  
They have to be arranged at a time of year that permits a raider to entrust his animals to 
other kinsmen in a safe environment.  Furthermore, because the families and animals 
are experiencing relative prosperity during this time, there are enough resources (food, 
milk, money for ammunition and other supplies, etc.) to support major raiding events, 
and the raiders themselves are in good condition to carry out the physical demands of a 
raiding event.   
“Most conflict happens in rob because animals get fat, there is lots of water, lots 
of pasture, animals have milk, and you get lots of good meat.  These things 
contribute to conflict because animals are strong to walk, and raiders are also not 
hungry, thirsty, or weak so they can walk too.” (Borana, male youth, border, 
Gotu)   
With improved conditions found during the rains, herd owners may feel more 
comfortable selling an animal at an increased price (as its condition has improved) that 
can be used to purchase raiding supplies, such as food, guns, or ammunition.  These 
items would be too costly to purchase during a drought season, and animals sold during 
this time would fetch a very low market value. 
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Second, respondents explained that during rainfall periods, raiding parties have enough 
water resources available to them, and the conditions are more favourable to travel over 
a vast distance into enemy territory for the purpose of a raid.   
“If rob increases, conflict will also increase because the raiding party will have 
plenty of water and food to travel – they will never be tired so they can attack all 
the time.” (Borana, elder male, interior, Malka Daka)   
Raiders report that the journey into enemy territory can be arduous as a raiding party 
may need to cross more than 100 km before meeting a neighbouring ethnic group.  
After stealing the animals, the raiding party would then need to travel back into their 
territory, however this time while driving a large herd of livestock.  The physical 
demands of such a journey should not be underestimated.  If the raid is well-planned, 
the party will move through areas that have sufficient drinking water, plenty of shade, 
and at a time when the climate is much cooler, as can be found during the rains. 
 
Third, the rainy season helps to obscure those about to raid and those who have 
successfully raided.   
“During 1997, all people were living in town due to insecurity because it was 
very thick bush here due to the heavy El Niño rains.  The Borana attacked here 
by spending the night at Sere-rongai before they came here.  The Borana 
planned to come here then due to the amount of cover here.” (Samburu, elder 
male, border, Sereolipi)   
Respondents claim that thick bush found during rainy conditions is essential for 
launching a successful attack as the element of surprise helps to ensure an advantage for 
the raider by reducing the amount of time the victims have to either prepare for the 
attack or to run away with their animals.  As the landscape in northern Kenya can 
become quite open during the dry season with large sweeping vistas, an enemy can be 
spotted at a great distance, thus reducing the chances of a successful raid.  Furthermore, 
a number of people interviewed mentioned that once a raiding party has stolen the 
livestock and is driving them back into their territory, the rain helps to obscure the 
footprints of the raiders and of the animals.  These footprints are the key means by 
which the herd owners and security personnel track the stolen animals in order to return 
them and identify the perpetrators, as members of the clan / ethnic group would not 
divulge such information freely.  If the stolen animals are not found, the footprints still 
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need to be tracked to their exact origin for compensation to be paid from one ethnic 
group to another.  Without these, the herd owner receives nothing in return for his loss.    
 
Finally, the rainy season is a time where defences are diminished within the border 
populations.   
“If I were living all the time in the boundary, I would raid more during the rains 
because animals then are very healthy and fat, and there will be fewer enemies 
in the boundary so the boundary communities are more vulnerable to attack.” 
(Samburu, moran, interior, Kitich)   
The reduction of enemy numbers in the border during the rains creates the opportunity 
for an unfair advantage between potential raiders and vulnerable border settlements.  
Although the journey into enemy territory may be arduous, the likelihood of success 
once there is increased tremendously due to improved man / firepower.   
 
5.3.3.1 Avoiding Conflict during Rains 
Despite the rainy season appearing to be an ideal time to conduct raids, interviewees 
cite a number of reasons for not initiating conflicts under these conditions.  Primarily 
people noted that  
“During the rains, you have lots of pasture so you don’t need to attack.” (Borana, 
elder male, border, Kambi Garba)   
The rainy season allows people once again to become more self-sufficient and start to 
‘grow up’ their animals once more.  Many people said that the rains give them time to 
focus on their own animals so there is no need to look for other people’s animals.  They 
stress that it is through their own labour and management that they can recover from 
any livestock losses incurred during the drought. 
 
Second, when the rains come to northern Kenya, they seem to come all at once, which 
can cause the small, ephemeral streams to flood over large areas and the major rivers to 
become deep and wide.  As one woman explains,  
“There are natural barriers in the rains, the riverbeds are flowing and the Ewaso 
may flood so you cannot pass it.” (Borana, elder female, interior, Malka Daka)   
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The Ewaso Nyiro is the major source of water in the north that passes through the 
territories and across the boundaries of a number of ethnic groups.  Once it fills during 
the rains, it is impossible to traverse, save for one permanent road, and even this was 
washed away in 2010 following heavy rainfall.  As the chief from Gotu, a Borana 
border settlement close to the Ewaso Nyiro, explained to me that once the rains come, 
his people must be on the ‘right’ side of the river (meaning closer to the larger Borana 
settlements), otherwise they will be cut-off from their people until the rains stop, and 
the Samburu will have access to raid them.  The river offers them protection and peace 
of mind during the rainy season.  As he explains:   
“It is good to be on the south of the river during rains because Samburu and 
Rendille may attack here so it is good to be on the other side as the river floods, 
and that creates a barrier between us and the Samburu.  It’s not that Samburu 
and Rendille raid more in the rainy season, it’s just that the Borana use the 
flooded river as an opportunity that it’s a natural barrier so people can relax then 
if they are on the south side.  Samburu are afraid to cross the river because they 
know they can’t get back with the animals.  Also, the Borana here on the north 
side don’t want to be cut off from the town and food when the river floods if 
they are on north side.” (Borana, elder male, border, Gotu) 
 
Finally, raiding in the rains after a drought may, in fact, not be a highly lucrative pursuit.  
A planned raid that happens during the rainy season takes time, effort, manpower, and 
resources.  The raiding party may be up to 100 – 200 men strong.  With the likely 
reduction of livestock during the drought months, which estimates in this area suggest 
approximately 70%, raids of border areas that happen during the drought may produce 
very few stolen animals.  As one Borana elder explains, in raids that occur during the 
rains after a major drought has ended,  
“the problem is, there is nothing to take on the side that was more affected.” 
(Borana, elder male, border, Isiolo)   
Raiders report that once these animals have been divided amongst the raiding party, 
individuals would be lucky to receive 1 – 2 animals each, if any at all.  Raiding occurs 
for a number of reasons (see chapter seven for more information on this); however, a 
major reason to raid is to accumulate animals into one’s own herd.  Without this, the 
motivation for raiding during the rainy months is diminished.   
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5.3.3.2 Characteristics of Conflict during Rains 
As demonstrated in the preceding paragraphs, raiding that occurs during the rains is 
characterised by large-scale, well-equipped, and well-planned raids involving many 
people and resources.  The main reasons behind this is that people are comparatively 
prosperous during the rains to afford the raiding costs, the raiding party are at leisure 
and can invest in the planning and organising of a raid, animals that are stolen are more 
likely to be retained in the interior far from their original owners, and the animals’ 
chances of survival increase tremendously when vegetation is more abundant during 
rainy conditions.  The following quote helps to summarise some of the differences 
between the small-scale stealing that occurs during the drought and the 
characteristically larger raids that happen in the rainy season:  
“The Samburu go to steal from others during the dry season because they are in 
contact with each other in the boundaries at that time.  The types of conflict 
during this period are the 1 – 1 or 2 – 2 types.  The big raid can only occur when 
the 1 – 1 type of stealing gets to be too much so the two sides will split apart 
from each other and organise a very big raid.  This is just the morans.  Big raids 
can be emergency raids if the community is upset at what the Borana have been 
doing.  Otherwise, they can take their time to organise and wait until the 
conditions are good, there is milk, and things are better because people may 
have to trek for a long distance so they need water along the way.  Also, 
organising a successful raid takes time to plan well so they need time to relax for 
this.” (Samburu, elder male, border, Remote) 
 
5.3.3.3 Conflict at the End of Drought / Start of Rains 
In trying to understand the ideal time for stealing animals where there are trade-offs 
between when one has access to a neighbour’s animals and whether the stolen animals 
will be re-captured or will survive, people refer to one time above all others where 
opportunities and strategies are optimal.  When a drought is coming to a close as the 
first rain showers are being reported within a population’s interior areas, there is a small 
but significant window of opportunity that herders try to capitalise on whilst still in the 
border areas.  One Samburu man explains,  
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“When it starts to rain, it is a major problem because as people leave the border, 
they snatch animals in order to go back with prizes.” (Samburu, elder male, 
border, Sereolipi)   
At this time, conflict explodes due to people getting ready to go back to the safety of the 
interior where stolen animals will be able to go undetected and will survive during the 
rainy conditions.  This is the raiding equivalent of a ‘smash and grab’ tactic, and it is 
highly effective as it requires little / no planning, somewhat reduced effort than rainy 
season raiding, little financial or time investment, and a higher assurance / known 
outcome that there are animals to be taken.  The mechanics of this strategy are rather 
interesting, as one woman explains,  
“conflict starts when the clouds are starting to form in their territory.  Each 
group starts to secretly move their animals back into their territory, then they 
attack.” (Samburu, elder female, border, Lolkerded)   
Even if relations have been relatively cordial while two ethnic groups are grazing in the 
border areas together during drought conditions, at the first signs of rain, they will start 
to move their own animals back towards their interior for protection.  Only when they 
feel that their animals are safe from potential retaliation will they strike and return to 
their home territory with as many animals as it is possible to obtain during this small 
window of opportunity.     
 
5.3.4 Interior versus Border Experiences 
Not only is it relevant to consider the climatic conditions under which conflict occurs 
between groups and what the characteristics are of each type of conflict happening at a 
given time, but it is also important to consider which groups of people are affected 
during conflicts.  Furthermore, the spatial distribution of the actors and their roles, 
either as perpetrator or victim, must also be taken into consideration.  There are a 
number of distinctions that could be made here about how conflict disproportionately 
affects elders versus youths or males versus females, for example.  However, the two 
broadest categories for comparison that come out of the ethnographic data are whether 
members of an ethnic group live within the interior of a territory versus living within 
one of the border regions.  The distinction between risks associated with border areas 
compared to those in interior regions has also been commented on in work by Smith, 
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Barrett and Box (2001) in relation to pastoral populations.  One Samburu woman helps 
to illustrate this difference when she explains,   
“Those who live in the interior will not have any conflict during the middle of 
the rains because they will come back to their [interior] sides.  Those who live 
close to the boundary are more protected during the drought if they don’t move 
because those from the interior will go beyond them and form a ‘wall’ at the 
boundary so they are more protected then.  During the rains, the ‘wall’ leaves, 
and they are left open to attack.  They are actually more protected during the 
drought because people move beyond them, and they have strength in numbers.” 
(Samburu, elder female, interior, Remote)   
This explanation is very telling because it demonstrates that depending on where one 
typically lives and grazes during the rainy conditions strongly influences when, or if, he 
or she will be the victim of conflict.  A Samburu woman living within a border area 
goes on to say that,  
“There is more conflict during the rainy season because their animals are home 
close to the Pokot, and in the dry season, they take animals closer to [the interior 
area].  In February through August, there’s rain here so there is insecurity here.  
For other people, this is vice versa, and so they come here in the drought season, 
and they get insecurity here then.” (Samburu, elder female, border, 
Lolmisigiyioi)   
What can be assessed from these quotes is that, due to the buffer that border populations 
provide most of the year, it is mainly interior populations who become the victims of 
conflict during drought conditions when they have to move from their protected areas 
into contested border regions.  However, as demonstrated earlier in this chapter, interior 
populations can be the perpetrators of conflict incidents during either drought conditions, 
characterised by small, frequent, opportunistic stealing, or during rainy conditions when 
they can carry out well-planned, large-scale raiding.  In contrast, border populations, 
due to their perpetual proximity to neighbouring ethnic groups, can be the victims of 
conflict under any climatic condition, however their relative level of conflict reduces 
during drought conditions because they tend not to be the most exterior (closest to the 
enemy) group at that time, where the interior populations have moved slightly beyond 
them (in order to access better grazing), and there is greater strength in numbers that the 
risk of being raided is spread over a larger group of people.  The situation changes 
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under rainy conditions when the border populations are left more vulnerable as the 
interior communities move back into their home areas, and the conditions become 
favourable for large-scale raiding from people living in the border.  A number of 
participants noted that as perpetrators, border populations may become involved in 
conflicts during drought conditions, but they are less likely to do so during rainy 
conditions.  The reason behind this is the raiders would have to move with the stolen 
animals into the interior areas to avoid detection, which is already a well-populated area, 
or they would need to send their stolen livestock into the interior with another herder, 
therefore not receiving the greatest benefit from obtaining these animals.  Furthermore, 
during rainy conditions, it behoves the border populations to maintain peaceful relations 
with their neighbours in order to try to reduce the possibility of attack when manpower 
is at its lowest, and people in the border have the most to lose.  
 
From this description, one can see that there is a great disparity between which subsets 
of a population are involved in conflict incidents and the role that each subset plays in 
the conflict.  As recalled to me by one very shrewd Samburu man, he described the 
following relationship that I have diagrammed below in Figure 5.2:   
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Figure 5.2:  Explanation of interior and border populations’ roles in conflict during drought and rainy 
conditions, taken from an interview with Samburu elder male, interior, Lenchokut:   
1) Interior moves to border during drought.  Neighbouring groups graze together and start small stealing 
2) the Interior grabs as many animals as possible once it begins to rain 
3) the Interior leaves to the safety of the interior area with their animals 
4) the Border populations are left vulnerable to raids from the neighbours during the rainy season. 
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Clearly from this relationship there seems to be an unfair burden of stealing that the 
interior populations put on the border populations. One of the Samburu chiefs who lived 
year-round in the border regions close to the Borana communities told me that as a chief, 
he tries to counsel the interior youth who come through his location not to cause 
problems, not to take animals, and to go away with nothing.  Otherwise, they are likely 
to cause substantial problems for him and his people if they steal, pass through his area 
with the stolen animals, and then retreat back into the interior.  The enemy will follow 
the livestock and raider footprints, and once happening upon the chief’s area, unable to 
find their own animals, they will take the animals of his people in retaliation.  This was 
a source of much stress for the chief and one that he had to monitor very closely by 
remaining vigilant to any would-be raiders of his ethnic group in the area.   
 
This relationship begs the question:  why does anyone choose to live in the boundaries 
at all when they seem to be rife with problems?  Briefly, people cited three main reasons 
that were benefits to living in border regions.  The first is that border areas tend to have 
access to major roads (of which there are few in the north) and to larger settlements / 
towns where goods and services can be obtained.  Second, because the borders are 
hotly-contested regions, there are not as many animals present within these areas; 
therefore, there is lower grazing pressure and more available vegetation for grazing 
animals.  Finally, by default, within any given territory someone has to be the most 
external subgroup of people living closest to the neighbouring territory.  Therefore, for 
the purposes of this study, “border populations” are not necessarily living within earshot 
of a neighbouring ethnic group.  Instead, it simply means that they are the subset of 
their ethnic community that is living closest to the neighbouring ethnic group.  The 
neighbouring groups can even be more than 100 km away from one another, which is 
seen in some highly contested areas. 
 
5.3.5 Reduced Conflict:  Long-term Trends 
Based on my observations and discussions with research participants, I inferred a 
number of time periods that could be categorised as relatively peaceful between 
different ethnic groups.  These time periods can be separated into both long-term trends 
and also as annual fluctuations.  Over year to year timescales, I can hypothesise that 
conflict would be less likely to happen if there was continuous, sufficient rainfall 
regularly throughout the year and from one year to the next.  Under these conditions, 
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people could stay closer to their home areas, move about their territory grazing their 
animals freely, not have to go to the border areas for grazing, and therefore not have to 
mix or engage in conflicts with their neighbours, which would also reduce the pressure 
for retaliation.  These conditions would create a more relaxed, prosperous situation for 
pastoralists where they would not be forced into confronting one another.  There would 
also be abundant resources throughout their territory where they could accumulate their 
animals and utilise them for their own benefit.  There would still be raiding that is 
characteristic of that which normally occurs during rainy conditions, as discussed, but it 
would be greatly reduced from current levels in the north because favourable rainy 
conditions would reduce a number of triggers that instigate conflict, such as poverty or 
opportunity (see chapter seven for a more detailed explanation of causes of conflict).  
However, the major problem with testing this theory is that there are very few cases, if 
any, where conditions have remained favourable for such long periods of time.  When I 
asked a Borana man if there had ever been a period of ten years where pasture and water 
were continuously plentiful and no effects of drought in the area, he responded,  
“No, there has always been oola.  There has always been conflict too.” (Borana, 
elder male, interior, Malka Daka)   
The other long-term trend that may correlate with a reduction in conflict between 
disparate communities (other socio-political factors notwithstanding) would be if there 
were predictable, ‘regular’ rains followed by ‘regular’ dry season periods.  “Regular” 
here is a rather difficult term to define but, for the sake of simplicity, it would mean a 
rainfall period that lasted long enough to provide enough pasture and water at home to 
graze the livestock freely with minimum labour, but not too much rain that the male 
youth were excessively idle and essentially unemployed as herders due to the abundance 
of leisure time at home.  The dry season would be long enough that the male youth 
remained employed and moving the animals around for pasture, but not too long that 
resource scarcity would force them into the border areas.  This kind of regularity would 
likely provide the ideal conditions necessary to greatly reduce the amount of conflict 
seen between different ethnic groups, beyond that which would be expected in the 
previous scenario.  The reasons being that, people would not have to go to the border 
areas, livestock would likely not die off due to the results of drought and malnutrition, 
and the male youth would have less leisure time in which to potentially create problems 
with neighbouring groups.  Ultimately, this condition is somewhat ‘artificial’ as it is a 
composite of climatic conditions that people associate with reductions in conflict 
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incidents; however, the likelihood of ‘regular’ rains and ‘regular dry seasons’ across 
multiple years is highly improbable.    
 
5.3.6 Reduced Conflict:  Annual Occurrences 
The above two scenarios are ‘idealised’ situations based on long-term trends that rarely 
occur.  Based on current observations of climatic conditions in northern Kenya, there 
are two periods during the course of a year where one would expect to see a drastic 
reduction, or lull, in the amount of conflict reported between communities.  The first of 
these periods is after the rains have started but before the land and animals have had the 
opportunity to recover considerably.  As detailed earlier in this chapter, at the very start 
of the rains after a drought period where two communities are found in the border 
together, there is an explosion of conflict as the proximity to another’s animals creates 
opportunity, and the onset of the rains provides the ideal climatic conditions in which to 
take stolen livestock back to the interior.  However, once this initial injection of conflict 
has subsided, people report that they spend the next phase returning home, re-
connecting with their kinsmen, enjoying their new-found free time and investing in 
leisure activities.  It is during this time that the focus is clearly on recovery:  socially, 
physically, financially, and environmentally.  It is a time to take stock of what has 
happened in the preceding months, to re-cooperate, to begin to “grow-up” what is left of 
one’s herd, and to enjoy down-time.  It may take some time to recover, and raiding will 
likely wait until animals start to “come up” again, in number and in body condition in 
order to make the raid a worthwhile venture. 
 
After this time passes and people move into the middle of the rainy conditions, where 
the land and animals have recovered significantly, raids may once again start, as 
explained in the discussion on rainy condition raiding earlier in this chapter.  After this 
time, the land will pass through the normal dry season, where people are still grazing 
their animals around their home areas, and then it will move to the extended dry season, 
where animals will have to be taken further afield.  It is during this time that the work 
load increases significantly, domestic resources such as milk and water are reduced, and 
the male youth will once again be in high demand to start to take the livestock to 
grazing pastures away from the home that are too far to return to the home with the 
animals at the end of the day.  Because of the high labour demands associated with this 
timeframe, there would be another relative lull in conflict, as leisure time has been 
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greatly reduced, the male youth are fully employed, and people are labouring more in 
preparation for an extended dry season that has the potential to turn into drought-like 
conditions should the rainy season not arrive.  Many participants state that it is during 
this time that their thoughts turn inwardly as each man looks to manage his own animals 
and to build resilience against possible resource scarcity.   
 
Table 5.3 below summarises each season discussed in this chapter, the levels of relative 
conflict predicted during each condition, who is affected, the reasons why conflict 
would be kept in check under each condition, and the characterisation of the types of 
conflict that occur in each period. 
Table 5.3:  Summary of the climatic conditions and associated conflict behaviour discussed in this chapter 
ESTABLISHED 
DROUGHT 
CONDITIONS 
START OF THE 
RAINS 
RAINS ESTABLISHED 
RAINY 
CONDITIONS 
DRY  
 
Border vs Interior 
 Interior moves 
beyond Border  
 
 Interior can steal 
and can be stolen 
from 
 
 Border stolen 
from less b/c of 
fortification from 
Interior 
 
 Border can steal, 
but stolen 
animals will go to 
the interior 
 
 
Border vs Interior 
Same relationship 
as during the 
drought conditions, 
yet stealing 
explodes 
 
 
 
Lull in 
conflict 
 
Border vs Interior 
 Interior prepares 
for raid 
 
 Border gathers 
intelligence and 
supports interior 
 
 Interior raids 
enemy Border 
and takes animals 
back to the 
interior 
 
 Border more 
susceptible to 
raids 
 
Lull in conflict 
 
Stealing Kept in 
Check By: 
 People are 
preoccupied / 
busy herding 
 People worried 
about retaliation / 
safety of own 
animals 
 Necessary to 
keep peace to 
access water & 
 
Stealing Kept in 
Check By: 
Stealing is not kept 
in check  
  
Raiding Kept in 
Check By: 
 People are 
capitalising on 
prosperity in the 
land 
 Rain can make 
natural borders 
b/w enemies 
 Stock numbers 
may be so low 
that stealing isn’t 
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grazing 
 Stolen animals 
will die in 
drought 
 
lucrative 
 
 
Conflict 
Characterisation 
Numerous, small 
stealing / petty 
theft events 
without force or 
with little force 
 
 
Conflict 
Characterisation 
Rampant, 
unplanned stealing 
and raiding, with 
use of force to take 
as many animals as 
possible in a short 
amount of time 
 
  
Conflict 
Characterisation 
Large, well-
organised raids 
using lethal force to 
steal as many 
animals as possible 
 
 
5.4 ‘Logical’ Progression and Thresholds 
After talking at length with people in interviews about the time periods when they 
expect to see conflict occurring based on their observations and understanding of 
conflict, I would ask them two final questions.  The first was:  if droughts were to 
increase in frequency and severity in the future, what do you think would happen to the 
conflict levels?  The second question was:  if rains were to increase in the future, what 
would you expect to happen to the conflict levels?  Looking at the first question, many 
people responded in a way that ‘logically’ coincided with the relationship between 
climate conditions and conflict that they had discussed during the course of the 
interview.  For instance, if a respondent said during the interview that conflict is 
associated with drought periods, then he / she may have responded to the first question 
with: 
“If droughts increase in the future, I think conflicts will increase because 
animals will all migrate to the same areas in other’s territory, and the two sides 
will fight to have access to grass” (Samburu, elder female, Resim), 
or 
“If droughts increase, there will be a massacre of people because of the increase 
in poverty.  [People] will look for livestock in other communities.” (Borana, 
elder male, Malka Daka) 
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This type of response follows a ‘logical’ progression, i.e. conflict is typically found in 
drought periods; therefore, if droughts were to increase in the future, then you would 
expect conflict to also increase.  However, what was an interesting result from this line 
of questioning was that in almost half of the interviewees polled, their responses did not 
follow with any type of ‘logical’ progression.  To clarify, this does not imply that the 
response was arrived at without reasoning or understanding, but simply that the given 
response did not match the expected response based on the relationship between 
climatic conditions and conflict levels that had been established during the interview.  
Some examples of these responses are:      
“If drought increases in the future, conflict will decrease because people will be 
very busy searching for pasture, you have no time to raid.  Also animals will be 
thin so people won’t be stealing them” (Borana, male youth, Malka Daka),  
or 
“If droughts increase in the future, conflict will reduce because the pasture area 
will decrease so there will be nowhere to take raided cows.” (Samburu, elder 
male, Resim) 
Likewise, when asking the second question to individuals who had previously stated 
that raids were more likely to occur during the rainy season, they may reply: 
“If rains increase in the future, conflict will increase because people will have 
plenty of water and food so the raiding party will have plenty to support them.  
They will feel more energetic and boastful so they will attack.” (Borana, elder 
male, Daka Dhima) 
However, many of these individuals were as likely to respond in the following way:  
“If rains increased in the future, conflict will decrease because reduction of 
conflict is caused by enough pasture and water so people are satisfied that they 
are not hungry.  Also, there are natural barriers – the darers are flowing and the 
Ewaso may flood so you cannot pass it.” (Borana, elder female, Daka Dhima) 
This result came as a surprise to me at first as the responses did not reflect an expected 
‘logical’ progression.  However, the reasoning behind these responses complies with the 
results presented in this chapter.  More importantly, I would argue that these unexpected 
responses potentially reflect the idea of climatic thresholds, that when reached, they 
change the nature of the relationship between climatic conditions and conflict behaviour.  
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In this way, increasing frequency of drought may be associated with increasing conflict 
levels until a point at which the severity of the drought makes raiding physically, 
logistically, or economically undesirable.  As we can see from the above quotes, the 
same threshold principle may also be applied to increases in rainfall.  The following 
chapter will examine these relationships more closely, with a look towards 
incorporating an understanding of critical climate-conflict thresholds.       
5.5 Discussion and Conclusions 
In this chapter, each of the climatic conditions and their associated conflict levels has 
been discussed in isolation from one another.  However, it is important to question 
whether or not the associations established under one climatic condition have any 
bearing on the associations found under another climatic condition.  For instance, many 
people I spoke with made reference to the concept of escalation.   
“In the drought season people go to the border and then just as it starts to rain, 
they grab animals so they can go home with them.  That happened at the end of 
this drought in September 2009.  This starts the conflict because then the other 
side needs to retaliate back and forth.” (Samburu, elder male, border, Lolkerded)   
It seems that once reaching the border, relationships may start out as cordial; however 
over time, the petty small stealing of animals from each side that is characteristic of 
drought conditions will eventually escalate into a full-scale raid, which sets the scene 
for rainy condition raiding.  People say that there is a certain “grudge” that starts during 
the drought from the persistent irritation of small stealing, each side progressively 
gaining collectively more and more animals to the point that one side feels that 
something must be done to try to stop the small stealing or gain back a portion of what 
they feel they have lost.  This is particularly true the longer a drought continues, and 
therefore the longer these two populations must stay together in the boundary areas.   
 
This being the case, then it seems that the drought condition here may be the motivating 
factor, or the initial condition, that sets off a series of aggressive interactions between 
the two sides.  This begs the question:  without drought, would conflicts happen at all?  
I believe, as demonstrated above, that the answer to that question is “yes,” however 
maybe in a diminished capacity or for different reasons that are not related to the 
resulting effects of drought conditions.  Chapter seven will explore this question in 
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further detail when I discuss the motivations behind each type of conflict that is 
witnessed in northern Kenya.   
 
This chapter ends as it began in saying that to a removed, outside observer, it may 
appear that conflict is occurring at all times in northern Kenya.  It is also sometimes 
difficult to separate the rhetoric of “pastoralists are always fighting” from reality.  Part 
of the problem lies in the fact that there are a considerable number of disparate ethnic 
groups spread throughout the northern region, which is an area characterised by 
spatially heterogeneous rainfall patterns.  When two groups are experiencing rainy 
conditions, there are two other groups who may be living under extended dry conditions.  
It is rare, although it has happened, that all of the northern territories experience the 
exact same conditions at the exact same time.  However, with this type of spatial and 
temporal heterogeneity, it will appear to an outsider that pastoralists do continuously 
fight because the conditions will be suitable somewhere in the north at any given time to 
create the opportunity to realise a potential conflict between two neighbouring groups.  
Furthermore, as will be discussed in the following chapter, conflict episodes are more 
widely recorded than instances demonstrating cooperation between two ethnic groups.  
This creates a bias that only strengthens the sentiment that pastoralist communities are 
always fighting.  However, this chapter sought to analyse how conflict is defined, the 
nature of inter-ethnic conflict, who are the actors, how they engage in conflict, and 
under which environmental conditions are conflicts more likely to occur.  It is only 
armed with this understanding that we can start to examine whether or not conflict is as 
pervasive from year to year, regardless of the types of climatic conditions that are found 
within each year.      
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Chapter 6: Statistical Analysis of 
Climatic Conditions and 
Conflict 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter suggests a positive relationship exists between drought conditions 
and inter-ethnic conflict; however, the chapter also shows that this relationship is not as 
straight-forward as one might think.  Firstly, there are compelling motivations for not 
aggressing during drought periods, and reasons for engaging in conflict can also exist 
outside of drought periods.  This current chapter will seek to analyse the relationship 
between drought-induced resource scarcity and conflict through quantitative 
applications.  Statistical analyses used in this way can help to test some of the 
hypotheses raised in the previous chapter, therefore contributing to more robust results.  
The aim here is to ascertain the strength of the relationship that exists between drought 
prevalence and inter-ethnic conflict levels in northern Kenya.               
6.2 Defining Variables 
6.2.1 Conflict and Cooperation Variables 
One of the key objectives of this study is not to focus simply on a human inclination 
towards competitive, aggressive behaviour, but also to incorporate an understanding of 
human potentials for pro-social behaviours.  Given north Kenyan pastoral communities’ 
proclivity for intra-group cooperation to manage unpredictable environments and 
resources, why then do I focus my attentions on quantifying only conflict incidents 
rather than including cooperative incidents?  The answer to this question is partly a 
methodological one:  it is very difficult as a third party to observe and record 
cooperative instances between ethnic groups or for informants to recall cooperative 
experiences as they are somewhat more obtuse and subtly woven into the fabric of 
people’s lives.  In truth, there are times when disparate ethnic groups may share access 
to wells, graze alongside one another, or have been known to trade livestock goods with 
one another; however, I was not directly witness to any such cooperative instances, and 
it is problematic for a participant to recall when, how, and why these instances took 
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place.  In contrast, an informant is more likely to be able to recall with great detail and 
accuracy a conflict incident where animals may have been taken, or people injured, or 
territory was lost to a neighbouring ethnic group.  These are the instances that are clear 
in people’s minds and not necessarily the more fleeting experiences of watering one’s 
animals together, for instance.  Although I am only able to quantify conflict episodes in 
this thesis, the importance of cooperative behaviours is discussed at length in later 
chapters, highlighting the significance of non-aggressive and conciliatory behaviours 
between ethnic groups.   
 
6.2.2 Numerical Value of Drought 
The first issue to manage in the statistical analysis of the relationship between drought 
and conflict is the quantification of climatic conditions.  The previous chapter 
highlighted contextual and descriptive depictions of drought; however, there are 
difficulties in quantifying these conditions.  Some ecological studies have defined 
drought in meteorological terms when rainfall is less than half of the long-term average 
(Hendy 2001).  The problem with applying this meteorological definition to north 
Kenyan pastoral populations is that the climate here is highly variable and prone to 
perturbations and vast fluctuations over time.  Thus, assessing drought in terms of its 
deviation from a long-term average would hide, or smooth out, the effects of these 
perturbations.  As demonstrated in the previous chapter, it may be climatic thresholds, 
rather than averages, that are more important in driving behavioural changes.  Low 
(1979) strengthens this argument when she says that populations are more likely to react 
to climatic extremes encountered rather than climatic means, and any statistical analysis 
should reflect this idea.  The annual spatial distribution of rainfall in northern Kenya 
ranges from less than 250mm of rain each year in the northern lowlands to over 750mm 
of rain per year in more mountainous regions (Markakis 1998).  It is with these ranges 
in mind that a numerical definition of drought can be arrived at in the following sections. 
 
6.2.3 Lag-time Effects 
Another effect that was raised in the preceding chapter was the issue of lag-time, both as 
“rainfall lag” and “behavioural lag.”  Many participants have stated that multiple 
consecutive years of insufficient (but not drought-level) rainfall can have a similar 
effect to a single-year acute drought episode.  If the rainfall data were only analysed as 
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discrete variables, then the effects from multiple years of low rainfall (but not 
necessarily drought) would not be picked up in the analysis.  Therefore, this approach 
will need to incorporate multiple consecutive years of insufficient rainfall into the 
drought index.  Furthermore, as we have seen through the ethnographic analysis, 
pastoralists affected during drought conditions may postpone the initiation of conflict 
until a time when the drought conditions have broken.  In this case, there is a 
behavioural lag-time between the drought event and the resulting behavioural outcome, 
which will also have to be incorporated into this analysis.  
       
6.2.4 Spatial Distribution of Drought 
Finally, as these are migratory populations, an understanding of the spatial distribution 
of climatic conditions in a given year is essential.  Using only one data source (i.e., one 
weather station) will only reflect the conditions found at one point in the landscape; 
however, due to the heterogeneous distribution of rainfall throughout the region, one 
source does not provide enough information about the climatic conditions elsewhere in 
the same time period.  As long as there is a distribution of rainfall, one area 
experiencing drought-like conditions in a given year will not generally have negative 
effects on a nomadic population.  Therefore, this study will need to incorporate an 
understanding of covariate risk throughout the region rather than simply at a fixed point.   
 
6.2.5 Comparative Statistical Analysis 
Witsenburg and Roba (2003, 2007) tested the theory that increasing resource scarcity 
leads to increases in human violence among pastoralists in northern Kenya / southern 
Ethiopia, with their results indicating that no correlations were found.  In fact, they 
concluded that violent events were most often associated with periods of adequate 
rainfall and relative prosperity.  Although Witsenburg and Roba’s study is the most 
relevant to this thesis, as there is overlap of ethnic groups, of geographic location, and 
of central research question (relationship between resource scarcity and conflict 
incidents), there are a number of distinctions that need to be highlighted.  Table 6.1 
below summarises these vital differences: 
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Table 6.1:  Differences in research design for statistical analysis of drought and conflict in two studies of 
north Kenyan pastoralists 
Witsenburg and Roba (2003, 2007) This Study 
All raids, murders, and armed attacks were 
included between ethnic groups and non-
ethnic group entities.  Politically-motivated 
attacks, police brutalities, army abductions, 
etc. were also included 
Only conflict incidents occurring between 
ethnic groups 
1 data source for rainfall was chosen (Marsabit 
Mountain), which typically receives between 
800 – 1000 mm of rainfall annually 
4 data sources for rainfall were chosen, 
distributed throughout the study area 
Discrete relationships were assessed Temporal lag-time and behavioural lag-time 
variables are included 
Each data point is a 3 year average, therefore 
smoothing any perturbation effects 
Data for each year are used in the analysis 
 
This current analysis builds on and extends that of Witsenburg and Roba in important 
ways by incorporating the complexities of rangeland dynamics within arid ecosystems 
and associated human behaviours necessary to test the relationship between resource 
scarcity and conflict.   
6.3 Statistical Analysis 
6.3.1 Hypotheses and Relationships 
Taking the above approach into consideration, this study will test the following 
hypotheses regarding the relationship between drought-induced resource scarcity and 
conflict incidence levels:   
1) Years with extreme low rainfall have higher levels of inter-ethnic conflict than 
years without extremely low rainfall.  
 
2) Years with extremely high rainfall have higher levels of inter-ethnic conflict 
than years without extremely high rainfall. 
 
3) Years with extremes of rainfall (both high and low) have higher levels of inter-
ethnic conflict than years without extreme rainfall. 
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The methods employed in testing these hypotheses needed to take into consideration the 
complex nature of rangeland dynamics within disequilibrium systems, the spatial and 
temporal heterogeneity of rainfall found in northern Kenya, the behavioural flexibility 
of pastoral populations to opportunistically utilise available resources, and the concept 
of “lag-time” as previously discussed in the above sections.  Again, the concept of “lag” 
here refers to both “rainfall lag” (i.e., cumulative effects of insufficient rain over a 
number of years producing drought-like conditions) and “behavioural lag” (i.e., 
drought-like conditions found in one year affecting behaviours found in that year and 
behaviours found in the following year).  Figure 6.1 provides a graphic representation of 
the different relationships that will be discussed in this chapter.  
 
Figure 6.1:  Four types of relationships to be tested by the eight hypotheses 
 
Relationship A Rainfall in a discrete year affects the number of conflicts found in the same 
year (non-lag relationship) 
Relationship B Rainfall in a discrete year affects the number of conflicts found in the same 
year plus the number of conflicts found in the subsequent year (behavioural 
lag relationship) 
Relationship C Cumulative insufficient rainfall over a period of 2 or 3 years affects the 
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number of conflicts found in the terminal year of insufficient rainfall 
(rainfall lag relationship) 
Relationship D Cumulative insufficient rainfall over a period of 2 or 3 years affects the 
number of conflicts found in the terminal year of insufficient rainfall plus 
the number of conflicts found in the subsequent year (behavioural and 
rainfall lag relationship) 
 
Hypotheses 1 – 3 are all represented in the relationship as described in Relationship A 
(no lag).  These same three hypotheses can be further tested using the lag relationship as 
described in Relationship B (behavioural lag) with the following three hypotheses: 
4) Years with extremely low rainfall have higher levels of inter-ethnic conflict in 
the same year and in the following year than years without extremely low 
rainfall. 
 
5) Years with extremely high rainfall have higher levels of inter-ethnic conflict in 
the same year and in the following year than years without extremely high 
rainfall. 
 
6) Years with extremes of rainfall (both high and low) have higher levels of inter-
ethnic conflict in the same year and in the following year than years without 
extreme rainfall (high or low). 
 
Furthermore, lag relationships C (rainfall lag) and D (behavioural and rainfall lag) can 
be used to test the following two hypotheses: 
7) Consecutive years with insufficient rain have higher levels of inter-ethnic 
conflict than consecutive years that have sufficient rain (Relationship C).     
 
8) Consecutive years with insufficient rain have higher levels of interpersonal 
conflict in the same year and in the following year than consecutive years that 
have sufficient rain (Relationship D). 
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6.3.2 Datasets 
A summary of the rainfall and conflict data, including sources, is listed below in Table 
6.2.  As the table demonstrates, colonial records were not included in this analysis due 
to some of the issues raised in reference to the Witsenburg and Roba (2003, 2007) 
study.  Primarily, there are too few data sources available for rainfall records, and the 
colonial records include all known conflicts, not just inter-ethnic conflict.  The conflict 
data that were collected for the purposes of this study were derived from semi-
structured interviews conducted in the field (please refer to chapter four for details).   
 
Table 6.2:  Datasets consulted and used for the purposes of this analysis 
DATASET SOURCE DATA THIS 
ANALYSIS 
Rainfall Data 
1921 – 1958 
National Archives, 
Colonial Records  
38 years 
Marsabit Annual Rainfall 
 Median = 805 mm 
Not Used 
Rainfall Data 
1959 – 2007 
Kenyan 
Meteorological 
Department  
49 years 
Marsabit Annual Rainfall 
 Median = 858 mm 
 
North Horr Annual Rainfall 
 Median = 131 mm 
 
Wamba Annual Rainfall 
 Median = 665 mm 
 
Garba Tula Annual Rainfall 
 Median = 306 mm 
Used 
Conflict Data 
1921 – 1958 
National Archives, 
Colonial Records  
38 years 
98 conflict incidents reported 
Not Used 
Conflict Data 
1959 – 2007 
Handley fieldwork 52 years 
300 conflict incidents reported 
Used 
 
Despite best efforts in trying to obtain the most complete datasets, there were some 
omissions in years recorded.  It was necessary to try to approximate these missing 
rainfall months because without them, the data for the entire year for that site would 
162 
 
have to be removed, which would affect the accuracy of the overall estimates for a 
given year across the four sites.  In order to fill in these missing months of rainfall data, 
I decided to take the following steps: 
 
1. If there were 3 or more missing months of rainfall data within any of the 6 rainy-
season months (March, April, May, October, November, December), then the 
entire year for that site was removed.   
Reasoning:  In any given year, these 6 rainfall months account for approximately 
85% of the total annual rainfall.  In order to accurately estimate the amount of 
rainfall a rainy month is expected to receive, it was necessary to base this 
calculation on the total of at least half of the rainy months for a given year.  By 
applying this criterion, three years were removed from the analysis. 
 
2. For the remaining years, I looked at each site individually to determine the 
median rainfall for each month.   
Reasoning:  Medians were used instead of means so that years with 
uncharacteristically higher than average amounts of rainfall wouldn’t inflate the 
amount of rainfall typically found within a given month.  As previously stated 
by (Low 1979; Behnke and Scoones 1993), medians rather than means are a 
more meaningful measure of typical rainfall within areas that are prone to 
extremes of climate. 
 
3. For months where the median measured 0 mm of rain, the missing data were 
entered also as 0 for those months. 
Reasoning:  As alluded to in point 1, the 6 dry season months account for only 
15% of the total annual rainfall.  In looking through the data by year and plotting 
average rainfall amounts by month over time, where medians measured 0 for a 
given month, an overwhelming majority of years measured 0 for the given 
month.  If rainfall was recorded in these months in a given year, it was usually a 
very small amount, not at all approaching expected rainfall for a rainy season 
month.  Therefore, due to the low variability of rainfall found in dry season 
months, with a median value of 0 mm of rainfall, the missing values for these 
months were also entered as 0. 
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4. Then for each year that remained, I determined how much the rainfall in a given 
year deviated from the expected median for each month by applying the 
following equation: 
  
Reasoning:  This ratio would provide an index of relative rainfall [i.e. relative to 
the long-term medians]. 
 
5. The results from (4) were multiplied by the median for a given month in order to 
provide an expected amount of rainfall for the missing data. 
 
After applying this method as appropriate to the dry season and wet season months, a 
complete dataset was finalised, and a database was then constructed in SPSS for the  
period 1959 – 2007, which were the years having the most complete rainfall data.  
Averages of rainfall (in mm) over the 4 sites were recorded for each year (Table 6.3 
shows a sample) along with 32 other variables that were created in the database for each 
year, which consisted of the rainfall variables, lag variables, and conflict variables.   
 
Table 6.3:  Sample of annual rainfall in millimetres for each of the four sites 
 
YEAR MARSABIT NORTH 
HORR 
WAMBA GARBA 
TULA 
AVERAGE 
1978 1163 130.5 1040.9 609.8 736.1 
1979 1104 191.5 610.1 527.5 608.3 
1980 391 229.6 265.6 33.2 229.9 
1981 1151 218.1 1092.4 332.0 698.4 
1982 1398 172.1 1041.2 322.2 733.4 
1983 625 53.8 440.7 174.1 323.4 
1984 398 2.8 445.3 220.2 266.6 
1985 1284 236.1 497.6 197.7 553.9 
1986 518 90.1 672.0 220.9 375.2 
1987 687 78.1 388.7 136.8 322.7 
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After completing the database, a scatter plot was produced to provide a visual 
representation of the number of conflicts recorded for each year against rainfall, as 
shown in Figure 6.2: 
 
Figure 6.2:  Scatterplot of number of conflict incidents reported each year against annual rainfall (mm).  
The vertical reference lines show rainfall quartiles and 10% / 90% thresholds.  The horizontal reference 
line shows the median number of conflicts reported (median = 2).   
   
Looking at the scatterplot, the hypothesised relationships between rainfall and conflict 
appear plausible and worthy of further statistical analysis. At first reading of this graph, 
one can see that conflict is found in all rainfall conditions, generally at low levels (< 3 
conflicts per annum).  What is potentially the most interesting feature of this plot is that 
all years recording extreme rainfall [in the upper and lower 10% of rainfall] showed 
conflict levels higher than the median ( >2 conflicts per year, represented by blue 
horizontal reference line), and there were no zero-conflict years recorded in these 
rainfall ranges.  This plot appears to demonstrate that conflicts can occur at all times; 
however, it is in the upper and lower ranges of rainfall that conflict always occurs, and 
conflict levels are consistently above the median.  These observations therefore lend 
tentative support to hypotheses 1 – 3, and potentially also to hypotheses 4 – 6.   
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6.3.3 Hypotheses Testing 
 
Hypotheses 1 and 4:  Low Rainfall and Number of Conflicts 
In order to test hypotheses 1 and 4 (that extreme low rainfall is associated with high 
numbers of conflicts), it was necessary to determine thresholds of extremely low 
rainfall.  As previously discussed, there are no standard ecological cut-off points for the 
amount of rainfall that constitutes a drought (USGS 2012).  In the following analyses, I 
set two separate thresholds for extremely low rainfall: one at the lowest 10% of rainfall, 
representing the climatic extreme, which had been further corroborated as an indicative 
threshold in Figure 6.2.  Another threshold was set at the lowest 25%, in order to 
increase the sample size and to offer greater comparability with other statistical analyses 
based on quartiles.  Each year was thus categorically defined (Yes / No) as being found 
within: 
 the lowest 10% of rainfall  
 the lowest 25% of rainfall  
Both of these are subsequently referred to as ‘1 Year’ variables because they refer to 
rainfall in a single, discrete year. 
 
Both variables [lowest 10% and lowest 25% of rainfall years] were tested against the 
following two conflict variables: 
 Conflicts – the discrete number of conflicts recorded for that year   
 ‘Compound Conflicts’ – the number of conflicts found in that year plus the 
number of conflicts recorded in the subsequent year (i.e., behavioural lag-time 
variable, as previously discussed) 
 
To reiterate, ‘compound conflicts’ were used in order to capture conflicts that happened 
as a result of rainfall amounts found in the preceding year (i.e., drought in 1984 could 
have bearing on number of conflicts reported in 1985). 
 
Tests – Hypothesis 1 and 4 (4 tests) 
Lowest 10% rain x Conflicts Hypothesis 1 Relationship A 
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Lowest 10% rain x Compound Conflicts Hypothesis 4 Relationship B 
Lowest 25% rain x Conflicts Hypothesis 1 Relationship A 
Lowest 25% rain x Compound Conflicts Hypothesis 4 Relationship B 
 
The comparator group for each of these tests are the upper 90% and upper 75% of 
rainfall years respectively for the two thresholds. . 
 
Hypotheses 2 and 5:  High Rain Conditions versus Number of Conflicts 
In order to test these hypotheses, as presented by Witsenburg and Roba (2003, 2007),  
showing years with higher amounts of rainfall have significantly higher levels of 
reported conflict, each year was also categorically defined (Yes / No) as being found 
within:   
 the highest 10% of rainfall  
 the highest 25% of rainfall  
 
The rationale for choosing these particular upper thresholds (10% and 25%) were for 
the same reasons as stated above for hypotheses 1 and 4.  These two variables were also 
tested against both the number of conflicts in that year and the number of compound 
conflicts for similar reasons as stated in the tests for hypotheses 1 and 4. 
 
Tests – Hypothesis 2 and 5 (4 tests) 
Highest 10% rain X Conflicts Hypothesis 2 Relationship A 
Highest 10% rain X Compound Conflicts Hypothesis 5 Relationship B 
Highest 25% rain X Conflicts Hypothesis 2 Relationship A 
Highest 25% rain X Compound Conflicts Hypothesis 5 Relationship B 
 
The comparator group for each of these tests are the lower 90% and 75% of rainfall 
years respectively. 
 
Hypotheses 3 and 6:  Extreme Conditions (high and low) versus Number of Conflicts 
In order to examine the effect of extremes (both upper and lower limits) on the number 
of conflicts reported, each year was categorically defined (Yes / No) as being found 
within: 
 the lowest 10% of rainfall or the highest 10% of rainfall 
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 the lowest 25% of rainfall or the highest 25% of rainfall 
 
These two variables were also tested against both the number of conflicts and the 
number of compound conflicts for each year. 
 
Tests – Hypotheses 3 and 6 (4 tests) 
Lowest 10% + Highest 
10% of rain 
x Conflicts Hypothesis 3 Relationship A 
Lowest 10% + Highest 
10% of rain 
x Compound Conflicts Hypothesis 6 Relationship B 
Lowest 25% + Highest 
25% of rain 
x Conflicts Hypothesis 3 Relationship A 
Lowest 25% + Highest 
25% of rain 
x Compound Conflicts Hypothesis 6 Relationship B 
 
The comparator group for each of these tests are the middle levels of rainfall (i.e., 
middle 80% and middle 50% respectively). 
 
Hypotheses 7 and 8:  Insufficient Rain in Consecutive and Cumulative Years versus 
Number of Conflicts 
In order to look at the cumulative effects of consecutive years having insufficient 
rainfall (rainfall lag) on levels of conflict, further variables were created to determine if 
a certain year could be categorically defined (Yes / No) as: 
 2 consecutive years – two consecutive years where both are within the 25% or 
50% lowest amounts of rainfall (2 variables) 
 2 cumulative years – two consecutive years where both are within the 25% or 
50% lowest amounts of rainfall when averaged over the 2 years (2 variables)  
 
These variables will henceforth be referred to as ‘2 Year’ variables as they pertain to 
rainfall conditions that happen over a period of two years. 
 
Cumulative and consecutive effects of insufficient rain were also created over three year 
timespans, also categorically defined (Yes / No) as: 
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 3 consecutive years – three consecutive years where all are within the 25% or 
50% lowest amounts of rainfall (2 variables) 
 3 cumulative years – three consecutive years where all are within the 25% or 
50% lowest amounts of rainfall when averaged over the 3 years (2 variables) 
 
Likewise, these variables will henceforth be referred to as ‘3 Year’ variables as they 
pertain to rainfall conditions that happen over a period of three years. 
 
The thresholds of 25% and 50% were chosen as insufficient rainfall over consecutive 
years because: 1) they utilise a standard statistical approach in using quartiles, and 2) 
the thresholds for ‘insufficient’ rain over multiple years can be raised above the 
thresholds for extremes because insufficient rain is the compound effect of low levels of 
rain over a number of years, bringing about drought-like conditions, that are important 
in this particular analysis.  
 
These rainfall lag-time tests are combinations of either: 
 The ‘1 Year’ variables + the ‘2 Year’ variables; or  
 The ‘1 Year’ variables + the ‘3 Year’ variables; or  
 Simply the effect of the ‘2 Year’ variables or ‘3 Year’ variables on their own   
 
Again, variables were defined categorically (Yes / No), with a “Yes” classification 
being determined if either of the conditions (1 Year or 2 Year; 1 Year or 3 Year) were 
below the 10% or 25% for the 1 Year variable and 25% or 50% for the 2 Year or 3 Year 
variables.  Like the previous analyses, these variables were tested against both the 
number of conflicts and the number of compound conflicts for each year.  The 
following table illustrates a sample of these tests. 
 
Tests – Hypothesis 7 and 8 (sample provided here, 48 tests in total) 
Lowest 10% 
rainfall 
+ 2 consecutive years 
at lowest 25% 
x Conflicts Hypothesis 
7 
Relationship 
C 
Lowest 10% 
rainfall 
+ 2 consecutive years 
at lowest 25% 
x Compound 
Conflicts 
Hypothesis 
8 
Relationship 
D 
Lowest 25% 
rainfall 
+ 2 consecutive years 
at lowest 25% 
x Conflicts Hypothesis 
7 
Relationship 
C 
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Lowest 25% 
rainfall 
+  2 consecutive years 
at lowest 25% 
x Compound 
Conflicts 
Hypothesis 
8 
Relationship 
D 
Lowest 10% 
rainfall 
+  2 consecutive years 
at lowest 50% 
x Conflicts Hypothesis 
7 
Relationship 
C 
Etc… 
Lowest 10% 
rainfall 
+ 3 consecutive years 
at lowest 25% 
x Conflicts Hypothesis 
7 
Relationship 
C 
Etc… 
Lowest 10% 
rainfall 
+ 2 cumulative years 
at lowest 25% 
x Conflicts Hypothesis 
7 
Relationship 
C 
Etc… 
Lowest 10% 
rainfall 
+ 3 cumulative years 
at lowest 25% 
x Conflicts Hypothesis 
7 
Relationship 
C 
Etc… 
None  2 consecutive years 
at lowest 25% 
x Conflicts Hypothesis 
7 
Relationship 
C 
None  2 consecutive years 
at lowest 25% 
x Compound 
Conflicts 
Hypothesis 
8 
Relationship  
D 
None  2 consecutive years 
at lowest 50% 
x Conflicts Hypothesis 
7 
Relationship 
C 
Etc… 
 
The comparator group for each of these are the years that were categorised as ‘No’ in 
relation to the above criteria.  Using the first test in the table above as an example, the 
comparator group included the years that were in the upper 90% of rainfall, or that 
didn’t have two consecutive years in the lowest 25% of rainfall.  Essentially, this is a 
comparison of the number of conflicts found in 1 discrete or 2 – 3 years periods having 
insufficient rainfall to the number of conflicts found in 1 discrete or 2 – 3 year periods 
having sufficient rainfall.    
 
6.3.4 Statistical Tests 
All of the statistical tests for hypotheses 1 – 8 were run using SPSS statistical analysis 
software.  All tests compared a continuous dependent variable (conflicts or compound 
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conflicts) against a categorical independent variable (1 Year, 2 Year, or 3 Year 
variables), each having two categories (Y / N).  Because the sample size of each group 
is small, non-parametric Mann-Whitney tests were used for all analyses (Agresti and 
Finlay 2009).  This approach was preferred over the use of standard linear regression 
because there is no indication [either from chapter five or other literature] that conflict 
and rainfall are associated in a linear way.  
6.4 Results 
Of the statistical tests conducted, the following Figure 6.3 and Table 6.4 highlight the 
significant results: 
 
Figure 6.3:  Each of the highlighted cells represents a significant result (p<0.05).  Each individual colour 
in the charts represents a separate result.  Where colours are matching (for instance, 2 pale blue cells or 2 
pale green cells), the combination of these cells represents a significant result.  For example, pale blue 
cells = lowest 10% at one year + 3 year cumulative lowest 50% tested against compound conflict. 
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Table 6.4:  Each of the significant results explained, colours refer to results in Figure 6.3 
Variables N P Hypothesis 
1 Year 
Variable 
+ 2 Year or 3 
Year 
Variables 
x Conflict 
Variable  
   
Lowest 10% 
of rainfall 
+ None x conflicts n =44  
Yes=5 
0.031 1 
Lowest 10% 
of rainfall + 
Highest 10% 
of rainfall 
+ None 
 
x conflicts n=44 
Yes=10 
0.004* 3 
Lowest 10% 
of rainfall 
+ 3 Years 
cumulative, 
lowest 50% 
of rainfall 
x compound 
conflicts 
n=41 
Yes=19 
0.042 8 
Lowest 25% 
of rainfall 
+ 3 Years 
cumulative, 
lowest 50% 
of rainfall 
x compound 
conflicts 
n=41  
Yes=20 
0.027 8 
None + 2 Years 
consecutive, 
lowest 50% 
of rainfall 
x compound 
conflicts 
n=41  
Yes=12 
0.041 8 
None + 2 Years 
cumulative, 
lowest 50% 
of rainfall 
x compound 
conflicts 
n=41 
Yes=17 
0.039 8 
None + 3 Years 
consecutive, 
x compound 
conflicts  
n=40  0.010 8 
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lowest 50% 
of rainfall 
Yes=6 
None + 3 Years 
cumulative, 
lowest 50% 
of rainfall 
x compound 
conflicts 
N=40 
Yes=17 
0.042 
 
8 
*highly significant  
 
In this analysis a total of 60 tests were run in order to produce the results listed in Figure 
6.3 and Table 6.4.  Due to the high number of tests involved, and to ensure that 
significance was not achieved by chance alone, the p-values were adjusted to correct for 
multiplicity.  The Bonferroni correction has been criticised for producing overly 
conservative estimates of corrected p-values (Storey 2002); therefore, this analysis uses 
a False Discovery Rate correction as suggested by Benjamini and Horchberg (1995).  
For this type of correction, significant p-values are ordered from smallest to largest, and 
the original p-values will retain their significance if they are less than 0.05 ÷ the rank of 
the p-value.  For instance, 0.010 < 0.05 ÷ 2, therefore this result remains significant.  
The adjusted p-values are referred to as q-values (Benjamini and Horchberg 1995).  
After completing the False Discovery Rate correction, the following two results 
remained significant: 
 
1) Number of conflicts in the years having the lowest 10% of rainfall + highest 10% 
of rainfall compared to the number of conflicts in the years of middle 80% of 
rainfall (q < 0.05), (see Relationship A in Figure 6.1 and hypothesis 3 for a full 
description). 
 
2) Number of compound conflicts found in the terminal year of three consecutive 
years having the lowest 50% of rainfall (insufficient rain), compared to the 
number of compound conflicts found in the terminal year of three consecutive 
years, where at least one year is not in the lowest 50% of rainfall (sufficient rain) 
with q < 0.025.  (Please see Relationship D in Figure 6.1 and hypothesis 8 for a 
full description).   
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Results for hypotheses 1 and 4:  When comparing the number of conflicts in years 
having the lowest 10% of rainfall in the four sites against the number of conflicts found 
in all other years, there is significance at the p < 0.05 level; however, with correction, 
the q-value only approaches significance (q > 0.0125).  This result addresses the 
primary hypothesis that higher amounts of conflict are experienced during periods of 
extreme drought.  In this study, with correction, no such correlation exists.  Also, 
assessing the lowest amounts of rainfall in respect to compound conflicts showed no 
significant correlations, meaning in this case, that behavioural lag is not a significant 
factor in response to drought conditions.  It is important to note here that extraordinarily 
high conflict levels that were found in 2009 (141 conflicts) do not have any bearing on 
this result, as this year was excluded in the examination due to a lack of corresponding 
accurate rainfall data.   
 
Because significance was found in comparing the upper and lower 10% of rainfall to the 
middle 80% of rainfall, a further test was run in order to isolate the effect of the lowest 
10% of rainfall without interference from the upper 10% of rainfall.  In this case, the 
test compared conflicts found in the lowest 10% of rainfall to the amount of conflict 
found in the middle 80% of rainfall in order to see the effect of low rainfall on conflict 
without the influence of the highest 10% of rainfall values.  The result was approaching 
significance, even with correcting for multiplicity (p = 0.019, with correction 
significance is q > 0.016 level).  Although not quite a significant result for the q-value, 
this result indicates that the relationship between the amount of conflict reported in the 
lowest 10% of rainfall years compared with conflict in the middle 80% of rainfall (see 
Figure 6.4 below for reference) approaches significance.   
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Figure 6.4:  Chart showing rainfall in millimetres plotted against the number of conflicts reported in each 
year.  A line of best fit has been added to the data. 
 
 
From these results, we can conclude that there is a weak correlation between extremely 
low rainfall and increased levels of conflict.  This result gives some tentative support to 
conclusions drawn in the majority of both academic and development literature that 
drought-like conditions are significantly correlated with increased levels of conflict.  
However, the results from this study demonstrate that the correlation between these two 
variables is weak, and other variables may need to be taken into consideration.  This 
finding suggests that the literature inflates the connection between drought and conflict.     
 
Result for hypotheses 2 and 5:  Interestingly, when testing Witsenburg and Adano’s 
(2003, 2007) hypothesis that higher amounts of rainfall correlate with increased 
amounts of conflict, this study found no such correlation, looking at both the highest 10% 
of rainfall and highest 25% of rainfall (versus conflicts and compound conflicts), see 
Figure 6.4 above for reference.  Likewise in order to evaluate this relationship further, a 
second test was run that compared conflicts found in the highest 10% of rainfall values 
to the amount of conflict found in the middle 80% of rainfall values in order to assess 
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the effect of rainfall on conflict without the influence of the lowest 10% of rainfall 
values.  Although the p-value approached significance at p = 0.052 before correction, 
after correcting for multiplicity, then this result is no longer significant (q > 0.005).  
This result does not provide any support for the argument that high amounts of rainfall 
are correlated with increased conflict episodes.     
 
When examining the result of this hypothesis further, Figure 6.5 below indicates that a 
lack of significant results from the data in the upper limits of rainfall may be due to the 
disparity and range in rainfall distribution in the upper 10%.  The rainfall varies widely 
within this range between the lowest three points and the upper two (please refer to 
Figure 6.5 below).  It may be that this variation within high-rainfall years masks any 
difference between high-rainfall and other years.  Furthermore, there is some indication 
from the two uppermost data points that when annual rainfall is extremely high [over 
1000 mm], this may be associated with increased levels of conflict. The small sample 
size means that this is clearly only conjecture, but if a dataset were available with more 
years of >1000 mm of rainfall, this could be an interesting avenue for further analysis.   
 
Figure 6.5:  Chart showing rainfall in millimetres plotted against number of conflicts per year, detailing 
highest 10% of rainfall data points. 
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Result for hypotheses 3 and 6:  The relationship, as presented by Low (1979), that 
populations respond to the extremes of climate rather than to the means of climatic 
conditions, was supported.  The test compared the levels of conflict found in years 
having the lowest 10% of rainfall or the highest 10% of rainfall against the number of 
conflicts found in all other years.  Significance is at the q < 0.05 level and represents the 
most significant result of all the relationships that were tested.  Assessing the lowest 10% 
and highest 10% of rainfall in respect to compound conflicts showed no significant 
correlations, therefore indicating again that including compound conflicts in the 
statistical analysis has little bearing on the strength of the proposed relationships. 
 
Result for hypotheses 7 and 8:  The number of compound conflict incidents during 
periods of three years of insufficient consecutive rain at the lowest 50% differed 
significantly from the number of compound conflicts found in sufficient rainfall years 
(q < 0.025).  However, compound conflict incidents taking place during insufficient 
rainfall over two years did not differ significantly from compound conflicts found 
during sufficient rainfall.  Furthermore, the cumulative effect of insufficient rainfall 
years (for two years or three years) was not significant.  The results from these tests are 
illuminating for a number of reasons.  From the data, we would expect to see greater 
differences in consecutive effects of insufficient rainfall than the effect of cumulative 
insufficient rainfall; the reason for this being that each year of the two- or three-year 
period needs to be below a certain rainfall threshold (either lowest 25% or lowest 50%) 
in the case of consecutive insufficient rain.  However, in the case of cumulative 
insufficient rain, it is only the average of the two or three years that must be below the 
rainfall threshold (again, either lowest 25% or lowest 50%).  As discussed earlier in 
light of the Witsenburg and Roba (2003, 2007) study, the averaging of multiple years of 
rainfall can have a smoothing effect.  In this latter case, even one year of extremely low 
rainfall out of three years can bring down the average so that it meets the threshold 
criterion of insufficient rain.  In practice, ethnographic data recorded in the field suggest 
that ethnic groups can cope with the effects of one year droughts, a point supported in 
research by Ellis and Swift (1987), as long as there is sufficient rainfall after drought 
conditions have passed in order for the environment to recuperate.  Due to this 
smoothing effect, the results from the cumulative tests support the expectation that they 
would produce less of an overall effect than consecutive effects of insufficient rainfall. 
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6.4.1 Discussion  
The results from the statistical analysis give strong support to the claim that single years 
with extreme rainfall (below 10% or above 90%) are more prone to conflict episodes 
than years having non-extreme rainfall (middle 80% of rainfall range).  We can also see 
this relationship represented in Figure 6.4, where increases in conflict are shown in the 
upper and lower 10% of rainfall when compared to the middle 80%.   
 
This finding corroborates the ethnographic material from chapter five, in which research 
participants discussed conflict episodes in relation to either rainy conditions or drought 
conditions, with a particular emphasis on drought.  Although not conclusive in the 
statistical analysis, there is some indication that the relationship between climate and 
conflict is experienced at the lowest 10% of rainfall and [less so] at the upper 10% of 
rainfall.  With improved climatic records increasing the sample size, this represents a 
promising area for future statistical analysis.        
 
In examining the second significant result of this analysis, periods of insufficient rain 
have a significant effect on increased levels of compound conflict, however only in 
relation to consecutive rather than cumulative insufficient rain years.  In looking more 
closely at this result, one would expect that the most severe case of insufficient rainfall 
(therefore, likely having the greatest effect on levels of conflict) would be the case of 3 
years of consecutive insufficient rainfall at the lowest 25% rainfall threshold.  However, 
when running this test, the relationship between this variable and an increase in conflict 
was not significant.  The reason for this outcome may simply be due to small sample 
size: there were only two years that qualify in the data to be included in this particular 
analysis.  By contrast, when using a 50% threshold [which increased the number of 
positive cases to 6] the relationship between 3 years of consecutive insufficient rainfall 
and conflict was significant.  Although not conclusive, because of the limited dataset, 
this result is consistent with the claim that insufficient rainfall over consecutive years 
may be associated with higher compound conflict levels.      
   
Although these two results provide some statistical evidence to explain the relationship 
between climatic conditions and conflict levels, they certainly do not explain the entire 
picture.  For example, referring to Figure 6.5, the year associated with the greatest 
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amount of conflict, occurred when rainfall was at 1080.6 millimetres for the year, which 
is in the upper 10% of the rainfall record.  This data point is in agreement with the idea 
that increased levels of conflict are associated with extreme climatic conditions (both 
high and low).  However, can this claim really be made?  The year associated with this 
data point is 1961.  In examining a number of colonial records taken at this time, there 
are two historical factors that may have bearing on the increased levels of conflict seen 
during this particular year.  One is that a large meeting was held in Isiolo in 1961 
between the DC’s office and the local area chiefs (both Samburu and Borana) where 
grievances from both sides were raised, raiding episodes discussed, and multiple fines 
were levied between the two ethnic groups in payment of stolen livestock 
(DC/ISO/4/7/11).  The high level of conflict reporting may simply be a function of there 
being a formal avenue for reporting from both ethnic groups, rather than reflecting an 
actual increase in conflicts that year. In other words, the increase in reported conflict in 
1961 may have less to do with the climatic conditions and more to do with improved 
record-keeping.  Furthermore, a telegraph was sent to the Isiolo DC’s office stating that 
all of the Samburu chiefs would be circumcising their sons in 1962 (DC/ISO/4/7/11).  
Circumcision of the new morans signals a ‘retirement’ of the standing morans, at which 
point they would become junior elders and would be expected to behave as such.  1961 
would therefore have been the final year in which these morans would be able to 
participate in large-scale raids as part of the warrior class before the circumcision of the 
new age-set in 1962.  It may be that these morans were capitalising on this final year as 
warriors to steal animals and potentially increase their herd size.  Although this 
suggestion is speculative, the point is that increased conflict in 1961 cannot simply be 
ascribed to the result of climatic conditions.  There are potentially more processes at 
work here that could also influence conflict levels seen at this time.                
6.5 Conclusions 
In light of this last point, results from this statistical analysis and from chapter five are 
starting to build a picture of the relationship between drought and conflict.  The first 
aspect of this picture is that the relationship between these two variables is vastly more 
complex than a lot of the current literature would lead the reader to believe (e.g., 
Markakis 1994).  Statistically, the variation in conflict episodes cannot be fully 
explained by climatic conditions alone.  This point raises two issues.  The first is: how 
important, relative to other factors, is climate [or rainfall] in generating conflict?  Based 
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on data presented in chapter five, I would argue that climatic conditions (either periods 
of substantial rain or increased drought) create the ideal opportunity for conflict, rather 
than being the sole impetus.  The second point is:  if climate is not the sole impetus for 
conflict, then what are the other motivations and causal factors that contribute to 
conflict for north Kenyan pastoralists?  The following chapter will address this question 
and therefore begin to build on the complexity found in the relationship between 
drought-induced resource scarcity and conflict.    
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Chapter 7: Motivations for Conflict 
7.1 Introduction 
As demonstrated in chapters five and six, conducting research regarding the effects of 
resource scarcity on behavioural adaptations within subsistence populations runs the 
risk of over-simplifying the nature of this relationship and implying that pastoral 
populations are environmentally-determined:  making warfare, raiding, and violence 
inevitable characteristics of these communities.  Authors such as Markakis (1994), 
Cousins (1996) and Behnke and Scoones (1993) go so far as to state that chronic, 
endemic conflict is a central feature of populations living in non-equilibrium 
ecosystems.  However, this chapter is looking to build complexity into the 
understanding of pastoral conflict by exploring beyond the ‘simple’ relationship as 
described in the above literature.  Research of this type cannot be a-historical or a-
political in its investigation; it must be inclusive of underlying social and cultural 
processes that can influence behavioural outcomes.  For instance, Lamphear (1992) 
highlights the role of the colonial government and international politics exacerbating 
ethnic tensions to the point of conflict in his study of Turkana and Pokot pastoralists, 
who had previously shared a significant period of inter-ethnic collaboration, alliance, 
and intermarriage.  Climatic stress may in fact be the condition by which ethnic tensions 
are created, but government policy, amongst other factors, may provide the platform 
upon which violence is carried out, or vice-versa.   
 
Over-simplification of the causes of conflict amongst pastoralists in northern Kenya 
helps to further stereotypes of pastoral communities long-held by outsiders.  During my 
fieldwork, I spoke informally with a number of expatriate, European ranchers from the 
fertile Mt Kenya region regarding their views on northern pastoral conflict.  From the 
perspective of someone who spent a considerable period of time within the north, the 
European ranchers’ opinions were rather shocking to me.  However, they were 
beneficial to hear as I believe that they didn’t just represent the viewpoints of a few 
protected, seemingly callous individuals, but rather they may be representative of many 
non-northern, non-pastoralist attitudes within Kenya.  Some of the comments I heard 
were, “Fighting is the national sport up there,” or “At least the killing helps to control 
the population - both of the animals and the people,” or “why should anyone care why 
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these people fight?  If they want to kill each other, then let them get on with it.”  
Although it was difficult to hear these opinions being expressed, I came to understand 
them as the result of people’s lack of exposure to northern populations, part of the 
pastoralist rhetoric, and as a product of views expressed in the media where conflicts are 
reported, and it is “brutality” or “senselessness” that is emphasised rather than a 
speculation on the causes of a particular conflict incident.        
 
Even within the government when I interviewed a number of District Commissioners 
(DCs), District Officers (DOs) or commanders of the Anti-Stock Theft Unit (ASTU) 
(who are all charged, in some capacity, with the protection and security of herders, and 
if necessary the prosecution of stock raiders), their views tended to be single-minded 
and reinforced established stereotypes.  Their attitudes generally fell into one of two 
camps:  either “these people raid just to restock their animals after the drought has 
wiped them” (ASTU Commander, Lolmisigiyioi, 17 October 2009), or “these people 
are rich by any standards.  They raid in order to gain wealth” (DO, Laisamis, 9 July 
2010).  It would initially appear that these individuals would be well-placed to make an 
assessment of the factors that contribute most to inter-ethnic raiding and conflict due to 
their position and supposed access to local communities, however upon closer 
examination, I did not find this to be the case.  This may, in part, be a product of the 
DCs, PCs, DOs, ASTU Commanders, and the Officer Commanding Police Station 
(OCS) not originating from the areas under their jurisdictions, nor are they ethnically 
related.  It is quite typical to find an officer from the majority Kikuyu or Luo ethnic 
groups who is presiding over a predominantly Borana or Somali district, for instance.  
This arrangement, although seemingly sensible in terms of reducing the possibility of 
favouritism or “tribalism,” means that the officers are not well-acquainted to the needs 
and behaviours of the people within their areas and may come to the position with 
particular prejudices.  Furthermore, in order to combat the pervasive nature of 
corruption within Kenyan government institutions, officers are moved from one district 
to another after a post of only one year purposely to reduce exploitative relationships 
amongst their charges.  This type of management may (or may not) help to reduce 
corruption; however, it denies the opportunity for individuals in power to build up 
institutional knowledge of the area’s constituents, their needs, identify areas of 
insecurity, or observe seasonal / recurring behaviours that may be associated with 
certain events or phenomena.  Finally, I would question the amount of exposure an 
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officer has to the local community as, by my observations, the officers’ daily duties tend 
to be confined to the realms of their camp, office compound, or domestic compound and 
rarely out amongst the pastoral grazing or settlement areas.  For these reasons, I 
question whether government officers understand the manner in which pastoral people 
operate, the underlying motivations behind observed behaviours, or how to address their 
local needs adequately.  As a result, officers tend to do little more than reaffirm 
established stereotypes, albeit ‘dressed up’ in the veneer of being in a position to “know 
the real story.”  
          
Given the above limitations in perspective, my fieldwork was purposely designed to 
incorporate considerable ethnographic depth by working and living between all three 
ethnic communities across 17 different sites, and by interviewing a range of individuals:  
from young to old, males and females, interior and border region inhabitants, and from 
“peri-urban” settlements to make-shift mobile satellite camps.  I endeavoured, as much 
as possible within a 17-month fieldwork period, to gain the widest variety of 
perspectives regarding how people felt about conflict and the factors that people identify 
as motivations resulting in conflict events within their communities.  The results that I 
present in this chapter demonstrate that engaging in conflict can rarely be motivated by 
a ‘simple’ or mono-causal effect, but rather as a result of a complex suite of factors and 
dispositions promoting aggressive behaviours.  When asked for an explanation as to the 
cause or motivation for violence, research participants, with very few exceptions, did 
not hesitate in their responses and were quite clear about the reason conflict exists 
within their communities; however, they rarely cited a singular cause.  It is specifically 
this multi-causal nature of conflict within pastoral societies that I would like to focus on 
in this chapter and try to provide a way of thinking about how each motivation can be 
assessed.   
 
7.1.1 A Note on Methods 
Although I have explained the interview methods for discussing conflict events quite 
extensively in chapter four, there are a few details to include here that are specific to 
understanding the motivations that research participants cited during fieldwork.  
Primarily, qualitative data for this purpose was gathered using both individual 
interviews and focus groups.   
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For reasons cited earlier in chapter four, the focus groups mainly engaged women and 
male youth.  For the interviews, I used two different approaches in trying to identify and 
record individuals’ motivations for engaging in conflict events.  The first method was to 
ask people rather directly what they felt were the main reasons inter-ethnic conflict 
occurs, has occurred in the past, has spurred them specifically to participate in or 
support a conflict event, or theoretically would make them engage in conflict.  This type 
of questioning was very open-ended, where participants were able to express how they 
themselves viewed conflict and what they felt were its primary causes.  From this 
method, I tried to understand the reasons why the participant him / herself has, or would 
have, for engaging in or supporting inter-ethnic conflict.  This method will be referred 
to throughout this chapter as the “Open-ended Interview Method.” 
 
The second method used during the interviews was part of the conflict incident 
recording, as described in chapters four and six.  These are conflict episodes that had 
actually occurred, with real material outcomes.  In the course of recording the ‘who, 
what, when, where’ aspects of the conflict event, I would ask why the participant felt 
that the raider(s) had committed an aggressive act towards him / her.  The responses that 
I recorded from this line of questioning helped me to understand the belief systems that 
one group has regarding the motivations of another group and also, it is more 
practically-focused on events that actually happened, couched within a context of a 
specific time, a specific place, under specific conditions, rather than speaking wholly 
theoretically.  More often than not, the responses that I received to the first line of 
questioning differed from those that were recorded during the second line of 
questioning, which will be discussed in detail within this chapter.  This method will be 
referred to henceforth as the “Incident Interview Method.” 
 
7.1.2 A Note on “Culture” 
The reader will see here that I make use of the term “culture” throughout this chapter as 
a way to distinguish between “cultural” traditions, which are those aspects of society 
that have long-standing histories.  As described to me by participants, “cultural” aspects, 
as they identify them, are said to be deeply-ingrained in the community and more 
permanent and unswerving.  People described their “culture” as those aspects that 
convey intrinsic elements of how an individual identifies oneself and is represented.   In 
opposition to culture are those things that have been taught, learned, or that people have 
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adopted through recent exposure.  In light of modern anthropological literature 
regarding “culture,” I understand that this term and its usage here may be seen as 
problematic; however, I am using it here simply because it is the language that was used 
by the local people, with local meaning, when certain aspects were being described to 
me.  Where this term appears, it is a result of the most direct translation into English as 
“culture,” and this was also the term used by participants who were able to converse in 
English without the use of a translator.  However, its use is not trying to impose a 
bounded, rigid structure on the behaviours found within these pastoral communities.  In 
this case, we may be able to think of its meaning as “custom” rather than the more 
immutable term “culture.”  I recognise in this thesis that local community behaviours 
seen today are a ‘snapshot’ along a continuing process of change (Spear and Waller 
1993); however, in order to try to represent the feelings of local people most faithfully, 
it may be necessary to accept this usage of “culture” as it is presented here.      
7.2 Results 
Utilising these methods in the field, over 275 individuals were interviewed using the 
Incident Interview Method, of which 194 of them recalled specific conflict incidents, 
which accounted for 300 unique conflict events.  Results from this method were 
compiled using a basic statistical analysis and are presented in Figure 7.2.  From using 
the Open-ended Interview Method, results were coded using basic Word functionality to 
separate responses into a document that could then be read and analysed for emerging 
themes surrounding conflict motivations.  It is important to clarify here that these 
themes came directly from the data without imposing categories on the data before 
having the opportunity to fully analyse the participants’ responses.   
 
When looking at this second category of data and the themes that emerged from it, a 
natural distinction began to form for me between the motivations cited that appeared to 
be “dispositions” for conflict and those which appeared as “triggers” for conflict events.  
A disposition would be a motivation that stemmed from feelings or sentiments that 
participants expressed as having long-standing histories, were slow to change over time, 
or that demonstrate a natural inclination or attitude towards a certain belief or behaviour 
within the communities.  Conversely, a trigger would be those things that people 
referred to as having a more temporary condition that are acted upon if and when they 
arise within and between two communities.  In this regard, a ‘trigger’ is a more fleeting 
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circumstance that can be highly situational.  Homer-Dixon (1999) also makes reference 
to triggers, saying that they are the proximate causes to conflict, rather than underlying 
explanations.  Making the distinction between dispositions and triggers is not a central 
theme of this chapter; however, it is provided as a way of separating the causal factors 
in order to aid the analysis and discussion.  After making this distinction, the results of 
the interviews based on the Open-ended Interview Method and the Incident Interview 
Method were used in Figures 7.1 and 7.2, respectively.  
 
Figure 7.1:  Results of the conflict motivations cited from using Open-ended Interview Method, separated 
into dispositions and triggers.  I did not quantify these responses; however, the pie chart below 
demonstrates the proportional distribution of motivations that were cited during interviews.  A larger 
section means that the corresponding motivation was cited in more interviews than a motivation that 
corresponds to a smaller section of the pie chart.    
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Figure 7.2:  Pie chart showing the percentage distribution of motivations cited by the participants after 
analysing the 300 unique conflict incidents (Incident Interview Method), separated into dispositions and 
triggers.  The corresponding percentages here are the proportion of times a motivation was reported out of 
all responses that were given.   
 
 
Other than the differences in proportions found between the two charts, the only other 
distinction is that “revenge” and “retaliation” are separate in the Figure 7.1, where 
revenge is a disposition and retaliation is a trigger, and they are combined as both 
triggers in Figure 7.2.  The reason behind this will be explained in greater detail later in 
the chapter; however, a simple explanation provided here is that the terminology used in 
the interviews during the conflict incident reporting made no distinctions between 
revenge or retaliation.  However, during the more in-depth discussions regarding 
motivations, from using the Open-ended Interview Method, I understood that this 
concept functions in two very distinct ways, simply:  one that refers to a “revenge 
culture,” and the other as a way of providing security.  Details expanding on this 
distinction will be presented in the following pages. 
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7.3 Dispositions of Conflict 
 
7.3.1 “Prestige Culture” 
The disposition most often cited by research participants in relation to the recorded 
conflict incidents is one that I refer to as “prestige culture,” where stealing animals is a 
sign of power and masculinity.  Part of the prestige is wrapped up in the ability to 
acquire and maintain large numbers of animals.  As this concept was explained to me,  
“Getting the property of a defeated person is the Borana culture.  It shows that 
you are a man – that you have truly defeated them as you take away their 
property.  Animals are taken as a sign of power and manliness, strength, and 
superiority that you have depleted someone else’s property.” (Borana, elder man, 
Gotu)   
Another man makes the point that,  
“the reason for stealing animals is a quest for wealth.  Even people with animals 
want to increase their numbers.  Each tribe doesn’t always steal for the same 
reasons, but tribes are all pastoralists and they have the heritage that they love 
animals.  This is cross- cutting.” (Borana, youth male, Kambi Garba) 
As demonstrated by these quotes, people explain that the accumulation of livestock is 
entwined with a cultural context based on the significance of owning animals.  Animals 
are truly beloved amongst pastoralists as, particularly for males, they represent financial 
worth, power / influence, security, heritage / inheritance, and also the ability to attract 
partners.  As I heard one man say during an interview,  
“When a man gets animals, his life starts there.” (Samburu, elder man, 
Lolkerded)   
Truly, at the core of each of the northern ethnic groups, people describe themselves first 
and foremost as pastoralists, and without animals, they indicate that they would cease to 
be a part of these communities.  Having animals, maintaining animals, and 
accumulating animals are an intrinsic part of their very existence.  Taking animals from 
one’s enemy challenges and jeopardises another’s existence, and therefore people report 
that it is extraordinarily damaging, not only financially but also to one’s own sense of 
being.  The “prestige culture” motivation for taking animals is two-sided.  On the one 
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hand, it increases one’s own worth, wealth, and power, while on the other hand it 
jeopardises another’s.     
 
This duality was repeatedly reported to me during interviews with people saying that 
their enemies were constantly trying to “make us poor, and make themselves rich.”  I 
came to realise over time that this was not just in reference to financial gains and losses, 
but instead it also meant making people poor of spirit and poor in influence, which also 
had repercussions for each side’s claim for the land and the resources in the area.  As 
one side gains power and influence, many people report that on the losing side of these 
exchanges, individuals become ‘deflated’ and ‘fearful’ of their enemy’s growing 
strength.  This being the case, it is much easier to push the diminished side off of their 
land or utilise their resources with impunity.  This was a reason that was often cited for 
the back and forth small stealing that occurred during drought conditions, as discussed 
in chapter five, when it would seem like wasted effort to steal animals during a time that 
they are more likely to die as a result of drought.  People often said that the stealing of 
animals during this time was a way of gaining prestige and influence over the other side, 
which benefitted them in “pestering” their enemy in the on-going jostle for access to 
sufficient pasture and water.   
 
As briefly discussed in chapter five, I found that both men and women saw the intrinsic 
value and use of conflict within their societies in a similar manner.  During interviews, I 
was just as likely to hear a woman calling for the violent ‘obliteration’ of an opposing 
ethnic group as I would a particularly aggressive man.  Likewise, both sexes were just 
as likely to extol the benefits of peaceful coexistence and the promotion of open 
dialogue between themselves and another ethnic group.  The discernible difference 
between men’s and women’s feelings regarding conflict is only really apparent when 
examining the concept of prestige.  Men tended to be more nostalgic and proud when 
discussing their youth and their own raiding activities where women didn’t have this 
same type of first-hand response to conflict.  Women can be a part of the collective 
pride that results from one’s own ethnic group being successful in a raid; however, they 
themselves do not necessarily experience feelings of increased self-worth and improved 
status.  Box 7.1 below illustrates this concept of prestige connected to raiding activities. 
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Box 7.1:  Taken from field notes, example demonstrating prestige associated with raiding, particularly 
amongst males.  (Lolkerded, July 2010)    
I had been up since before 4 this morning, making sure to give myself enough time to 
walk the 4 or 5 miles to the marriage ceremony before the sun peaked over the horizon, 
and the day’s events got underway:  events which started with the circumcision of the 
young bride, the slaughtering of the wedding bull, the division of choice pieces of meat 
taken into the bride’s mother’s home, and the constant, copious amounts of tea being 
leisurely sipped and slurped by the elder males of this Samburu community as they 
perch upon their tree stumps and carved stools.  With the formalities out of the way, the 
festivities really begin to gain momentum as groups of morans gather slightly outside of 
the manyatta, drawn together by one hypnotic, guttural chorus.  As the rhythm takes 
shape, the high-pitch notes of the soloist start to dictate the unfolding of their story.  He 
sings of beautiful animals, of thirst that knows no end, of landscapes he and his brothers 
have travelled, and the friends and foes that they have met along the way. 
 
It is at this time that I am about an hour into my interview with an Lkishili elder of the 
community, estimated to be in his early 60s.  Our conversation has already taken us 
over the ethnic origins of his family, the names and characteristics of all types of rains 
within the Samburu territory, and we have just now begun to discuss the migration 
pattern of his animals during the 2009 drought.  With pen poised at my paper, I ask him 
to describe for me when his cows first left their home territory.  Sitting on a low stool 
under the shade of a sprawling acacia tortillis 100 meters from the wedding site, the 
man breathes in deeply, his back arches as he closes his eyes and lifts his head towards 
the sky.  The breath remains in his body, his chest expanded and frozen, seemingly 
transfixed in that position for a number of minutes.  Confused and concerned, I turn to 
Raphael and ask in English, “Raphael, do you know what’s going on?  Have I offended 
him?  Is he not clear on the question?  Do you think he’s tired,” running through the 
usual laundry list for abrupt disruptions to my incessant probing.  Raphael just sits and 
waits with his eyes on the man, and finally with his characteristic politeness, he 
addresses the man, still with his eyes closed, respectfully inquiring as to his current 
state.  The man slowly opens his eyes, and just as slowly, a warmth spreads across his 
face, all the wrinkles of his mouth turning upwards into an infectious smile.  His now 
open eyes are dancing, and for this moment, his body appears light, and there is 
freedom there that had not existed at the start of our interview.  He responds 
deliberately to Raphael in Kisamburu, shaking his head without apology, saying simply, 
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“The music is just too sweet.”  Now, there is no need to turn back to recording 
migration histories and names of plants that his animals like to eat.  His simple smile 
has dictated the remaining hour of our interview, which is spent engaged in stories of 
his youth, testing his fledgling moran strength, and reliving the perils of encountering 
enemies in the bush.  Raphael and I leave him to roam and wander through the 
transcendent descriptions of his memories, concluding as the black eyes encircled by 
watery blue perimeters focus squarely on us, with the declaration “I am feeling proud.”             
 
7.3.2 “Youth / Moran Culture” 
7.3.2.1 Youth:  Prestige 
Very closely linked to the concept of a “prestige culture”, youth or “moran culture” is 
another disposition within each of these communities that contributes greatly to the 
discharge of inter-ethnic aggressive acts.  One key point to keep in mind is that raiding 
and conflicts are almost solely within the realm of the youth.  This has some practical 
basis, namely that raiding requires a certain level of physical stamina that would 
preclude many of the older members of the society, but there are also other 
considerations for this being the case.  As one elder man simply put,  
“Morans don’t have children to lose them.” (Samburu, elder man, Lenchokut) 
which means that the youth members of the community are not yet married, and 
therefore they don’t have the responsibilities of a wife and children to care for during 
this time.  Should the youth perish in a battle, his family would suffer his loss; however, 
it would not be as catastrophic as had he been the head of the household with many 
individuals relying on him.  Across the three populations under study, it was the youth 
who were the perpetrators of all of the raids; the only distinction being that the term 
“youth” could also be applied to a junior elder within Borana communities.  As 
discussed in chapter three, while the Samburu and Rendille have definitive age-sets 
which determine whether or not individuals are classified as youths, the Borana do not 
have as strong a distinction, and therefore junior elders (up until about the age of 40) 
may participate on raids alongside their younger compatriots.  It is the younger 
members of the society that have the most to prove and are in need of building up their 
reputations within the community.  As one elder explains,  
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“If you are a moran, and you don't steal cows, you are less of a moran.  All of 
their prestige is in praise from stealing cows.  Secretly the moran’s father is 
happy and proud of his son for stealing.” (Samburu, elder man, Lenchokut)   
This raises another point that people describe raiding as being a part of one’s “cultural 
heritage,” wrapped up in the “prestige culture,” which is part of a disposition towards 
conflict, separate from any apparent triggers.   
“Culture makes a moran steal even if he’s not poor, particularly if the father of 
the moran used to steal, and that moran hears the story so he thinks that stealing 
is good.” (Samburu, elder man, Lolkerded)   
Acquiring animals and increasing the size of one’s herd is a good thing at any age, but 
there is disproportionately more pressure on the youth of the community to do so, as 
they need to prove themselves as individuals who are able to acquire, manage, and 
maintain substantial herd sizes.  As explained to me by one moran,  
“You also want a lot of animals to show that you are hard-working, and you can 
survive during a drought.  You’re trying to show the community that you are a 
hard worker.  It is good when you are trying to find a wife.  When you have a lot 
of animals, it is easier to get a wife.  You steal even if you have a lot of cows, 
but if you have a few cows, then stealing helps to accumulate the herd size.” 
(Samburu, moran, Kitich) 
 
7.3.2.2 Youth:  Ladies’ Praise and Incitement 
This idea leads onto the next concept that part of the youth / “moran culture” is very 
much tied with the ability to be able to attract young ladies during one’s youth with the 
ultimate goal of securing enough animals to attract a future wife / number of wives.  
One young Samburu girl told me,  
“Girls will say that they will sing to praise them.  They praise certain colours of 
the stolen cows and where they brought the cows from.  The songs happen 
outside of the home when herding animals or even at night they can sing close 
by.  If a moran is unsuccessful, he will still be praised, but he will try his luck 
again.  If a moran loses all his animals in the border, he won’t come home – he 
will hate himself, and he will be ashamed.  The shame he feels will be coming 
from the girls and from his parents.  If I were to choose my marriage, I would 
choose a moran who has gone on raids because he is precious because he has 
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tried to get cows.  Everybody likes the cows that are brought back.  In order to 
make the morans stop raiding, the girls need to stop praising them.  I praise them 
all the time.  Nothing can stop me from praising the morans.  I want a boyfriend 
who raids.” (Samburu, female youth, Resim)   
 
In speaking with groups of women regarding raiding activities, the marriageable women 
tended to focus on the number of animals a potential suitor owns, whereas the young 
(unmarried) girls focused more on the aggressive nature of the moran / youth – whether 
he has gone on raids or not.  However, whether he was successful in capturing animals 
during the raid was less of a concern for the young girls.  As it has been explained to me 
by multiple informants, generally an “aggressive nature” and showing aggression are 
not particularly prized characteristics amongst these communities.  However, in the case 
of the young unmarried girls, they honour those morans and youth who have raided not 
to honour their aggression, but rather, as a sign that a particular individual may be hard-
working and capable of providing in the future.  Many girls have pointed out that these 
individuals have the potential to acquire animals, grow them up, and maintain / protect 
them.   
 
Conversely, while the ladies’ songs can be used as praise, they can also be used to 
ridicule or incite youths to engage in conflict.  Likewise, Spencer comments, “It is the 
taunts of girls and their praises which are largely responsible for inciting many moran to 
steal stock” (Spencer 1965: 127).  For such male-dominated communities, I found this 
concept to be very interesting as it placed a lot of power within the women’s hands to 
incite or influence such serious behaviours as raiding.  Many times, I heard the women 
jesting and having fun with this concept.  A Borana woman told me,  
“Women here feel that there is no place for raiding behaviour in today’s society.  
Also, we don’t feel as though our men are brave enough to do it” (Borana, elder 
woman, Mata Arba),  
which was followed up with some laughing from the other women.  On the one hand, 
women may be aware that in “modern times” they should not be promoting aggressive 
behaviour amongst the male youth; however praising and inciting conflict is part of 
their identification as women in these societies and perhaps, one of the ways that they 
can exercise their influence in a cultural sphere that can leave few opportunities to do so.  
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The existence of the youth / moran culture gives women a sanctioned space in which to 
assert themselves and their personal desires.  
 
7.3.2.3 Youth:  Employment 
Youths also steal because, without animals to take care of, they feel that their role in 
society would be undefined.  Many youths that I spoke with said that the reason they 
took their animals to graze in insecure areas during the 2009 drought, despite their 
fathers’ concerns for the safety of the animals, was to maintain their role in society.  
This means that if the animals died from starvation while they remained in the interior 
away from adequate grazing, then the herder would have to come home, have to leave 
behind his other fellow age mates, and he would be without a job or purpose.  With 
animals, the young male herder has a purpose; without them, he is unemployed, and his 
role is diminished or eclipsed within the society.  Simply, without animals, the male 
youth report that they would feel worthless.  Although the colonial government tried to 
tackle this ‘problem’ of youth / “moran culture,” a criticism that I heard on a number of 
occasions was that the colonial government,  
“thought that abolishing ‘moran-hood’ would stop the fighting.  The policy 
failed because morans were a Samburu tradition, and also the colonialists didn’t 
give any alternative of what to do with our morans.  They didn’t have education 
or alternative income or jobs so they were not guided in what to do.” (Samburu, 
elder man, Remote)   
The pressure of being employed and maintaining one’s role and status is strong enough 
that should a youth lose all of his animals, he will use other means to get them back.     
 
7.3.2.4 Youth:  Group Belonging 
Group-belonging is a strong motivating force reported by the male youth for engaging 
in conflict.  As one Borana male, who was known within the community for his prowess 
in raiding, explained to me,  
“If your age-mates go, then you can’t stay because you will have an inferiority 
complex.  I went to raid for pride, not wealth…I wasn’t a coward.” (Borana, 
male youth, Girissa)   
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A number of other youths lamented that they wanted to hear their names called out and 
praised in the songs of the young ladies when they were to come back from herding in 
distant places and that it was natural to feel left out if others are called, and you are not.   
 
This “group mentality” also has practical origins that are not tied up in the desire to 
conform to a group.  Logistically speaking, in order to increase one’s chances of success 
during a raid, it is necessary to ensure that there are more people on your own side than 
there are on the other side.  A Rendille elder explained to me,  
“When it comes to Samburu morans, one steals and the other doesn’t because 
the ones who steal are ones who have had animals stolen from them.  For the 
ones who steal without being stolen from first, it’s because morans need 
reinforcement from friends who will help them go for the retaliation.” (Rendille, 
elder man, Farakaren)   
 
In this sense, young men are motivated to participate on a raid and steal animals as a 
way of reinforcing his compatriots in order to ensure a greater chance of success.   
 
7.3.2.5 Myths 
Here may be an appropriate place to discuss the dangers of an outsider “buying into” the 
myths and rhetoric about ethnic groups, as told by the neighbouring ethnic groups.  I 
have chosen to write about this aspect here in talking about youth culture because the 
biggest myth by far that I heard was in relation to how the Borana view the Samburu 
and Rendille morans.  On a daily basis, generally more than once a day, I would hear a 
statement akin to the following:   
“Samburu have the culture of the moran where they have to steal to get married 
so this will never stop.” (Borana, elder woman, Malka Daka)   
 
On a number of occasions, I asked the respondents where they had heard this 
information or what evidence they had on which to base this supposition.  Many 
responded that it is a notion that has been passed down through the generations, or 
simply that “it is known.”  The ethnic myths were not reserved solely for the Samburu 
morans, but I found that each side had their own beliefs of the “other.”  For the Turkana, 
the  
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“Turkana’s purpose of trying to steal cows is just that they are thieves.  A 
Turkana man will even try to steal children.  Stealing is their culture.” (Samburu, 
elder man, Resim)   
In this vein, the Pokot are fierce and undeniably cruel warriors, the Meru are sleeping 
pacifists, the Somali kill their own brothers to advance themselves, the Rendille are 
wiley, covert warriors, and so forth.  Part of the motivation for working within 17 
different sites across three culturally and linguistically distinct populations was to 
unpack this type of rhetoric and local mythology.  During my time in the field, I was 
likely to interview as many Samburu morans who hadn’t raided as those who had, 
Turkana who were charitable, Meru who were opportunistic, etc.  If a well-founded 
understanding of conflict within these communities is to be achieved, a monumental 
task is to try to overcome and undo what has been done by colonial isolationist policies.  
The exclusion of one ethnic group from another creates the ideal conditions by which 
these myths can be created and propagated, thus making them very difficult to dispel.   
 
7.3.2.6 Differences in Perspectives, Separated by Age 
A final aspect to discuss here when assessing the role of youth culture in conflict is that 
there is a sharp distinction between how youths view conflict and the views of the elder 
community members.  As explained to me by one young Borana male,  
“The conflict that I was involved in before, the elders knew of; they didn’t 
sanction it, but they let it go on anyway.  The youths organised themselves, and 
the elders found out by chance.  We didn’t have the elders included because the 
youths were bitter, and the elders are always worried about the repercussions.  
The youths were bitter because they believe it was the youths on the other side 
causing havoc, and it is their job to serve their community.  It is becoming more 
prevalent that the youths are not consulting the elders.  The community is 
becoming disenchanted with the security, and the elders are acting like a 
roadblock because they fear the government.” (Borana, male youth, Girissa)   
From this statement, it is clear that the youths of the community want to do what they 
feel is part of their responsibility as young, able men within the community by 
providing security.  However, in speaking with the elders, they are more apt to preach 
moderation towards neighbouring tribes, cooperative behaviour when travelling to 
border regions, and are fearful of retribution from the government or from the opposing 
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side.  This has created a schism within the community to the point that elders are rarely 
being consulted, and the youths are characterised by many of the elders as “not even 
having ears” to hear the advice of their parents.  This contemporary view may be 
somewhat different to the colonial era in which Paul Spencer conducted his fieldwork 
when he wrote that much of his attentions were “paid to the over-riding push and pull of 
cooperating and conflicting sub-divisions within the community that are ultimately held 
together and maintained by the respect given to and dominance of society elders.  
Ultimately, it is the elders of the community who structure social expectations and 
regulations that achieve resilience against internal and external forces that may threaten 
the Samburu way of life” (Spencer 1965: 87).  Based on his depiction of Samburu 
culture at this time, I would suggest that the voice of the elders, in terms of their role in 
preventing conflicts, has diminished greatly.  Both male and female elders pointed out 
that the modern culture and exposure to education has reduced the importance of the 
elders to the point that the youths of today feel that their parents have very little to teach 
them about the world and how to behave.   
 
On the one hand, this may be the case; however, it would be an oversimplification of 
the matter to state that the youth are the aggressors without ears, paying no attention to 
the elders who only preach restraint and peaceable cooperation.  In fact, a number of 
youths told me of how their parents sang their praises or slaughtered animals for them in 
celebration of a successful raiding event, gave them ceremonial combs for killing 
members of the opposing ethnic group, or graciously accepted stolen animals into their 
own boma, while lecturing them in secret not to join any further raids.  During a number 
of the elder female focus groups, each woman within the group was asked how she 
would feel and respond to a son who came back to the home territory having stolen 
animals, with the caveat that there would be no retribution from the original owners and 
their own animals would be safe.  The responses were mixed; however, a significant 
number of women said that they would accept the animals graciously, thank their sons 
for what they had done for the family, but then tell them not to go on another raid.  
There is this apparent duality here that it seems elders preach moderation because they 
know that raiding will ultimately bring harm to their own herds / people through acts of 
retaliation or government intervention, and also they do not want to see their sons 
engaging in behaviours where they could lose their lives.  On the contrary, it is difficult 
to adhere to these principles when parents are quick to praise stolen animals, quick to 
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ridicule those who do not go on raids or violently defend one’s territory or property, or 
have themselves engaged in raiding activities, from which they are either still reaping 
the financial benefits (animals) or the social benefits (prestige) from these endeavours.              
 
7.3.3 “Revenge Culture” 
A third disposition that has a bearing on motivations towards conflict behaviour is that 
of “revenge culture.”  Although people cited “retaliation” as a major cause of conflict 
when reviewing the conflict incident reporting, with more contextual information taken 
from the open discussions on conflict in general, a second meaning to this word 
developed.  People talked about a strong, deep-seated belief that a grave wrong-doing 
such as killing or stealing must be revenged.  Many individuals stated this as though the 
concept of revenge was a law or compulsion that they must follow regardless of their 
own personal beliefs, or even a debt that must be repaid back to one’s community if a 
member has been wronged.  As one man explains,  
“The Borana have a taboo according to their culture that if a Samburu kills one 
of them, then they must revenge, even if 3 or 4 years have passed without 
revenging.  Even an old dying man can tell his sons that there is a debt that they 
have to revenge for him.” (Samburu, elder man, Lolkerded)   
One Borana said that the revenge is “like a formality” and that “you don’t necessarily 
have to get the animals back” that have been taken (Borana, elder man, Gotu).   
 
The revenge itself is based on an almost visceral belief that your community’s strength 
or prestige has been damaged, and time and time again, people referred to the ‘pain’ 
associated with aggressive attacks.  Some views I heard to highlight this point were,  
“I’ve had brothers killed, and [revenge] is to return the pain for their death” 
(Samburu, moran, Resim),  
or  
“Having animals taken by drought is not painful like the pain of an animal being 
stolen.  You don’t steal unless you’re stolen from.” (Borana, elder man, Kambi 
Garba), 
or 
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“I would want to be part of a raiding party because I still feel the pain of my 
fellow Borana and I being raided by the Turkana.  My priority is settling how I 
feel in order to relieve the pain, but this is also connected to getting back 
animals that relieves pain.” (Borana, male youth, Kambi Garba) 
 
Revenge in this way is a cathartic experience, relieving pain and paying debts back to 
the community when it has been wronged.  One question I had was what is the role of 
taking animals if one is revenging?  Are the animals central or incidental to the revenge?  
If a kinsman is killed but no animals are taken, can his death be revenged with killing or 
is the taking of animals essential?  As we can see from quote above from the elder 
Borana man, the taking of animals is not essential during an act of revenge.  However as 
my Borana field assistant explained to me when I asked him this question,  
“In [revenge], animals are not the major objective of the raids – it is just to hit 
back at the enemy.  Animals are taken as a sign of power and manliness or 
strength and superiority that you have depleted someone else’s property.” 
(Borana, male youth, Kambi Garba)   
The taking of animals for revenge represents something superior to just getting one’s 
animals back or reducing the other side’s financial well-being.  It is about ‘hitting them 
where it counts’ with a view to actually depleting the opposing side’s worth as people.        
 
It is here when talking about revenge that I would like to try to explain the distinction 
between the way in which these communities live and what they considered to be their 
“culture.”  This distinction was pointed out to me on a number of occasions; however, I 
think discussing the concept of revenge is the most illustrative for this purpose.  I would 
sometimes ask participants why they would act in a way that was, by observation, 
seemingly counterintuitive to what I had learned about their understanding and “world 
view” over the course of an interview.  When something struck me as being in 
opposition to what I came to understand as an individual’s fundamental belief system, I 
would question why this was the case.  Time and again, I received the same answer, 
“Ah, this is just culture.”  One example of this was when I was conducting fieldwork in 
Farakaren, a remote mixed Samburu and Rendille community in the far northern 
reaches of Samburu territory.  I had been interviewing the only school teacher in the 
area, himself a highly educated man having been schooled in larger, cosmopolitan areas, 
such as Meru.  Our conversation spanned many topics, and it was clear to me that he 
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had been heavily exposed to modern Western culture, both in his dress and in many of 
his views.  Later that same day, I interviewed his mother, who was a kind and 
accommodating elder Rendille lady.  Inside her house was a girl of no more than 9 years 
old who had her ears pierced like that of a married woman.  I inquired about the earrings, 
to which I was told that the girl was married to the school teacher, making her the 
daughter-in-law to the woman I was interviewing.  She said that the girl was to stay in 
her home until she reached an age whereby she could go to live as a wife in her 
husband’s home.  I asked the lady whether the marriage to a young girl had caused any 
problems for her son or was judged inappropriate for a school teacher, to which she 
responded, “No, it is just culture.” (Rendille, elder woman, Farakaren)        
 
In terms of revenge, for the Borana, the role of “culture” plays a part seemingly 
juxtaposed to the rules and mores by which people live, in this case to their Islamic 
practice.  As a Borana Imam explained to me,  
“In Islam, if someone is attacked and has his property stolen, then it is justified 
to retaliate against the exact person who stole from you and get back your 
animals...You cannot take just anybody’s from that group – it needs to be exact 
to the individual in the eyes of Islam.  Eye for eye, tooth for tooth is just a 
culture of the Borana.  Their revenge is different from the Islamic 
religion...Borana retaliate against anyone, which is not living up to tenants of the 
Islamic religion, and this is not allowed.” (Borana, elder man, Malka Daka) 
 
“Culture” here has very deep roots – ones that are not overcome easily, even with the 
influence of the Islamic faith, which is a relatively new introduction into the Borana 
community. 
 
7.3.4 “Tribal” Hate 
Hate between one ethnic group to another is the final “disposition” cited as a motivation 
behind conflict.  A question that I asked very young children (from approximately age 
three and above) quite frequently was whether or not they would play with a child of an 
opposing ethnic group if they were to meet.  Generally, if the child had heard of the 
ethnic group, and that group was deemed to be bad according to their elders, then they 
would not play together; if they had heard of the ethnic group, and that group was 
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deemed to be good, then they would play together; and if they didn’t know of the ethnic 
group that I referenced, then they would also play together.  The impression that I got 
from this exercise was that children within these communities are exposed at quite an 
early age to who the ‘enemy’ is and the feelings that one should have towards an 
opposing ethnic group.  These feelings persist throughout childhood, are strengthened 
during adolescence (particularly for the young males), and remain throughout adulthood, 
with very few exceptions.  I met a Samburu woman who had a Borana mother, which is 
quite rare; however, it was a product of her Samburu father being a police officer 
working in the Borana region of Garba Tula, where he met her mother, and where the 
woman herself was born and lived during her childhood.  She is now married to a 
Samburu man and identifies herself as Samburu.  The woman explained to me her 
feelings on the relationship between the Samburu and Borana:   
“I haven’t seen my uncles on my mother’s side since I was a little girl because 
I’m married now, and when I visit my mother’s home, my uncles can’t visit 
because other Samburu don’t like Borana.  I have the same feelings as other 
Samburu have because I am on the side of the Samburu.  If my uncles came to 
visit, I would receive them in both hands.  If other Borana not related to me 
came to visit, then I wouldn’t receive them.  All Borana are bad, but my uncles 
are OK because they did nothing bad to me.  They are only good because they 
are related to me.” (Samburu, elder woman, Remote)   
It may be important to note here that children always identify themselves as having the 
same ethnic affiliation as their fathers and, should an inter-ethnic marriage occur, the 
wife will identify herself as having the same ethnic affiliation as her husband – a 
common practice amongst many East African pastoral populations (e.g., Galaty 1993; 
Hodder 1982; Spencer 1973).  Furthermore, women leave their natal area and go to that 
of their husband; therefore, it is only the female ethnic affiliation that must change.  In 
the above case, despite being raised in Borana surroundings to a Borana mother, the 
woman was identified as a Samburu because of her father, and therefore was 
indoctrinated to attach negative feelings towards the Borana in general, despite the fact 
that half of her family line is Borana.  What this example seeks to highlight is that 
although ethnic affiliations, in the case of women, can be flexible, there are established 
expectations as to how one ethnic group should feel towards another ethnic group, 
whether this be positive or negative.  One essential point is that these feelings don’t 
necessarily have to be, and are more often not, based on reasoning.  As one moran states,  
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“I feel about the Borana that they are all bad, even the little tiny children.” 
(Samburu, moran, Sereolipi)      
For opposing ethnic groups, the ‘hate’ that they feel for one another is a reason given 
for why conflict events occur.  As one man simply put,  
“Turkana tried to take our animals just because we hate each other.  This is 
normal.” (Samburu, elder male, Farakaren)   
I think part of the reason why hate is cited as a motivation for conflict, or even why 
indoctrinated feelings of hate exist within these groups is that uniting behind ‘hate’ 
helps to promote intra-group solidarity, and consequently, also helps to identify the 
enemy as part of the out-group.  Reinforcement of this in-group – out-group bias, as 
discussed in chapter two, provides a pathway to aggressing against ‘the other.’  
7.4 Triggers of Conflict 
Moving from dispositions to triggers for conflict, a trigger is a temporary condition that 
initiates conflict when it arises within and between two communities.  Broadly, the 
triggers to be discussed below are:  competition for water and pasture resources, 
retaliation, opportunity, poverty, and politics. 
7.4.1 Competition for Land, Water, and Pasture 
One trigger of conflict is when there is an increase in competition for water and pasture.  
As explained to me,  
“The biggest contributing factor to inter-tribal conflict is due to pushing Borana 
off our land.  The Samburu and Turkana want this land due to the fact that this 
area is better than their land because it has sufficient pasture and water.  We 
Borana don’t want the land on the Samburu side.” (Borana, elder male, Gotu)   
Owning livestock comes with the necessity to be able to provide sufficient pasture and 
water for the animals – a demand that keeps herd owners moving in search of 
productive land, which may ultimately not be found within one’s own territory.  Clearly, 
this pressure increases during times of environmental hardship, such as drought, which 
may therefore escalate the likelihood of triggering inter-ethnic conflicts.   
“The conflicts we’re hearing of [during drought] happen because of scarcity of 
water and competition over water.  Animals are being stolen now because it’s 
incidental to the fighting.” (Samburu, Lkichami moran, Kitich)   
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One woman further explained the relationship between resource competition and 
livestock theft when she said that conflicts happen particularly in a drought  
“when the animals have just gone to the boundary because they are fighting for 
grass.  They are fighting to compete for grass, but they take animals.  This is a 
given.  They don’t fight without taking animals.  The taking of animals is to get 
animals and to chase away other groups from good grazing.” (Samburu, elder 
woman, Farakaren)   
The objective here is ultimately to gain access to valuable grazing land in order to 
obtain scarce resources for one’s own animals rather than the taking of animals being 
the motivating factor.  Taking animals is incidental to the resource conflict; however, it 
facilitates moving competitors off of the land.   
 
This particular trigger is actually closely connected to the “prestige culture” disposition, 
as explained to me that  
“Raids have been a cultural tradition to show supremacy over the other ethnic 
group.  You need to show supremacy so that you can stake your claim easily on 
the land.” (Samburu, elder male, Lolkerded)   
By building up one’s “prestige” and influence by acquiring animals, this increases fear 
in the minds of the opponent.  As I saw many times amongst border populations, fear is 
a strong motivating factor in “running away” or moving off of the land.  Rumours begin 
to circulate that the enemy may be in the area, or that they may have superior resources 
and firepower, which tends to result in the domestic population moving from the land 
until the situation “calms down” – an indeterminate amount of time that can last 
anywhere from a few weeks to a few years in some cases.   
“In drought, people are fighting due to poverty and access to grass and water.  
Each ethnic group wants to push the other one back from the border.  The 
retreater knows that there is no water and pasture back in the interior, which 
means certain death so they have to fight if they want to stay in the border.  
Conflict in the border is more to do with having access to grass rather than 
stealing animals.  If they fight, though, they have to try to take animals always.  
Even though accessing land and grass is the number one reason, they want to 
make the other group have fear, tension, and feel harassed so that they leave the 
area.” (Samburu, elder woman, Lolkerded)   
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7.4.2 Retaliation 
Retaliation is the second “trigger” which can lead to conflict.  The condition here is 
contingent upon an aggressive act already having been brought against the retaliator.  In 
theory, without the initial attack, then retaliation cannot happen.  A most basic function 
of retaliation is simply for security and protection of one’s land, life, and property when 
there may be no other official security measures in place.  It stems from the “frustration 
of the government not listening to our cries and helping” so people claim that they are 
left with no choice but to retaliate and push back on the offending group (Borana, elder 
man, Malka Daka).  This was a sentiment that I heard many times:  that official security 
(government, military, police) is inadequate and ineffective throughout the northern 
territories.  During the conflict incident reporting, I asked people whether or not they 
reported the incident to any authorities, of which 25% of the incidents went unreported, 
with the chief reason being that people found the government to offer little or no 
support, so they felt that reporting the crime wouldn’t make a difference to their 
circumstances.  For the incidents that were reported, 64% of respondents said that they 
were unsatisfied with the efforts made on the part of the security forces to rectify the 
situation.  Even personally, I came to understand that if I had any grievances where the 
police should become involved, I didn’t alert them, as experience proved that they were 
unreliable, completely ineffective, and furthermore, the plaintiff was likely to incur 
further financial loss in having to pay bribes to the police in order for them to deal with 
the matter with even a minimal amount of effort.  Experiencing the lack of support of 
the security forces first-hand, it is not surprising that local pastoral communities tended 
to take matters of security into their own hands.  As one Samburu woman explained to 
me,  
“The reason for going [to raid] was for retaliation.  [The morans] had no stealing 
in their minds, and they had no poverty, and they had no admiration of animals 
in their minds.  It’s just we lost more than fifty people that year so we needed to 
push the Somali out or be killed ourselves.  This was supposed to be Samburu 
territory.” (Samburu, elder woman, Lolkerded)   
The same principle can be applied in the protection of one’s own wealth by trying to get 
back at least the number of animals that have been taken.   
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“What the Borana are doing, the Samburu should also do.  The Borana steal so 
one side keeps on taking animals and no one is getting your animals back – what 
should you do?  If the police could get the animals back, then there is no need to 
raid.  We will just stay and accumulate our own animals.” (Samburu, Lkichami 
moran, Sereolipi)   
In this way, it ‘balances the scorecard’ between the two sides.  Unfortunately, as 
demonstrated previously regarding the discussion on revenge culture, the specific 
perpetrator almost never becomes the victim of a conflict incident in retaliation for his 
crime.  An unfortunate reality of retaliation is that innocent people are drawn into 
retaliation activities, who may eventually become perpetrators themselves, thus 
contributing to the escalating and cyclical nature of retaliation that makes it very 
difficult to break.   
 
 A central feature of retaliation that should be discussed here is that out of all of the 
dispositions and triggers described in this chapter, retaliation is seen by these three 
communities as being the most legitimate motivation for engaging in conflict.  In 
general, people told me that aggression, or an aggressive nature, are not qualities that 
are seen as being favourable within these groups.  Instead, people tended to speak of 
moderation, a level head, or strong powers of reasoning as being highly valued 
characteristics.  In many interviews, when I queried why an individual participated on a 
raid, the first response was likely to be ‘just for retaliation.’  However, when digging a 
bit deeper and discussing the web of surrounding issues, respondents would begin to 
cite other contributing factors.  Rarely, if ever, did a single respondent remain with his / 
her stance that a conflict incident was motivated solely for retaliation purposes.  In 
referring back to Figure 7.1, this is one of the main reasons why I separated “revenge 
culture” from “retaliation for security purposes” because although they are thematically 
linked (see Figure 7.4 later in this chapter), they have very different origins.  When 
thinking about these two concepts separately, “retaliation” as a stand-alone, driving 
force for conflict doesn’t end up registering as a substantial motivation, even though it 
is reported with great frequency, likely due to its legitimation.  Retaliation for security 
purposes would be the “stand-alone” trigger, and therefore, this concept is recorded in 
Figure 7.1.     
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7.4.2.1 Collectivism in Retaliation 
Legitimisation of conflict and the collective nature of these three communities are 
essential elements to discuss when looking at concepts of retaliation.  An important 
aspect to keep in mind when discussing retaliation is that communities tend to view a 
loss and blame for an attack in a collective sense.  For instance, if one Samburu is stolen 
from, then it is as though all Samburu have somehow suffered a loss / been attacked.  
Likewise, if a group of Samburu have perpetrated a theft against another ethnic group, 
then all Samburu are to blame for the attack.  A more formalised collective 
responsibility has been described among ‘dia-paying groups’ of northern Somalia, 
where blame / consequences for actions and payment from other dia-paying groups for 
wrongdoings are shared by the members at large (Lewis 1961).  In northern Kenya, this 
blame can even extend to members of other complementary ethnic groups.  For instance, 
I was witness to a raiding event where a small group of Samburu had attacked a group 
of Borana, stealing a number of camels and killing a herder.  When I spoke to the 
Borana chief of the area, he told me that in the coming days they would likely be 
retaliating against a group of Rendille who were settled close to that particular Borana 
community.  When I asked why they would be attacking the Rendille and not the 
Samburu, as the chief was fully aware that the Rendille had not been involved in 
perpetrating the attack, the chief responded,  
“It doesn’t matter – they are together.  If you hit one, it is like hitting the other.” 
(Borana, elder male)   
In the eyes of the community, the act of retaliation against the Rendille would be 
condoned as there was a justifying event (“halo” in Kiborana) that the community could 
point to as the legitimisation for their behaviour.  The timeframe of the halo can 
typically range anywhere from a few days to a few months from the original attack, or 
in rare occasions, it can last several decades or can be passed on to subsequent 
generations.  Also, particularly amongst the Borana communities, one individual can 
retaliate in the name of another individual who has been wronged, even if the 
transgressed individual is not known personally to the retaliator.  The halo that is cited 
as a reason for attack can be a collective element that brings together all members of a 
raiding party under one unifying justification for the retaliation event, even if each 
individual’s motives for joining the raiding party are different.  As one man explains,  
“Borana steal animals because of retaliation for animals taken from them.  Also 
they steal out of poverty.  People can join a raiding party if they want to get 
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animals even if it’s not for retaliation, but the basis of the raiding party is 
retaliation.  I must revenge the death of my stepfather, Mohammed Roba, who 
was killed.  If Borana far away hear of the attack here, then they can attack on 
behalf of the Borana here.  Retaliation on our behalf is fine, and they don’t have 
to report back here that they have revenged for us or give the people here any 
animals.  There can be multiple revenges at all different locations or one large 
raiding party coming from all over.” (Borana, elder male, Kambi Garba)   
 
7.4.3 Opportunity 
 
7.4.3.1 Optimal Conditions:  Proximity and Obscurity 
For populations living within dynamic environments, necessitating a high degree of 
adaptability, it is logical that they may display opportunistic behaviours.  From my time 
in the field, I saw that opportunism in many forms is a strong motivating characteristic.  
As discussed in chapter five, there are optimal times to engage in conflict based on 
seasonal conditions that influence communities’ locations in relation to one another and 
contribute to environmental pressures that may influence behaviour.  In this vein, 
seasonal conditions can help to trigger the social conditions in which individuals may be 
motivated to engage in conflict events.  One such opportunity that may trigger a conflict 
event is when people are found close to one another in the territorial boundary areas.  
During this time, taking animals is  
“opportunistic stealing when [people] are in the boundary searching for water 
and pasture.” (Borana, elder man, Malka Daka)   
Conflict during this time may not be highly strategized, but rather, it is a result of 
proximity to one another creating the opportunity to take animals with a reduced 
amount of effort, resource investment, and planning.  A number of herders that I spoke 
to talked about their “admiration” of another community’s animals when they are in the 
border together due to the herd’s beauty and size.  Being persistently close to one 
another, this admiration may grow over time to the point that it can spill over into 
“trying one’s luck” and “snatching” animals while they are close. 
 
Likewise, another seasonal condition that creates the opportunity to take animals is 
during the rainy season when vegetation and foliage cover are high.  As discussed in 
207 
 
chapter five, the plant cover provided during the rainy season optimises a raiding 
party’s ability to travel across areas undetected and to catch the opposing side unaware 
– a strategy that greatly diminishes the likelihood of casualties within the raiding party 
and increases the likelihood of success in taking animals.       
 
7.4.3.2 Vulnerability:  Unarmed, Unprotected, or Imbalance in Manpower 
The second opportunity that may trigger a conflict incident is when vulnerabilities 
amongst one community weaken their defences or their ability to protect themselves 
adequately.  The offending party may seize the opportunity to attack and capitalise on 
their opponent’s weaknesses.  In this case, the conflict itself need not be a particularly 
aggressive act.  I was told on many occasions, a motivation for taking animals is when 
one side can see that the opposition offers very little defence, as would be the case when 
children are herding animals.  As one Samburu man told to me,  
“Today seven camels were taken in Loojorin by Turkana.  These were Samburu 
camels.  They were taken by stealth from children.  The Turkana took the camels 
just due to opportunity.  It doesn’t matter if they are poor or rich.” (Samburu, 
elder man, Farakaren)   
Also, in one Samburu community when I was recording conflict incident reports, people 
time and again reported that their animals were taken in 2004.  After recording this date 
multiple times, I began to make inquiries as to whether 2004 held any real significance 
or if there was something particularly special about that year that may contribute to the 
levels of conflict that people were experiencing at that time.  What I found out is that 
this particular community circumcised their new Lkichami morans in 2004, of which 
the neighbouring Pokot community were aware.  One man explained to me that the 
crossover between the out-going moran age set and the in-coming moran age set can be 
precarious as defences are low, and the new morans need some time to adjust to their 
new roles within the community.  He said that the Pokot capitalised on this vulnerability 
by attacking incessantly during 2004, managing to capture a substantial number of 
animals from their neighbours.   
 
When deciding where to raid, it is typical for the raiding party to discuss the location of 
the government, if they are present.  The government, in this sense, is any state-level 
security force – whether an Administrative Police post (AP), local policing unit, the 
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General Service Unit (GSU), an Anti-Stock Theft Unit camp (ASTU), or a military post, 
such as the Kenyan Army or Air Force.  Although from talking with people, a 
government unit offers relatively little protection to the communities that it is serving.  
However, it still stands to reason that a raiding party would be looking to optimise their 
chances of capturing animals, reducing casualties within their group, and would hope to 
retain the stolen animals until they can safely return to their home territories.  It is 
logical that in order to achieve these three goals, the raiding party would be more apt to 
focus on communities where there is little / no government presence rather than those 
that are located near a government outfit.   
“The place chosen to attack is all about the government – as long as the 
government is not present. Even if the place is far- we will go and attack there,”  
Although, to reinforce the earlier point, this individual goes on later to criticise the 
government by saying,  
“It’s very bitter that the government pretends to intervene.  [When my animals 
were stolen] six trucks of police came, but they did nothing because they are 
cowards even though they could see the dust of the animals.” (Borana, elder man, 
Kambi Garba)   
What should be highlighted here is that although the government is ineffective in 
practice, their presence, or more importantly their lack of presence, can be a motivating 
factor in whether or not to attack a certain location.  If no government resistance is 
likely, then this can buoy the raiding party into action.   
 
It is possible that the intrinsic ‘fear’ or aversion towards the government despite its 
inefficacy may to some degree be a remnant of the effects of colonial government 
security on these communities.  During interviews, all sides agreed that the colonial 
government managed a successful and strict policing regime whereby,  
“the colonial government made people fear to do big raids.  The government 
walked with the people all of the time so they felt the presence of the 
government.” (Samburu, elder man, Lenchokut)   
As one elder explains,  
“the colonial government gave harsh punishments to keep the peace…the British 
camped in Marsabit between the Rendille and the Borana so when anybody 
created a problem, the aggrieved could report to Marsabit and even if the 
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accused ran away, the colonial government would punish the accused’s family 
so the accused would come back.  I think that it was good to do it that way 
because people didn’t repeat their mistakes.  It brings peace to everyone and 
reduces the crime.  Then, criminals could not hide.  The family had to give over 
their animals to the police, and when the accused was handed in, they would get 
their animals back.” (Samburu, elder man, Farakaren)   
In stark contrast to the current government, people recall that the colonial government 
was ever-present, enforced strict boundary controls between communities, diligently 
followed-up on community reports of theft or killings, and dealt heavy punishments to 
guilty parties.  It is important to note that colonial security for pastoralists was not 
always the case in Kenya.  Most notably at the end of the 19
th
 century, the British had 
allied with the Maasai, supporting stock raids against neighbouring groups in order to 
dampen local resistance against the British government (Waller 1976).  However into 
the mid-20
th
 century, Paul Spencer writes that “during the late 1950s and early 1960s, 
the British administration did impose a system to interfere in any matters which came to 
its notice in order to keep an uneasy peace between formerly hostile neighbours, such as 
the Samburu and Boran and intercede in any serious affray within the Samburu itself.  
Stock thefts, murders, and raids were investigated, and new laws against game killing, 
damaging forests, and grazing cattle in forbidden areas were introduced,” and he goes 
on to say that in the 1950s, “apart from minor incidents, the moran as warriors held no 
real significance, however, with the coming departure of British administration in 1963, 
the Samburu saw this as heralding a return to their former way of life for the moran” 
(Spencer 1965: 99).  I found during my fieldwork that in describing the past, the three 
communities agreed in their discussions regarding security during the colonial period in 
contrast to that of the current government.  In the years around 1963, there is a sharp 
increase in conflict incidents reported, for which people point to the departure of the 
colonial government, and a subsequent lack of security being provided by the 
government as the motivating factor behind this increase.  This trend has persisted until 
today that unprotected communities present the opportunity to trigger conflict events as 
there is little fear of government reprisal and punishment of the offending transgressors 
when targeting these communities.         
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7.4.3.3 Gun Ownership 
Following on from a lack of security, gun ownership is another opportunistic condition 
that may trigger conflict events.  There has been extensive literature on the detrimental 
effects gun ownership has had among pastoral populations.  Government provisioning 
of weapons to ethnic groups has allowed for the manipulation of pastoral communities 
in order to acquire land and gain political influence, as McCabe describes in the 
consistent raiding of the Turkana by the government-armed Pokot (McCabe 2004).  
Mirzeler and Young (2000) demonstrate how gun use has the ability to change existing 
social dynamics within pastoral communities, where weapons proliferation has led to a 
decline in the influence of elders as warlords expand their authority.  Ultimately, many 
authors agree that disparity in weapons, in terms of number and lethality, is influential 
in creating the condition that may trigger conflicts (Gray et al. 2003; Gray 2000; 
Mirzeler and Young 2000; Turton 1994; de Waal 1989).        
 
In speaking with a Samburu teacher living within a border community close to the 
Borana territory, he described to me the local history of gun ownership amongst the 
moran herders.  He said that conflicts have become more prevalent  
“Nowadays from 2007 until present being the worst.  At this time, Lkichami 
were initiated and started having their own guns.  Conflict has always been there, 
but it escalated due to gun ownership, starting in Lmooli.  Lkishili and Lkuroro 
had conflicts but not at the level that it’s at now, as with Lmooli.” (Samburu, 
elder man, Lolkerded)   
The teacher then went on to draw a graph for me (Figure 7.3) depicting that conflict 
over time has not been a steady linear  progression, nor did it start with the introduction 
of guns, but instead it sharply increased when gun ownership became more prevalent 
during the time of the Lmooli morans (approximately 1990 – 2005).  
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Figure 7.3:  Drawing by a Samburu teacher showing a sharp increase in conflict incidents coinciding with 
an increase in gun ownership 
 
 
Gun ownership quite drastically changes the nature of conflict and creates the 
opportunity for conflict, as one man reveals,  
“[Gun ownership] changed the nature of the warfare because a man with a gun 
gets courage because even the coward has strength now, and they start wishing 
they had more guns so they steal to buy some more.” (Borana, elder man, Malka 
Daka)   
Many people reported that owning a gun can buoy one’s confidence when engaging in 
conflict, and the increased potential for success can spur individuals into action.   
 
An essential characteristic of gun ownership is not only the mere fact of having a gun, 
but instead, conflict can be triggered when there is a disparity in the level of gun 
ownership.  If equal firepower exists on both sides of a territorial line, one group is not 
more likely than another group to engage in conflict, however, if there exists the 
perception that one’s own firepower exceeds that of one’s neighbour, then the 
advantageous opportunity is created for a successful raiding event.  One woman simply 
states,  
“The purpose for the Somali stealing is because they see that people don’t have 
guns so it is an easy opportunity.” (Borana, elder woman, Malka Daka)   
I saw this to be the case during my fieldwork, when the government began a six month 
disarmament scheme, starting in December 2009, with the plan of disarming all 
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northern pastoral communities.  In theory, it was a massive undertaking, with varying 
levels of success, but what I did find is that communities having been “disarmed” 
reported to me that they could not engage in raiding activities because they themselves 
were not armed while their enemy remained armed (without empirically knowing the 
status of the enemy).  Furthermore, I heard that youths were rapidly organising 
themselves to participate in raiding activities when they knew that a neighbouring 
ethnic community had been disarmed while they themselves remained with their 
weapons.  There was a sense that they were striking before the government had the 
opportunity to disarm them, and they themselves capitalised on the opportunity 
presented to them while they were in possession of superior firepower in relation to an 
opposing group.   
 
7.4.3.4 Markets and Commercialisation of Conflict 
The final opportunity that may trigger conflicts is the creation of ready-made markets 
and the commercialisation of conflict which benefits the raider by providing a profitable 
outlet for stolen animals.  A member of the Samburu community living on the border 
with the Pokot explained to me that,  
“When a Pokot raids and steals animals, they tend to pack them into lorries and 
sell them.  This is a new practice that started about 1.5 - 2 years ago...the 
educated [businessmen] who are the agents give the Pokot raiders contracts to 
raid animals, pay them, then they take [the animals] to bigger markets to sell 
them.  [The Pokot] get money from the agents for the animals, and with the 
money, they buy lots of guns that others can rent if they want to go to raid and 
also they provide bullets...Renting a gun is 1 cow taken from the raided 
stock...The agents pay the raiders for each stolen animal, which is a throw-away 
price because the animal is stolen.  It is a throw-away price as the raider might 
be caught.” (Samburu, elder male, Lenchokut)   
As this respondent states, commercialisation of conflicts is a relatively new 
phenomenon that involves unscrupulous businessmen from outside of the community 
creating a ready market for stolen animals and the means (weaponry) by which to 
acquire the animals.  This ploy has been used to great effect during drought periods 
where raiding potential is high, but the risk of livestock death due to malnutrition is also 
high.  However, if agents are willing to buy animals and ship them to larger, distant 
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markets for sale, the problem of keeping stolen animals during a drought is diminished, 
and therefore increases the likelihood of conflict.  In talking to people from 
Lolmisigiyioi, who had stolen animals returned to them after persistently pressuring 
authorities into action, their confiscated livestock had been shipped to markets more 
than 350 km away from where they had been stolen.  It is the agents who are able to 
create the opportunity for lucrative conflict incidents due to their available wealth (in 
buying animals / funding weapons), their business sense (in knowing how to broker 
arrangements with pastoral communities), and their access to markets (in shipping 
animals and avoiding / bribing authorities).   
 
7.4.4 Poverty and Employment 
Acute poverty as a result of the loss of animals is another trigger that can lead to 
conflict events between ethnic communities.  Most often poverty and livestock loss 
occur through the effects of prolonged / severe drought, livestock disease, raiding events, 
or state confiscation of animals.  If a family no longer can support its basic needs, the 
youth may turn to raiding animals in order to restock animal losses when the situation is 
particularly dire, and the livestock have been lost relatively abruptly.  One man relayed 
to me that a motivation for stealing animals for some is  
“poverty.  You don’t have animals, and you hear of a raiding party going so you 
follow.” (Samburu, elder male, Farakaren)   
Poverty is pervasive throughout the region where I worked, yet as a motivator for 
conflict, poverty was more of an individual pursuit.  As the quote above suggests, a 
raiding party typically needs to be formed first, having apparently “legitimate” reasons, 
and then individuals may join the raiding party in order to strengthen the party’s 
numbers.  However, their individual motivation may simply be to acquire animals when 
they themselves have been made poor.  A number of people told me that restocking 
animals by theft when you are poor is not their first option, but rather a last resort when 
all other means have been exhausted.  As the respondents mentioned, pastoral 
communities will try to “bring up” their herds (reproduce them) after catastrophic 
livestock losses, or they will borrow animals from kinsmen / family members / stock 
friendships in order to breed them, or they will seek alternative contract employment to 
support their families and to purchase animals for further reproduction.  Raiding to 
restock is not mentioned as the primary strategy one would utilise under these 
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circumstances; however, it does happen, with increasing frequency as alternatives may 
be exhausted or unavailable.  After a catastrophic event, people may not be left with any 
animals to breed and replenish lost stock.  Furthermore, with the increase in co-risk 
from droughts, stock alliances and family members may all be left poor and in need of 
animals at the same time.  Finally, the acute loss of animals may overwhelm the number 
of temporary contract positions that are available when there is high demand for 
employment.  With few alternatives, pastoralists may be forced into raiding animals in 
order to support their families.  Respondents were somewhat reluctant to discuss raiding 
as a strategy to combat poverty, which gave the impression that this trigger for conflict 
is seen as “illegitimate,” and as pastoralists, there is also some amount of shame in 
stocklessness (e.g., Waller 1976).   
 
Due to a lack of legitimacy and associated shame, I felt that the motivations behind 
poverty avoidance were more subverted and more personal.  The public face of conflict 
events may be sanctioned in the name of retaliation or as a way to provide security to 
the community, however a desire for poverty relief may exist in the hearts and minds of 
some of the raiding party’s members.  As one Samburu elder, who was a prolific raider 
during his days as a moran, told me,  
“When morans from Samburu go to steal animals, they do so because of poverty.  
If people are starving and idle and have no other alternative, then they will steal.  
Stealing animals to combat poverty is not the first thought.  He will look to 
others first for help.  If exhausted, then he will go to stealing.  In the moran’s 
mind, they don’t share their secrets with the elders.” (Samburu, elder male, 
Lolkerded)   
 
This quote also helps to explain the inherent relationship between “moran / youth 
culture” as a disposition and poverty / lack of employment as a trigger for conflict (see 
Figure 7.4 later in this chapter).  As previously discussed, if the male youth within the 
community find themselves lacking animals, and therefore inherently unemployed, then 
they are not serving their role / filling their designed purpose within the community.  As 
a result, they may try to steal animals in order to regain their employment and reinstate 
their identity.  Likewise, a lack of employment makes the youth idle, which provides 
them with the opportunity to turn their attentions towards conflict.  An administrator for 
one of the community madrasas commented to me that when poverty strikes,  
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“the youth become idle, which makes them gangsters.” (Borana, elder male, 
Isiolo),  
and one sub-location chief told me that,  
“the Lkichami morans are stealing now because they are not employed and have 
no animals to herd and are in poverty problems.  Lkichami is the only generation 
that was initiated without animals in the bank.  They are the poorest and also the 
most aggressive.  Their aggression is due to poverty and idleness.” (Samburu, 
elder male, Lolkerded)   
Without viable alternatives, and a lack of employment and purpose, the youth will use 
their time and energy to engage in conflicts in order to reinforce their identity, gain 
employment, and thus help to ensure the financial security of their families.   
 
Another motivating factor that shouldn’t be neglected in this discussion is hunger.  For 
the young males of the family, during times of resource stress, the burden of labour is 
disproportionately greater for them than any of the other family members, although 
labour increases substantially during this time for all members.  Malnutrition and 
associated illnesses due to hunger can be highly problematic for the young men at this 
time.  I myself witnessed the physical transformation of many of the herders when they 
returned from distant pastures during the drought to their home areas – often times, 
individuals were unrecognisable to me as their bodies adapted to significantly greater 
calorie intake once they had left the bush and were able to relax during the rains.  It was 
only then that I could gain an appreciation for the effects of malnutrition and the toll 
that hunger takes on the herders during periods of resource scarcity.  For the Samburu 
morans, their cultural eating restrictions place an additional burden on them during this 
time.  Morans are not allowed to eat alone, meaning they have to be in the presence of a 
fellow age-mate in order to consume food or drink, and they are not allowed to eat 
anything but milk in the home of their mothers, which is their preferred staple diet.  As 
one elder explains,  
“Because morans can only eat milk at home and not maize, it is only the cows 
that make them free and make them able to come home.  If after the drought, 
there are no cows, then the morans will have to look for them if they want to be 
free.  Otherwise, they will always be in the bush.” (Samburu, elder woman, 
Remote)   
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After periods of prolonged resource scarcity and associated nutritional hardship has 
passed, the moran herders are looking to come home and be able to live more freely and 
regain much of the strength that they have lost over the months of migration and 
hardship.  However, without animals to milk, the morans’ time at home will not be free, 
and individuals without animals will have to eat supplementary foods in the bush, away 
from the settlements.  As a moran cannot eat alone, this will place additional stress on 
him if he cannot eat within the home and has to wait for available age-mates.  In this 
respect, poverty and continued hunger, particularly in the case of the Samburu moran, 
are very much motivating factors triggering youth to engage in conflicts with a view to 
replenish decimated livestock levels.      
 
7.4.5 Politics and Government Incitement 
Pastoral communities in the north have remained largely independent of government 
oversight and government intervention, both to their benefit and to their detriment.  
Although, from what I saw, these northern ethnic groups are very much interested in 
political issues on a national level, access to impartial, official information can be 
difficult.  Not only is illiteracy very high in this region, but for the average person, there 
is no access or limited access to television or radio.  In August 2010, I was located in a 
remote Samburu community during the referendum vote for the new Kenyan 
constitution.  At the end of the day, I asked an elder woman if she had voted, to which 
she said that she had.  I asked her what she voted for, and she responded, “Red.”  When 
I asked her what ‘red’ stood for, she responded, “Kibaki.”  The woman was under the 
impression that the vote was to elect a new president and did not know that a vote for 
red was to reject the new constitution.  When I asked around the rest of the community 
that same evening, the picture became quite clear that despite the government 
distributing pamphlets for a number of months prior to the vote and trying to ensure that 
there was sufficient access to remote communities such as this one on the day of the 
vote, the information wasn’t accessible, and most people were ill-informed regarding 
the purpose of their vote.   
 
In this kind of setting, it is no surprise to hear numerous stories of government 
corruption, exploitation, manipulation, and coercion – far too many to document 
adequately here.  However, the unifying nature of these stories of political manipulation 
is that local politicians or government bodies were fully implicit in either:  1) inciting 
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conflict between communities specifically for their own direct political gains, or 2) 
administering excessive punishment on communities, which incited conflict in the form 
of retribution against neighbouring communities. 
 
The jostling for land and power by local politicians illustrates the first.  In the 
cosmopolitan area of Isiolo, an area inhabited mostly by Borana and Somali, but with a 
growing Turkana presence, there exists a tense struggle for power and influence.  In 
1996,  
“Turkanas supported Romano Losike Nasur, and the Borana supported Mokku.  
[The Turkanas] took advantage of the breakdown in relations to attack.  After 
the 1997 election, the relationship became even worse because the Turkanas 
were incited by their leaders to stand up for their rights.  The Turkanas were 
killing people in vehicles travelling the road so the relationship in Kambi Garba 
became bad too.  Between 1993-1996 more Turkanas came.  In 1997, the 
Turkana population continued to grow...The small stealing escalated until the 
pinnacle in 2009.  This is due to the elections in 2007.  2008 was a time for 
rumours where the Borana were blaming the Turkana, and the Turkana passed 
the blame onto the Samburu who passed it back to the Turkana, then real 
violence happened in 2009.  Also, in June to October, the government gave KPR 
guns to the Borana and to the Turkana, which escalated the fighting.  The 
government gave the guns so that people could protect themselves, but people 
weren’t even trained.  You just go to the chief or police or OCS and say you 
have animals that you want to protect and so they give anyone a gun – especially 
if you pay a little bit of money as everyone wanted one.” (Borana, elder male, 
Kambi Garba)   
Tales such as these of political corruption and incitement all happen in border areas 
having a significantly mixed population, such as near Isiolo or Maralal or Marsabit.  
MPs are vying for land, power, and most importantly, re-election.  Politicians require a 
solid voter-base having close ethnic ties, therefore they must also ensure that these 
ethnic groups have strong claims to the land within their constituency and will not be 
moved on easily by competing ethnic groups.  In order to help ensure claims to land, I 
heard a number of accusations from the communities that they had been supplied with 
weapons, food, and money by the local MPs and were also told the “plans” of the other 
side that there were designs, fuelled by the opposing MP, to take over their land, 
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animals, and resources.  In this instance, the MPs and local government officials didn’t 
necessarily have to ‘dirty their own hands.’  However, with the clever use of rumours, 
fear, and support, they were able to trigger conflict events within their area, with a view 
to their own political gains.   
 
The second type of government trigger and incitement occurs through excessive 
collective punishment of a community.  A famous example of this in the north was 
during Daba, where the Borana united with the Somali shifta against the independent 
government due to fear of the Kikuyu political leaders spreading Christian influence 
amongst these northern Muslim populations.  However,  
“Eventually shiftas were defeated because the government attacked many 
Borana and put their animals in concentration camps and burned them down or 
shot them.  This was actually the Daba.  People were also put in concentration 
camps and killed...Many people were left in poverty, and there was no 
government relief then.” (Borana, elder male, Malka Daka)   
For the majority of Borana and Somali that I spoke to who were alive during this time 
and remember the early 1960s Daba, it was an event that left a lasting impression that 
much wealth and financial security was lost at this time.  An extended family’s entire 
assets may have been decimated at this time, leaving people in abject poverty.  Many 
people had to turn to alternative means, such as joining raiding parties, to try to rebuild 
their herds as there was no other assistance or places to turn after the government 
destroyed their animals as a show of force and community punishment.  Likewise, in 
March 2009, the Isiolo MP, Dr Kute, led a successful campaign against the Samburu 
claiming that the Borana, whom he represented, had been hapless victims of the 
Samburu’s incessant raiding behaviour, and he requested that the government step in to 
deliver punishment upon the Samburu and to return the thousands of animals that the 
Samburu had taken from the Borana.  As a result, the GSU and Kenyan policing units 
launched a series of attacks on the Samburu along the Samburu-Borana border areas, 
where with the aid of automatic weapons, vehicles, and helicopters, they killed a 
substantial number of Samburu, drove people from their grazing land, and managed to 
capture approximately 4000 – 5000 animals from Samburu families living in the area.  
These animals were taken from the Samburu community collectively – from families, 
widows, the elderly, the innocent, and the poor.  The captured livestock were to be 
returned to Borana families who had had animals stolen from them by the Samburu in 
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the past, however in reality, these animals were distributed to families at random, or 
they were kept / sold by the officers and members of the police in large numbers.  When 
I discussed this incident with a number of Borana respondents, even they agreed that the 
government used excessive force, and their actions were illegitimate as a blanket 
punishment against an entire community.  As can be expected, these Samburu 
communities themselves felt extremely bitter towards the government, towards Kute, 
and by default, towards the Borana people for what had happened to them and to their 
livestock.  A number of people cited this particular incident to me when discussing why 
they took animals during the 2009 drought as they were seeking retribution against what 
they saw as illegitimate government intervention.  Events like the Daba and the 2009 
seizure of Samburu animals by the government help to trigger further conflict events 
between communities as a form of retribution and as a redistribution of wealth.      
7.5 Discussion 
7.5.1 Population  
A number of authors, including Homer-Dixon (1999), have argued that population 
growth is linked to increasing resource scarcity and is therefore an essential component 
that contributes to the resource scarcity – conflict relationship.  This argument reflects a 
Malthusian view of unchecked population growth resulting in contentious human 
relationships as societies compete for scarce resources (Fraser et al. 2003).  However, a 
number of other authors have pointed out that warfare is not an inevitable product of 
high population densities (Johnson and Earle 2000).  This thesis, in light of the 
ethnographic data, supports the latter view and rejects Homer-Dixon’s claim that 
population growth is a key contributor to resource-based conflicts.  During interviews, 
population growth was never cited as one of the underlying motivations for conflict.  
Although it is true that competition over land and resources was one of the most 
recognised contributors to conflict, the competition the informants were referring to was 
a result of drought diminishing water and fodder availability rather than an increase in 
the human or livestock populations.  In fact, people now note that the livestock 
populations have dwindled to very few animals compared to the herd sizes of previous 
generations.  Little et al. (2001) also recognise this general trend.  Because of the small 
herd sizes, many participants comment that the capacity of the land is sufficient for their 
needs.  As one Borana man explains in regards to sharing lands with the Somali, 
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In 1995 and 1996, the Somali started coming back because they love this land 
here.  The land in Isiolo District is particularly good for pastoralism.  There are 
two rivers here…there is plenty to share here.” (Borana, elder male, Kambi 
Garba) 
Based on comments such as these and an understanding that livestock stocking densities 
are kept at levels below ecological carrying capacity due to the effects of drought 
(Behnke and Scoones 1993), these results support the argument that population growth 
is not a necessary component of resource-based conflict. 
 
7.5.2 Relationships between Triggers and Dispositions 
As alluded to in section 7.3.1, many of the dispositions and triggers discussed in this 
chapter are not working in isolation from one another.  For instance, insights offered by 
the discussion on “prestige culture” support this understanding and also acknowledge 
that the nature of these associations can either be one factor contributing to an escalation 
or decrease in another factor, or they can equally influence one another .  Not only does 
the level of prestige on one side affect one’s ability to compete for valuable resources, 
but also being successful in competing for resources can increase one’s influence and 
prestige.  Figure 7.4 below visually demonstrates the inherent relationships that exist 
between the described dispositions and triggers.  Here, we can see that prestige 
contributes to one’s ability to compete for resources, just as one’s ability to compete for 
resources further reaffirms one’s prestige.  Finally, a community having a high prestige 
value in comparison to a neighbouring group may actually reduce overall competition 
for pasture and water through driving the opposing community from their land due to 
fear before actual conflict incidents can occur.    
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Figure 7.4:  Associations between dispositions and triggers demonstrating that these factors do not 
operate independently of one another 
 
 
7.5.3 Multi-Causal Nature of Conflict 
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the motivation behind conflict is rarely, if 
ever the result of a single cause, but instead it is a complex suite of factors (dispositions 
or triggers) that lead up to a conflict event.  Despite making this point clear in the 
introduction, in the rest of the chapter for the sake of clarity and thoroughness, I have 
discussed the dispositions and triggers of conflict individually.  However, at this stage, I 
would like to draw the reader’s attention back to the essential argument that conflict 
motivations are not stand-alone conditions, and the quotes that have been chosen in the 
previous sections are only very small parts of much longer interviews where the 
respondents typically discuss a number of motivations, and through reading the 
complete interview, a picture begins to emerge that reflects the multi-causal nature of 
conflict.  The following extended excerpt taken from an interview with a Samburu 
moran (Box 7.2) helps to illustrate the point that these motivations, both triggers and 
dispositions, should not be taken in isolation, and the reader may get a sense of how 
these particular aspects work together.   
 
Box 7.2:  the multi-causal nature of conflict (Interview with Samburu Lkichami moran, Lenchokut) 
In the last drought, I was herding cows and shoats for my father only.  Before I left 
home, my father gave me advice.  He told me to take responsibility of the cows and that 
they were solely my responsibility so I must try my best.  My father is of the Lkishili.  
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When I knew that I had full responsibility of the animals, I felt that I needed to be 
positive in my behaviour and must take responsibility.  I liked the idea of having the 
responsibility, and at that point there were no worries or concerns.  Before I left, I knew 
the drought was going to be as bad as it was.  To prepare for my departure, I made 
preparations by getting a gun, getting bullets, and cleaning the gun.  [Opportunity: gun]  
I didn’t buy the bullets from anywhere; I just picked them up from the ground and got 
ten bullets in this way.  The gun was an M16.  I had bought the gun already along with 
some bullets.  The gun was bought from some Somalis at the border.  I paid for the gun 
with four cows.  I left home with six other morans.  From the six of us, all of us had 
guns.  I’ve actually had my gun for over three years.   
One of the hardships that we faced was the conflict with the Borana stealing animals.  
Food and water was a big problem because animals move and spend days out and even 
go to the river the next day so there is no time to search for food.  These things were a 
problem.  [Poverty: hunger]  We slaughtered about six cows from my herd.  There were 
about one hundred cows in my herd at that time.  I did ask for permission from my 
father.  The first place we took the animals was my decision, not my father’s.  [Youth / 
Elder Perspective]  We eventually went to Losesia.  Going to the border like that gave 
us concerns for our safety, but we had to go because it had plenty of grass.  If all of my 
cows died of starvation, it would have made me feel completely bad because I would 
have had nowhere else to go so I would have just had to have come home.  [Youth:  
employment]  If I had come home with all the cows being raided, I would have felt even 
more pain than if they had just starved.  [Animals:  meaning]  I would have had to 
retaliate.  [Retaliation]  Towards the young ladies, I would have felt shame if the 
animals were raided but not if they had died of drought.  [Youth:  ladies incitement]  
There is no shame there.   
When we got to Losesia, the Borana were grazing their animals so close, less than 200 
meters away.  [Opportunity:  proximity]  We didn’t speak with them.  As long as we had 
guns, we could ensure that the cows were safe while in the border.  The Samburu met 
and had patrols moving ahead of the cows in order to keep a security line until the cows 
were able to come back home.  The animals that we were herding were attempted to be 
stolen – not in Losesia but in Daraja – Mungu (close to Kom).  We had been there for 
two months before the incident happened.  In those two months, we also admired the 
Borana animals, but we didn’t want to steal them because the Borana were too close, 
and we could have lost our own animals.  We waited until the fall of the first rain before 
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taking any animals and going home.  This is when we are further from each other.  
[Raids:  conditions – see chapter 5]   
We met together to talk about stealing and decided to go for a raid.  We raid first and 
then decide what each of us gets.  The primary reason for stealing animals is problems 
– when we don’t have animals.  [Poverty]  When we had the meeting to steal, at that 
point, I had lost all but six cows.  If I had had all one hundred cows left, I would not 
have gone for the raid.  Some morans who joined hadn’t lost that many animals, but we 
just wanted reinforcement from them.  [Collectivism]  We were not able to capture any 
cows in our attempt though.  I came home with only six.  In choosing which area to raid 
or which Borana to raid, we chose a direction and hit just the first ones that we met.  
[Opportunity:  proximity]   
My father has told me not to raid, but I turned a deaf ear [Youth / Elder Perspective] 
because I didn’t want to be left without animals to herd when other morans have them.  
[Employment]  If I had been successful and bought back ten raided cows, my father 
would say nothing because he has no authority over what I do.  [Youth / Elder 
Perspective]  I would give the cows to my father, and he would say thank you.  He 
couldn’t give the cows back to the owners because it would cause a fight with me and 
my father.  If I wasn’t herding animals, maybe I would just go to school.  I would prefer 
herding over school because there is no one else in my family to herd.  [Solution:  
education]   
In order to stop the conflict between the Samburu and Borana, both sides need to be 
disarmed simultaneously.  [Solution:  security]  The season that has the most conflicts is 
lari because we are free to go and raid then.  [Employment:  idleness]  I raided in the 
beginning of lari when the Borana were still close.  [Opportunity:  proximity]  Now is 
not a good time to raid because it is drying up so we are not free – we need to take care 
of our animals.  If riai becomes more frequent in the future, we wouldn’t think of 
raiding because we would just want to keep peace so that we can graze our animals.  
We wouldn’t want to raid and incite more conflict because our animals would be too 
weak to run away continuously if the Borana kept on attacking them.  [Raids:  
conditions]  I will only listen to my father’s advice and hear him if he is telling me good 
things.  The young ladies here praise raiders – I also want to be praised too.  [Youth:  
ladies’ praise]   
No one has managed to keep a gun here.  Armed people were reported by a spy 
(yimyim) from within the community, and the government paid him.  Everyone knows 
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who he is, and they hate him now.  Yimyim has no relationship now with even his own 
family.  He’s only alive because he’s being protected by the government in Isiolo.  He 
wrote a list and handed it in and then the operation [disarmament] came with yimyim to 
the community.  The operation here took three months, and no one ran away or stashed 
their gun because they are known people, and the government makes people suffer to 
produce the guns by kicking and beating the family, taking money, and burning clothes.  
[Solution:  security]  My gun got taken by handing it over to the chief, and then your 
name gets crossed off the list.  Without our guns, we feel more tension because the 
Samburu don’t have guns and the Borana do have them still.  [Opportunity:  guns]   
 
If the drought hits again, we will still go to border but with great fear.  We will behave 
differently there – we won’t go to the exact places as before.  We won’t be on the ‘touch 
line’ of the border with the Borana, and we will graze far from them.  We want to have 
our guns back.  We’re not planning on buying guns because we don’t have the cows for 
it.  If they come up, then we will buy guns and will go to the Somalis to buy them.  
[Opportunity:  guns]   
Borana steal animals for the same reason as us.  The size of the Borana herds is bigger 
than the Samburu’s.  The fight isn’t just about cows; it’s also about pasture and water.  
[Compete: pasture and water]  Fighting helps because the Borana leave their area due 
to fear so the Samburu can expand their pasture, and they also don’t have to wait for 
water.  If I went to the border and lost the ninety-four animals solely due to drought but 
never saw a single Borana, I wouldn’t still try to raid.  I can’t go looking for them if I 
haven’t seen them.  Even if I just grazed my animals here and lost all ninety-four of 
them here, I still wouldn’t go looking for the Boranas’.  [Opportunity:  proximity]  
There was tons of small stealing in border.  Small 1 – 1 stealing continues until it 
escalates into a big raid.  If the small 1 – 1 stealing didn’t happen, the big raids 
wouldn’t happen.   [Retaliation:  escalation]  When we go on a raid together, we feel 
very good – a bit light.  It makes us bond.  [Collectivism]  Being a Samburu and raiding 
is part of our cultural right. [Prestige Culture]  The Borana saying that morans must 
raid to marry is false.  [Myth]   
The government should not interfere with us.  We also want to have plenty of animals so 
that we can be independent and live our sweet life.  We will be happy when we graduate 
and have our own family because I will be resting and others will take on responsibility.  
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A Borana who is the same age as me is different from me just from the grudge we have 
that we repel from each other.  [Hate]   
 
7.5.4 Disposition for Cooperation 
In writing a chapter on motivations contributing to conflict events, it is easy to lose 
sight of the argument that pastoralists in northern Kenya also have a tremendous 
motivation towards cooperative behaviour between different ethnic groups.  Saying that 
one group of people has a disposition that may contribute to engaging in conflict is not 
synonymous with saying that they have a tendency towards aggressive conflict.  Under 
the appropriate conditions, pastoralists will engage with their dispositions and triggers 
that contribute to cooperative behaviour.  One such disposition is the pastoral practice 
of reciprocity, that due to the unpredictable environment in which pastoralists live, if an 
individual or group asks for assistance in the form of water, resources, or access to 
grazing, the request should never be denied.  The basic premise here is that ‘I may have 
today, and so I will give to you, as tomorrow I may need, and you will have to provide.’  
The disposition towards cooperative communal living is very strong within and between 
these communities and between individual interactions.  As long as both sides come 
together in peace, then no one will be denied water or access to grazing if there is 
hardship on their side.  As one Borana man said,  
“We allow other tribes in to graze because we cannot have people die due to 
lack of food or water.  We all face common problems, and we have a sense of 
belonging to each other.  We also want reciprocity that we could graze on the 
Samburu side if there are problems on this side.” (Borana, elder man, Girissa)   
A crucial element to this type of communal reciprocity is that both sides need to come 
together with the intention of peace (whether temporary or permanent) in order for the 
exchange to be successful.  It is customary that the elders from both ethnic groups will 
first come together and discuss the terms of sharing resources, on which both sides will 
agree.  Livestock and herders will then converge in the same region with the hope that 
peaceful conditions will carry them through the hardship months; however, the 
‘dispositions’ of the youth and the triggers of opportunity through proximity, guns, and 
poverty, for example, may take their toll after some time.  There is a balance that must 
be struck as communities modulate between cooperative and competitive behaviours, 
acting on communal dispositions or individual dispositions that may lead to conflict.  
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Even amongst the youth, despite urges described in the preceding pages as “youth / 
moran culture,” there is also a disposition within this sub-group of society that is 
inclined towards cooperative behaviour.  For the moran, the hardship of eating 
prohibitions also promotes beneficial behaviour amongst the youth members as  
“not eating alone makes it essential that you maintain cooperative relationships 
with fellow morans, that you’re never alone in the bush, and that there is always 
someone else to rely on.  One may have food to share on one day, and then the 
other may have food to share the next day.  This maintains the bonds between 
the morans as they are sharing food.” (Samburu, moran, Kitich)   
It can be argued that such strong internal bonds create a distinction between ‘us’ and 
‘them’ which may encourage competition with others; however, these communities do 
recognise that at their most basic levels, they are all pastoralists, and they all have the 
same struggle for survival.  During my time in the field, I did hear a number of stories 
of youth from both sides digging wells together, sharing grazing areas, or exchanging 
veterinary medicines during the drought when they were in the border areas together.  
This is not completely exceptional behaviour, and the older generations all told stories 
of sharing a significant amount of time, anywhere from a few months to a couple of 
years, living in close proximity to apparent “enemies” and sharing times of relative 
peace.   
 
A reinforcement of the disposition towards a pastoral communal belief system is if two 
ethnic groups share a number of cultural practices or common beliefs, both of which aid 
groups in rectifying periods of tension or unease.  Many of the Rendille respondents that 
I spoke with told me that the Samburu regularly small steal (1-1) livestock from them 
when the two sides come together, however the Rendille never respond with any form 
of retaliation.  This was confirmed by the Samburu who say the Rendille never take 
animals from them.  When I asked the Rendille informants why this was the case, the 
response was always the same.  The Rendille identify themselves as cultural brothers to 
the Samburu, having a similar appearance, a shared use of beads and decoration, and 
generations of intermarrying has resulted in Rendille family names being found 
amongst the Samburu.  They simply say that they are all brothers, and as such, they 
cannot retaliate for instances of small stealing against the Samburu. 
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Likewise, the relationship between the Somali and the Borana is complex, and 
seemingly turbulent from an outside perspective.  On a number of occasions, the Somali 
have asked permission to move into Borana territory due to severe and prolonged 
drought within their home areas.  Due to the pastoral communal belief system, the 
Borana have always granted access to the Somali into their territory to utilise the water 
and pasture that is available there.  Based on information that I received from a number 
of Borana communities, the Somali have most recently been hosted within Borana 
territory from 1970 – 1986, 1990 – 1992, and 1995 – present, however they were 
forcibly removed by the Borana through large-scale fighting in 1986 and 1992.  The 
progression of events appears to be repetitive, as told by the Borana, each time:  1) the 
Somali suffer scarcity of pasture and water in their area, 2) they ask permission from the 
Borana to co-occupy the Borana territory, 3) the Borana accept, 4) the Somali graze for 
a period of time without major incidents occurring, 5) the drought ends in the Somali 
territory, 6) the Somali refuse to leave as they are partial to the resources available 
within the Borana territory, 7) the Somali begin a series of attacks and aggressive acts 
towards the Borana in order to try to push them from their land, 8) after some time, the 
Borana retaliate in a full-scale war and manage to push the Somali back into their own 
territory, 9) the Somali apologise for their aggressive behaviour.  After a few years, the 
process repeats itself, and the Borana again allow the Somali to enter their territory for 
grazing and access to resources when they are asked for assistance.  It is interesting to 
note that the Borana, in living memory, have not requested permission to graze or use 
resources within the Somali home areas.  Given the tumultuous history that exists 
between these two ethnic groups, one may assume that the Borana, based on prior 
knowledge of the Somali’s behaviour, would eventually deny the Somali access to their 
home territory; however, this is not the case.  This example highlights the strong 
disposition for pastoralists to act cooperatively when a group is faced with hardship and 
scarcity; however, in the case of the Borana and Somali, a cooperative disposition is 
reinforced by their shared belief system.  As one Borana woman explains,  
“Somali have been forgiven for stealing where the Samburu have not because 
Somali are Muslims, and they pray together for peace and so they are forgiven, 
but Samburu are not Muslims” (Borana, elder woman, Malka Daka)   
In this case, it is the shared religion that helps to reinforce and repair cooperative 
relationships between the two groups when there is a temporary disagreement or period 
of tension.  The nature of cooperation and the strategies that help to mediate potentially 
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competitive relationships are discussed further in the following chapter.  This chapter 
has helped to demonstrate, through using detailed ethnographic data, that the causes of 
conflict in light of increased resource scarcity are rather more complex than the direct 
relationship examined in chapter five and six.  Instead, it is a relationship that is 
mediated by inter-related, multi-causal factors.  Building on this insight, chapter eight 
will discuss the mechanisms, or strategies used, that help to understand how social and 
causal factors influence the drive towards aggressive or peaceable interactions between 
ethnic groups.   
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Chapter 8: Conflict and Cooperation in 
Pastoral Populations 
8.1 Introduction 
All human populations have the potential for aggression, and none are entirely devoid 
of conflict; however, cooperation is a fundamental component of human societies that 
allows us to live as a social species (de Waal 1992).  As previously discussed, if both 
conflict and cooperation are part of the human toolkit, both potentials can be realised 
and are selectively and dynamically utilised as beneficial tactics in inter- and intra-
group interactions (Johnson and Earle 2000; Dentan 1992).  The result is not only great 
behavioural and cultural variability between populations but also among populations, 
depending on their particular historical and geographical circumstances.  This chapter 
addresses the conditions and context in which conflict and cooperative tactics are 
utilised by the three ethnic groups, using game theory as an analytical framework.    
8.2 Applying Games to Empirical Data 
Game theory has been applied broadly to a vast array of disciplines, from economics to 
mathematics, biology and sociology, and as such, there are a great many model games 
that have been developed to explain relevant concepts.  In fact, there are more than 30 
games that have been used to understand optimality of strategies in multi-person 
interactions.  The three games that I focus on in my analysis are the Prisoner’s Dilemma, 
being the most-widely discussed game in the literature, the Hawk-Dove game, also 
widely discussed and relevant to questions of competition over resources, and the 
Snowdrift, which places greater emphasis on cooperative relationships.  Each of these 
games is constructed in a similar manner:  there are two players, and they have two 
possible choices (defect or cooperate), and dependent on the choice that each makes and 
the choice of the opponent, there is an associated pay-off.  Figure 8.1 details each game 
and their associated pay-off matrices. 
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Figure 8.1:  Diagram describing pay-off matrices and scenarios for the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Snowdrift 
game, and Hawk-Dove game 
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For clarity, a comparison of each of the games’ pay-off matrices is provided in Table 
8.1. 
 
Table 8.1:  Comparison of the pay-off matrices for three games 
BOTH DEFECT (D) 
Prisoners:      medium cost for telling 
Snowdrift:     0 
Hawk-Dove:  (benefit resource – cost of 
fighting) / 2 
DEFECT, OPPONENT COOPERATES (B) 
Prisoners:      receive all benefit  
Snowdrift:     receive all benefit  
Hawk-Dove:  receive all benefit 
COOPERATE, OPPONENT DEFECTS (C)  
Prisoners:      large cost for silence 
Snowdrift:     benefit – all cost of digging 
Hawk-Dove:  0 
BOTH COOPERATE (A) 
Prisoners:      small cost for silence 
Snowdrift:     benefit – (cost of  
                        digging / 2)                              
Hawk-Dove:  all benefit / 2 
 
As discussed in chapter two, the pay-off matrix for the Prisoner’s Dilemma indicates 
that during a single iteration of the game, the most rational decision is one of defection, 
primarily due to the prohibitively high cost of cooperation in the face of defection (C).  
For the Snowdrift game, the proportion of cooperative acts is expected to be 
substantially higher than the other two games because even cooperation in the face of 
defection still provides a benefit (i.e., digging leads to moving the car) to the 
cooperating individual (Kummerli et al. 2007).  In the Hawk-Dove game, there is less of 
an incentive towards defection because: 1) it can be costly in terms of injuries if both 
players defect (D), and 2) cooperation in the face of defection (C) results in no injury to 
the individual as the dove will peacefully give up claims on any resource in this 
situation (Maynard Smith 1982). 
 
Assessing each of these games in light of their individual pay-off matrices and reward 
schemes is a crucial step when applying such models to empirical data as the 
composition of these elements has been shown to have a significant effect on the 
proportion of cooperative to competitive acts (Ledyard 1995).  Table 8.2 below 
illustrates the associated costs and benefits (in light of real data taken from each 
population) for inter-group interactions between the Samburu / Rendille, and the Borana 
mapped onto a game pay-off matrix.  The scenario of the game, based on conditions 
similar to fieldwork in 2009 and 2010 is as follows:  one of the yearly rains has failed in 
northern Kenya and the dry season continues without any reprieve in sight.  The elders 
from two neighbouring, disparate ethnic groups have come together to broker an 
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agreement for both of their communities to come together in a boundary area where 
they can share overlapping grazing areas and watering points until such a time as the 
rains come, and the two groups can return to the interior of their territories.  Whilst in 
the boundary area for an undetermined amount of time, they can either choose to 
continue to cooperate with one another and share the resources peacefully, or they have 
the opportunity to defect on one another, forcefully taking over land, resources, and the 
other ethnic group’s livestock. 
   
Table 8.2:  Table showing the pay-off matrices for the pastoral drought scenario, which reflects a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game 
 Borana 
Defect  
(take land & animals) 
Cooperate  
(graze & share land peacefully) 
S
a
m
b
u
ru
 o
r 
R
en
d
il
le
 
Defect  
(take land & 
animals) 
Both: 
Benefits (+): 
Gain others animals  
Attract wives  
Bond w/ agemates  
Gain territory / resources  
Gain prestige / reputation  
Increase security  
 
Costs (-): 
Loss life / injury  
Loss / confiscation animals  
Loss continued reciprocity  
Loss territory / resources  
Loss prestige / reputation  
Financial cost of battle  
Increase retaliation  
 
Value (D) =  =   
Defector: 
Benefits (+): 
Gain others animals  
Attract wives  
Bond w/ agemates  
Gain territory / resources  
Gain prestige / reputation  
Increase security  
 
Costs: 
Loss continued reciprocity  
Financial cost of battle  
Increase retaliation  
 
Value (B) =  + + 
 
Co-operator: 
Benefits: 
Gain future reciprocity  
 
Costs: 
Loss life / injury  
Loss animals  
Loss territory / resources  
Loss prestige / reputation  
Cooperate 
(graze & 
share land 
peacefully) 
Co-operator: 
Benefits (+): 
Gain future reciprocity  
 
Costs (-): 
Loss life / injury  
Loss animals 
Loss territory / resources  
Loss prestige / reputation  
 
Value (C) =  - - 
 
Both: 
Benefits (+): 
Access land and graze animals 
peacefully  
Gain future reciprocity  
 
Costs (-): 
Sharing scarce resources  
 
Value (A) =  + 
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Defector: 
Benefits: 
Gain others animals  
Attract wives  
Bond w/ agemates  
Gain territory  
Gain prestige / reputation  
Increase security  
 
Costs: 
Loss continued reciprocity  
Financial cost of battle  
Increase retaliation  
 
 
The pay-off matrix was generated by looking at data recorded from each of these 
populations taken from the conflict incident reporting.  It takes into consideration what 
people have cited as benefits to conflict, benefits to peace / passivity, and the associated 
costs for both.  These figures show the relationship between factors, i.e. one quadrant is 
relatively better or worse than the others for the participant.   
 
The pay-off matrix in Table 8.2 shows a pay-off structure ranked as B > A > D > C (i.e., 
[taking land and animals with very few costs] is better than [grazing together peacefully 
and having to share land] is better than [both sides taking land and animals with costs 
incurred by both] is better than [having land and animals taken from you]).  Referring to 
Figure 8.1, this ranking would exclude the Snowdrift game – the primary reason being 
that this game places too high a value on cooperative acts in the face of defection (C) 
for it to be relevant to the pastoral population matrix.  In comparing Table 8.2 to each of 
the pay-off matrices in Table 8.1 for the Hawk-Dove and Prisoner’s Dilemma, there are 
a few points for consideration: 
1) The Hawk-Dove fits more closely with the pastoral population matrix for 
value (D) as both sides will receive some benefit minus some cost to each, 
both of which are shared between the players. 
2) Value (B) is applicable to either game.  
3) Most importantly, the Prisoner’s Dilemma fits more closely with the pastoral 
population matrix for value (C) as the cost of cooperation with the opponent 
defecting is substantial.  In the Hawk-Dove, the cost for passivity is counted 
as 0, which is unrealistic for the pastoral context. 
4) The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a better fit with the pastoral populations for value 
A as there is a small associated cost with sharing land and resources, as these 
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are scarce resources, which therefore become reduced if shared amongst 
many. 
 
In light of the above assessment, the pastoral population matrix best fits with the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) model, which will be the game that is referenced throughout 
this analysis.  The PD is rather appropriate for this purpose as “provided that the payoffs 
to each side satisfy the inequalities that define the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the results of the 
analysis will be applicable” (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981: 1392).  Furthermore, 
although classic game examples are explained with the individual as the unit of analysis, 
which some social scientists may find problematic, comparisons to iterated play 
between two endogamous groups is satisfactory for these purposes (Maynard Smith 
1982).         
 
8.3 The Samburu / Rendille and Borana Relationship 
This analysis will first examine the most “complex” relationship as these were the 
pairings that came up most frequently during conversations I had with research 
participants.  Actually, there are two relationships described here:  a) the Samburu and 
the Borana, and 2) the Rendille and the Borana; however, the nature and principles 
governing both of these relationships, as discussed in the previous chapters, are quite 
similar and therefore will be discussed as Samburu / Rendille and Borana.  Primarily, 
the relationship here is based on one of reciprocal altruism, which is typically 
characteristic of peasant societies living under uncertain environmental and social 
conditions, where it cannot be anticipated who will need help in the future and who will 
be in a position to provide help (Erasmus 1955; Scott 1976; Panter-Brick 1993).  
Empirical studies by Kaplan and Hill (1985) have shown that food sharing amongst 
rural communities can increase the overall food availability from 20 – 80%, therefore 
making reciprocity an attractive strategy for managing resource insecurity.  During my 
fieldwork, shared grazing rights were held as a value in high regard amongst all three 
ethnic groups in equal measure.  As one man explained to me,  
“We allow other tribes in [our area] to graze because we cannot have people die 
due to lack of food or water.  We all face common problems, and we have a 
sense of belonging to each other.  We also want reciprocity that we could graze 
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on the Samburu side if there are problems on this side.” (Borana elder man, 
Girissa)  
The unpredictable climate in which the Borana, Rendille, and Samburu live exacts a 
great pressure on these communities, yet it also exposes their common ground:  they are 
all pastoralists, and they are all confronting the same challenges.  As discussed in 
chapter two, reciprocal altruism provides an incentive for cooperation to establish itself 
within group interaction, and given the right conditions, potentially to flourish.   
     
As discussed in the previous chapter, the vast majority of livestock theft and aggravated 
conflicts between the Samburu / Rendille and Borana can be classified as retaliatory.  
As one woman describes,    
“There has always been a lot of back and forth stealing between the two groups 
– every year that game has been going on.” (Samburu, elder woman, Sereolipi) 
In attempting to classify each of the conflicts that the Samburu and the Rendille brought 
against the Borana, they can best be described as relatively numerous (in comparison 
with the Borana), relatively small-scale (smaller groups of raiders, stealing smaller 
numbers of animals than the Borana), and brought about in response to “right” some 
perceived “wrong-doings” by the other side.  One Samburu elder explains,  
“If the animals are taken, you must revenge.” (Samburu, elder man, 
Lolmisigiyioi) 
A younger Samburu man continues to describe Samburu raiding strategies when he says,  
“When I was coming back, I stole one Turkana cow and brought it back to my 
area with me.  Then, the Turkana retaliated and stole two cows.  Then the 
owners of those two cows took a number of cows from the Turkana.  Then it 
will go back and forth like this until one group organises a large raid, but 
eventually we become friends again.” (Samburu, elder man, Lenchokut) 
In analysing Samburu and Rendille conflict in relation to Borana conflict strategies, due 
to their back and forth nature, consistent vigilance and maintenance of incursions into 
their territories, and insistence that any infractions be rectified absolutely immediately, 
the Samburu and Rendille in relation to the Borana can be categorised as Tit-For-Tat 
strategists. 
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For the Borana, the situation is slightly different.  From conflict incident reports taken 
from both the Borana and the Samburu / Rendille communities, conflicts initiated by the 
Borana tend to be less frequent, with more raiders involved, adequately planned, and 
much larger groups of animals being taken in any single raiding event.  One of the 
Imams in the Ewaso area explained to me,  
“When I was living in Kom, the border was not entirely peaceful, but it was the 
colonial period so there were Administrative Police there monitoring the 
boundaries, but sometimes Samburu would come and cross to graze and sneaky 
steal 2-5 animals because it is their culture...When the offenses become many, 
the Borana would hit back with a big raiding party, once.  Generally, we were 
friends to one another.” (Borana, elder man, Malka Daka) 
Repeatedly, Borana informants classified their type of conflict behaviour to me as that 
of a sleeping snake: 
“The Borana are like a sleeping buti [snake] that doesn’t move easily, but when 
it does, it strikes once and strikes hard.” (Borana, elder woman, Gotu) 
In reviewing this conflict behaviour, the strategy displayed by the Borana is more akin 
to the Tit-For-Two-Tats (TFTT) strategy.  This was developed by Robert Axelrod 
himself during the second simulation tournament.  He developed the TFTT as an 
improvement on the TFT strategy, which may result in a “death spiral” of echoing 
defection should the TFT interact repeatedly with an aggressive tactic.  TFTT retains 
cooperation on the first move, just like the TFT, but it will only answer with defection if 
the opponent defects twice in a row rather than in response to the first defection.  In this 
way, TFTT is a more forgiving strategy which helps to re-establish cooperation within a 
repeated interaction with a TFT strategist.  In Axelrod’s second tournament, the TFTT 
did very well against the TFT; however, it was not the tournament winner because it can 
easily be taken advantage of if it faces particularly aggressive strategies with high rates 
of defection (Axelrod 1984).   
 
The TFT and the TFTT both start with the first move being an act of cooperation, which 
is reflective of the real behaviours that we see between these pastoral groups.  In this 
case, both sides come together and arrange to graze in one another’s territory; a request 
that is almost never refused as open access to land is a fundamental right of pastoralists, 
regardless of ethnic affinity.  When assessing the stability of the TFT and the TFTT 
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strategies in an iterated game of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD), the pure strategies 
would play out as follows: 
 
Table 8.3:  Iterated game having TFT and TFTT strategies 
TFT C C C C C C C C C C C C C END 
TFTT C C C C C C C C C C C C C END 
 
The table above demonstrates what would take place in a simulated exercise where 
strategies remain “true” to their designed tactics; however, the real world can be a much 
different picture.  Even for cooperative populations, as described in the above table, 
unforeseen defections can invade the system in a number of ways in the real world.  
One way defection enters is through the opportunity that unconditional cooperation 
(ALL C) can provide.  Defectors do very well in these situations and can easily take 
advantage of a habitually forgiving opponent.  Second, quite simply, mistakes can 
happen.  For instance, herders on all sides have reported to me that when large groups 
of livestock go to drink in shared wells and dams, it is common for animals to become 
mixed into another herd.  It is only later that herd owners realise that some animals are 
missing or that they have accidentally acquired new animals.  When this happens and 
relations are stable between the benefactor and the loser, then the misappropriated 
animals can be easily returned to the rightful owner; however, if there is pre-existing 
tension between the two sides, then communication may not be forthcoming enough to 
rectify the situation, thus fuelling the tension even further (Maynard Smith 1982).  
Finally, miscommunication can also lead the intrusion of defections.  
Miscommunication generally takes the form of blaming an “innocent” ethnic group for 
another group’s “crime.”  During interviews, I recorded this happening repeatedly 
where Somali were mistaken for Borana, Samburu mistaken for Rendille, Turkana 
mistaken for Samburu, and even Samburu mistaken for conservancy rangers following 
incidents where animals had been taken.  When information is transmitted orally, over a 
great distance, and through many individuals, discrepancies and misinformation are 
likely occurrences.  Keeping this in mind and reviewing the above simulation, a more 
“realistic” version might result as follows: 
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Table 8.4:  Iterated game having TFT and TFTT strategies, with the introduction of unintentional 
defections 
TFT C C C D C C C D C D D D D END 
TFTT C C C C C C C C C C D D D END 
 
As the first move for both the TFT and the TFTT is a cooperative one, these strategies 
dictate that the play would continue in an all cooperative manner.  However, defection 
(D) may be introduced due to mistakes, miscommunications, or by accident, therefore 
unintentionally altering the play in the game.   
 
8.3.1 Transition from Non-zero Sum to Zero Sum Games 
One of the fundamental principles of game theory application, as discussed in chapter 
two, is that the ESS fluctuates depending on the expected length of the game.  Quite 
simply, if the number of interactions is finite and known by the players, then the only 
evolutionarily stable strategy is one of all defection (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; 
Kummerli et al. 2007).  Defection on the last interaction is optimal for both sides (if it is 
known to be the last), and therefore defection on the preceding interaction would be 
beneficial, and so forth and so on, all the way back to the initial interaction.  For the PD, 
cooperation will be able to establish itself and persist throughout interactions only as 
long as both sides can anticipate that they will remain in need of one another for an 
indefinite period of time.  As discussed in chapter five, when two populations come into 
a boundary area to share grazing and resources, initially this is for an indefinite period 
of time, and as such it behoves individuals to behave responsibly and cooperatively in 
order to ensure continued grazing when resources elsewhere are scarce.  However, as 
discussed, when clouds start to gather and both sides realise that the rains will soon be 
coming to their areas, there is less of a pressure to cooperate, and as such, there is a 
relative explosion of conflict during this time.  This phenomenon can be clearly 
explained using principles of game theory.  Axelrod and Hamilton have written that  
“the ability to monitor cues for the likelihood of continued interaction is helpful 
as an indication of when reciprocal cooperation is or is not stable.  In particular, 
when the value of w falls below the threshold for stability…it will no longer pay 
to reciprocate the other’s cooperation...Both animals in a partnership would then 
be expected to become less cooperative...resulting in an incentive to defect so as 
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to take a one-time gain when the probability of future interaction becomes small 
enough” (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981: 1395).   
For pastoralists, the pattern described above is representative of what one would expect 
when moving from a non-zero sum game, where multiple strategies are utilised and 
participants’ gains and losses are aggregated, to a zero-sum game where competition 
results in the benefit of one group over another.  McAdam et al. (2001) highlight this 
point when describing Russian life under Gorbachev’s reforms where  
“Time horizons contracted rapidly.  On the large scale and the small, people 
could no longer count on payoffs from long-term investment in the existing 
system; they reoriented to short-term gains and exit strategies.” (Layton 2006: 
118)         
Clearly, whether or not two parties perceive a situation in which interactions will 
continue has a direct bearing on whether or not cooperation is a sustainable or favoured 
strategy.  In reality, there are three ways in which to conceptualise one’s future 
interactions with another group: 
1) I know we will continue to interact into the future for an indefinite period of 
time. 
2) I know that we will not continue to interact in the future. 
3) I do not know if we will interact in the future, but it’s possible. 
 
As already discussed, condition (1) will continue to promote cooperative strategies (i.e., 
TFT) where there is an emphasis placed on reciprocity.  For condition (2), the only 
stable strategy is one of complete defection (ALL D) in order to ensure optimality.  
Condition (3) is more nuanced in as much as the resulting behaviour depends on the 
likelihood that one places on the probability of interactions continuing into the future.  
Axelrod and Hamilton suggest that the factors affecting this reasoning are:  the average 
lifespan of individuals within the populations, their relative mobility, and the health of 
the individuals (1981).  Boyd (1992) continues on to say that when the expected number 
of interactions differs between individuals, selection tends to favour cautious strategies, 
which ultimately delays cooperation between two groups.  There is likely little debate 
that the economic, political, environmental, and social situation in northern Kenya is 
one of unpredictability and fluctuation.  Having a highly mobile herding population that 
diversifies herding locations depending on the vagaries of rainfall distribution and 
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international indices pointing to health standards well below average (UN 2005-2010 
World Population Prospects indicate the average life expectancy in Kenya at 54.1 years, 
well below the worldwide average of 67.2 years), it is conceivable that pastoralists in 
northern Kenya view the future within relatively “short” timespans.  In order to test this 
hypothesis, I asked a number of individuals (~25) the following question:  If I offered to 
give you 100 ksh (£0.80) today or 1000 ksh (£8) three months from now, which one 
would you take?  Without exception, all participants opted for the 100 ksh.  The reason 
being, 
“I do not know about tomorrow – I may die tomorrow.  You may never come 
back, and then that money means nothing to me.” (Borana, elder man, Malka 
Daka) 
For these communities, future unpredictability operates in two ways.  On the one hand, 
when benefits and prosperity are unknown, this situation favours reciprocal altruism and 
cooperative strategies in order to spread and effectively manage risk.  On the other hand, 
when an opportunity presents itself and is assured, an unpredictable environment can 
pressure individuals into, quite bluntly, “getting while the getting is good” with very 
little regard for the future.  In this case, the likelihood of future interactions (w) becomes 
eclipsed, and as suggested by Boyd, cooperative strategies can be delayed. 
 
8.3.2 Mechanisms Promoting Continued Cooperation 
The above discussion demonstrates that the Samburu / Rendille and Borana populations, 
displaying TFT and TFTT strategies respectively, have the potential for continued, 
cooperative interactions.  However, defection is an ever-present potential due to the 
effects of miscommunication, misrepresentation, opportunistic benefits of defection, 
and a reduction of the timescales in which pastoralists operate.  Given this reality, what 
lessons can game theory provide in attempting to favour conditions in which 
cooperative strategies are optimal?  Elinor Ostrom et al. in the book Rules, Games, and 
Common-Pool Resource Problems states that “The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a useful 
device for demonstrating the conflict between individual rationality and group 
rationality…when they cannot communicate and establish agreed-upon rules and 
strategies, and when no other authority has established and enforced effective rules, 
predictions of suboptimal use…are likely to be correct…individuals will defect on one 
another, and potential collective benefits will not be achieved” (Ostrom et al. 1994: 5).  
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Ostrom’s plan has three basic conditions that are necessary if defection is going to be 
limited:  1) communication, 2) establishing rules that are satisfactory to all parties, and 
3) enforcing established rules through the sanctioning of defectors.     
 
The primary step in trying to satisfy these three conditions is to first be able to 
accurately identify who exactly is involved.  Strategies can lean towards cooperation if 
either individual recognition is possible or if the number of potential partners that one 
interacts with is kept small (Maynard Smith 1982; Axelrod and Hamilton 1981).  
Knowing who is involved and the nature of their behaviour is absolutely crucial in 
monitoring outcomes and sanctioning defectors.  Second, although Ostrom never 
explicitly states that group homogeneity is necessary for establishing rules that are 
collectively agreed upon, she does say that all involved members need to have similar 
views and values if viable rules are to be effectively maintained (Ostrom et al. 1994).   
For pastoralists in northern Kenya, the reality of their current situation can cause 
difficulties when trying to adhere to the above principles for maintaining cooperative 
interactions between groups.  First of all, it is not always apparent who is involved in a 
particular interaction.  As previously stated in this chapter, due to physical similarities, 
Rendille can easily be mistaken for Samburu or Borana for Somali.  Even within each 
of these populations, due to the constant shift of individuals over the land, interior 
populations responsible for a theft incident, for instance, can easily be mistaken for a 
border population located close to the site of the theft.  Defectors’ tactics are numerous 
and varied, for instance, disguising themselves as different ethnic groups, walking 
stolen animals through the territory of another ethnic group or clan, “stashing” animals 
in the bush until tensions are calmed, and “laundering” animals through the use of 
corrupt businessmen who can sell stolen animals at distant markets, just to name a few.  
Accurate identification in this instance is not as straightforward as it may first appear.   
Second, accurate and reliable communication is not always possible during inter-ethnic 
interactions.  There is almost no linguistic overlap between these three groups, and the 
medium of communication is predominantly through mother tongue.  Communication 
in this instance needs to rely on a limited number of individuals who can express 
themselves equally well in Swahili.  In this regard, spontaneous or more informal 
communication between group members can be challenging.  Even when the medium of 
language does not provide any obstacles, there is the secondary issue of 
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miscommunication when information is transmitted and potentially mutated as it goes 
from one individual to the next, which will have unforeseen repercussions. 
Third, group members (between groups and within groups) are not always 
homogeneous in their views, desires, and values on which rules and adherence to rules 
are constructed.  For instance within populations, group elders and youths may have 
different views about expected behaviour during interactions with neighbouring 
communities.  When herders go to the border during extended dry periods, the elders 
from both sides have to negotiate the peace agreements: 
“During drought, Samburu go to the border and have meetings with the Borana 
to ask that they maintain peace because they need grazing...Samburu leaders are 
told by moran that they are approaching the boundary, and the Samburu elders 
call the peace meeting.” (Samburu, elder woman, Sereolipi) 
However, the efficacy of these peace meetings is often times called into question by 
community members, with many complaining that while the peace meetings are going 
on and the elders are negotiating peace and grazing agreements, the youth can be 
concurrently engaged in small stealing, thus undermining the elders’ efforts.  Clearly, 
the desires of one sub-group are not completely in-line with those of another, which can 
hamper effective communication and group decision-making.   
 
Finally, Maynard Smith made the point that even between groups capable of 
communication, agreeing on viable rules of interaction, and with effective punishments 
in place for defectors, these conditions still do not guarantee stability or cooperative 
behaviours amongst participants.  He argued that without punishment for individuals 
who are tasked with enforcing the rules of the game, individuals would likely accept the 
benefits of the contract and try to avoid the costs of enforcing it (Maynard Smith 1982).  
In this regard, enforcement can be delegated to a third party, who may be rewarded for 
effectively punishing defectors.       
 
In northern Kenya, pastoral elders may be wary of punishing offenders for stock thefts 
despite agreeing that defectors should be punished.  A number of the respected men 
from these communities told me during interviews that they did not want their youth to 
be punished if they were complicit in a raid because the authorities would either 
incarcerate them, or the loss from the theft would be over-reported to the authorities by 
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the offended ethnic group, which would result in an over-appropriation of stock that 
would need to be paid back to the aggrieved community.  Police authorities in northern 
Kenya are notorious for their heavy-handed tactics.  In fact, in March 2009, many 
innocent Samburu families living in the Archer’s Post region had their livestock 
populations decimated when the Kenyan government launched a retributive measure 
against this community for previous, notably small-scale, offenses against the 
neighbouring Merian, Borana, and Garre.  Accounts taken from both the Samburu and 
the Borana describe the government action as unjust, using lethal force against unarmed 
individuals, helicopters to round-up stock, and indiscriminate punishments.  The results 
were devastating not only to the Samburu livelihood, but in fact it helped to fuel 
already-present tensions between the Samburu and Borana.   
 
In relation to the above situation, Axelrod and Keohane (1985) stressed that “when 
sanctioning problems are severe, cooperation is in danger of collapsing.  One way to 
bolster [cooperation] is to restructure the situation so that sanctioning becomes more 
feasible” (1985: 236).  In moving forward, Elinor Ostrom et al. warn that rules and 
regulations coming from the outside can be highly dangerous as they may not be 
sensitive to the needs or understanding of the groups being governed, resulting in 
suboptimal adherence and benefit (Ostrom et al. 1994).  Paul Spencer notes that this 
was precisely the predicament that resulted from the establishment of the King’s 
African Rifles to patrol the northern frontier on a permanent basis from 1921.  He states 
that “the principle criticism is that [the Samburu elders] did not actively help the British 
to bring murderers to (British) justice; a justice that was as cold-blooded and inhuman 
in Samburu eyes as inter-tribal murders were to the British” (Spencer 1973: 162).  Quite 
correctly, Paul Spencer goes on to make the point that as the colonial period advanced, 
the British government assisted in monitoring and managing borders, however penalties 
for any wrong-doings were more effectively dealt with when following ‘tribal law’ 
governed by the community elders and based on local value systems.  Spencer notes 
that during his fieldwork, any interventions he witnessed that were taken by the elders 
as a punitive measure were done so “to restore peace rather than to prolong the feud” 
(1973: 100). 
As one Borana woman explained during the drought, 
“[The elders] were in Archers Post and held peace meetings and decided that for 
every 1 cow stolen, 5 would be repaid.  This was the agreement made between 
244 
 
the Borana and Samburu.  That was decided on in March 2010, but it has not 
been implemented.” (Borana, elder woman, Malka Daka) 
Again, a well-established punitive system for handling any wrong-doings between the 
communities is already in place and agreed upon as legitimate action by both sides.  
However, adherence to enforcing the punishment is severely lacking.  Throughout the 
duration of my fieldwork, I was never aware of any payments made between two groups 
for stock thefts or in payment of injuries / deaths, thus leaving an unpaid debt between 
communities that needed to be rectified by other, more violent, means.        
 
At first appearance, the rules that Ostrom et al. (1994) present (communication, 
establishing agreed-upon rules, and punishment for defectors) seem well-constructed 
and applicable.  However, there is one key ingredient that ultimately helps to decide the 
viability of such application:  simplicity.  Ostrom herself alludes to this point when she 
says, “If the interests of the individuals involved are relatively symmetric, face-to-face 
communication is possible, and the situation is relatively simple, we expect individuals 
to select rules that are: a) already known to them; 2) easy to learn, follow, and monitor; 
3) likely to reduce the complexity of the situation; and 4) perceived as likely to improve 
joint outcomes” (1994: 323); however, “Field settings are so wrapped up in complexity 
and uncertainty that satisfactory rules-in-use are a significant achievement, regardless of 
whether such individuals can actually achieve the optimal solution…the common pool 
resource problems faced in many field settings – characterized by resources that lack 
stationarity and storage – are particularly difficult for participants, observers, 
government officials, or anyone else to solve” (1994: 325). 
 
Putting aside its ethnic diversity for a moment, northern Kenya presents an enormous 
challenge in managing complexity.  It is an area characterised by a constant state of flux:  
socially, environmentally, politically, and developmentally.  With this in mind, there 
could be a case made that in order to move forward, it may be necessary to work 
backwards, with simplicity being the necessary condition from which to initiate change.   
The current relationship between the Samburu / Rendille and Borana should not be 
looked upon with pessimism and hopelessness.  In fact, these communities have 
demonstrated their willingness to engage in cooperative relationships despite the 
presence of factors that threaten the establishment and maintenance of cooperation.  
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Unlike the Yanomamö described by Jürg Helbling (1999) as a population “trapped in a 
form of the prisoner’s dilemma that discourages the development of reciprocal altruism” 
(108) which helps to create “a social environment that favours aggressive individuals” 
(111), these three pastoral populations have negotiated a social system that, in fact, 
seeks to balance aggressive and cooperative tactics in a sustainable manner, thus 
limiting excessively aggressive interactions.  This last point will be discussed further in 
section 8.6.1 of this chapter, but the discussion here reinforces the principle that both 
conflict and cooperation are potentials within the human toolkit, and these three pastoral 
populations are no exception to this idea.  Furthermore, as the following discussion will 
demonstrate, these potentials are simply that – they are not etched in stone, dooming 
individuals to a fate beyond their control.  Inter-ethnic relationships are flexible and 
responsive to relevant conditions; relationships that can be changed over relatively short 
timescales.  Maynard Smith (1982) already recognised this point when he said that the 
vehicle for the spread of cooperation throughout a population is not necessarily genetics, 
as we can neither be innately cooperative nor aggressive, nor through individual 
learning, as this would be an entirely inefficient process, but instead he favours cultural 
inheritance, where copying successful mentors can spread cooperative behaviour 
patterns rapidly across a population.  The following discussions illustrate the spread and 
maintenance of cooperative behaviours between disparate ethnic groups in northern 
Kenya.      
8.4 The Borana and Somali Relationship 
Chapter three discusses the relationship between the Somali and Borana at the 
establishment of an independent Kenya and the punishment that was dealt almost 
exclusively onto the Borana communities of northern Kenya.  After a period of relative 
separation between the two ethnic groups as a result of the Daba and fleeing of the 
Somali from northern Kenya, the two groups once again came together within Borana 
territory due to apparent resource scarcity in Somali during the late 1970s and early 
1980s.  Many of the Borana that I interviewed stated that the Somali land is known to 
be an intense hardship area suffering from a severe lack of rainfall and ever-increasing 
aridity.  All of my Borana informants concurred that from independence until today, the 
Borana have never asked permission to graze or share resources within Somali areas to 
the north and east of the Borana territory.  Instead, it is the Somali who seek refuge 
amongst the pasturelands of the Borana, to which the Borana have always granted them 
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entrance.  However, this arrangement has certainly not been without its problems.  
According to the Borana, starting in the late 1980s and continuing into the early 1990s, 
the Somali clans living amongst the Borana went from a peaceful arrangement, to some 
isolated skirmishes, into a full-scale assault on the resident Borana population over a 
relatively short period of time.  The reason that many Borana claim for this change in 
relationship is that the Somali realised the potential of the land in Kenya, where their 
homeland offered them very little, and for their superior strength as gun owners, they 
saw an opportunity to take the land for themselves and for their animals rather than 
sharing it with the Borana.  One elder Borana man describes the relationship during this 
time: 
“The Somali came into Borana land looking for pasture, and the Borana allowed 
them to stay...the Somali had guns and the Borana feared them...The Somali 
came for Borana livestock and killed the people to try to chase them away from 
their land.  This was [happening] all over Borana land – even in the interior, not 
just the border.  Up until 1990, this continued until the Borana went to Ethiopia 
to acquire guns, which brought about the major Borana-Somali war in Ewaso 
from 1990 to 1993.  The Borana defeated the Somali, chasing them to Togi...The 
Somali were defeated although they had experience because of the Borana’s 
long-term grievance so it was do or die for the Borana.  The Somali came here to 
Borana land because Somali land is barren – no pasture or water and there are 
too many people and livestock.  It is still like this now – that’s why the Somali 
are here.  Somali have an enterprising and adaptable spirit because the Somali 
are connected to the government in Somalia.  Due to the hardship in their 
homeland, they have to enterprise.  They get guns easily from the government in 
Somalia and easily move the small arms as there are no regulations over gun 
merchants.” (Borana, elder man, Mata Arba) 
After the war ended in 1993 and the Somali were pushed back to their home territories, 
the two ethnic groups remained separated for a few years; however, in about 1996 the 
Somali again asked permission to graze on Borana lands due to the hardships 
experienced within their areas, and again, the Borana granted them permission.  The 
most often cited reason for the Somali’s forgiveness is one of a common religion, 
“The Somali have been forgiven for stealing where the Samburu have not 
because the Somali are Muslims and they pray together for peace and so they are 
forgiven, but Samburu are not Muslims.” (Borana, elder woman, Malka Daka) 
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In a relatively short time the relationship between the Borana and Somali as described 
above has transitioned radically from cooperative to competitive strategies and back 
again to one of cooperation.  From an outside perspective, the metamorphosis of this 
relationship can appear perplexing.  How can two groups apparently “revolutionise” the 
nature of their interactions, not once but twice within the course of one generation?  
Aguilar (1996) notes the importance of the Waso Borana’s diversification of religious 
and cultural practices in helping to ensure prosperity – adopting Islam during the 
colonial period, due to increased Somali influence, and reinvesting in traditional Oromo 
practices in the post-Daba period, thus reaffirming ethnic affiliation with their northern 
brothers.  From this understanding, it is possible that Waso Borana social flexibility 
may allow for the relatively rapid behavioural transitions that characterise the Borana-
Somali relationship in northern Kenya. 
 
Looking to game theory to help answer this question, we can first examine the transition 
from cooperation in the 1970s / 1980s to one of conflict in the 1980s / 1990s.  One 
apparent explanation for this transition is that both groups were exhibiting an 
unconditional cooperative strategy (ALL C) towards one another.  As previously 
discussed, unconditional cooperation allows for the intrusion of defectors into the 
population, who will thrive within the opportunity that presents itself in an ALL C 
environment.  Once defection is established, the ALL D strategy is extremely stable.  
Having established a defector strategy, and having the firepower to defend such a 
strategy, the Somali were in a position to continue benefitting from their relationship 
with the Borana.  However, there are two conditions which ultimately changed the 
nature of this relationship and put an end to the antagonistic relationship.  The first was 
establishing a marked asymmetry between the two groups.  As Maynard Smith explains, 
“If some difference exists between two contestants, and if this difference can be 
perceived by the contestants then the perceived asymmetry will typically be used as a 
cue to settle the contest.  Most pairwise contests are likely to be asymmetric in this 
sense” (Maynard Smith 1982: 76).  As alluded to above by the Borana elder from Mata 
Arba, the Borana aligned with the Ethiopian Oromo and acquired guns from them to 
increase their power over the Somali.  In this instance, the Borana relied on their wider 
Oromo identity with the Ethiopian Borana (Baxter 1994) for assistance and increased 
weaponry, furthered by the contentious relationship that has historically existed between 
the Ethiopian Borana and Somalis over land and water rights in Ethiopia (Bassi 1997).  
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Furthermore, the quote makes reference to ‘a do or die’ situation for the Borana where 
other interviewees have supported this claim that the war against the Somali was an all-
out effort on the part of the Borana as defeat for them would have meant the loss of their 
homeland.  The increased firepower and “die-hard” attitude of the Borana helped to 
over-power the Somali where the upper-hand clearly rested with the Borana.  This 
asymmetric relationship between the two sides led to the second condition in that for the 
Somali, the costs of defection now grew too great to be offset by any benefits of 
defection.  Classic game theory suggests that when the costs of injury increase to the 
point that they exceed any expected rewards, then neither an ALL D or an ALL C 
strategy are ESSs (Maynard Smith 1982).   
 
From this scenario, it can be argued that the initial instigation of conflict by the Somali 
towards the Borana was also a result of an asymmetry (i.e., the Somali having superior 
firepower).  Manson and Wrangham (1991) note that even for animals, differences in 
group sizes, competitive advantages, body size, etc. are taken into consideration when 
deciding whether or not to enter into aggressive interactions with conspecifics.  Once 
advantages are assessed, the additional requirement for entering into a fight is that for 
the instigator, the benefits of defection outweigh its costs.  The following figure 
demonstrates how these two groups can modulate between competitive and cooperative 
strategies: 
 
Figure 8.2:  Diagram demonstrating how two groups can modulate between competitive and cooperative 
strategies based on an assessment of perceived differences between the two groups 
 
 
From the figure above, we can see that when pronounced asymmetry with the costs of 
the contest outweighing the benefits forces the game to be settled, this does not 
necessarily signal a return to cooperative strategies.  Instead, it is simply the end of the 
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game.  As in the case of the Somali and the Borana, the end of the game would have 
come when the Somali were chased back into their home territories (i.e., were defeated) 
and the two sides spent a number of years with relatively little interaction.  In order to 
re-establish cooperative relationships, the remaining necessary ingredient is one of trust 
based on prior knowledge of how a partner is likely to behave during interactions.  
When the Somali returned to the Borana for a second time in 1996 to ask for the 
opportunity to graze within their area once more, based on prior experience, it could be 
assumed that the Borana would decline the Somali’s request.  However, the two forces 
that were working at re-establishing relationships between the groups were that of 
reciprocal altruism (i.e., the Borana may need the Somali at some point in the future) 
and also that the shared religion between the Somali and Borana was a motivating factor 
reinforcing trust between the two sides as the Borana viewed themselves as “all 
Muslims” and therefore “all brothers.” 
 
Reciprocity between the two sides has been maintained now for approximately 15 years; 
as Boehm (1992) notes, such a stable state can be maintained and protected between 
two groups when power remains balanced between them.  However, as witnessed 
during my fieldwork, there are growing tensions between the Somali and the Borana 
due to a number of factors which cannot be fully discussed here but include complaints 
of political favour, resource monopolisation, increased refugee populations from 
Somalia, disparity in gun ownership, and exclusive trade networks, to name a few.   
As one Borana woman living in a mixed Borana – Somali community described to me,  
“For the Somali that are here, I don’t think they should be here.  The best thing 
to do is for the Borana to fight them and push them out.  The argument of some 
is that the Somali bring trade here so a faction of Borana, generally the leaders, 
doesn’t want them out.  I have given up on the government and elders because 
they are corrupt and bribed by the Somali with animals and money so they are 
doing nothing.  The only thing to do is fight them to get them out.  The problems 
that the Somali bring now are they want to fight the Borana, even over use of 
shallows wells in Darer Shai, using up the best water and pasture…If the matter 
went to a vote, I feel most people would want the Somali to leave Borana 
land…I think the current relationship with the Somali will degenerate because 
the Somali don’t want peace with us.” (Borana, elder woman, Darer Shai) 
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This was the general feeling that I recorded amongst the Borana as to the current state of 
affairs with the Somali.  For the time being, the ‘marriage of convenience,’ as one 
woman called it, is holding, but this does not appear to be a permanent agreement.  One 
way of strengthening this relationship over the long-term would be for the Borana and 
Somali to inter-marry, thus establishing bonds of kinship; however, through my 
interviews, I recorded only two marriages.  The future of this relationship is as yet 
unknown.  However, in assessing the history of these two ethnic groups using game 
theory applications, what becomes apparent is the dynamic nature of these relationships 
and how strategies can shift depending on perceived asymmetries and changes in pay-
off matrices.  The following discussion will examine the nature of relatively “stable” 
cooperative relationships as seen between the Samburu and Rendille. 
8.5 The Samburu and Rendille Relationship 
The nature of the relationship between the Samburu and the Rendille has been 
beautifully described by Paul Spencer in his 1973 book Nomads in Alliance, where he 
shows two populations, of disparate origins, coming together into a mutually-beneficial 
symbiotic relationship born out of a dynamic environment prone to periods of 
unpredictability and hardship.  The Rendille, claiming ethnic origins akin to the Somali 
due to their linguistic similarities, and the Samburu, as Maa-speakers closely linked to 
the southern Maasai populations, have not always been in complete allegiance with one 
another.  Chanler, one of the earliest European travellers to northern Kenya in the 
second half of the 19
th
 century, notes that these two ethnic groups were once deadly 
enemies; however, both Spencer and I have not recorded any Samburu nor Rendille 
who can recall having heard of such a time.  Instead, both sides comment that they are 
‘one people just like brothers.’  As such, the predominant strategy that has developed 
between the two is one of mutual cooperation without a need for retaliatory behaviour 
(ALL C).  This poses the question:  how did unconditional cooperation initially emerge 
between these two groups, and how has it been maintained for more than 100 years?   
 
Although historical accounts taken from early travellers in the pre-colonial period are 
few, and often times contradictory, most detail a social environment in the north which 
was highly pressurised by competing factions.  Donald Smith talks about a great 
reduction in the populations of both the Samburu and Rendille by the Borana in 1888, 
which followed a devastating smallpox epidemic (Smith 1897).  By 1893, Chanler 
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(1896) describes the Samburu as ‘impoverished’ and in need of rebuilding both their 
human and livestock populations while Arkell-Hardwick (1903) notes that the Rendille 
were suffering greatly at the turn of the century from the effects of disease, constant 
raiding, and a drastic reduction in the number of young males within their population.  
Spencer notes around this time, the Samburu and Rendille “turned their attention to 
their more traditional enemies (the Boran) and coped with the Turkana as best they 
could” (Spencer 1973: 153).  Although not explicitly stated by Spencer, it is plausible, 
given the pressures on their populations and continued aggressive tactics used by 
neighbouring ethnic groups, that the Samburu and Rendille came to see themselves as 
having a common future and that benefits could be shifted in their favour if they 
enhanced cooperative strategies between them.  This alliance was aided by the fact that 
there was, and still is, little ecological overlap between their two territories.  The 
Samburu region is cooler with low-lying vegetation and grasses, which are more 
suitable for grazing cows and mixed small stock, whereas the Rendille inhabit desert-
like areas to the north, with vegetation and a landscape suitable for rearing camels.  
With two livelihoods based on two separate strategies, there was little competitive 
pressure between these two groups for acquiring the others’ land or animals.  What 
grew from this situation was a strong stock friendship where “for countless generations, 
Samburu have claimed certain rights in Rendille camels and Rendille have claimed 
certain rights in Samburu cattle” (Spencer 1973: 142).  On the back of this stock 
friendship, these ties were greatly enhanced through marriage exchange between the 
Samburu and Rendille which helped to cross-cut any ethnic boundaries.  Spencer 
continues to say that “with every marriage and every individual migration, these [stock] 
rights are fully exercised and the claims are made good” (Spencer 1973: 142).   
 
In the 300+ individual incidents that I recorded, none of the Samburu ever reported any 
amount of stock theft or aggressive actions taken by the Rendille towards them.  In fact, 
raising this question during interviews often solicited a laugh from the participant as 
these communities refer to themselves as ‘one people.’  However, when conducting the 
same exercise within an exclusively Rendille area, the response was quite different.  
Although Rendille communities acknowledged that they are still ‘one people’ due to 
clan ties with Samburu families, both formal interviews and informal conversations 
highlighted a significant amount of small stealing by the Samburu towards the Rendille 
(although the reverse was never recorded by either group).  Arkell-Hardwick 
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acknowledges this phenomenon when he writes that fortunes had changed by 1900 as 
the Samburu had emerged from the disasters of the 1890s as the more dominant ethnic 
group and “were perfectly willing to protect the Rendili, but in return they considered 
that they ought to be allowed the right to help themselves from the Rendili flocks 
whenever they felt so disposed; and to do them justice they fully acted up to this idea 
without fear of reprisals.”  Arkell-Hardwick continues, “It seemed to me a very peculiar 
state of affairs.  The two tribes lived together; yet the Burkeneji [Samburu] constantly 
raided the Rendili, and though the Rendili did not seem to like it, they never openly 
resented the depredations” (Arkell-Harwick 1903: 241).  
 
Although full-scale raiding between the two is kept “in-check” due to extensive 
marriage ties and stock friendships, the presence of any amount of theft between the two, 
particularly being one-sided, is perplexing.  As noted earlier in this chapter, 
unconditional cooperative strategies are simply easy targets for the intrusion of 
defectors to take advantage of opportunistic interactions.  Small defections such as 
minor 1 – 1 stealing are likely in this scenario.  However, if the likelihood exists for the 
Samburu to take advantage of an unconditionally cooperative Rendille population, then 
it stands to reason that the Rendille could likewise do the same.  Why then is this not the 
case? 
 
Again, the answer to this question can be furthered by looking at the effects of 
asymmetrical games on a competition.  Robert Boyd has worked extensively on 
assessing the effects of changes to pay-off matrices and variations between players on 
the utilisation of competitive and cooperative strategies during games.  He explains that 
“for a given cost, it is likely that the benefit that results from aid by a subordinate to a 
dominant is less than the benefit that results from aid from a dominant to a 
subordinate…it still may be evolutionarily stable for the dominant to cooperate only 
infrequently, and in return the subordinate cooperates at every opportunity.  In this way 
the dominant can receive sufficient benefit to compensate it for its cooperation” (Boyd 
1992: 479).  A mutually-beneficial alliance had been established between the two by 
1900; however, the Samburu were clearly the stronger of the two groups, which by all 
accounts has remained so until today.  The Kenyan census report taken in 1962 during 
Spencer’s fieldwork states that there were 8,000 Rendille proper as opposed to 50,000 
Samburu.  One of the reasons for this disparity in population stems from the practice of 
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impoverished Rendille men migrating with small stock into Samburu areas, and 
likewise due to delayed, monogamous marriage practices amongst the Rendille, the 
excess of marriageable Rendille women found greater benefit marrying into 
polygamous Samburu households (see Spencer 1973 for further details regarding 
population dynamics).  The results of the 2009 Kenyan national census show 
increasingly greater numbers of Samburu in comparison to the Rendille.  The analysis 
here, based on Boyd’s work, asserts that periodic defection on the part of the dominant 
group (the Samburu) is to off-set the comparatively high cost of cooperation relative to 
minimal benefits received.  Likewise, the subordinate group (the Rendille) cooperates 
unconditionally as even with defection, the benefits of cooperation exceed the relatively 
minor costs of cooperation.  
  
For both groups, total defection is not advisable as conflict between the two would 
drastically alter the cost to benefit ratio of defection.  For the Rendille, out-right conflict 
with the Samburu would result in the cost of defection out-weighing the benefits of 
defection for a number of reasons.  Primarily as discussed above, it is likely that the 
Rendille are too small a population to wage an adequate war against the Samburu.  
Second, regardless of victory or defeat against the Samburu, disbanding such an alliance 
would subsequently leave them vulnerable to increased attacks from hostile neighbours, 
such as the Borana.  For the Samburu, unconditional defection towards the Rendille 
would also lead to reduced benefits and increased costs.  The Rendille have proven 
themselves time and again to be valued allies of the Samburu when engaging in conflict 
with other ethnic groups.  Furthermore, stock friendships with the Rendille have 
allowed for greater diversification of livestock ownership and management for the 
Samburu.  Finally if Samburu victory were achieved, monopolising Rendille land and 
animals would provide only a minor benefit to the Samburu as: 1) Samburu animals, 
particularly cows, are not accustomed and adapted to living in the aridity of the Rendille 
territory, and 2) the Samburu are not “camel specialists” where the intricacies of camel 
rearing are left to their northern brothers.  Without proper management, camels can be 
highly unproductive and labour-intensive to manage.     
  
A report taken by Spencer illustrates how conflicts are carefully managed between these 
two groups when he writes of an incident in 1959, 
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“when the Samburu elders demanded a stricter enforcement of their boundary 
with the Rendille…provoked by a government employed Rendille who had 
reported some Samburu trespassers to the Marsabit authorities.  This had led to a 
confiscation of the trespassers’ cattle.  It was in retaliation for this that the 
Samburu elders asked their administration in Maralal to withdraw all grazing 
concessions to the Rendille and to confiscate any trespassing camels…once the 
Samburu had expressed their outrage at this unnecessary betrayal of confidence 
by a Rendille…they quickly returned to a normal relationship with the Rendille 
in the border area.  This was no doubt made more easy by the Rendille, who 
carefully took no part in trying to provoke the situation any further.  On the 
contrary, at a local level they conferred with the Samburu to restore harmony, 
and among themselves they took action against the government employee.” 
(Spencer 1973: 194)   
Minor skirmishes between these two groups may occur periodically; however, the 
relationship is a stable one, assisted by a system of checks and balances that 
acknowledges relative power relations and is reinforced by cross-cutting marriage ties 
and stock alliances. 
8.6 Is Conflict Adaptive? 
The above assessment regarding factors influencing cooperative and competitive 
strategies between these three populations leads to a broader discussion of whether 
conflict, as it functions within pastoral societies, is itself adaptive.  Initially, this 
question can be interpreted as:  does conflict and the use of aggressive tactics by one 
ethnic group towards another increase the reproductive fitness of the aggressive party?   
 
There are a number of studies that have addressed this question where data show that 
reproductive success can be partially determined by social dominance in modern human 
populations (Jokela and Keltikangas-Jarvinen 2009).  Perhaps one of the more famous 
studies of this kind, Napoleon Chagnon concluded that men who had killed other men 
had higher reproductive fitness than non-killers in Yanomamö communities (Chagnon 
1988).  However, there has been some controversy surrounding Chagnon’s work, with it 
being called into question as highly biased, politically motivated, and even that 
Chagnon’s intrusive methods helped to ignite some of the inter-community conflicts 
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that he recorded (Tierney 2000; AAA 2002).  To a less extreme degree, a number of 
authors have demonstrated that aggressive interactions may likely be adaptive when 
done to protect kin (Queller and Strassman 2002; Smith 1964) or in order to increase 
influence of one’s social kin over others, which may increase mating potential 
(Ferguson and Beaver 2009).      
 
For north Kenyan pastoralists, at present this question is theoretical as no such empirical 
data exist on which to test this hypothesis.  For livestock, it can be argued that the 
presence of conflict amongst these groups helps to push animals into new territories, 
which requires them to have a suite of adaptations for survival, thus increasing the 
genetic diversity of the population.  Furthermore, as demonstrated amongst animal 
populations (Carlson 2009) fitness can be increased through warfare in that the 
strongest individuals have a greater likelihood of survival and victory in battle, may 
gain greater access to women, and therefore pass on aggressive, robust genes at a 
greater rate than their weaker and less successful compatriots.  However, for pastoralists 
there is an argument to be made that increased influx of lethal weapons is changing the 
nature of aggressive competition within these communities.  It is likely that victory, or 
even entry into the competition, is not necessarily influenced by the strength of the 
individual, but rather, by the strength of the individual’s weapon.   
 
My fieldwork made no concerted attempts at recording and analysing the number of 
conflicts that the elder men had engaged in during their youth and the subsequent 
number of wives or children that they maintained.  To do so with any degree of 
accuracy would require an increased longitudinal study beyond the scope of this 
research.  Anecdotally, I recall with some amusement, when talking with an elder 
Samburu man in the Laresoro region about the benefits of conflict, he replied, “Raiding!  
How do you think I paid for all of these wives you see!”  In truth, the man had six wives 
and 29 surviving children.  Although this is an interesting observation, it is nothing 
more than an observation upon which no emphatic conclusions may be drawn.   
 
Given the limitations of the data collection and a relatively scant number of conclusive 
publications taken from human populations on the subject of conflict and reproductive 
fitness, this question may be somewhat misguided or, in fact, not the most important 
question to be asking.  In moving forward, I would like to ask instead how or in which 
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ways can conflict as it operates within these communities be beneficial?  This question 
challenges the conceptualisation of human aggression as wholly negative where much 
of the focus is placed on the harm that conflict brings to ‘victims’ rather than 
understanding how its existence has inherent benefits.  War, as defined by Paul Sillitoe, 
is “a relationship of mutual hostility between two groups where both try by armed force 
to secure some gain at the other’s expense” (Sillitoe 1978: 252).  I have already 
highlighted in chapter two the pitfalls and problems associated with producing a totally 
inclusive definition of human conflict; however, Sillitoe’s concept of warfare and our 
problematic definitions of conflict, aggression, and violence heavily focus on the nature 
of a relationship that pits A against B rather than exploring the ways in which 
aggression helps to shape the relationships between A and B, and in some cases it can 
be argued, for the better.  Bohannan (1983) stresses this point that as humans initiate 
warfare, they are also involved in the process of making peace.  To turn this idea further 
on its head, as previously discussed, cooperation itself can be a costly affair depending 
on the situation of the parties involved.  In speaking with pastoralists facing abject 
poverty at the end of the 2009 drought, there were few individuals more aware of the 
costs of passivity.    
“Stealing is good...because you have lost many through starvation and disease so 
you need to restock.  You don’t wait because you need to get them back 
immediately if you have nothing – you cannot wait.” (Rendille, moran, Unesco 
Ririma)     
            
8.6.1 The ‘Limited War’ Theory and Extreme Violence 
If the argument is made that conflict can be beneficial, we must seek to understand how 
and under what conditions this position holds true.  A number of authors (Ferguson and 
Beaver 2009; Ferguson 2008; Smith 2007; Hawley and Vaughn 2003) have argued that 
human aggression benefits individuals, and to some extent populations, as long as it 
does not violate one specific rule:  it must be moderate.  Simply, the virulence of 
aggressive acts needs to be restrained to a level at which the benefits of aggression 
continue to outweigh the risks of aggression (Ferguson and Beaver 2009).  For these 
authors, successful employment of aggressive acts lies in the individual’s ability to 
accurately assess costs and benefits, and when conditions arise where costs outweigh 
benefits, the individual has a great enough capacity for the self-control required to 
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inhibit aggressive acts.  Therefore, adaptability lies in an individual striking the correct 
balance between utilising aggressive tactics and restraining violent behaviour.   
Although I agree with the general findings of these studies, a criticism I have of this 
body of work is that the examples used by the authors when describing beneficial 
aggressive acts (standing up for one’s beliefs, sports participation, active pursuit of 
education, career success, etc.) may be interpreted more as ‘assertiveness’ rather than 
aggression.  This distinction is a subjective one; however, when compared with the 
types of conflict witnessed in pastoral populations, these studies are not necessarily 
appropriate analogies.        
 
Perhaps more appropriate to the discussion, in 1973 Maynard Smith and Price published 
their seminal work “The Logic of Animal Conflict,” providing a game theory model 
which helps to prove that “limited war” strategies within mixed populations are more 
evolutionarily stable than “total war” strategies.  Their argument is that animals, and by 
extension humans, have benefited from the evolution of conventional fighting methods 
which help to limit injurious fighting, as such degrees of violence would “militate 
against the survival of the species” (Maynard Smith and Price 1973: 15).  Briefly, 
Maynard Smith and Price ran a series of simulations between five different strategies:  1) 
the Hawk, playing ALL D and representing the “total war” strategy, followed by the 
four “limited war” strategies: 2) the Mouse, playing ALL C; and 3) the Bully, defecting 
on the first move, then playing opposite to the opponent’s previous move; 4) the 
Retaliator, playing a TFT strategy; and 5) the Prober-Retaliator, playing a PAVLOV 
strategy (see chapter two for details).  In pairing these strategies through repeated 
interactions, the results showed which strategies within a population comprised 
primarily of individuals having the same strategy were the most profitable (ESS).  For 
example, for Hawk to be an ESS, it would need to be the most profitable strategy in a 
population comprised mostly of Hawks and be uninvadable by other strategies found 
within the population.  Maynard Smith and Price’s results showed that the Retaliator 
was the only ESS in a mixed population, with the Prober-Retaliator approaching an ESS 
(depending on the percentage of Mouse in the rest of the population).  Both of these 
strategies are limited war strategies.  In fact, Hawk as the total war strategy, performed 
the worst in comparison to all five strategies, which was attributed to the high cost of 
injury resulting from engaging in repeated aggressive interactions.  Silverberg and Gray 
(1992) echo this finding when they suggest that violence is limited during inter-specific 
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interactions simply due to the high costs levied on the group or individuals when overtly 
aggressive tactics are utilised.  In this case, the use of extreme violence shifts the payoff 
between groups into a situation where the costs of battle outweigh both the short and 
long-term benefits, therefore making extreme violence undesirable from an evolutionary 
perspective.  Ferguson and Beaver (2009) argue that the presence of extremely violent 
individuals in the population is controlled by the extent to which they are 
‘reproductively advantageous’ and are therefore comparatively uncommon.  In light of 
Maynard Smith and Price’s simulations, the Hawk is not advantageous in a population 
comprised mostly of Hawks because of the likelihood of engaging in violent conflict 
with high costs; however, extreme violence can be profitable when applied to some very 
limited situations (i.e., against Mouse or Bully).   
 
Likewise, in pastoral populations, extreme violence is also limited where the vast 
majority of conflict interactions are small scale stealing and acts of retaliation.  Spencer 
commented in 1973 that Samburu conflicts tended to be “small semi-organized 
skirmishes rather than highly organized attacks.  Traditionally the tribe was not 
organized for carrying out large-scale raids,” and he goes on to say that “one effect of 
this seems to be that the Samburu did not suffer heavy casualties as a result of any 
specific raid” (Spencer 1973: 96).  Boehme (1986) supports this idea that inter-group 
feuding rather than full-scale warfare is the likely result when populations are in close 
proximity to one another and are trying to avert all-out disasters that could result from 
intensive fighting.  The progression of conflict between pastoral groups can be 
classified as an escalating relationship rather than a binary distinction of non-aggression 
to full-scale warfare.  Related to discussions presented in the previous chapter regarding 
types of conflict, Maynard Smith and Price (1973) note that even species possessing 
‘dangerous weaponry,’ such as the felid claws, are able to limit physical aggression.  
The authors argue that there is a mechanism for incremental probing between 
contestants that gradually increases aggressive tactics with a look to carefully balancing 
costs (injuries) while striving to achieve benefits.  After a series of escalations, the 
previous description of the conflict that took place between the Somali and Borana is an 
example of warfare being limited only to isolated, selective situations.  When discussing 
conflict events with north Kenyan pastoralists, the ‘big wars’ as described by research 
participants can be named, as in “Gan Dul Koore,” meaning the ‘Year of the Borana-
Samburu War.’  The purpose of these wars, as described by the people, is ‘to finish’ the 
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other side that has been causing problems so that peaceful / tolerable relations can 
resume. 
 
Interestingly from Maynard Smith and Price’s results, Mouse was also outperformed in 
its own group (comprised mostly of Mouse individuals) by every other strategy due to 
the advantages taken by the Hawks, Bullies, Retaliators and Prober-Retaliators.  The 
Mouse strategy not only unconditionally cooperates with opponents, but more 
importantly, it flees at the initiation of defection by the opponent.  In reality, this 
strategy within a mixed population bears extremely high costs to the Mouse as fleeing 
can translate into loss of territory, loss of access to vital resources, loss of access to 
mates, etc.  Ultimately, a wholly cooperative strategy is also unsustainable given a 
mixed population.          
 
In light of a game theory approach, it can be argued that the use of conflict strategies 
amongst pastoralists appears to satisfy most of the requirements for an evolutionarily 
stable limited war strategy without violating the factors controlling for extreme 
violence.  Chapter nine will discuss in greater detail the values and conditions that may 
arise in creating an environment conducive to the use of aggressive acts.  What should 
be kept in mind, as discussed in chapter seven, is the role of moderate behaviour in 
restraining some of the motivations in the complex web of causal factors that lead to 
violent outcomes.  In recording conflict incident reports, these data do not reflect the 
more numerous incidents stemming from perceived threats or violent reputations, 
arguably the lowest form of aggressive acts, which have the prosocial effect of keeping 
disparate groups separate from one another and therefore preventing any actual fighting 
from taking place.  The counsel of the elders, venerated within the community for their 
moderate ideology, consistently seeks to guide the younger generation of herders, who 
are potentially lacking in the honed skills required for impulse control, on the non-
antagonistic behaviours expected of them whilst interacting with neighbouring ethnic 
groups along the borders.  Generations of cross-cutting marriage ties and the need to 
employ reciprocal altruistic behaviours continually help to dampen the flames of any 
potentially incendiary relationships.  Conflicts, when they do occur, are escalatory 
rather than full-blown warfare, helping to ensure that benefits are achieved with only 
incremental costs.  If limited war strategies are beneficial and pastoral populations have 
evolved to adopt such an approach, chapter nine will address how resilient these 
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systems are given increasing disturbances, such as extensive drought conditions, lapses 
in security measures, and increases in gun ownership.  The field on which these ‘games’ 
are being played has been changing drastically in the post-colonial period.  The final 
chapter of this thesis will examine whether or not such adaptive strategies can be 
maintained under the pressures imposed by these changes.   
8.7 Limitations of Theory and Scope for Future 
Research 
In closing, game theory provides an extremely useful framework for potentially taking 
the discussion beyond the obvious in analysing the utility of strategies employed 
between human populations, particularly without the need to wage judgement on the 
associated behaviours.  However, as a model, there are inherent limitations when trying 
to apply it to empirical settings.  Not only are real conflicts vastly more complex than 
any of the models discussed in this chapter, but the models themselves suffer from a 
tremendous amount of variation when their complexities are increased.  Maynard Smith, 
in his ground-breaking 1982 work on game theory, readily acknowledges that 
determining evolutionarily stable strategies is contingent on a number of factors, 
including the location of the contest or spacing between territories (Maynard Smith 
1982).  Robert Boyd (1992) continues this work to see the effects of variation between 
the nature of the games played, between the players involved, and fluctuations on the 
pay-off structures on the evolutionary stability of different strategies participants utilise.  
This analysis led Boyd to conclude that “the nature of the strategies that support 
cooperation may vary widely from one context to another.  Even the seemingly innocent 
introduction of variation in costs and benefits among interactions leads to a dizzying 
variety of outcomes” (486).  Furthermore, game theory only operates and explains 
evolutionary traits as they function within equilibrium states.  However, the real world 
is prone to perturbations and both continuous and step-wise changes.  Chapter nine will 
discuss the relevance of these disturbances in assessing the resilience of pastoral 
systems in a contemporary context.  Moreover, further research in this area necessitates 
the construction of models that are directly applicable and relevant to observations 
obtained in the field.  To this end and relative to north Kenyan pastoralists, I would 
endeavour to conduct simulations that adjusted pay-off matrices combining elements of 
both the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Hawk-Dove, taking into consideration both low-
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level and escalated interactions and making adjustments for the likelihood of injury 
accordingly in each.    
 
A second, and potentially the strongest, criticism of the game theory approach is that it 
does very little to take into consideration who is interacting, what are their motivations 
for doing so, and what is the nature of their interaction.  The argument here is that these 
factors are likely to influence the outcome of the “games” – even whether or not the 
actors elect to interact in the first place and to what end.  Youths likely engage in 
conflicts for different reasons to those of elders – reasons that may address particular 
desires or offer solutions to their particular problems (Lee and Johnson 1992).  Likewise, 
some empirical tests have shown that there is a pronounced gender bias in game playing 
where females, depending on the social context, score significantly higher than males in 
their use of cooperative acts during contests (Kummerli et al. 2007; Simpson 2003; 
Ledyard 1995; Sell et al. 1993).  How social cues are read and interpreted, how values 
are assessed for outcomes, where motivations are developed, etc. are very much 
contingent on the identities of the interacting individuals.  Respected scholars such as 
Bourdieu, Giddens, and Schlee have voiced their criticisms of a game theory approach 
in understanding human conflict for its apparent ambivalence towards sociological 
considerations, assessing human interactions as though they are ‘culture free.’  This 
criticism is valid, and one that, I believe, most researchers working on game theory 
models would acknowledge.  However, it bears repeating that models are simply that.  
To expect a complete explanation of human behaviour based on modelling is misguided 
and unrealistic.  Instead, models help to make the complex simple, and that is their 
greatest asset.  To begin to understand the complexities of human cooperation and 
conflict, game theory is a useful framework for making sense of the vast array of human 
potentialities.      
          
Finally, the apparent ‘objectivity’ of the models also needs to be called into question as 
they themselves require a certain amount of interpretation in their design.  Maynard 
Smith states that “a major difficulty in applying game theory to human conflicts lies in 
the need to place a numerical value, or ‘utility’ on the preferences the players place on 
the possible outcomes.  How for example does one put the utilities of financial reward 
and of injury or death on the same numerical scale?...In human conflicts, strategies are 
chosen by reason to maximize the satisfaction of human desires” (Maynard Smith 1974: 
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212).  When assessing costs and benefits in a real-world situation, how can one begin to 
assess numerical values for apparent losses and gains?  In applying principles of game 
theory to practicalities, one is forced into thinking about, for instance, how many stolen 
goats are necessary to outweigh the inherent costs of being significantly injured during a 
raid?  When faced with the reality of the situation, the question seems, at best, absurd.  
We can never actually directly come to answer a question like this one, regardless of the 
precision of the models.  Game theory is one lens amongst many through which to 
examine the question of the role of conflict amongst pastoral populations.  
Acknowledging the weaknesses of this approach clearly demands the need for a more 
in-depth discussion of human values, desires, motivations, and concerns, which will be 
addressed in the following chapter.    
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Chapter 9: Adaptation and Resilience 
9.1 Introduction 
Semi-arid and arid areas in East Africa make up 70% of the total land area (Little 1996), 
and many reports suggest that the climate in these areas will continue to see greater 
variability both within and between seasons (Christensen et al. 2007, McSweeney et al. 
2007).  In northern Kenya, pastoral reports suggest that this phenomenon is on the 
increase locally, as one Samburu chief reports,  
“In terms of predicting the rains, it used to be easier to predict the weather.  
People used to accurately predict it.  They could also predict the intervals 
between the droughts, and now the droughts seem to follow each other.  
Previously, the interval between the droughts was a period of about 10 years.  
Now it’s about every 5 years, and it keeps decreasing.” (Samburu, elder male, 
Remote)   
 
In light of apparently escalating unpredictability, pastoralists in northern Kenya display 
a vast range of coping mechanisms and strategies that are responsive and flexible in 
managing periods of resource scarcity.  However, Adger et al. (2007) draw attention to 
the need to evaluate societies at multiple scales in order to gain a more accurate 
understanding of the influences and potential constraints being placed on coping 
strategies, which can inform an assessment of their current efficacy.  My data analysis 
revealed four distinct influences affecting the coping strategies of north Kenyan 
pastoralists today:  environmental changes, development initiatives, political influences, 
and conflict.  My data showed that each of these factors has a marked effect on all of the 
six pastoralist coping strategies discussed in chapter two (mobility, herd accumulation, 
herd diversification, social networks, livelihood diversification, and market access) that 
are employed by the groups that I interviewed in the field.  However, within the scope 
of this chapter, there is not ample room in which to discuss at length the effects of the 
four identified influences on the six different coping strategies.  Instead, I would like to 
identify one coping strategy, where I provide an in-depth discussion exploring how each 
of the four influences is having an effect.  I further aim to highlight one particular 
influence and demonstrate the ways in which it affects each of the six coping 
mechanisms.  To the first aim, mobility as a coping strategy was most often discussed 
amongst research participants, which provided me with a rich source of data.  The IPCC 
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reinforces this point in its 2007 report on climate change when stating that “Mobility 
remains the most important pastoralist adaptation to spatial and temporal variations in 
rainfall” (Parry et al. 2007: 5.4.7).  To the latter aim, although environmental concerns 
weighed heavily on people’s minds during the 2009 – 2010 field season, the 
repercussions of conflict were pervasive and left lasting impressions within the 
collective conscience over a number of generations.  Gray et al. (2003) had similar 
findings with their research on the Karimojong of north eastern Uganda when they 
reported that “[d]uring the year-long field season, a modern form of cattle raiding with 
automatic weapons…appeared to be the chief impediment to established adaptive 
behavioral responses of Karimojong pastoralists to environmental stress” (S3).   
9.2 Mobility in Northern Kenya 
Colonial administrative records kept for northern Kenya from the early to mid-20
th
 
century indicate that colonial officers delimited tribal territories, demarcated and 
patrolled border areas, and required individuals to apply for an official leave notice if 
they should wish to visit a territory where they were not a member (e.g., PC/NFD/1/9/1; 
PC/NFD/1/2/5).  During this time, should drought befall a particular territory, the 
affected pastoral communities would have to apply to the colonial administration for 
grazing permits that would temporarily allow them to move their animals into a nearby 
territory where resources were more available.  With the departure of the colonial 
government in 1963, pastoral movement became less restricted with people utilising all 
open access land, removing colonial herd stocking quotas, and reducing security 
measures along border areas.  In conducting interviews with numerous individuals 
across all three ethnic groups, there were two principles that I came to understand as 
forming the bedrock of ‘ideal’ pastoral movement.  Primarily, mobility remains closely 
connected to the concept of communal ownership of rangelands which, as I have 
discussed, is necessary in unpredictable, risk-prone areas in order to keep migration 
options open by allowing free movement of people across the landscape.  One Samburu 
man explained to me: 
 “Access to the community area is open to all from anywhere…we can’t let 
others die so it is open to all.” (Samburu, elder male, Sereolipi)   
 
This quote refers to migration within the same ethnic group; however, as previously 
discussed, this form of reciprocity is also applied to inter-ethnic relations during times 
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of resource stress when permissions are granted for groups to share resources across 
borders. 
 
Second, I was able during fieldwork to record the migration histories of people from 
their birth to the present.  Furthermore, I recorded in detail their patterns of migration in 
the context of the 2009 drought, from the time that the animals first left home until the 
time that they returned home, which for some was a period that spanned almost two 
years.  What I found interesting in recording these detailed, recent migrations was that 
people may move from one area to another only to return a number of weeks or months 
later to the same area.  I wondered why the herd would migrate when apparently there 
was still grazing available, as this seemed like unnecessarily movement.  However, 
people explained that they continually sought out the “best” pasture and water for their 
animals.  This qualifier referred to a myriad of conditions, such as resource abundance, 
availability, intensity, temperature, salinity, nutrition, palatability, diseases present, 
security, terrain, wind, etc. – in fact, too many to discuss here.  A general expression 
that I heard time and again that helped to simplify these matters was “Pastoralists follow 
the rain.”  I came to understand that herders were not satisfied to stay in one area and 
exhaust the pasture if there was more “suitable” pasture and water to be accessed 
elsewhere.  Therefore, herds could return to an area more than once in a given season if 
it was found to be the most satisfactory grazing land, by their standards, at that moment.  
In continuing the discussion on influences affecting pastoral mobility, it is important to 
keep in mind these two principles:   open access to resources and the desirability to 
move into the “best” pastures, as described above, were the two over-riding aspects that 
formulated my understanding of migration amongst research participants in the field.   
  
9.2.1 Development Initiatives and Mobility 
Through interviews conducted in the field, it is clear that development initiatives are 
having a profound impact on mobility patterns for north Kenyan pastoralists.  Local 
reports from government agency workers have pointed out that food rations have been 
regularly distributed to the people of northern Kenya since the 1984 drought, which 
affected most of the northern territories.  At that time, President Moi set up the National 
Famine Relief Fund to manage the procurement of ration funds and a nation-wide 
distribution policy.  However, at the end of the 1984 drought, food rationing continued 
in northern Kenya, which was considered to be a chronically food-insecure region.  In 
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recent years, the largest donors of food aid to this region have been the WHO and 
USAID, supporting roughly 3.8 million Kenyans as of February 2010 (USAID 2010), 
representing approximately 10% of Kenya’s national population.  A food distribution 
programme spanning more than 25 years and providing for such a large number of 
people has come with its administrative difficulties in ensuring that assistance reaches 
the most vulnerable people, for whom it is intended.  Local people explained to me that 
in order to facilitate adequate and proportional distribution of food aid across the region, 
recipients must be registered as residents belonging to a corresponding division, which 
will be the only location from which they can claim food rations.  Unfortunately, when 
food rations are most needed (i.e., when drought is at its most severe), this corresponds 
to a time when livestock will need to range and graze further from home territories in 
search of suitable pasture and water.  Therefore, food ration as a support system is in 
direct conflict with the need for people to freely move over the land, as one Samburu 
man from the Lolmisigiyioi region of Samburu Central District demonstrated when he 
said: 
“Ration is coming now about once a month, however we are registered to 
Maralal Division, my wife is sick, our donkeys have died from the drought, so I 
have to leave my animals to journey back here as there is no one else to take the 
food to the children.” (Samburu, elder male, Lolmisigiyioi)  
 
Quite clearly, this man is restricted in terms of how far he may travel with his livestock 
in search of pasture as it is necessary for him to return to his registered area so that he 
may regularly claim his family’s food ration.   
 
Sinking boreholes and digging earth dams are development practices designed with the 
intention of opening up areas of land that may have sufficient grazing available yet 
suffer from insufficient water supplies.  During my time in the field, I saw a number of 
new boreholes being opened by agency officials where no permanent water sources had 
existed previously.  Before these boreholes or dams became available, the people 
grazing in these areas could rely on two types of water sources mainly:  either seasonal 
water sources (sandy ephemeral streams, rock catchments, etc.) that flow only during 
the long and short rains (March – May and November – December, respectively), or 
moving to more substantial water sources (secondary rivers, water pans, etc.) outside of 
these timeframes until the point where supplies were diminished, thus necessitating 
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subsequent movement to more productive sources.  Many people spoke about the need 
to move away from seasonal or unproductive water sources in order to allow for the 
regeneration of surrounding vegetation and fodder species.  Depending on the rainfall 
patterns, the land could be unused for a period of six months or more without 
interference from grazing livestock.  However, borehole and earth dam construction has 
led to an over-concentration of people and livestock in a given area due to the year-
round availability of water, which can have devastating impacts.  I witnessed such 
effects of over-crowding whilst visiting an earth dam in the Girissa area of Isiolo 
District, which receives 3500+ heads of livestock per day, as represented in Figure 9.1. 
 
Figure 9.1:  Girissa earth dam, Borana area, receiving more than 3500 livestock each day 
 
 
While in the Girissa area, two Borana elders shared stories with me of their fathers, who 
in their time as herders used the Girissa area for grazing before the earth dam was dug.  
They recalled that it was once a vital dry season grazing area where water flowed down 
into a small natural catchment that could often times support them through a portion of 
the long dry season.  However, now people are staying for much longer and at even 
higher densities.  With continuous grazing, the land is becoming dry with no plants or 
grass growing close to the dam (Girissa, February 2010).  Other people whom I spoke to 
around the dam informed me that the lack of vegetation close to the dam due to the 
effects of trampling and over-grazing requires them to range further between the 
pastureland and the water source.  I saw this with my field assistant walking daily to the 
earth dam from our camp, which was a distance of 3.2km.  The land over this stretch 
lacked any vegetation and was extremely dusty, also having no larger shrubs or trees to 
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provide shade.  For animals in transit to or from the dam, there was no vegetation for 
them to feed on, meaning that their movement in pursuit of the water source was not 
optimally efficient.   
 
Currently, the Kenyan government is soliciting development assistance from 
international organisations to sink additional boreholes and earth dams as a way to 
alleviate water insecurity in the north.  I was told by a number of district officers and 
district livestock managers that the boreholes are intended to open up tracts of unusable 
grazing land by providing a sufficient water supply, and the design of these programmes 
recommends that boreholes should be turned off during the wet season when water is 
found distributed throughout a territory.  In design, this appears practical; however, the 
reality of the situation can be vastly different.  For all of the boreholes that I visited 
(~26), none of them had been switched off since their construction, and they continued 
to support a human population throughout the year.  Studies have also shown that 
boreholes and reservoirs used only in the driest months support higher livestock 
biomass than water sources that are exploited year-round or that are spread over a larger 
area (rather than one terminal), which reduce livestock biomass (Boone, BurnSilver and 
Thornton 2006).   
 
Finally, mobility has been affected greatly in the north due to government development 
schemes and various INGOs aimed at promoting childhood education to pastoralists.  
Development funds are being used to build schools and create awareness programmes 
encouraging parents to bring their children to school instead of herding animals.  The 
majority of locations that I visited during my fieldwork had at least a nursery school 
(semi-permanent structure or natural structure) for children between the ages of two and 
six that hosts a feeding programme and provides some preliminary education, although 
options for education beyond these ages are still in short supply within the remote 
northern territories.  Despite this, the government has promoted education as the 
panacea to save northern Kenya, bringing with it the promise of prosperity and further 
development initiatives.  Accepting this claim, many women and children are settling in 
areas surrounding nursery or primary schools so that their families can have access to 
the free education provided by the government.  However, in the majority of cases, 
there is very little additional support (i.e., shops, markets, health clinics, water, etc.).  
Therefore, the herders (usually male family members) must remain grazing their 
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livestock in pastureland close enough to the women and children to provide them 
regularly with milk and other animal products for their basic subsistence.  From the 
populations that I sampled, livestock needed to remain within no more than a six hour 
walking radius to the women and children in order to supply them with enough animal 
products for use every other day.  This migration restriction presents another challenge 
to herders, who are charged with the task of searching for adequate pasture and water 
for livestock, but within a circumscribed range acceptable to their dependent families.  
Balancing these needs is proving to be a serious challenge, as not all objectives are met 
with equal efficacy.  
 
Government education campaigns have been so successful in northern Kenya that the 
unintended outcomes are having profound effects.  In speaking with a 70 year old 
Borana woman in Mata Arba village in Isiolo District, she said that she had remained 
entirely in the Mata Arba settlement for approximately seven years whereas before, she 
used to regularly follow her herd, receiving meat and milk from her animals.  When 
asked why she no longer migrates with the herd, which is now kept close to Mata Arba, 
she said it was because a school had been established in Mata Arba, which meant that 
she needed to be close to it for the sake of education.  When she was asked whether she 
had children, grandchildren, or any other children for whom she was responsible 
enrolled or previously enrolled in the school, she said that she had none.  When 
questioned about this seeming contradiction, she did not understand the relevance and 
simply stated that:  
“Education is important.  The school is here.” (Borana, elder female, Mata Arba) 
 
Although confusing, this was not a sentiment confined to this woman alone as many of 
my interviews demonstrated the desire people had to engage with the schools and 
increase education in the area regardless of whether they would directly benefit from the 
education programmes through their own children or not.    
 
Development initiatives such as these are undoubtedly altering the way that people 
move over the land and the amount of access they have to all available grazing areas.  
Gray et al. (2003) also highlight this problem, stressing that “[b]y reducing the mobility 
of people and herds in response to environmental stress, these initiatives promoted 
overgrazing and undermined local strategies that facilitated recovery of the rangelands 
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during the intervals between droughts” (S5) among the Karimojong.  What remains to 
be seen is whether these apparent restrictions can provide some greater long-term 
benefit or whether pastoralists making use of such development programmes are truly 
putting themselves at increased risk.   
 
9.2.2 Environmental Change and Mobility 
Environmental changes are a second factor altering pastoralists’ access to land and 
unrestricted mobility in northern Kenya.  Moving herds to make best use of resources 
requires landscapes to be highly variable and spatially heterogeneous in climate, rainfall 
distribution, seasonality, and fodder abundance.  Traditionally, herders established long 
distance social networks amongst kin groups and stock friendships in order to be able to 
move animals over various landscapes and successfully employ their strategy of 
“following the rain.”  However, research participants voiced a growing concern over 
increased covariate risk of drought within northern Kenya, where drought is being 
experienced by more people, over a greater area and at the same time.  This 
phenomenon homogenises the land that is available to grazing herds, which curtails 
mobility options (Parry 2007).  Time and again while speaking to pastoralists and 
asking why they had not moved out of their rainy season ranges during the 2009 
drought, people answered that there was no benefit to moving animals over vast 
distances when alternative areas provided little improved productivity.  A Samburu 
elder from Lenchokut summarised these feelings when he said: 
“The drought has cleared everything and has equalised everyone.  There is 
nowhere else to go.  Our problems are all the same so I may as well stay here 
and face the drought.” (Samburu, elder male, Lenchokut)         
 
In this case, the grass is not ‘greener on the other side’ and therefore, there is no 
discernible advantage in moving livestock towards different grazing areas or in search 
of alternative water sources.  Alternatively, herd owners try to make the best use of the 
land around them in the hope that the drought will eventually break before livestock 
losses become catastrophic. 
 
As discussed in chapter two, this example of increased covariate environmental risk 
highlights the interrelatedness of different coping strategies.  Primarily, herd mobility is 
affected in this situation, but as alluded to above, social networks also become 
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contracted as the benefits of sending animals to distant places are diminished.  As one 
Samburu elder notes, due to droughts like the one experienced in 2008 / 2009, stock 
exchanges like paran, or borrowing animals from alliances when one is left destitute, 
are diminishing in efficacy:   
“If someone loses all of their animals in a drought, when the rains come, they 
can restock through paran.  However, now everyone is in the same situation so 
no one can help.  If I had to ask for paran, I have uncles in Marsabit…but 
Marsabit is just as bad as here in terms of drought so they couldn’t really help 
me though.  In the 1984 drought or previous droughts, there were regional 
differences where some good places were still left within the district so it was 
not a uniform disaster.” (Samburu, elder male, Remote)   
 
Research conducted by the Dyson-Hudsons (1999) and McCabe (1990) reinforce this 
point that strategies such as mobility and social networks depend on differential fitness 
within the family network in order for them to be effective.   
 
Another point raised in chapter two that has relevance to the following discussion is the 
manner in which risks affect the coping strategies of members of pastoral societies in 
different ways, depending on age, gender, economics, etc.  During my fieldwork, I 
found this to be the case when assessing environmental hazards on mobility, particularly 
in relation to women.  When I questioned many of the local women in the midst of the 
2009 drought as to why they were not moving with their animals to find better pasture 
and water, a large proportion of women responded that it was because their donkeys had 
died from malnutrition.  At the time, I didn’t fully appreciate the real significance of this 
response until I spent time with these women and saw how much donkeys are relied 
upon for their ability to carry household items, water, food, milk, roofing or covering 
for the houses, and elderly or infirm family members during migrations.  I was told that 
for an average family having 6 – 7 children, the transport requirements would be 
roughly 4 or 5 donkeys.  Most families that I spoke to were left without any donkeys or 
at most two donkeys by the time the drought broke in October 2009.  To transport the 
household by any other means would prove to be almost impossible due to the high 
labour demands (particularly on the women) from the vast distances that would need to 
be covered by the livestock in order to reach adequate grazing land.  Interestingly, the 
death of donkeys, and the subsequent loss of transport, has a large gender element.  
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Donkeys are seen by north Kenyan pastoralists as the least valuable livestock because: 1) 
for most ethnic groups they are not a source of meat, 2) they do not produce drinking 
milk, and 3) for these three pastoral groups, they are not generally bought or sold at 
markets.  Donkeys are used solely by the women for transport and are often referred to 
as “women’s animals.”  Due to their low status and the correspondingly low status of 
pastoral women, donkeys are not cared for in the same way as small stock, camels or 
cows, which benefit from managed grazing, facilitated watering, constant vigilance, 
corralling, protection from wildlife, and controlling for diseases.  Donkeys are left to 
wander, find water and grazing where they may, and they are often vulnerable to getting 
lost or being eaten by predators.  Many women noted that the loss of donkeys had a 
profound effect on the ability for families to move more frequently and at greater ranges 
to seek out resource-rich areas: 
“I didn’t move in this drought because I don’t have donkeys to use.  If in the 
drought, I was given 10 donkeys, then I would have moved my children with our 
animals because they are our food.” (Rendille, elder female, Farakaren) 
 
9.2.3 Political Influence and Mobility 
Political influences were a third factor identified in interviews affecting the way that 
pastoralists in northern Kenya utilise land and their ability to make use of communal 
areas.  In speaking with local elders, I came to understand that since independence, they 
have felt that politicians in northern Kenya have played only a minor role and have had 
relatively little influence on their lives.  However, this opinion is recently changing, as 
informants are now citing ‘politics’ as one of the crucial aspects affecting their lifestyles, 
mainly due to increased political power of northern politicians within the presidential 
cabinet.  Resulting from the post-election violence that erupted in 2007 due to alleged 
vote fixing, civic measures have been taken to ensure that elections are just, transparent, 
systematic, and are executed in a well-designed manner.  As such, voters need to be 
registered as residents of a specific location.  It is also quite difficult for a politician to 
garner the support of his constituency if the composition of that constituency changes 
on a seasonal basis.  Therefore, informants feel that northern district politicians are 
benefitting from having an increasingly sedentarised population in order to build 
support amongst their constituents.  Furthermore, they complain that politicians are 
accepting high numbers of refugees from Somalia, Ethiopia, or Sudan who are allowed 
to settle within their territories in exchange for political support.  For these reasons, they 
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feel that politicians are supporting policies and development schemes that favour a more 
sedentary population, such as the construction of boreholes, permanent schools, and 
healthcare facilities.   
 
Some pastoralists see exploitation of resources by ‘outsiders’ becoming a serious 
consequence of these policies, with more people entering northern Kenya’s borders, 
thereby further increasing competition for land and resources.  A Borana woman from 
Malka Daka town in Garba Tula District explained to me that thousands of Somali were 
allowed to cross into Borana territory and settle by their MP Mohamed Kute, who is 
competing for re-election in 2012.  As she explained, Kute is actively seeking the 
support of Somali migrants, who will be granted voting permission as residents of 
northern Kenya by this time.  In the meantime, she feels her own family is having 
difficulties finding adequate grazing land due to the increased competition from large 
Somali camel herds (Borana, elder female, Malka Daka).         
 
9.2.4 Effects of Sedentarisation 
Whether due to development initiatives, environmental concerns or political 
manoeuvring, pastoralists in northern Kenya are undoubtedly becoming increasingly 
sedentarised.  Although settling in areas with the ability to access aid and public 
services can be quite alluring (Fratkin 1992), increased sedentarisation can have a 
profound negative effect on pastoralists’ overall productivity, social welfare, and basic 
subsistence strategies, particularly for poorer members of society.  Primarily, increased 
sedentarisation will likely decrease overall animal numbers as livestock will be forced 
to graze in sub-prime land or will graze in higher concentrations within circumscribed 
areas, furthering the potential to degrade pastoral landscapes (Solomon, Snyman and 
Smit 2007).  Second, a rising influx of people settling into towns and more urbanised 
areas, such as Isiolo and Wamba, has also resulted in a growing problem of 
cosmopolitanism that local leaders have yet to address.  As members of disparate ethnic 
groups increasingly live in closer proximity to one another, leaders in these areas have 
not considered nor made efforts to design a plan for successful integration.  The lack of 
integration has often times led to continuously high conflict levels as people remain 
settled near towns.  However in more mobile populations, conflict can be diminished as 
there are dispersal options available to reduce the escalation of isolated conflict 
incidents. 
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Finally, as populations settle and reduce their reliance on livestock, they are faced with 
the need to develop alternative income sources.  The Kenyan government, along with a 
variety of international development organisations, has encouraged pastoralists in 
northern Kenya to irrigate and farm the surrounding landscapes as a viable alternative to 
herding animals.  However, from information gathered about farming schemes during 
interviews, this recommendation conflicts with the conventional knowledge of 
optimising the productivity of arid and semi-arid ecosystems.  Farming in this area 
requires intensive irrigation at seemingly unrealistic levels, where water is already 
scarce, even in comparatively wet years.  Furthermore, when moving into towns, the 
reality of these densely-populated areas is a high rate of joblessness as there is little 
infrastructure in place to support a large influx of people into them.  Townships often 
require intense use of resources and persistent water and food aid to be distributed to the 
occupants.  With few alternatives available, informants report that settled populations in 
towns may engage in low-value and potentially damaging alternative sources of income.  
Indicated from observations and discussions with pastoralists in the field, activities such 
as charcoal burning, wildlife poaching, illegal alcohol brewing, drug trade, prostitution, 
and livestock raiding are steadily increasing in these areas.  Permanent town settlement 
also places additional burdens on herders.  Town inhabitants do not allow for livestock 
to be kept within towns, and therefore animal products must be sent frequently to the 
families living there.  As I observed, particularly amongst Borana groups, who have 
higher rates of urban and peri-urban living than the Samburu and Rendille, families split 
between the ola (home in town) and arjal (home in the bush) tended to keep smaller 
herds than those who remained together in the arjal.  Furthermore, the herders of split 
family homes often complained that they needed to carry milk frequently and at a great 
distance to their family members in towns.  Box 9.1 below illustrates some other aspects 
of town life.      
 
Box 9.1:  Life in a Borana town, taken from Field notes, Ewaso region, August 2010 
At first, I thought that the daytime restrictions of Ramadan had taken their toll on the 
minds and bodies of this Borana town.  Or that Ab and I had been here for too long and 
by now we were just old news – so much so that people no longer rose from their mats 
to greet us as we entered their homes.  Daytimes took on the monotonous rhythm: 
mosque, sleep, mosque, relax, mosque, chat, mosque, nap, mosque, chat, sleep, repeat.  
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I missed the work of the arjal, the nightly chorus of animals at milking time, the 
morning sun pushing us out of bed, herding and weaving silently through the forest, 
heart pounding with the sight of elephants and crocodiles, leaving us to swap insults of 
cowardice with our fellow herders, and the nightly ritual of breaking fast together with 
a warm anjela under a transforming sky.   
Only a week in town, apparently here to see how ‘the other half live,’ and the apathy is 
contagious.  A substantial number of the inhabitants greet me in English; we have 
lengthy conversations on the short-comings of the British parliamentary system and 
ways in which the newly-created Kenyan constitution will revolutionise government 
corruption.  And yet the idle pace of this town is almost painful.  But tonight was 
different...there was something electric in the air, a palpable change as men moved 
from house to house, played games in the street, were found chatting lively in doorways, 
and whose eyes reflected some internal ignition as we walked down the street.   
“Abdy, what is this all about?”  Before he could answer, Hassan replied.  He was a 
reserved, deeply thoughtful herder who had left the arjal to accompany us to town 
where his family lived and only yesterday lamented, as did we, that he was missing the 
arjal life.  “Tonight the weekly miraa trucks coming from Meru pass through here on 
their way to Somalia.  We will all ware tonight.”  Chewing the green leaves of the 
miraa, producing an amphetamine-like stimulation, complemented the late night ‘ware’ 
sessions of chatting and sharing stories into the early morning.  Then in the distance, 
we heard the tell-tale low rumbling of a diesel engine, accompanied by the metallic 
grating of a cobbled gearbox, mashing and crunching its way towards the enlivened 
town.  The Bedford truck crabbed into the awaiting crowd, barely coming to a stop as it 
flung open its rear door, and the frenzy ensues.  Crumpled notes are handed back and 
forth, difficult to discern their origins, but somehow the small bags of bundled green 
leaves make their way to their rightful owner, and thus commences a long night of ware.  
Returning to my tent in view of the chief’s compound, I begin the nightly ritual of 
boiling water, peeling vegetables, making stock.  Our consistent dinnertime companions 
begin to trickle back to my cooking pot, their feet light and mouths stuffed with leafy 
green stems, but tonight there is no interest in cups of tea or bowls of rice soup.  It is 
only time for ware, and with the close of dinner and some late night jovial banter, I 
enter my tent, falling asleep as usual within minutes, however tonight to the excited 
cackles of the young men.   
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In the morning I wake, the sun’s heat pushing me out of bed at least an hour too soon.  I 
open my tent, but there’s no shout of good morning, no curious child to watch me brush 
my teeth, not even a misbehaving goat chewing at my guy ropes.  And again begins that 
monotonous rhythm that has been plaguing us all week.                  
9.3 Conflict Effects on Coping Mechanisms 
The discussion switches now to focus on how one particular influence affects the 
spectrum of coping mechanisms that pastoralists are known to employ in the face of 
resource scarcity.  A number of studies (e.g., Hendrickson, Armon and Mearns 1998; 
Pike n.d.) have pointed to persistent conflict playing a major role in numerous human 
crises of late.  The following discussions will focus on the role of conflict as it is 
affecting Borana, Samburu, and Rendille coping strategies in northern Kenya. 
 
9.3.1 Mobility and Conflict 
As previously discussed, when pastoralists ‘follow the rain’ to opportunistically exploit 
impermanent resources, there must be open access to all suitable grazing land as and 
when it becomes available.  In order to meet basic needs, pastoralists make use of 
unpopulated border areas, which are typically resource-rich, but contested (Morton 
2006).   As numerous respondents noted, with increasing pressure from drought and 
lack of secure grazing management in the borders, there is a breakdown in effectively 
using buffer zones that were once essential to pastoral dispersal strategies.  There ensues 
a struggle as drought pushes herds toward the resource-rich border areas, yet the threat 
of conflict repels them.  A decision must then be made to either face the potential 
consequences of drought or to take one’s chances in the borders.  As one Samburu man 
explains:  
“As long as the drought continues, and I hear of a place with insecurity due to 
humans, I will have to take my animals there.  I can protect my animals from the 
raiders, and if I have bad luck, then I will be killed… No one can kill the 
drought.” (Samburu, elder male, Lenchokut) 
 
This was even a dilemma written about by the colonial government in Kenya in 1931 
when discussing Turkana movements towards the Ethiopian border, with one officer 
writing: 
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 “They prefer to take the risk of raids from Abyssinia rather than the prospect of 
slow starvation in the country allotted to them, and none can blame them.” 
(DC/ISO/2/1/1: 5 – 6) 
 
But not all pastoralists’ feelings reflect the above two quotes, particularly amongst the 
women, who from interviews appear more risk-averse than men.  One Samburu woman 
explains: 
“The people are saying that the animals are dying [in the interior pasture], and 
they no longer have things to eat.  They are going to come back [home] because 
there is nowhere else to go.  People will come back here to certain poverty rather 
than risking elsewhere because other places are insecure.” (Samburu, elder 
woman, Remote) 
 
In this way, the threat of conflict restricts free pastoral mobility as it denies access to 
resource-rich areas, a phenomenon noted by several scholars (Smith, Barrett and Box 
2001; Lusigi 1981; Lamprey and Yusuf 1981).   
 
Furthermore, in order to exploit available border resources under the threat of conflict, 
herders described to me the practice of waiting until members of their community 
progressively moved from the interior towards the borders of one’s territory instead of 
dispersing over a range in order to exploit all possible resources at low densities.  In this 
way, migration is en masse, picking up comrades along the way in order to ensure that 
by the time the border is reached, settlements are fortified with high concentrations of 
people of the same ethnic group providing security for one another (Gray et al. 2003; 
Dyson-Hudson 2000).  Pastoralists commented that large herds moving into border 
areas often results in trampling of pastureland, wasting precious grazing and also 
contributing to soil erosion.  They were also concerned that increased herd 
concentrations graze out areas quickly, therefore greatly reducing the effective time that 
a dry season refuge can support the community.  As a result, mass migration towards 
the border due to the threat of conflict ultimately creates further resource insecurity 
through rapidly grazing out vital rangeland areas.   
   
Second, the threat of conflict differentially affects the unrestricted movement of large 
portions of society, particularly women, children, and the elderly.  Paul Spencer noted 
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that warfare was not a defining characteristic of the Samburu during colonial 
administration (Spencer 1965, 1973) and that migrations of the entire settlement would 
occur roughly every five weeks (Spencer 1973) in order to make use of available 
pastures and avoid over-grazing in concentrated areas.  One elderly Samburu woman 
reported to me that during this time, they were “addicted to moving” (Samburu, elder 
female, Remote).  With reported increases in resource scarcity, increasing the frequency 
of migration would appear to be beneficial in order to follow the herds in search of 
grazing and water sources; however, for vulnerable members of society, this option is 
not a viable one.  As one man notes:   
“If the drought worsens and the animals are living in a secure place, I would 
follow the animals with my family, but if the place was insecure, I wouldn't risk 
the small children.  It is a benefit to follow the cows because the children will 
have milk if there are calves.  There is no other deterrent to moving my family to 
follow the animals other than insecurity.” (Samburu, elder male, Lenchokut) 
 
The threat of conflict with neighbouring ethnic groups poses too much of a risk to move 
vulnerable family members) into contested grazing areas.  Instead, the responsibility of 
movement rests with the moran and young men who are acting as herders and 
protectors of the community’s assets.  Individuals reported that the complete separation 
of family members from the herd can last from a few months to more than a year, as 
seen in this most recent 2008 / 2009 drought in northern Kenya.  In this situation, family 
members are not receiving the economic and dietary benefits of their animals.   
 
Finally, the threat of inter-ethnic conflict in northern Kenya is limiting pastoral mobility 
by forcing herders into sub-prime grazing areas as the only available conflict-avoidance 
mechanism during times of resource scarcity.  These areas are characterised mainly by 
thick bush, which is typically avoided during prosperous years as they pose a number of 
associated dangers.  Primarily, these are regions with high concentrations of wildlife 
where the presence of elephants and buffalos pose a security threat to the human 
population moving into the area, and likewise the cheetah, leopards, lions, hyenas, and 
wild dogs present a significant risk to livestock.  Furthermore, pastoralists report that 
bushy or forested areas present hazards from vector-borne diseases transmitted from 
ticks and tsetse flies, which can wipe out livestock populations as effectively as drought 
or raiding.  In conducting livestock off-take surveys with these communities during the 
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2009 drought, I found that vector-borne diseases rank closely behind drought-induced 
starvation as a threat to livestock.  Spencer discusses these same issues for the Samburu 
during the colonial period when he writes, “As the dry season advances, the settlements 
converge on the water points closer and closer to the foothills of the mountainous 
districts (Ndotos and Matthews Range).  These parts are overgrazed and the thick bush 
adds risks from wild animals and tsetse fly.  As soon as the drought breaks, the 
settlements may disperse into less heavily grazed areas” (Spencer 1973: 24).  Migration 
that avoids inter-ethnic conflict may also require pastoralists to move into protected 
exclusionary zones, namely national parks, reserves, or conservancies that prohibit 
grazing in order to provide core conservation areas necessary to support local wildlife 
populations.  Faced with the dilemma of moving towards conflicted border zones or 
grazing illegally, many pastoralists choose to cross protected boundaries as a last resort 
when pasture and water are particularly limited.  During the 2008 / 2009 drought, 
respondents reported that they used conservancy areas such as West Gate, Namunyak, 
Sera, Bisanadi National Reserve, and Meru National Park.  However, illegal grazing in 
conservancy areas often resulted in harassment or brutalities carried out by park rangers, 
fines or bribes levied for illegal grazing, or ultimately confiscation of animals as a 
deterrent for entering protected areas.  When presented with few other viable options 
and in trying to avoid conflict with neighbouring ethnic groups, these populations are 
forced into moving animals into protected land during the night to graze illegally, 
increase camp movement in order to avoid detection by the park authorities, and 
ultimately live in a perpetual state of fear that animals may be confiscated or their own 
personal security threatened.        
 
As discussed in chapter five, conflict differentially affects the movement of north 
Kenyan pastoralists depending on one’s home area.  There is a marked difference in the 
timing of raiding intensity if living in the border or in the interior areas.  During 
interviews, I asked herders to name the areas where they tended to graze their animals 
during:  a) rainy seasons, b) short dry seasons, and c) prolonged dry seasons / drought.  
For individuals having home areas in the interior of their ethnic territories, their 
responses were extraordinarily similar.  In the rainy season, herders would remain in the 
interior around their home areas, returning to the homestead each night.  During short 
dry seasons, they would remain in the interior and return home each night, however as 
the dry season progressed, they may have to establish satellite camps that prevented 
them from coming home each night.  During the extended dry seasons into drought 
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periods, the vast majority of interior herders said that they would move into the border 
areas, remaining there until the rains came, when they could return to the safety of their 
home area.  However, a number of herders also said that they had never taken their 
herds into border areas during extended dry periods / droughts due to the threat of 
insecurity and therefore remained in the interior regions during this time.  For border 
populations, there was no clear migration pattern identified.  The most common 
responses from this group were as follows:     
 
Table 9.1:  Seasonal patterns of border population migration 
Options Rainy Season Short Dry Season Extended Dry Season / 
Drought 
1 Border Border Border 
2 Border Border Interior 
3 Interior Interior Border 
 
in comparison with the interior populations who displayed the following: 
 
Table 9.2:  Seasonal patterns of interior population migration 
Options Rainy Season Short Dry Season Extended Dry Season / 
Drought 
1 Interior Interior Border 
2 Interior Interior Interior 
 
As discussed in chapter five, the different patterns of migration between the two groups 
result from the border populations bearing an additional burden of insecurity in the 
rainy season as the overall population reduces in the border with the return of the 
interior population to their home areas.  This can be a precarious time for border 
populations, and therefore, they may move to the interior areas away from their homes 
during the rains in order to avoid possible conflict.    
 
9.3.2 Herd Accumulation / Diversification and Conflict 
As Spencer writes, “the Samburu argue that with large herds of cattle, they can afford to 
lose considerable numbers in a drought or an epidemic.  The drought of 1959 – 1961 
left the Samburu more convinced than ever that their reasons for over-stocking were 
281 
 
right” (Spencer 1965: 4).  Despite the benefit of accumulating herds as an insurance 
policy against drought losses, accumulation is only viable if herds are left to recover 
from stock loss or free to multiply without the disruptive influence of external factors.  
Conflict in the form of livestock raids has clearly been one of the most devastating and 
direct impacts on pastoralists’ ability to cope with environmental stress.  It can strip 
communities of their wealth, decimate livelihoods, reduce effective breeding stocks, 
ultimately resulting in further resource scarcity.  As one Borana woman explained: 
“My animals were taken at Kom along with many others.  Now that the rains 
have come, I am left with not even one cow to support my family.  What the 
drought didn’t take, the Samburu have so I would rather be secure in the town 
than re-grow my herd only to watch them be taken away again.” (Borana, elder 
female, Mata Arba)    
 
Lacking an insurance policy in the form of an accumulated herd means that the effects 
of drought are increasingly catastrophic, leaving people destitute with few remaining 
options available to successfully manage climatic events.   
Likewise, Samburu, Borana, and Rendille communities recognise that diversifying the 
composition of their herds between small stock, cattle, and camels means that they can 
exploit a far greater range of environments.  Herding with pastoralists is an incredibly 
rich participatory experience, and I was fortunate to witness a number of practices and 
hear views from the herders that dispelled some of the preconceptions that I had about 
livestock rearing while in the field.  Primarily, I was intrigued to find out that herds are 
not necessarily divided between browsers (camels and goats) and grazers (cows and 
sheep) according to their vegetation requirements, but instead they are divided primarily 
according to labour considerations.  Camels cover a much greater distance at faster 
speeds compared with goats, and cows also move further and quicker than sheep.  
Therefore, goats and sheep are kept together in one herd, camels left to browse in a 
separate herd, and cows graze in a third group.  Furthermore, after following multiple 
shoat herds, I came to find that sheep seem as likely to browse on bushes and trees as 
goats are to nibble at long grasses during herding.   
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Figure 9.2:  Goat grazing on grass and small shrubs, Garba Tula region 
 
I was also quite surprised to find that each type of animal seemed to thrive in one 
environment over another, where as an outsider, I first found it difficult to discern the 
subtle differences between the environments utilised by each type of herd.  When I 
would query the use of one waterhole over another or why certain available tracts of 
land were not being utilised, the responses would reflect attitudes like “too cold for 
goats,” or “too salty for cows,” or “too wet for camels.”  Under these ‘hardship’ 
conditions, livestock found in this part of the world can easily be classified as resilient 
creatures.  However, it was vital to see the importance of diversifying animal species in 
order to optimise the use of varying landscapes to their greatest benefit.     
  
Diversifying herd compositions also assists communities by allowing them to flexibly 
meet their fluctuating financial needs.  As one Borana woman explained, during periods 
of environmental hardship,  
“The animals we sell for upkeep are goats and sheep because they are like 
current accounts to use.” (Borana, elder female, Girissa),  
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whereas, to continue the analogy, cows or camels are more like savings accounts that 
should be protected as high-value assets during times of crisis that may be used to 
rebuild herds once the threat has ceased.  Ultimately, if one particular environment is 
affected more than others due to drought or the spread of disease, having a diversified 
herd means that die-off of one particular livestock species is undesirable, however not 
ultimately catastrophic to a family’s livelihood.      
 
Unfortunately, tension between ethnic groups is a significant obstacle to successfully 
diversifying herds to their greatest potential in northern Kenya.  Conflict and distrust 
among competing ethnic groups means that the beneficial transmission of goods, 
services, trade, and information between them is lacking.  As a district veterinary officer 
mentioned to me, livestock cross-breeding is extremely advantageous in order to ensure 
that animals are physiologically suited to bear the potential threats of these extreme 
northern environments.  For instance, herders reported that Borana cattle are particularly 
robust in surviving resource scarcity and combating pathogens in arid environments.  
Some Samburu and Rendille herders expressed their desire for greater access to these 
breeds in order to fortify their own stocks; however, trade with the Borana is non-
existent.  Therefore, acquiring these animals can only be achieved through force, which 
in turn further exacerbates tensions between these groups. 
 
Open transmission of goods and information between pastoral groups can also improve 
herd health and provide access to necessary veterinary medicines that may otherwise be 
unavailable.  Somali living in the North Eastern Province of Kenya and bordering 
Borana territories have a reputation for their adept camel-rearing abilities and their 
access to medicines that prevent fatal diseases within the species.  Due to the periodic 
wars between the Borana and the Somali, the Borana are only now fully realising the 
potential for keeping camels, favoured for their ability to produce large quantities of 
milk, act as effective transport, and most importantly, withstand severe drought 
conditions.  As one man says:   
“I have never owned camels, but I really want to so much.  I never converted my 
cows and small stock into camels because I didn’t know enough about camels.  I 
came to know about their benefits only recently, and I learnt this from the 
Somali.” (Borana, elder male, Malka Daka)   
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Currently, the Borana are in a state of relative, albeit uneasy, peace with the Somali; 
however, a history of tensions have left a lasting impression in the minds of the people 
where they are slow to trade or share knowledge regarding camel rearing, which can be 
fraught with problems for an untrained camel owner.  Conversely, where relationships 
are peaceful, as is the situation between Rendille and Samburu communities, stock and 
information about animal rearing practices can be easily transmitted where one group 
can rely on the ‘specialist knowledge’ of another group to take care of their animals.   
“[The cows] don’t stay around here because it doesn’t rain enough so they can’t 
stay.  For the Rendille, cows normally don’t come home because they produce a 
‘sigh’ when they sleep.  Rendille say that cows will blow away the 
camels…[Cows] need water always.  Cows need Samburu specialists to take 
care of them, not Rendille camel people.” (Rendille, elder male, Farakaren) 
 
From this quote, we can see that the Samburu and Rendille benefit greatly from their 
amicable relationship.  Multi-species herds can be kept and managed between the two 
ethnic groups.  Ultimately, diversification and expanding livestock herds are beneficial 
when managing environmental stress; however, persistent tensions impede knowledge 
exchange.   
 
9.3.3 Social Networks, Stock Alliances, Knowledge Transfer and 
Conflict 
Box 9.2 below illustrates the importance of social networks in managing herds 
effectively. 
 
Box 9.2:  Field note demonstrating how social networks inform herd management, Biliqi Dera, February 
2010 
After much deliberated discussion night after night around the gose campfire, our ola 
was to move, and by the end of the day, Hussein and I would be left alone in the dust to 
carry on mapping what has been our home for the last two weeks.  The two small 
Borana women begin the systematic deconstruction of their house, with hands swiftly 
guided by their memory.  By the time I’m scraping the last spoon of porridge from my 
bowl with the sun creeping over the horizon, the donkeys are being loaded:  weathered 
reed matting, battered metal sufria, carved damelas bursting with the morning’s camel 
milk are packed one by one onto the waiting concave backs.  And so our caravan sets 
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out – at the helm is our gentle patriarch, known to me simply as ‘Ab,’ with a destination 
for Biliqi Dera almost a day’s walk away.  I bring up the rear, notebook in hand, 
traipsing behind with a glorious view spreading out before me of the packed donkeys, 
Ab spurring us on, and the women silhouetted by the imposing hillsides ahead, making 
them appear even more diminutive.  With not a word between us, there is hope in the 
minds of my companions that Biliqi Dera will hold the possibility of some small rains, 
much needed as the area around my tent has remained disturbingly dry for these last 
two weeks.  In the distance emerges the distinct yet wavy outline of an approaching 
camel caravan, sun scorching already hot enough to blur my vision, and it’s not yet 
even 10:00.  Ab quickens his pace, showing that his days as a young herder still serve 
him well in his old age.  The distance is covered in blinding speed, and by the time I’ve 
caught up with my fellow travellers, our leader is immersed in sombre conversation 
with our new acquaintance.  A hush falls over us all, even the camels are silent, as the 
two men carry on a considerate discussion, listening and talking in turn.  And like that, 
all that needs to be said has been exchanged, and the camels with herder in tow 
disappear behind us as quickly as they had arrived.  All eyes turn to Ab, his own eyes 
wide with realisation:  Biliqi Dera is not the place for us.  The promise of rain was a 
fallacy.  It is being abandoned.  We must find another way.  Ab wipes his brow hot from 
the sun overhead and weighty with this new information.  “I would have brought my 
animals to death” is all he can manage.  With that we turn on our heels, blessedly home 
in time for fireside soup while watching the women’s nimble fingers reconstruct their 
cover for the night.  The evening wind carries with it the talk from nearby goses and the 
smell of rain coming from Luk Buriya and this time the hope of better pastures.                      
 
Some studies have suggested that protracted clashes and an escalation in conflict can 
result in the breakdown of contact between neighbouring communities and the 
consequent loss of constructed social networks and institutions which have proved to be 
crucial for coping with uncertainty (Hassan 1997).  When I questioned pastoralists 
about inter-clan marriage networks, and compared them to those found during Spencer’s 
fieldwork (1963, 1975), it appears that the geographical distance between the bride and 
groom’s home areas and clans has decreased over time.  As discussed in relation to 
mobility, due to the effects of conflict, family homes are becoming increasingly 
sedentary and are now located closer to towns.  As a result, marriages are being 
arranged more locally rather than between distant ecological zones.  In times of acute 
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environmental stress, it is becoming increasingly difficult to transfer herds to areas that 
may not have been as negatively affected by drought because either:  1) families lack 
affines in distant areas to look after their herds, or 2) the herder is unaware of 
opportunistic rains or temporary availability of pasture in distant regions as he lacks the 
social networks through which this type of information has been disseminated in the 
past.   
 
Furthermore, the threat of conflict forces a separation of the community into two groups 
during times of resource hardship.  One group comprises women, children, and most 
importantly, the elder men in large sedentary settlements, and the second group consists 
of the highly mobile herding camps composed of the warriors and young men of the 
community.  As drought progresses and the distance between these two groups grows, a 
knowledge divide results between the young men and the elders.  Many elders report 
that this divide can be catastrophic as they possess the experience and wisdom 
necessary to counsel the youth in ways to reduce livestock loss during times of hardship.  
Paul Spencer explains that it was the elders of the community who strengthen pastoral 
resilience against external threats by controlling herd management (Spencer 1965).  As 
discussed in chapter seven, young men are increasingly making independent decisions 
regarding herd movement, finding pasture, exploiting water sources, or deciding 
whether to take herds into conflict areas without the guidance of their fathers.  The 
youth and elders from these groups generally recognise that elders are more moderate in 
their herd migration decisions, as explained by one moran: 
“Even if there is insecurity but plenty of grass, I will have to take his animals to 
[a border area]…My father would likely refuse due to insecurity, but I would 
take them anyway…because the problem of the cows is in my eyes, and I will 
feel very bad if the cows are here, and they have nothing to eat.” (Samburu, 
moran, Kitich) 
 
The moderation demonstrated by the elders may ultimately help to minimise risks to the 
herd in terms of loss from theft.  The threat of violence fosters the separation of herders 
and elder community members, resulting in the breakdown of experiential knowledge 
transmission between the generations and therefore, perhaps increased risk of violence.   
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9.3.4 Livelihood Diversity and Conflict 
In an attempt to diversify income sources, several pastoralist communities in northern 
Kenya have previously attempted farming in regions of their territories that had the 
potential to support agriculture.  Unfortunately, many of these schemes have ultimately 
failed as a result of tensions with neighbouring ethnic groups.  For example, Samburu 
located along the Maralal highlands of the Leroghi Plateau within Samburu Central 
District are agro-pastoralists growing maize, beans, sukuma wiki, and potatoes, as the 
area benefits from the effects of a rain belt extending from Laikipia into the highlands.  
However, constant attack, pressure, and harassment from the neighbouring Pokot means 
that farm plots are often abandoned, crops are left untended, the raiding of fields, food 
stores, and livestock is prevalent, and ultimately food production is sub-optimal or 
insufficient in supporting Samburu populations in this zone.  During the ten days of 
fieldwork (intended for 27 days) that I stayed in this border region in November 2009, 
the Lolmisigiyioi community I was living with was raided or trespassed on by the Pokot 
on four occasions, resulting in a number of families, myself included, abandoning the 
area due to fear of attack. 
 
Likewise, organisations such as the Northern Rangelands Trust (NRT) are increasing 
efforts to establish community conservancies in northern Kenya, aimed at providing 
wildlife enterprise and tourism in an area that has the ecological capability to support 
higher densities of wildlife than it currently does.  Money generated through wildlife 
enterprise is designated for reinvestment back into the local communities by providing 
education bursaries, building nurseries and primary schools, improving healthcare 
services, providing employment within lodges and wildlife reserves, and constructing 
roads.  Unfortunately in the initial stages of implementing community conservancies, 
neighbouring ethnic groups are regarding conservancies and agencies such as NRT with 
suspicion as they are providing local rangers, who are themselves pastoralists within the 
conservancy area, with vehicles or increased communication (two-way radios and 
mobile phones), which has in some instances fuelled tensions along border areas, 
particularly amongst the Borana and Samburu.  The following is part of a story that was 
told to me multiple times by individuals along the Samburu – Borana border after a 
number of Samburu animals had been taken by the Borana: 
“The Kalama Conservancy vehicle was helping the Samburu look for their 
stolen cows…The Borana ended up stealing a jacket from a Kalama ranger and 
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took it to their MP who showed it to some journalists to say that the 
conservancies are supporting the Samburu cattle raiders, which is what made the 
[General Service Unit] come to take the Samburu cows from innocent people in 
order to give them back to the Borana.” (Samburu, elder male, Lenchokut) 
 
 At present, the potential of wildlife conservancies in northern Kenya is constrained, 
tourists are often advised not to travel to these areas, and outside investors have been 
reluctant to build lodges and infrastructure in an area characterised by insecurity and 
instability. 
   
9.3.5 Markets and Conflict 
Livestock market systems are currently not well established in northern Kenya, with the 
vast majority of participants interviewed complaining about the lack of local markets, 
the distances they need to travel to larger markets, and the lack of stable pricing.  
Complicating these issues even further, conflict, or rather the commercialisation of 
conflict, greatly affects the optimal functioning of markets in supporting pastoral 
livelihoods during periods of resource scarcity.  Research participants in all three ethnic 
groups made reference to their fear of the government locating and confiscating raided 
livestock.  Raiders therefore may opt to sell stolen animals rather than keeping them 
amongst their own herds.  The quick sale of illegal animals can flood local markets, 
driving down the market price of all animals in the process.  Also, the need to sell off 
animals within one market day allows dishonest middlemen working in the markets to 
offer no more than ‘rock bottom prices.’  Livestock prices in northern Kenya are already 
known to be particularly volatile (Barrett et al. 1999); however, as markets are 
inundated with stolen livestock, respondents have reported that a cow normally fetching 
upwards of 10,000/ksh may receive only 3,000 to 4,000/ksh – an acceptable price for 
raiders trying to off-load stolen animals.  Informants also report on the 
commercialisation of conflict, as highlighted by one Samburu elder when he said: 
“Leaders and businessmen are organising guns, from which they have shares on 
the take from the raids in exchange for their guns and support.” (Samburu, elder 
male, Remote)   
 
Support can take the form of providing guns, ammunition, and vehicles necessary to 
move stolen animals quickly away from the border areas and into markets.  In an area of 
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the world where cross-border illegal stock sales (from smuggling) can account for as 
much as 70% of the market (Homewood and Rodgers 1991; Field and Moll 1987), this 
lack of control has allowed for conflict to become easily and increasingly 
commercialised.  Pastoralists in northern Kenya note that in order to avoid detection and 
confiscation by authorities, middlemen quickly transport raided stock to distant urban 
markets, sometimes as far away as Ethiopia and Somalia where they will be sold at 
higher profit margins as the risk of detection is reduced.  Rather than wealth circulating 
in local markets through the buying and selling of livestock at fair prices, wealth is 
removed from local people and taken out of their area, profiting individuals external to 
the northern pastoral communities. 
         
9.3.6 Conflict as Cause and Effect  
An understanding of the relationships between coping mechanisms and outcomes is 
necessary in formulating a framework in which to examine the adaptive capacity of 
pastoral populations facing increasing resource scarcity.  A simple linear relationship 
would demonstrate that increased resource scarcity contributes to livelihood insecurity 
(due to the breakdown in traditional coping mechanisms and catastrophic loss of 
livestock), which then may result in unsustainable behaviours (in this case, conflict used 
to replenish lost stock or to increase access to resource-rich environments).  However, 
as described above, conflict acts as both a cause in the breakdown of coping 
mechanisms and as an eventual outcome resulting from the breakdown of coping 
mechanisms (Swift 2001; Barnett 2006), which further reaffirms resource scarcity.  
Conflict, or the threat of conflict, limits pastoral mobility, strongly influences decision-
making regarding herd movement or separation, localises and consolidates herd assets, 
closes essential trade routes, alters the structure of marriage and social networks, 
interferes with healthcare delivery, and reduces the amount of land utilised for pasture 
(McCabe 2004; Ecosystems Ltd 1985; Gray et al. 2003) – all things that can negatively 
affect the successful implementation of traditional pastoralist coping strategies.  
Conflict, in this case, may be a likely result from the loss in capacity of coping 
mechanisms.  With few alternatives to cope with resource scarcity, herders may look to 
raiding to try to improve their situation.  Despite this, pastoralism as a way of life has 
survived and continues to do so.  Waller and Sobania (1994) describe this phenomenon 
as the ‘feast and famine’ – the pastoral norm where communities utilise one state so that 
they may survive the other.  However, in light of increasing resource scarcity, additional 
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pressures having the potential to degrade traditional coping mechanisms, and an 
apparent escalation in inter-ethnic conflict, how long can this trade-off stand to serve 
pastoral communities and ensure their survival? 
9.4 Limits of Coping and Evaluating Resilience 
Pastoralism itself developed as a mode of production in response to harsh and 
unpredictable climates, allowing for flexibility and adaptive land use practices, where 
flux rather than stability has been the cornerstone of its survival.  The question 
presented in news stories, development reports, by rangeland ecologists, and land 
managers is whether or not pastoralism as a viable subsistence strategy has reached the 
limits of its ability to cope and adapt in the rapidly changing environment of northern 
Kenya.  Is this just an alarmist point of view or Western knee-jerk reaction in response 
to East Africa’s escalating impacts of climate change, reduction in annual rainfall and a 
rise in multi-year droughts (Ellis et al. 1987), increasing livestock off-take during 
drought periods (Cossins and Upton 1988b; Desta and Coppock 2002), or increasing 
bush encroachment and reduction in forage production (Oba et al. 2000), or will 
pastoralists simply continue to manage within such a harsh environment as they have 
done for the last 4000 years?  While insights from Helland (1997) and Solomon, 
Snyman and Smit (2007) demonstrate a decreased capacity of pastoralists to manage 
single season droughts effectively, other studies by Galvin (Galvin et al. 2004; Galvin, 
Thornton and Mbogoh 2000) and Thornton, Galvin and Boone (2003) demonstrate 
through the use of simulations and models that increased frequency of drought is having 
little discernible effect on the dietary deficit of Maasai communities in the Ngorongoro 
region.  Furthermore, livestock and vegetation, such as those found within arid north 
Kenyan regions, display robust physiological adaptations to extreme aridity where 
animals prone to emaciation exhibit greater energy conversion efficiency (King 1983; 
Western and Finch 1986), and plants found within similar environments possess a 
profound capacity to recover after disturbances (Walker et al. 1981).  Clearly the 
question remains:  how resilient are north Kenyan pastoral communities in their abilities 
to withstand the negative effects of increased resource scarcity? 
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9.4.1 Evaluating Resilience 
 
9.4.1.1 Persistence 
Answering this question becomes extraordinarily complex due to the inter-relatedness, 
interdependency and interactions that exist amongst pastoral coping mechanisms, which 
are further influenced by fluctuating social, political, environmental, or economic 
factors.  The Dyson-Hudsons (1980) point out that some ecological interpretations of 
the 1970s assumed that pastoral systems must be resilient because simply, they exist.  
Although this argument is tautological, and incomplete, it does point to the first 
principle of resilience in social ecological systems (SES), as discussed in chapter two.  
Primarily, resilience is demonstrated by the persistence of the system (Holling 1973; 
Walker et al. 2004).  Holling’s work emphasises the idea that populations and 
behaviours may fluctuate vastly over time; however, the fluctuations themselves as 
responsive mechanisms are an essential feature that maintains persistence (Holling 
1973).  Proponents of these socio-ecological theories of resilience argue that in order for 
a system to remain within a domain of attraction, there must be substantial resistance (R, 
in Figure 2.2 in chapter two), which is “the ease or difficulty of changing the system” 
from one domain to another and is represented by the depth of the domain of attraction 
(Walker et al. 2004: 6).  In relating this concept of resistance to an examination of 
pastoralist resilience in northern Kenya, it can be argued that it is the diversity and 
redundancy found in pastoral coping mechanisms that allow the system to persist within 
an ever-changing environment.  As the “stability landscape” changes (for example, with 
increased frequency of drought, reduction in security, bush encroachment, etc.), in order 
to remain within a particular domain, there must be strong resistance against 
transferring into a new domain.  The resistance for pastoralist systems is borne out of 
the successful implementation of coping mechanisms, thwarting the effects of change 
within the “stability landscape,” and therefore allowing the system to persist.  Figure 9.3 
below seeks to illustrate this point. 
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Figure 9.3:  Diagram demonstrating a domain of attraction and the redundancy, or multiple pathways, 
found in pastoral coping mechanisms (red) which help to keep the SES within its current domain of 
attraction 
Resistance
Domain of 
Attraction
System
Redundancy in 
Coping 
Mechanisms
 
 
Faced with a changing “stability landscape”, the system will move around the domain, 
as it is not in any way static; however, the redundancy of effective coping mechanisms 
will keep the system anchored in the domain.  Therefore, the more effective coping 
mechanisms there are, then the greater the resistance against movement into a new 
domain of attraction. 
 
9.4.1.2 Adaptation 
A key term here is ‘effective.’  This term relates to the second principle of resilience in 
socio-ecological systems as discussed by Walker et al. (2004), which is adaptation.  
Barton, Morton and Hendy (2001) make a clear distinction between coping mechanisms 
and adaptive strategies when they say that, 
“[s]ome grazing practices and increased charcoal production are examples of 
ecologically unsustainable practices; sale of breeding stock is an example of a 
coping strategy unsustainable at a household level (sometimes known as an 
erosive coping strategy).  Adaptive strategies are likely by their nature to be 
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more sustainable; the adoption of drought-tolerant breeds and species of 
livestock is a case in point.” (2001: 13)   
 
When faced with diminishing strategies for successfully coping with resource scarcity 
in northern Kenya, pastoralists may increase their engagement in unsustainable coping 
mechanisms as adaptation strategies may be lacking, unachievable, or rendered 
ineffective by external influences.  In the short-term, unsustainable coping mechanisms 
may help to serve immediate needs during serious environmental hardship; however, 
over longer periods, these same mechanisms may become destructive or result in a 
degradation of more adaptive strategies (Adger 2006).  During fieldwork conducted in 
the 2009 drought in northern Kenya, I witnessed the following activities amongst the 
three study populations as methods employed to cope with extreme resource scarcity: 
 
Table 9.3:  Diversity of activities / mechanisms pastoralists utilised during the 2009 drought in order to 
cope with extreme resource scarcity 
ACTIVITY ADAPTIVE ACTIVITY ADAPTIVE 
Increased mobility + Grazing schemes +- 
Social networks & 
Knowledge transfer 
+ Illegal grazing 
(conservancies, reserves) 
+- 
Maintaining accumulated 
herds 
+ Transporting goods & people + 
Diversify herd species + Road banditry +- 
Arabic gum collection + Food ration + 
Market access (sell hides, 
meat, animals) 
- + Urban movement to access 
services 
+- 
Shop co-operatives (tea, 
sugar, tobacco, eggs) 
+ Attend school (give up 
herding 
- + 
Gov. livestock off-take 
programme 
+ Use of boreholes / earth 
dams 
+- 
Conservancy employment - + Market restaurants + 
Brewing alcohol +- Fencepost selling +- 
Cutting trees for fodder +- Night guards at school + 
Prostitution +- Charcoal burning +- 
Small-scale farming +- Fetching water for pay + 
Employment as herder + Stealing animals +- 
Road construction (work for 
food) 
+ Fight for access to land & 
water 
+- 
Supplementary feed (weaver 
bird nests) 
+- Veterinary medicine for 
animal disease 
+ 
Selling semi-precious stones - + Employment with Catholic 
mission 
+ 
Wildlife poaching +- Managing a shop + 
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In this chart, I have tried to assess whether each coping mechanism was likely to be of 
benefit in the foreseeable future and lacked erosive elements, thus contributing to its 
adaptability (+, highlighted in gray), if the coping mechanism was likely to contribute to 
long-term vulnerability in these communities and is therefore an erosive coping strategy 
in the long-term (+-), or if the coping mechanism is currently erosive but might become 
adaptive in the future if other external factors were to change (-+).  An example of this 
is the practice of young individuals giving up herding in order to attend schools.  
Currently, as a number of people are starting to express, this is an erosive coping 
mechanism when faced with resource insecurity because it takes herders away from 
their animals, puts pressure on the rest of the family to cope with increased labour 
requirements, and therefore limits the range to which the family’s livestock herd can be 
sent.  Furthermore, education requires families to pay school fees, education in the north 
is lacking funding and quality investment, and the chances of employment after 
completing school are distinctly small.  However, if investments into northern education 
were to increase in the future and the government / private businesses were to recruit 
employees from an educated northern population, then accessing education over herding 
may be a viable and adaptable coping mechanism. 
 
The strategies that are highlighted as potentially adaptive are ones that centre on the 
traditional coping strategies discussed in the first half of this chapter; they also include 
increased access to good and services (aid, rations, veterinary medicines), and further 
employment diversification.  The last point is somewhat contentious as Dercon and 
Krishna (1996) reinforce the importance of remaining in a pastoral mode of production 
whilst diversifying into other income-generating scheme rather than abandoning 
pastoralism in favour of other livelihood strategies.  They report that most of these 
activities generate very little income, particularly for poor families, and therefore have 
the potential of increasing risk during future periods of scarcity.  In this sense, 
diversification whilst maintaining pastoral production may have greater adaptive 
potential than abandoning pastoralism altogether. 
 
In light of the range of possible pastoral coping mechanisms utilised during times of 
resource scarcity, two pertinent issues arise when assessing each mechanism’s current 
and future benefit.  The first is that (given the degree of social, cultural, environmental, 
economic, and political change amongst these communities) it is an almost impossible 
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task to ascertain future adaptability dependent on so many fluctuating variables.  As 
Holling explains, “it is extremely difficult to detect the precise form of such curves in 
nature; however, variability is high, typically data are only available for parts of any one 
curve, and the treatment really only applies to situations where there are no lags” 
(Holling 1973: 11).  In this case, strategies that are adaptive today may not, with a 
substantial change in situation, be adaptive in the future, and vice-versa, and 
unfortunately, there is no way of knowing this with any degree of certainty.   
 
Second, the judgement of whether or not a strategy helps to build resilience in the 
system needs to give attention to the degree of interrelatedness found between strategies 
and also the areas of the system that they impact.  For instance, illegal grazing of 
livestock in wildlife conservancies during periods of drought helps to strengthen 
economic resilience in the system as it provides fodder for animals that may otherwise 
starve under drought conditions, and therefore the herd stock levels remain satisfactory.  
It also maintains cultural resilience as pastoralism as a mode of production is able to 
continue despite environmental scarcity.  However, illegal grazing can reduce human 
resilience due to dangerous exposure to wildlife, it may reduce social resilience as it 
produces antagonistic relationships between pastoralists and conservationists in the area, 
and it has the potential for reducing ecological resilience as livestock compete with 
wildlife for access to pasture.  Davoudi (2012) summarises this concept of resilience 
trade-offs for systems and individuals when he says that unlike in nature, where there 
are no winners nor losers but just consequences,  
“in society, there are always rewards and punishments, some people gain while 
others lose in the process of resilience-building. Resilience for some people or 
places may lead to the loss of resilience for others. Therefore, in the social 
context we cannot consider resilience without paying attention to issues of 
justice and fairness in terms of both the procedures for decision-making and the 
distributions of burdens and benefits.” (Davoudi 2012: 9)   
 
9.4.1.3 Desirability and Perceptions of Risk 
As discussed in chapter two and highlighted by the above example, applying concepts 
from ecological resilience to socio-ecological systems (SESs) can at times be 
problematic as natural systems do not necessarily need to account for perceptions of the 
actors, justice, fairness, or feelings regarding the outcomes of strategies taken.  However, 
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all of these more social attributes must be taken into consideration as they play a 
substantial part in resilience building within SESs.  Baxter makes the point that, 
although sedentarisation in certain instances may be helpful (i.e., in order to access 
goods and services), pastoralists may think of the process as regrettable and undesirable 
(Baxter 1975), which will likely influence their utilisation and management of 
sedentarisation as a strategy in coping with resource stress.  Furthermore, some 
empirical studies have shown that in a number of populations, there is a psychological 
divide between a group’s perception of the risks that it faces and the perception of its 
abilities to cope with such risks (Grothman and Patt 2005).  In these cases, the gap 
between the perception of risk and actual adaptive capacity can be an obstacle in 
successfully employing effective coping mechanisms.  In attempting to address the 
question of whether or not pastoral systems have reached their limits of coping in light 
of increased resource insecurity or whether they are, in fact, representative of resilient 
systems, Adger (2006) surmises that “the choice of thresholds is based on values and 
preferences and hence is both institutionally and culturally determined” (2006). 
   
The following case study, taken from data that I collected during 2009, highlights some 
of the issues surrounding resilience that have been discussed within this section.  For 
pastoral populations in northern Kenya, cutting tree branches, or in some cases entire 
trees, when groundcover is sparse provides a significant source of supplementary fodder 
to livestock as animals browse leaves from the branches.  The chart below in Table 9.4 
represents results from tree transects that I conducted in seven separate locations within 
the Samburu and Borana territories (see chapter four for details on methods).   
 
Table 9.4:  Results from tree transect data, showing the percentage of trees in each field site that have 
been cut for fodder usage during the 2009 drought. 
FIELD SITE % TREES – NEW CUT 
Lenchokut 61% 
Remote 40% 
Lolmisigiyioi 62% 
Ntabasi 22% 
Girissa 9% 
Mata Arba 16% 
Darer Shai 2% 
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The results show that up to 62% of trees that are used for supplementary fodder were 
cut during the 2008 / 2009 drought, resulting in either damage to the tree or complete 
tree death.  Although the practice of cutting trees provided livestock with vital resources 
necessary to help them survive the effects of the 2008 / 2009 drought, it may be that this 
coping strategy is contributing to long-term vulnerability in the area as it reduces shade 
and ground-cover, contributes to erosion (if the tree is lost, particularly near a riverbed), 
and reduces a source of vegetation (leaves and seed pods from the trees) for the 
subsequent dry season.  In this sense, cutting trees as a coping mechanism in drought 
cannot be seen as adaptive, and therefore, it is degrading the system’s resilience.  
However, these findings are not definitive as, from this limited perspective, we cannot 
ascertain whether the trees will cope sufficiently well with this level of disturbance, or if 
northern Kenya will not experience another drought for a significant period of time, or 
if conservation efforts will help in re-seeding some of the rangeland areas and actively 
manage erosion (two programs that are currently underway), etc.  Without knowing any 
of these things with any level of certainty, we cannot now know the future effects of 
tree cutting that took place in 2008 / 2009, and therefore, we cannot make any assertions 
regarding the system’s resilience.  However, in speaking to the people regarding the 
practice of tree cutting, it was clear from their responses that such a practice, though 
necessary, is lamentable and undesirable in an “ideal” situation.  As one moran says:     
“If there is another drought next year, and the trees didn’t have time to recover, I 
would feel remorse for cutting the trees and would have wanted to preserve them 
more.” (Samburu, moran, Kitich)   
 
The fact that individuals are engaging in practices that they feel are undesirable 
indicates that these behaviours have the potential to reduce overall system resilience and 
should be recognised as potentially harmful to long-term sustainability.   
 
9.4.1.4 Reorganisation and Transformability 
Although the tree-cutting is seen as a long-term undesirable practice, populations who 
utilise such short-term coping strategies are not necessarily doomed to a complete 
breakdown or loss of resilience.  Resilience includes “the capacity of a system to absorb 
disturbance and reorganise while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the 
same function, structure, identity, and feedbacks” (Walker et al. 2004: 6).  In this case, 
human ingenuity and resourcefulness for re-organisation play a large role in a system’s 
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ability to retain its same function post-disturbance (Simon 1981; Boserup 1981).  For 
example, in order to contain and mitigate the potentially negative future effects of tree 
cutting, an environment management committee was formed for the northern rangelands 
area by local pastoralists.  As one member of the committee describes: 
“The responsibilities are making sure people don’t destroy trees because they are 
important to people and animals. I walk around and see if a tree is cut, then I 
follow the footprint of the streaks from the branch.  When I find [the person 
responsible], I fine them.  It’s 500 Kenyan shillings for shaking the tree.  If they 
have been found cutting the tree, they pay a 3000 Kenyan shilling fine.  The fine 
money goes to the committee, and the committee spends it on community 
problems paid as a loan to those who need it for sickness or other problems, and 
it needs to be paid back.” (Samburu, elder male, Farakaren) 
 
Although environmental management committees have not existed in northern Kenya 
for very long, and the efficacy of these schemes is yet to be seen, their inclusion is a 
testament to the ability of these communities to assess contemporary needs in response 
to a changing environment and adjust behaviours accordingly.   
 
Finally, should human ingenuity become eclipsed by mounting vulnerabilities or should 
people find themselves squarely within the confines of an undesirable domain of 
attraction, the capacity to establish an entirely new “stability landscape” and way of life 
is referred to as a system’s transformability (Walker et al. 2004).  Transformability 
represents a monumental change, both in the system and in the “stability landscape.”  
Walker et al. (2004) cite the agrarian revolution, the industrial revolution, and the 
emergence of cities as examples of transformative change.  Where I disagree with the 
argument that wealth and infrastructure, such as that found within the West, are 
necessary components in reducing vulnerability within a system (e.g., Adger 2006) (for 
reasons cited in this chapter discussing pastoral coping mechanisms), I do, however, 
concede that wealth and infrastructure play a much greater role in a system’s ability to 
transform.  Transformability represents a fundamental system change, an overhaul of 
behaviours, an immense supply of ingenuity, and the capacity to withstand the 
adjustment into and adaptation to an entirely novel domain.  Warrick and Riebsame 
(1981) substantiate this point that transitional developing societies are most vulnerable 
to new ways of living as, in order to achieve transitions, they have dismantled 
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traditional coping strategies.  However, technology replacement may be lacking, and 
adaptation into the new domain is precarious.  Knowing how and when to initiate 
transformation and having the capacity (social, behavioural, economic, technological) to 
do so represent a substantial challenge, particularly for poor communities.  Based on the 
analysis provided in the second half of this chapter, pastoralists in northern Kenya 
demonstrate considerable resilience in terms of the persistence of their way of life, their 
adaptive capacity within a dynamic environment, assessment of (un)desirability in 
behaviours, and ability to deploy human ingenuity to re-organise the system when 
engaged in erosive coping mechanisms.  Therefore, the pressure to fundamentally 
transform pastoral livelihoods seems relatively weak at present.  However, the analysis 
provided in the first half of this chapter suggests that in order to keep this pressure at 
manageable levels, stabilising conflict amongst pastoralists is essential for maintaining 
the efficacy of proven adaptation strategies against resource scarcity.    
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Chapter 10: Discussion and Conclusions 
10.1 Introduction 
In attempting to explain the relationship between resource scarcity (as represented by 
drought) and levels of conflict among pastoralists in northern Kenya, the preceding 
chapters have incorporated a number of methods and types of analyses.  Chapters five 
and six approached this question by investigating the direct relationship between the 
two variables:  drought as the independent variable and conflict as the dependent 
variable.  Chapter five took an ethnographic approach, which was followed by statistical 
analysis in chapter six.  These two chapters covered a lot of empirical ground, both 
qualitatively and quantitatively, where results were in-line with the hypothesis that 
escalations in conflict are found during extreme climatic conditions, particularly at low 
rainfall levels.  However, the results from these two chapters were not sufficient in 
providing the complete picture of how conflict functions in north Kenyan pastoral 
societies, nor did they explain the entirety of the relationship between the two variables.  
Chapters seven, eight, and nine built on the simple direct relationship to include greater 
levels of complexity:  identifying the intermediary and additive motivations for conflict, 
how conflict and cooperative outcomes are moderated, and coming to an understanding 
of the intervening and interactive coping mechanisms employed during periods of 
resource scarcity that work to alleviate (although sometimes exacerbating) the negative 
effects of increased resource scarcity.  The purpose of this final chapter is to incorporate 
and draw upon all of these perspectives in order to provide a comprehensive and holistic 
understanding of the relationship between drought and conflict in northern Kenya.  
10.2 Process Tracing 
In providing a comprehensive view of the relationship between drought-induced 
resource scarcity and conflict, a number of authors have acknowledged the complexity 
of multiple, interacting (social, environmental, political, etc.) causes in mediating this 
link (Taylor and Buttel 1992; Uvin 1996, 1998; Newbury 1998; Fraser 2003) rather than 
a simple linear relationship between the two.  In order to begin to comprehend the 
nature of this complex relationship, Homer-Dixon (1995, 1999) draws attention to the 
method of ‘process tracing,’ in constructing a web or network that places all of the 
relevant variables into the same framework.  Figure 10.1 takes information from 
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chapters five, seven, and nine to produce a web using the process tracing method in 
order to represent visually the relationships between variables, as they were discussed 
by respondents in the field.     
  
Figure 10.1:  Process tracing web, including all variables discussed in the relationship between drought 
and conflict from chapters five, seven, and nine 
 
 
In the figure, increasing frequency of drought is represented by the green circle (referred 
to generally here as ‘environmental crises’) and increased incidence of conflict is 
represented by the red circle.  Decreasing / sub-optimal mobility is highlighted in the 
blue circle because, in constructing the web, mobility was the most important coping 
mechanism referred to, playing a pivotal role in connecting causal factors with 
intermediate social effects (e.g., increased drought precipitates movement into insecure 
border areas, which results in increased opportunity to raid).  The solid arrows 
connecting each of the variables should be read as ‘may lead to,’ and the dotted lines 
should be read as ‘has a close association with,’ as they represent more minor 
relationships.  For example, increased drought may lead to increased land and resource 
competition.  Land and resource competition has a close association with ‘prestige 
culture’ for raiders, as discussed in chapter seven. 
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The process tracing web illustrates conclusions also drawn in chapters five and six that 
there is, in fact, a relationship that exists between increased frequency of drought and 
increased conflict incidence.  However, the process tracing also highlights that the 
correlation between these two variables is not direct (as there are no direct arrows from 
increased environmental crises to increased conflict); instead, there are intermediate 
factors that compound, intensify, and interact with the environmental crisis in order to 
result in conflict.  For instance, increased drought may lead to a loss of animals due to 
starvation (herd accumulation -), which may ultimately lead to the pressure to raid 
animals (conflict +).  This example also shows that there is redundancy in the pathways 
that may lead to increased conflict.  For example, increased conflict may lead to 
movement into sub-optimal locations (e.g., movement into towns for protection), which 
may further lead to increased poverty and stock loss, which again may help to re-affirm 
greater conflict incident levels.  Furthermore, results from the statistical analysis 
conducted in chapter six demonstrate that there is a correlation between increased 
frequency of drought and increased conflict incidence.  However, it is a weak 
correlation, as indicated in the process tracing web.  As the web shows, one would 
expect the strength of the statistical correlation to be affected by these intermediate 
variables.  Quite simply, increased conflict incidence cannot be explained entirely by 
increased frequency of drought alone.  There are other factors mediating this 
relationship (e.g., movement, land competition, increasing poverty, etc.). 
 
An issue that was raised in chapter five, but is difficult to demonstrate using the process 
tracing web, is the matter of thresholds.  Participants’ responses demonstrated that the 
relationship between drought and conflict was not a linear one.  Instead, the relationship 
is characterised by stepwise change, where thresholds must be met in the independent 
variables (e.g., resource scarcity, land competition, poverty, etc.) in order to precipitate 
change in the dependent variable (conflict).  Furthermore, depending on the threshold 
reached, the change is not always in the same direction (i.e., increases in the 
independent variables precipitating an increase in the dependent variables).  For 
example, increases in land competition may be tolerated at low-levels (meaning there is 
no effect on conflict levels when land competition remains relatively low, likely due to 
the alleviating effects of multiple coping mechanisms).  However, with increasing land 
competition, there will be a threshold that is reached, precipitating an increase in 
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conflict incidence events.  Recalling from chapter five, a number of respondents 
suggested that this stepwise relationship will continue until a maximum threshold is 
reached for land competition that can no longer be tolerated, at which point, there will 
be a decrease in the level of conflict incidents (see discussion in chapter five on ‘logical’ 
progressions).  Figure 10.2 demonstrates this relationship. 
 
Figure 10.2:  Diagram showing stepwise changes in independent and dependent variables depending on 
thresholds reached.  Direction of the relationship changes when critical thresholds are no longer tolerable 
 
 
In the figure above, the “critical threshold” is a hypothetical situation that, as indicated 
by the data presented in chapter six and the responses from individuals in chapter five, 
has not yet been reached as increases in drought are still currently leading to increases 
in conflict levels.   
 
Complicating matters further, each independent variable will likely be affected by the 
threshold levels of other variables.  For example, thresholds reached for increases in 
drought episodes may have a stepwise effect on land competition, which might in turn 
have a stepwise effect on conflict incidence levels.  Therefore the answer to the most 
simple question (is there a correlation between drought and conflict) becomes rather 
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complex.  There is a relationship; however, the relationship is characterised by 
thresholds, and depending on the magnitude of the effect (e.g., increased drought, 
increased poverty, increased land competition, etc.), there can be either a positive or 
negative correlation within the same relationship.  The sheer complexity of these 
relationships, incorporating an understanding of thresholds having positive or negative 
feedbacks depending on the magnitude of disturbance, makes exact predictions 
regarding the future of conflict in northern Kenya similarly difficult.  The conclusions 
to be drawn from this analysis are as follows:  1) there is a relationship that exists 
between extreme low-levels of rainfall and conflict incidence levels, 2) the nature of this 
relationship is mediated by coping mechanisms and contributing social effects, 3) the 
relationship between contributing effects and conflict outcomes are characterised by 
thresholds that precipitate change rather than any smooth, linear relationships, and 4) 
these thresholds can have positive feedback effects or negative feedback effects 
depending on the magnitude of the disturbance.    
 
10.2.1 Example:  Retaliation    
The concept of retaliation provides an excellent example to illustrate some of the points 
made above (refer to Figure 10.1, highlighted red arrow).  It is cited in chapter seven as 
one of the primary motivations for conflict: the desire to ‘hit back’ at an enemy for 
previous aggressive acts.  Retaliation itself is a form of conflict and, if kept at low-
levels characterised by small stealing events, there is a positive feedback cycle between 
retaliation and increased conflict (i.e., one side retaliating against the other, who 
counter-retaliates against the perpetrator, etc.) in a back and forth manner.  One woman 
characterised this type of retaliation by saying, 
“Every year that game was going on.” (Samburu, elder woman, Sere-olipi) 
The type of conflict this woman is describing would be represented on Figure 10.2 by 
the escalating steps on the left side of the graph.  However, at some point in this 
relationship, a theoretical critical threshold should be met that changes the nature of this 
relationship between retaliation and increased conflict.  Recalling in chapter five, one 
respondent described conflict by saying,   
“The big raid can only occur when the 1 – 1 type of stealing gets to be too much 
so the two sides will split apart from each other and organise a very big 
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raid…Big raids can be emergency raids if the community is upset at what the 
Borana have been doing.  (Samburu, elder man, Remote) 
 
In this case, the small retaliatory stealing has reached a threshold which it is no longer 
tolerable, and therefore a big raid is organised in retaliation in order to stop the conflict 
cycle, rather than escalate it further.  This is what has been referred to in chapter seven 
as retaliation for the purposes of security.  This type of retaliation is characterised by a 
negative feedback cycle, or a conflict(s) brought about to decrease overall levels of 
conflict.  In Figure 10.2, the critical threshold met resulting in a decrease in conflict is 
represented by the declining steps on the right side of the graph.  A logical question 
resulting from this type of analysis is:  how can one identify the critical thresholds?  
What are the critical thresholds that help to moderate the outcome of these 
relationships?  These questions will be addressed in section 10.4, keeping in mind the 
example of retaliation for security purposes discussed here.    
10.3 Modelling Resource Scarcity and Conflict 
Variables 
Process tracing, as discussed above, helps to: 1) identify causal factors (e.g., increased 
drought), 2) identify intermediate factors – either coping mechanisms (e.g., relying on 
social networks) or social effects that lead from the causal factor (e.g., increased land 
competition), and 3) demonstrate where there are relationships between the different 
causal, social, and coping factors.  However, within the arrows of the process tracing, 
there hide many intricate mechanisms, feedbacks, and relationships that influence how 
the factor(s) interacts with (an)other factor(s).  Recalling from chapter two, Homer-
Dixon (1999) presents a way in which to think about the relationship between causal 
factors, contextual factors, social effects, and outcomes when trying to understand the 
relationship between resource scarcity and conflict.  The diagram explaining this 
analysis is reproduced here in Figure 10.3 (without the effects of population growth (A), 
for reasons discussed in chapter seven). 
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Figure 10.3:  Diagram illustrating the resource scarcity-conflict relationship model based on Homer-
Dixon (1999) 
 
 
A complete description of this schematic is provided in chapter two; however, it will be 
explained here in light of the factors and relationships identified in the process tracing 
(Figure 10.1).  In Figure 10.3, (B) represents the causal factor (in this case, drought-
induced resource scarcity).  The causal factor may lead to certain social effects (C), such 
as increased resource competition, movement into sub-prime areas, increased poverty, 
etc.  First, however, this pathway from (B) to (C) is mediated by certain contextual 
factors (1).  Coping mechanisms, e.g., relying on social networks, livelihood 
diversification, etc., can be thought of as contextual factors that help to mediate the 
relationship between the causal factor (B) and the social effects (C).  The social effects 
(C) may then lead to the conflict outcome (D); however, these effects are moderated by 
contextual factors (2).  This second group of contextual factors represents the processes 
that mediate the drive towards aggressive outcomes or the drive for non-aggressive / 
cooperative outcomes.  They can be assessed in light of game theory (why one might 
choose conflict over cooperation as a strategy in iterated interactions, or vice-versa) or 
biological and social learning theories of aggression, as discussed in chapter two. 
 
Figure 10.3 represents the relationships between these factors as unidirectional, 
explaining how one causal factor may lead to a particular outcome.  Absent from this 
diagram are the feedback loops, thresholds, etc.  Moreover, the apparent immutability of 
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the arrows tends perhaps to eclipse the importance of humans as active participants in 
the system.  In order to complete the picture of the relationship between drought-
induced resource scarcity and conflict, demonstrate multidirectional relationships, and 
more clearly illustrate the role of human actors in the system, aspects of resilience in 
socio-ecological systems (SES) need to be included.  The resilience diagram for socio-
ecological systems is reproduced in Figure 10.4 below, with a full description of the 
schema provided in chapter two. 
      
Figure 10.4:  Resilience diagram for socio-ecological systems 
 
 
The key contributions of the SES resilience approach to the understanding of the 
relationship between drought-induced resource scarcity and conflict are:  1) the human 
perceptions of risk that may elicit appropriate human responses, 2) the interactions 
between disturbances, coping mechanisms, and secondary risks that are negotiated 
by human adaptive abilities and human ingenuity, 3) the human assessment of 
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desirability of the outcomes, and 4) the human ability to re-negotiate and re-organise 
elements of the system if the outcomes do not meet the desirability criteria.  This 
schema points to the two “goals” of resilience in socio-ecological systems:  persistence 
and desirability, i.e., how sustainable is the system, and how desirable is the system for 
the population involved?   
 
Figures 10.3 and 10.4 map easily onto one another, as they share many of the same 
features.  The combination of these two models is provided below in Figure 10.5, in 
what I refer to as the Socio-ecological systems Resilience-Relationship Model (SRRM).   
     
Figure 10.5:  The Socio-ecological systems Resilience-Relationship Model (SRRM), combining the 
resource scarcity-conflict relationship model in Figure 10.3 and the SES resilience model in Figure 10.4.  
Labels refer to components as they appeared in the original models.  The bullet points are provided as 
examples of the components.   
Causal Factor (B) 
or Disturbance 1
•Resource Scarcity
Vulnerability 
Assessment 2
Perception 
of Risk 3
Coping 
Mechanisms 
Employed 4 / CF1
• Mobility
• Social Networks
Secondary Risks 
& Influences 5
•Political
•Development
•Conflict
Negotiation 6
Social Effects (C)
• Loss of Vegetation
• Land Competition
•Poverty
Perception 
of Risks 3
Evaluate 
Resilience 7
• Desirability 8
• Learning
• Re-organisation
• Adaptation
Re-informs 
Negotiation
Motivations For / 
Against Outcome CF2
• Social Learning
• Biological Dispositions
• Game Theory
Outcome (D)
•Conflict
Evaluate Resilience 7
•Desirability 8
• Learning
•Re-organisation
•Adaptation
Re-informs 
Negotiation
Re-informs 
Causal Factors
Re-informs Causal Factors
 
 
All of the components of the SRRM have been retained from the resource scarcity-
conflict relationship model and the SES resilience model, and no new components have 
been introduced to this framework.  However, the SRRM presents a clearer picture of 
the multidirectional nature of the relationship between resource scarcity and conflict, the 
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feedback mechanisms that are involved, and most importantly, the human agency 
involved in assessing vulnerability and perceptions of risk (2,3), negotiating appropriate 
coping mechanisms (6), evaluating potential outcomes (CF2), judging desirability of the 
social effects and outcomes (8), learning and re-organising elements in the system (7), 
adapting to changes (7), and re-informing the process.  
 
The SRRM is a culmination of all of the component parts that have been discussed 
throughout the chapters in this thesis.  It is to be used as an explanatory tool – as a way 
of distilling the complexity of the relationship between drought-induced resource 
scarcity and conflict into its component parts and to try to explain how the components 
relate to one another.  The complexity that contributed to the construction of these 
diagrams lies in the analysis provided in each of the chapters.  Making reference to 
Figure 10.5, chapters five and six directly discuss the coarse-grained relationship 
between resource scarcity (B) and conflict outcomes (D), without considering in any 
detail intermediate components.  Chapter seven begins to build on the complexity with 
the addition of multiple causal factors (B) and the inclusion of intermediate social 
effects (C).  Chapter eight looks specifically at the strategies employed in inter-ethnic 
relationships that moderate the drives toward aggressive or cooperative interactions 
(CF2).  The first half of chapter nine introduces the coping mechanisms utilised by 
pastoralists to help mitigate the social effects of increased resource scarcity (4 / CF1) 
and introduces the secondary risk factors and influences (5) that may degrade the 
effective implementation of traditional coping strategies.  Finally, the second half of 
chapter nine draws attention to evaluating socio-ecological resilience found in pastoral 
systems, assessing their adaptive capacities, and their reliance on human ingenuity to 
help re-organise the system in a way that strengthens overall resilience.  As described 
above, I present the SRRM as a tool by which all of these components can be presented 
and explained together as one cohesive picture, thereby recognising the complexity 
found in the relationships but aiding in distilling it.  
10.4 Is Conflict Part of a Resilient System? 
The discussion above helps to address the first question posed in the introduction to this 
thesis:  whether there is a positive relationship between drought-induced resource 
scarcity and conflict.  The second question regarding the capacity of pastoral 
populations to cope with increased resource scarcity has been addressed in chapter nine 
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when assessing pastoralists’ resilience in managing the effects of resource scarcity. 
However, the complete answer to this question will need to incorporate an 
understanding of the third question of this thesis: whether conflict can be a beneficial 
strategy as part of a resilient system.   
 
The benefits of conflict have explanations in game theory, demonstrating when it may 
be advantageous to use conflict as a strategy, particularly in helping to bring about 
cooperative relationships.  For pastoralists, conflict may be used to re-enter into 
livestock ownership after catastrophic animal loss (Gray  and Akol 2000), or it may be 
an effective tool in gaining access to resource-rich land (McCabe 1985; McCabe and 
Ellis 1987), or it may help to increase genetic diversity amongst mixed herds (stolen and 
resident animals together), or it may allow land to rest in buffer-zones, thus improving 
pasture quality.  However, as discussed in game theory, conflict can only be a beneficial 
strategy if the benefits of defection continue to out-weigh the costs of defection.  One 
way of ensuring that the ratio of benefits to costs is kept in positive balance is to only 
engage in games that employ limited war strategies.  As Maynard Smith and Price 
(1973) demonstrated, in a population composed of all defectors, the worst strategy to 
take is one of defection (total war strategy) because the costs to the defectors become 
too great.  Many authors have pointed to the catastrophic and revolutionary effects 
automatic weapons have brought to northern Kenya (Baxter 2001; Gray et al. 2003), 
with some studies citing gun violence as accounting for 50% of deaths amongst pastoral 
males (Gray et al. 2003).  Conflict at one time may have been an adaptive behaviour for 
pastoralists (Gifford-Gonzalez 1998) as part of a resilient socio-ecological system.  
However, the introduction of automatic weapons has quite literally changed the game, 
where any benefits received from livestock raiding (arguably fewer and fewer due to the 
effects of drought) risk being dwarfed by the catastrophic effects that armed raiding has 
had on human resilience.  Furthermore, deterioration in the status and role of elders 
within pastoral communities has also potentially moved the game play from one of 
limited war strategies to total war strategies.  Although not an entirely straightforward 
characterisation, elders are seen to be a moderating influence on conflict behaviour for 
north Kenyan pastoral societies.  They are charged with counselling young men in their 
behaviour, brokering peace agreements in grazing arrangements, and negotiating 
compensation when there has been a break-down in amicable relations.  As discussed in 
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chapter seven, the role of the elder is becoming increasingly down-graded and as such, 
social restrictions that once limited escalations in conflict are becoming less effective.     
 
Also explained using game theory, and to continue the discussion from section 10.2.1, 
retaliation may be effective in bringing about peaceful relationships.  However, one 
principle of this theory is that both players in the game are known to one another, and 
therefore sanctioning can easily be brought about against defectors (Ostrom 1990).  
Highlighted in a quote taken from the Borana area of Gotu after a raid by the Samburu 
had taken place the previous night, one Borana man said, 
“We will hit back either the Samburu or the Rendille – it doesn’t matter which 
one.” (Borana, elder man, Gotu) 
Despite knowing that the Rendille were not involved in the original raid, the Rendille 
became un-witting targets of the Borana retaliation simply because the Borana 
acknowledge that the Samburu and the Rendille ‘are together.’  In this case, the Borana 
feel that raiding one is the same as raiding the other due to the perceived similarities 
between the two ethnic groups.  However, what could have been a retaliatory act against 
the Samburu, with an aim of retrieving animals and perhaps dampening the conflict 
between the two sides, has resulted in an aggressive act towards the Rendille, bringing 
them into the fight, with the risk of escalating conflict in the area. 
 
Assessing conflict as part of a resilient system also needs to bring in the four 
components of resilience in socio-ecological systems (SESs) as discussed in chapters 
two and nine:  persistence, adaptation, desirability, and transformability.  While some 
may argue that raiding activities help in promoting cultural persistence (Gray et al. 
2003), chapter nine focused specifically on how conflict effectively degrades the 
diversity and efficacy of traditional coping strategies used to alleviate the effects of 
resource scarcity.  In this way, conflict reduces redundancy of the coping mechanisms, 
thus weakening the resistance of the system to remain in a desirable domain of 
attraction (refer to Figure 9.1).  Ultimately, this will negatively affect the chances of the 
SES persisting.  Second, conflict within pastoral populations is not likely to be an 
adaptive strategy in its current form because, although it may satisfy some short-term 
goals (acquiring animals, accessing contested land), it has the potential to introduce 
long-term vulnerabilities, which mean that the costs of conflict are likely to out-weigh 
the benefits, as previously discussed.  Third, the question of desirability is perhaps the 
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most difficult one to address.  Davoudi (2012) raises the point that, when we think about 
resilience, we have to think about resilience for whom and to what end.  Desirability 
addresses those questions, but it raises another question of whose desirability?  
Although I met many male youths and morans who had been injured from engaging in 
conflict, the young members of these populations, both males and females, spoke highly 
of raiding activities as an important part of their lives.  From this point of view, conflict 
is desirable to this sub-set of the population mainly because of its cultural and social 
value, and therefore would fit the necessary desirability criteria to be included as part of 
a resilient SES.  Similarly, Keen has argued that famine, although wholly undesirable to 
those who are victims of it, can be used as an effective weapon of war, can help in 
controlling the movement of migrant populations, and most importantly, produces many 
economic beneficiaries (Keen 1994), which would make famine a desirable condition 
for a select group of people.   
 
However, there is just as strong a case to be made for the undesirability of conflict in 
pastoral communities, recorded in the many stories recounted by men and women in 
each ethnic group.  A common sentiment that I heard throughout the region was: 
“Raiding animals is a bad thing – raiding doesn’t have a place here because war 
is bad due to the economic and social problems it brings.  People die, and they 
get poor from raiding” (Borana, elder woman, Darer Shai). 
It is difficult to reconcile conflicting opinions about the desirability of conflict for 
pastoral communities; such an endeavour raises philosophical questions about whether 
the desires of a few out-weigh the negative consequences of the many; a question that is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, but is something that may be considered in further 
investigations.  Although Keen emphasises the benefits of processes, such as famine 
and conflict, his argument rests on the ‘politically powerful’, or ‘privileged urban’, etc. 
as beneficiaries at the expense of those who are not.  He states that, “processes of 
famine involved the forced transfer of assets from victim to beneficiary groups in a 
context of acute political powerlessness on the part of the victims” (Keen 1994: 13).  In 
the case of north Kenyan pastoralists, it is true that the side with disproportionately 
more firepower, political influence, etc. does benefit substantially from raiding activities; 
however, the context in which this power is attributed is highly dynamic and tends to 
shift with the ever-changing winds of fortune.  Therefore, these benefits are temporary 
and more often subject to influences outside of the pastoralists’ control.  Governments 
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arm and disarm ethnic groups, northern politicians fall into and out of favour with 
frequency, alliances are forged and broken with gun-owning neighbours across borders, 
drought decimates one area while another remains productive, only to see a shift in the 
climate shortly afterwards.  Among these pastoral communities, ‘power’ is in a constant 
state of flux (more often than not controlled by ‘real power’ of the government, police, 
international agencies, etc.), and under these conditions, remaining as the beneficiary of 
on-going conflict is never assured.  As many pastoralists in this area say regarding 
conflict, ‘this game has been going back and forth forever.’  Over the long-term, there 
cannot be sustained benefits from conflict among these pastoral groups, as they are 
matched in equal measure by losses, which are arguably becoming more severe.  
Therefore for much of the pastoral population in northern Kenyan, conflict cannot be 
seen as a sustainably desirable practice.               
 
Finally, it is difficult for pastoral populations to be transformative in light of 
increasingly negative effects of conflict.  As discussed in the previous chapter, while 
pastoral populations demonstrate highly adaptive capabilities, increasing 
transformability can be more challenging.  Transformative strategies have been 
developed in northern Kenya to help manage conflict levels; these include holding inter-
ethnic peace meetings and forming district peace committees.  However, both suffer 
from a lack of legitimacy and ability to bring about substantial changes across 
boundaries (Adan and Pkalya 2006).  Furthermore as noted in a number of interviews, 
police presence, support, and security are severely lacking in northern Kenya, as is the 
government’s apparent will to change the projected outcome of contentious inter-ethnic 
relationships.          
                
In light of the above discussion, the conclusion drawn here is that conflict cannot be 
considered a beneficial part of a resilient SES in the long-term.  To turn this analysis on 
its head slightly, Walker et al. (2004) make the point that sometimes a population finds 
itself in a domain of attraction that is not desirable, and then it is necessary to try to 
overcome the resistance in the SES to move from one domain into one that is more 
desirable.  Conflict is part, albeit a mostly undesirable one, of the domain of attraction 
that characterises the contemporary north Kenyan pastoralist situation.  An aspect that 
can be seen from the process tracing web in Figure 10.1 is that there is a substantial 
amount of redundancy leading to conflict outcomes.  To translate this into a matter of 
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resilience, sufficient redundancy towards conflict increases the SES’s resistance (R) to 
remain in its current domain of attraction.  Without increasing transformability within 
the system, it will be difficult to overcome this resistance and move into a more 
desirable domain of attraction.         
10.5 Building Resilience in Northern Kenya 
Although not originally intended to be prescriptive, during my fieldwork and in the 
course of writing up the results, I could not help but think about this question of 
transformability and how resilience is built into pastoral communities as people try to 
overcome some of the negative outcomes of drought and inter-ethnic conflict.  Having 
gained some insight into the issues, could I offer some useful perspectives in addressing 
this situation?  The following discussion has been developed in light of information 
provided by respondents, with attention being paid to the current political and economic 
situation in Kenya, and with an understanding of approaches that may have been taken 
in the past by the communities and various development agencies.   
 
I take a similar approach to Ellis and Swift (1988), who cautiously emphasise building 
on traditional systems rather than suggesting monumental changes or additions to the 
pastoral way of life.  Most of the suggestions here run contrary to the approach that 
many development agencies have taken, which has typically been to inject ‘novel’ 
schemes into pastoral areas.  Although usually designed with the best intentions, local 
people point out that ‘novel’ development schemes tend to be short-sighted and fail to 
consider longer-term outcomes.  For instance, a campaign was started in the last few 
years by a European development agency in order to encourage Pokot youth 
(neighbours to the Samburu) to attend school.  The ASTU Commander at Loosuk, on 
the border between the Samburu and Pokot, reported to me that many Pokot youth had 
been arrested for trying to sell stolen Samburu animals.  When the Commander asked 
their reasons for stealing the animals, many youth reported the need to find money for 
school fees.  How widespread this practice is, at present, is unknown, and I have not 
raised it here to debate the pros and cons of education in pastoral areas.  Instead, it is a 
cautionary tale about the risks of imposing ‘novel’ development approaches on 
populations where there may be a limited understanding of the pressures that people 
face and the ways in which they may overcome them.  The alternative proposals I offer 
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here entail two approaches:  bottom-up at the community level and top-down with 
greater state-level involvement. 
 
10.5.1 Bottom-up Approaches             
The underlying objective of this bottom-up approach is to support the diversity of  
coping mechanisms found in pastoral communities.  This objective fits closely with 
recommendations made from a resilience perspective, as discussed by Holling (1973), 
which places greater emphasis on diversity, heterogeneity, and keeping options open 
rather than specialising or focusing exclusively on one type of strategy.  Taking this 
approach, I suggest that programmes or initiatives that aim to strengthen the traditional 
coping mechanisms discussed in chapter nine would be beneficial:  encouraging diverse 
social networks, helping pastoralists to accumulate livestock, supporting economically-
profitable livelihood strategies, pursuing ways to increase species diversity within herds 
and, above all else, programmes that support pastoral mobility.  I would recommend 
that development work within a mobility framework (e.g., Hampshire 2002; Sandford 
1978; Swift, Toulmin and Chatting 1990; Meir 1987), offering mobile schooling, 
mobile markets, mobile banking, and mobile health services rather than localising these 
facilities.  One of the more detrimental development initiatives has been somewhat 
‘haphazard’ borehole sinking, which as many local people say, is not responsive to 
where people actually need water.  Namely, boreholes should be in areas that can open 
up access to sufficient grazing lands that are water-poor.  Furthermore, when I queried 
how boreholes are designed to be used in the community areas, many of the local DCs 
and DOs informed me that the boreholes are switched off during the rainy season so that 
people disperse from these areas, leaving the land to rest.  However in practice, I did not 
find this to be the case, and a number of informants testified about the harmful effects 
on the land they had seen after a borehole had been sunk or an earth dam constructed.  
In this case, strategic borehole planning is needed, alongside careful monitoring in order 
to adequately meet the needs of the people and without introducing additional 
vulnerability (Helland 1997).   
 
A second community-level strategy that could be used to strengthen pastoral coping 
mechanisms is to improve overall livestock health.  Data that I recorded in the field 
pertaining to livestock off-take rates during 2009 show livestock disease as the second 
largest cause of livestock death during droughts, after starvation, and in a majority of 
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cases, the two causes are closely linked.  Development initiatives that promote livestock 
health through mobile veterinary services would be greatly encouraged (e.g., Schelling 
et al. 2010).               
 
10.5.2 Top-Down Approaches 
It is likely that any recommendations made at the local level would have only limited 
effect if they are undermined or not supported by government policy, or rendered 
ineffective due to government negligence.  The Kenyan government also needs to be 
engaged in pastoral issues and held accountable for policies that directly impact these 
communities.  I acknowledge that it is easy to make these statements, but much more 
difficult to achieve them.  The new Kenyan Constitution came into effect in 2011, 
which offers some promise; however, change is slow and not guaranteed, even with 
formal policies in place for the governance of pastoral areas.   
 
Based on discussions with community herders, the Kenyan government could make 
significant contributions in the area of pastoral security.  Providing security along key 
border areas and actively (and equitably) reducing illegal gun ownership in northern 
Kenya would be the first steps in helping to foster greater security for people and their 
livestock as they move into contested grazing areas (Barton, Morton and Hendy 2001).  
It is interesting to note that when I asked respondents why they did not report theft 
attempts to the authorities if they themselves had managed to hold onto their animals or 
if animals had been returned through community channels, participants stated that if 
animals are returned, then the matter for them is closed, requiring no further follow-up 
or retaliation.  In this way, government-assisted security and returning animals to 
rightful owners could result in a significant decrease in retaliatory behaviour.  
Furthermore, if markets are to provide a reliable alternative source of income for 
pastoralists, there need to be tighter government regulations and monitoring to combat 
the overwhelmingly large number of stolen animals being sold.   
 
State policy in the North, including during the colonial period, has generally been one 
based on exclusionist principles where borders are maintained, ethnic groups remain 
separate, and incursions carry punishments.  Such policies were constructed with the 
aim of maintaining security; however, they can have a deleterious effect in that they 
help to foster mistrust, isolationism, and fear.  I would argue that government policies 
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aimed at encouraging inter-ethnic exchange and exposure to one another should be 
greatly encouraged.  I collected a number of stories from the three communities that 
showed a small group of individuals taking the initiative to exchange veterinary 
medicines across borders that were in low supply or to cross-breed livestock between 
the communities.  I also had the good fortune of meeting a Samburu individual who has 
dedicated his efforts to forming an inter-ethnic football league for unemployed northern 
youths.  As a result of his dedication, the league is extraordinarily successful, with 
teams composed of players from the Samburu, Borana, Somali, Turkana, and Rendille 
ethnic groups.  These team-mates are working together in the pursuit of a common goal 
that helps to unify them despite their ethnic differences.  Currently, these are small, 
individual efforts; however, over time this type of positive exposure and focus on 
commonalities may help to combat some of the negative effects of exclusion and ethnic 
isolation.   
 
Conflict in northern Kenya will not be solved overnight, and it is certainly beyond the 
scope of this dissertation.  However, the discussion provided here argues that a holistic 
approach must be taken at both the community and state levels and must incorporate an 
understanding of community desires and adaptive behaviours specific to these 
populations.    
10.6 Assessment of Objectives 
This thesis had four primary objectives in investigating the relationship between 
drought-induced resource scarcity and conflict:  1) exploring and explaining complexity, 
2) highlighting cooperation, 3) demonstrating ethnographic depth, and 4) achieving 
intersubjectivity.  Much attention was paid to the first objective, which was achieved 
through examining the direct relationship between drought-induced resource scarcity 
and conflict in chapters five and six.  The following three chapters built on the 
complexity of this relationship, which brought to light the compounding or additive 
causal effects of conflict, the intermediary factors and social effects that influence the 
relationship between resource scarcity and conflict, the drives towards aggressive or 
cooperative interactions, and the coping mechanisms that mediate the relationship 
between climatic events and conflict.  Once the component pieces of the complexity in 
the relationship were identified, the second part of this objective requires a way in 
which to explain and make sense of the complexity.  The frameworks that I have used to 
318 
 
achieve this - statistical analyses, process-tracing, game theory, and applying an SES 
resilience framework to build upon the resource scarcity–conflict relationship model - 
have added considerable explanatory power.  Wherever possible, having noted the 
limitations within this thesis, objective two has been met in highlighting cooperation as 
an integral part of inter-ethnic pastoral interactions, helping to contest environmentally-
deterministic analyses of the climate – conflict relationship.  Regarding objective three, 
achieving ethnographic depth from multiple perspectives has been the foundation of this 
thesis.  Without this, the other three objectives could not have been met, particularly 
when attempting to go beyond simple explanations.  Although present throughout the 
thesis, through chapters three, four, five, and seven in particular, I have endeavoured to 
foreground the voices and understanding of a wide range of local people and to adhere 
closely to their interpretations of phenomena as they experience them.  This leads to the 
final objective in achieving intersubjectivity, where I have sought to place myself in an 
understanding of these phenomena and relationships from the local point of view; 
moreover, I have explained them in a way that translates to an audience outside of this 
realm.       
10.7 Conclusions      
Although discussed at considerable length throughout this chapter and in chapter nine, I 
would like to review the central questions of this thesis.  They are:   
1) Do episodes of drought-induced resource scarcity correlate with higher levels of 
human inter-ethnic conflict found within Kenya’s pastoral communities?  
 
2) What is the current (and theoretical future) capacity of these populations to 
manage increased levels of drought-induced resource scarcity?  
 
3) Is conflict used as a strategy for pastoral groups coping with resource scarcity?  Is 
conflict a beneficial strategy as part of a resilient system? 
 
Results aimed at the first question have demonstrated that there is a relationship that 
exists between periods of drought-induced resource scarcity and escalated conflict 
incidents; however, it is not a strong association nor is it a direct one.  There are many 
intermediate steps along this pathway that either compound, exacerbate, moderate, or 
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alleviate conflict outcomes when pastoralists are faced with increased resource scarcity 
and drought.  The relationship is one of complexity, prone to perturbations, feedback, 
and interactions, rather than a deterministic one that moves directly from causal factor 
to expected outcome.  Furthermore, results have demonstrated that optimal conditions 
for raiding can occur either during drought periods or during rainy periods.  In either 
case, both of these relationships are characterised by step-wise change when tolerable 
climatic or conflict thresholds are reached, at which point, the direction of the 
relationship may change.   
 
Regarding the second question, north Kenyan pastoral populations have historically 
demonstrated considerable resilience in managing and coping with drought-induced 
resource scarcity.  This thesis supports the argument that these populations have 
remained resilient in their social, ecological, and economic persistence and as a direct 
result of their capacity for utilising effective coping mechanisms when managing 
resource scarcity.  However, I also argue that the current situation in northern Kenya 
may not be desirable from the communities’ perspectives, that erosive coping 
mechanisms may introduce long-term vulnerabilities, and the efficacy of adaptive 
strategies aimed at managing resource scarcity may be decreasing due to the effects of 
multiple influences, but particularly due to the effects of conflict.  Despite this, I have 
also demonstrated how north Kenyan pastoralists assess their own vulnerabilities and 
are capable of re-organising themselves with an aim to strengthen overall resilience.  
 
To the last question, I have demonstrated that conflict may be used at times as a 
successful strategy in dampening ethnic tensions and restoring cooperative behaviours 
through retaliatory responses.  It can also be effective in gaining access to valuable yet 
scarce grazing areas.  However, conflict is not part of a resilient socio-ecological system 
as it ultimately degrades the efficacy of strategies for coping with resource scarcity, it 
reaffirms human vulnerability, it is largely undesirable to the populations who 
experience it, and the economic and social benefits of conflict are being vastly out-
weighed by its costs within the modern context.        
 
I conclude this thesis by saying, despite many aspects discussed within this volume, the 
situation for north Kenyan pastoralists is not one characterised solely by doom and 
gloom.  Conflict and resource scarcity are integral parts of their everyday lived 
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experiences; however, these pastoral communities display, and have displayed, 
tremendous human ingenuity in facing complex, pervasive problems.  They are 
communities whose persistence is a result of their flexibility, adaptability, and 
dynamism.  
 
Because of these things, we cannot begin to predict what the future will hold as pastoral 
behaviours may reorganise in ways that one would not expect.  Therefore, negative 
outcomes are not the foregone conclusion.  Truly, resource scarcity and conflict are 
component parts of a complex relationship, but the ingenuity and adaptive abilities that 
have served north Kenyan pastoral populations for thousands of years will put them in 
good stead to continue to navigate this complexity.  Inter-ethnic conflict, in its current 
manifestation, is not a desirable part of a resilient system – threatening personal security 
and devastating livelihoods.  It may be true that no one can kill the drought, but where 
actions can be taken, they must, and the proliferation of conflict in northern Kenya 
needs to be addressed at every level if resilience is to be strengthened within these 
communities.            
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